

Machivel's  
**DISCOURSES**

Upon the  
First Decade of T. LIVIUS,

Translated out of the *Italian*.

To which is added

**His Prince.**

With some Marginal Animadversions  
Noting and Taxing his  
**ERRORS.**

---

By E. D.

---



---

LONDON,

Printed for Tho: Dring, and are to be sold at  
his Shop at the Sign of the George  
in Fleetstreet. 1663.

Machinists

DISCOVERIES

Had the

And Orders of the

The

The

THE

With some Marginal Annotations  
Noting and Taming his  
THE


By A. D.



THE

Printed by the  
in the  
1863





the true meaning of the word

and to the most

more noble and illustrious

will to the most

choice of the most

will to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

and to the most

**I** Offer here to your Graces  
patronage my best endeav-  
ors, discovering at large  
their imperfections, in  
what I can claim mine in this work.  
For which however I may have in-  
curred

A 3

curred

304522

## The Epistle

curred the blame of some, as unable to do the Author, I have undertaken, his full right, but rather by my rude stile wronging his original lustre; yet perhaps, with others more moderate, I may find favor and good acceptance, as well for my choice of the Author, whose worth will somewhat beare me out, as because I have contributed hereunto what I ought, which can be no more then what I could. Mine Author was a Florentine, whose national attribute among the Italians is subtilty, and whose particular eminence in cunning hath styled the most cunning, as his Sectaries, *Machiavillians*. Nor hath this workman taken in hand a work unproper for his skill, being the discovery of the first foundations, and analyzing of the very grounds upon which the Roman Commonwealth was built, and afterwards rose to such glory and power, that neither before nor after all the ages of the world  
ever

*Dedicatory.*

ever afforded the like example.

This book I conceived, I might not unfitly present your Grace with, as unto whose service I owe my self and what I can, and whom as well for neereness of blood, as affection and favor, his Sacred Majesty may most probably imploy in this our ship of State near the helme, to the end it may in some part serve for your experience, as a good sea-card, whereby you may become able and expert, as well in the entrances and passages into all creeks and harbors of quiet, as in the discovery and avoidance of all rocks and shelves; for as at sea it is alwaies seen, that in a stormy and tempestuous time, the master dares not trust the rudder in the hand of others then such as are the best approved and experienced Mariners; so, in all States we find, that however in time of peace and quiet, allyance, blood, and favor have a main stroke in matter of preferments and imployments too

### *The Epistle*

yet when the times grow perplexed with perils and difficulties, true worth and experience are sought after, and then of value. No climate is so benigne, as to afford a perpetual calme, and therefore your Grace may do well to enable yourself for the service of your Prince and Countrey, that being called for into the steerage in turbulent times, not favor, onely may give you a place there, but use find you necessary, whereunto if I could contribute a poore mite, I had done enough.

Notwithstanding however my Authour, in what he hath done well, hath far excelled others, yet is he not without his blemishes and errors to; which, as well as I was able to discover them, I have markt, and thereunto added some observations, taking (as I think) all his notorious errors in this book: Wherein I may have committed faults too, which

*Dedicatory.*

which you may be pleased to pass  
over, as no strange thing, but ac-  
cept rather the duty of

*Your Graces*

*humblest servant,*

**EDWARD DACRES.**

**A 4 A**

**A Table of the Arguments of each several Chapter.**

**W**hat were in general the beginnings of every City, and especially that of Rome. Chap. 1.

How many kinds of Commonwealths there are, and what was that of Rome, Chap. 2.

Upon what occasions the Tribunes of the People were created in Rome, whereby the Commonwealth became more perfect, Chap. 3.

That the disagreement of the Senate and people of Rome made the Commonwealth both free and mighty. Chap. 4.

Whether the people or the Nobility are the better guardians of liberty, and which have greater occasions of being tumultuous, either they that strive to enlarge the State, or they that endeavor but to maintain it. Chap. 5.

Whether in Rome there could have been such a State founded as would quite have taken away the hatreds between the people and

## The Table:

and the Senate.

Chap. 6.

How usefull accusations are in a Republic;  
for the maintenance of liberty; Chap. 7.

Accusations are not more beneficial to Com-  
monwealths then Calumnies pernicious.

Chap. 8.

How needful it is, that he who frames a-  
new the laws, and laies new foundations  
of a Commonwealth, be alone without  
Companion or Competitor.

Chap. 9.

As the Founders of a Commonwealth or  
Kingdom are praise-worthy, so the be-  
ginners of a Tyranny deserve much insa-  
my.

Chap. 10.

Of the Romans Religion.

Chap. 11.

Of what importance it is to hold a worthy  
esteem of Religion; and that Italy for  
having faild therein by means of the  
Church of Rome hath gone to wrack,

Chap. 12.

In what manner the Romans avail'd them-  
selves of their Religion; in ordering the  
City, in undertaking their designs, and  
stopping of tumults.

Chap. 13.

The Romans interpreted their auspices as ne-  
cessity required, and with discretion  
made a shew to observe their Religion, yet  
upon occasion they neglected it; but if a-  
ny did rashly contemn it, they punished  
him.

## The Table;

him.

Chap. 14.

The Samnites for the extreame remedy to their broken state, have recourse to Religion.

Chap. 15.

People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident they become free, have much ado to maintain their liberty.

Chap. 16.

A disorderly people getting their liberty, cannot keep themselves free without great difficulties.

Chap. 17.

In what manner, in a corrupted City; a free state may be maintained, being gotten; or how when they have it not, it may be gotten and well ordered.

Chap. 18.

A very mean Prince may easily subsist, succeeding a brave and valorous Prince; but a mean one following one that is mean, brings a state into great hazard.

Chap. 19.

Two continued successions of valorous Princes work great effect, and Commonwealths well ordered, of necessity have valorous successions: And therefore are their gains and increases great.

Chap. 20.

What blame that Prince or Republique deserves that wants soldiers of his own subjects.

Chap. 21.

What we may observe in the case of the three  
Horatij



## The Table.

Horatij Romans, and the three Curiasij  
Albans. Chap. 22.

That the whole fortune ought not to be laid  
at stake, where the whole forces trie not  
for it: and for this cause it is often hurt-  
full to guard the passages. Chap. 23.

Commonwealths well ordered appoint re-  
wards and punishments for their people, and  
never recompence the one with the other.

Chap. 24.

Whosoever would reforme an ancient state in  
a free City, let him retain at least the  
shadow of the old customs. Chap. 25.

A new Prince in a City or Province taken  
by him, should make innovations in every  
thing. Chap. 26.

It is very seldom, that men know how to be  
altogether mischievous, or altogether good.

Chap. 27.

For what reason the Romans were less un-  
gratefull to their Citizens, then the Athe-  
nians. Chap. 28.

Whether of the two be more ungratefull  
people, or a Prince. Chap. 29.

What means a Prince or Republ. should use to  
avoid this vice of ingratitude, and what a  
Commander or Citizen to be free from  
their danger. Chap. 30.

That the Roman Commanders were never  
extra-

## The Table.

extraordinarily punish'd, for any error committed, nor at all punish'd when either by their ignorance, or upon some unlucky resolution taken by them, the Commonwealth suffered.

Chap. 31.

A Prince or Republ. should not defer to do good unto men, until their necessity require it.

Chap. 32.

When an inconvenience is grown in a state or against a state, it is better to bear with it for a while, then presently to struggle with it.

Chap. 33.

The Dictators authority did good and not harme to the Commonwealth of Rome, and how authorities which the Citizens take upon them of themselves, and not those that are given them by the peoples free voices, are hurtfull to the government.

Chap. 34.

The reason why in Rome the creation of the Decemvirate was hurtful to the liberty of that Republique, notwithstanding that it was made by publique and free voices.

Chap. 35.

The Citizens who have possessed the greatest charges in the Commonwealth, ought not disdain the less as unworthy of them.

Chap. 36.

What distastes the Agrarian law gave in Rome, and that it is very offensive to make a law in a Commonwealth, that looks

## The Table.

looks far backwards, and yet goes directly  
against an ancient custome of the City.

Chap. 37.

Weak Commonwealths are hardly drawn to  
a certain resolution and know not how to  
determine, and the course they ordinarily  
take, they are rather forc'd too, then choose  
of themselves.

Chap. 38.

The same accidents are seen to besfall several  
People.

Chap. 39

The creation of the Decemvirate in Rome,  
and what therein is to be noted, where a-  
mong many other things is considered, how  
by the like accident a Republique may be  
preserved or suppressed.

Chap. 40.

Of humble to become proud, of mercifull  
cruell, without passing through the due  
means between these extreames, argues in-  
discretion, and turns not to advantage.

Chap. 41.

How easily men may be corrupted.

Chap.

42

They that fight for their own glory, are the  
good and faithfull soldiers.

Chap. 43.

A multitude without a head is unprofitable,  
and a man should not first threaten, and  
afterwards demand the power.

Chap.

44.

It is a matter of very evill example, when  
he

## The Table.

he that makes a law, neglects the observing of it : and it is very dangerous in a State, to make a continual practice of cruel executions.

Chap. 45.

Men arise by degrees from one ambition to another, and first they ayme no further then that they themselves suffer no harme of others, afterwards they strive to be able to hurt others.

Chap. 46.

Men though they are deceived in generalities, yet are they not so easily beguiled in particulars.

Chap. 47.

He that would not have a Magistracy given to one that is base and lewd, let him cause it to be demanded either by one that is very base and very lewd, or by one that is very noble and very good.

Chap. 48.

If those Cities, that have had their beginning free as Rome, have found difficulty to make laws, that can maintain them so, those that have had their beginning immediately servile, find almost an impossibility.

Chap. 49.

The power of stopping the publique actions of the City, should not be given into the hands of one Council, or one Magistracy.

Chap. 50.

A Commonwealth or Prince should make a shew to doe that of a free mind, which indeed

The Table.

Accid meere necessity compells them to do.  
Chap. 51.

To stay the insolence of one that grows power-  
full in a Commonwealth, there is no way  
more secure and less offensive, then to seize  
beforehand, and so prevent him of those  
ways, by which he attains to that power.

Chap. 52.

The People deceived by a false shew of good,  
oftentimes seek their own ruine, and great  
hopes and large promises do easily move  
them.

Chap. 53.

What authority the presence of a great and  
worthy personage hath to appease and quiet  
the rage of a multitude.

Chap. 54.

How easily things are ordered in a City  
where the people is not corrupted; and that  
where a parity is, there is no place for a  
Principality; and where that is not, a  
Republique cannot be.

Chap. 55.

Before strange accidents and changes befall a  
City or Countrey, usually there are some  
prodigies that forewarn them, or men that  
foretel them.

Chap. 56.

A Common people united are strong and vi-  
gorous, but taken apart and separated, vile  
and contemptible.

Chap. 57:

The multitude is more wise and constant  
then a Prince.

Chap. 58.

What

## The Table.

*What confederation or league is rather to be trusted; either that which is made with a Republique, or that is made with a Prince.* Chap. 59.

*How the Consulship and every other magistracy in Rome, was given without respect of age.* Chap. 60.

## The Table of the second book.

**V***Which contributed more to the Romans in the conquest of their Empire, either their vertue or their fortune.* Chap. 1.

*What people the Romans had to make war withall, and how obstinately they fought for the defence of their liberty.* Chap. 2.

*Rome became a great City, by ruining those that were near neighbors unto her, and by admitting strangers without difficulty to share in her dignities.* Chap. 3.

*Republiques have taken three particular courses to amplify and enlarge their states.* Chap. 4.

*That the changes of Religions and languages, together with the chances of floods and*

The Table.

and pestilences, abolish the memory of things.

Chap. 5.

How the Romans proceeded in making of war.

Chap. 6.

How much land the Romans allowed to each man they sent out to inhabit their Colonies.

Chap. 7.

The occasions, wherefore people leave their own native soyles, and invade other countreys.

Chap. 8.

Upon what occasions wars are begun among Princes.

Chap. 9.

Moneys are not the sinews of war, according to the common opinion.

Chap. 10.

It is not a match wisely made, to joyn alliance with a Prince, whose credit is greater then his strength.

Chap. 11.

Whether it is better for a Prince fearing to be assailed by his enemy, himself first to begin the war with him, or to expect while it comes home to him.

Chap. 12.

That men rise from poore and small beginnings to great fortunes, rather by the help of guile then force.

Chap. 13.

They are often deceived who think with humility to overcome pride.

Chap. 14.

Weak States are alwaies irresolute in their determinations; and slow deliberations are alwayes hurtful.

Chap. 15.

How

## The Table.

How much the order used by our soldiers in these modern times, differ from those of the ancients. Chap. 16.

What esteem our modern armies ought to have of artillery, and if the opinion which is generally conceived of it be true. Chap.

17.

How by authority taken from the example of the Romans, and from the use of the ancient military discipline, the foot is more to be esteemed then the horse. Chap. 18.

That conquests in Republicques not well governed, and that proceed not according to the Roman valour, procure rather their ruine then advancement. Chap. 19.

What hazard that Prince or Commonwealth runs, which is served by auxiliary and mercenary soldiers. Chap. 20.

The first Rector that ever the Romans sent to any place, was to Capua four hundred years after they began to make war. Chap.

21.

How erroneous many times the opinions of men are, when they give their judgments touching great affairs. Chap. 22.

How much the Romans in giving judgement upon their subjects, whensoever occasion was offered that constrained them thereunto, avoyded the middle way, and rather



## The Table.

rather betook themselves to one of the extremes. Chap. 23.

Fortresses in general do more harme then good. Chap. 24.

It is a wrong course, to assail a City fallen into discord, thinking by means thereof to become master of it. Chap. 25.

Contempt and contumely begets a hatred against them that use it, without any return of advantage to them. Chap. 26.

Prudent Princes and Commonwealths ought to be content with the victory, for oftentimes when that suffices not, they lose it. Chap. 27.

How dangerous a thing it is for a Republique or Prince, not to revenge an injury done against the publique State, or against a private person. Chap. 28.

Fortune blinds mens eyes, when she will not suffer them to prevent her designs. Ch. 29.

Republiques and Princes that really are mighty, seek not by moneys to make alliance with others, but with their valor and repute of their forces. Chap. 30.

How dangerous a thing it is to give credit to men that are banished out of their Country. Chap. 31.

How many wayes the Romans used to make themselves masters of Towns. Chap. 32.

That

The Table.

*That the Romans gave their Commanders of  
their armies, free and large Commissions.*

Chap. 33.

The Table of the third  
book.

**F**or the maintenance of a Religion or  
Commonwealth long in being, it is  
necessary oftentimes to reduce them to  
their first grounds.

Chap. 1.

*It is a very great part of wisdom sometimes  
to seem a fool.*

Chap. 2.

*That it was necessary for preservation of the  
new gotten liberty, to put Brutus his sons  
to death.*

Chap. 3.

*No Prince lives secure in his Principality,  
while those are living who were despoiled  
of it.*

Chap. 4.

*What it is that makes a Prince lose his  
Kingdome, which he enjoys by right of in-  
heritance.*

Chap. 5.

*Of Conspiracies.*

Chap. 6.

*From whence proceeds it, that of the chan-  
ges from liberty to slavery, and from sla-  
very to liberty, some are without blood, o-  
thers exceeding bloody.*

Chap. 7.

He

## The Table.

He that will make alteration in a Repub-  
lique, must consider the subject he is to  
worke upon. Chap. 8.

How a man must of necessity change with the  
times, if he will alwaies have good suc-  
cess in his undertakings. Chap. 9.

That a Captain cannot avoid battel when  
his enemy will fight in any case. Ch. 10.

He that hath to deal with many, however  
that he be the weaker, provided that he  
can but support their first violence, over-  
comes. Chap. 11.

That a wise Commander upon his own sold-  
iers, should lay all manner of necessity to  
fight, and take it, as much as he can, from  
his enemies. Chap. 12.

Whether more trust is to be reposed in a good  
Commander having a weak army, or in a  
good army having a weak Commander. Chap. 13.

New sleights and inventions that are used in  
the midst of a fight, and new cries  
that are heard, what effects they produce. Chap. 14.

That the command of an army ought to be  
given in charge onely to one, and where  
there are more, they alwaies erre. Chap. 15.

In a time of difficulty and peril, true worth  
and

## The Table.

and vertue is sought after; and in calmes  
and quiet times, not their vertues but their  
wealth, friends and parentage prefer  
them.

Chap. 16.

That he who hath received any notable dis-  
grace or injury done him from a Prince or  
Republique, should never be intrusted by  
them in any employment or service of  
importance.

Chap. 17.

There is nothing more worthy of a Commā-  
nder, then to be able to discover before-  
hand and espy out the enemies practices.

Chap. 18.

Whether in the government of a multitude,  
mildness or severity be of greater avail.

Chap. 19.

One example of humanity prevailed with the  
Falisci, more then all the force of Rome  
could.

Chap. 20.

From whence it came that Hannibal by a  
manner of proceeding different from that  
of Scipioes, wrought the same effects  
in Italy, which the other did in Spain.

Chap. 21.

How Manlius Torquatus his rigor, and Va-  
lerius Corvinus his mildness gained each  
of them the same glory.

Chap. 22.

For what cause Camillus was banished  
Rome.

Chap. 23.

Th

### The Table:

The continuation of government: brought  
Rome into thraldom. Chap. 24.

*Of Cincinnatus and many Romans poverities*  
Chap. 25.

How that upon the occasion of Women's States  
have been ruined. Chap. 26.

How a City at discord in it self is to be united: and how that opinion is not true, that to maintain Cities in obedience, it is necessary to keep them in discord, and divided into factions.

That the Citizens actions ought to be well weighed: for many times under vertuous and charitable deeds, are laid the foundations of Tyranny. Chap. 28.

That the peoples faults grow from their  
Princes... Chap. 29.

A Citizen, that will of his own authority  
do any good in his own City, of necessity  
must first extinguishe all envy: and what  
order is to be taken for the defence of a  
City upon the enemies approach. Chap. 30.

Powerful Commonwealths, and great and  
worthy personages in all manner of fortune  
retain the same courage and the same dig-  
nity. Chap. 31.

What means some have practised to disturb  
a treaty of peace. Chap. 32.

It much furthers an army in the winning of  
(a)

## The Table.

- a battel, to be confident of their own forces  
and their Generals valor. Chap. 33.
- What fame, report, or opinion causes the peo-  
ple, so begin to cast their favors upon a Ci-  
tizen: and whether a Prince or a People  
do bestow their Magistracies with better  
judgement. Chap. 34.
- What dangers they incur, that put themselves  
forwards as Principals to advise any de-  
signe, which are so much the greater, by  
how much this carries with it the more  
difficulty and peril. Chap. 35.
- The reason wherefore the French have been  
and are thought in combats at the begin-  
ning more then man, and afterwards less  
then women. Chap. 36.
- Whether slight skirmishes or battels are ne-  
cessary before a great battel; and what is  
to be done to know a new enemy, when one  
would avoid those skirmishes. Chap. 37.
- What manner of man that General ought  
to be, on whose abilities an army may con-  
fidently rely. Chap. 38.
- That a Commander ought exactly to know  
situations. Chap. 39.
- How deceit is commendable used against the  
enemy in time of war. Chap. 40.
- That the defence of ones countrey ought to be  
undertaken, either with ignominy or with  
glory.

## The Table.

- glory, or whatsoever way it be done, it is  
well defended. Chap. 41.
- Promises extorted by force ought not to be  
kept. Chap. 42.
- Those men that are bred in the same Country,  
do throughout all ages keep very neere the  
same nature and disposition. Chap. 43.
- By sudden surprisal and boldness many times  
more is obtained, then by ordinary means  
can be gotten. Chap. 44.
- Which course is the better in a battel, either  
at the first to sustain onely the enemies shock  
and reserve some forces till the latter end  
to give them a blow withall, or else as up-  
on themaine to venture all upon the fury of  
the first onset. Chap. 45.
- Whence proceeds it that one family in a City  
holds a long time the same manners and  
disposition. Chap. 46.
- That a good Citizen for the good of his Coun-  
try ought to forget all private wrongs.  
Chap. 47.
- When we see the enemy commit a great error,  
we ought to beleve there is some treachery  
in the business. Chap. 48.
- A Republique if one would preserve it free,  
hath every day need of provision of new  
orders: and in regard of his good deserts  
that way, Fabius was termed Magnus.  
Chap. 49.

FINIS.

The Table

Chap. 47.   
 Chap. 48.   
 Chap. 49.   
 Chap. 50.   
 Chap. 51.   
 Chap. 52.   
 Chap. 53.   
 Chap. 54.   
 Chap. 55.   
 Chap. 56.   
 Chap. 57.   
 Chap. 58.   
 Chap. 59.   
 Chap. 60.   
 Chap. 61.   
 Chap. 62.   
 Chap. 63.   
 Chap. 64.   
 Chap. 65.   
 Chap. 66.   
 Chap. 67.   
 Chap. 68.   
 Chap. 69.   
 Chap. 70.   
 Chap. 71.   
 Chap. 72.   
 Chap. 73.   
 Chap. 74.   
 Chap. 75.   
 Chap. 76.   
 Chap. 77.   
 Chap. 78.   
 Chap. 79.   
 Chap. 80.   
 Chap. 81.   
 Chap. 82.   
 Chap. 83.   
 Chap. 84.   
 Chap. 85.   
 Chap. 86.   
 Chap. 87.   
 Chap. 88.   
 Chap. 89.   
 Chap. 90.   
 Chap. 91.   
 Chap. 92.   
 Chap. 93.   
 Chap. 94.   
 Chap. 95.   
 Chap. 96.   
 Chap. 97.   
 Chap. 98.   
 Chap. 99.   
 Chap. 100.



# MACHIAVELS DISCOURSES

UPON THE

First DECADE

OF HISTORY

T. LIVIUS

Translated out of Italian.

*The Preface.*

**W**Hen I consider the esteem which is made of antiquity, and that many times (letting pass further examples) a small piece of an ancient statute hath been bought at a great rate, only to have it at hand, to adorn the house withall, and that thereby they may be able to cause others, who take delight in the art, to draw copies thereof, and these likewise endeavour, as lively as they can, to represent it again in all their works and on the other side seeing the most vertuous actions that histories relate us, to have been achieved by Kingdomes, ancient Commonwealths, Kings, Captains, Citizens and Lawgivers, and such others who have undergone much for their Countries good; that these, I say, have been rather admired then

B

followed

follow'd, or rather by every one have been  
 so much avoided, that now the very foot-  
 steps of that ancient vertue is utterly desic'd.  
 I cannot but both marvaile and grieve: and  
 the rather, because I perceive, that in mat-  
 ters of process arising in a Commonweal-  
 among Citizens, or in Criminal causes, re-  
 course is alwaies made to those judgements  
 and those remedies which formerly have  
 been ordain'd and practis'd by the ancients  
 for the civil lawes are nothing else, but the  
 opinions given by ancient Lawyers, which  
 since having been reduc'd to a method, to direct  
 our Doctors of the Law now a daies, in giving  
 of their judgements: yet for all this in the  
 ordering of Commonwealths, in the main-  
 tenance of States, in the government of Kin-  
 domes, in ordaining of military discipline,  
 waging of war, in giving judgment upon  
 subjects, in amplifying of the Empire, there  
 are neither Princes, nor Republicques, Com-  
 manders, nor Citizens who ever seek after any  
 these ancient patternes, which I perswade  
 my self proceeds not so much from that weak-  
 ness, into which the breeding and customs  
 now a daies have brought the world, or from  
 that evill which idleness accompanied with  
 ambition hath done to many Christian coun-  
 tries and Cities, as from their want of the true  
 knowledge of histories, in that by reading  
 them, they conceive not that meaning nor re-  
 lish that tasle they have in them: whence it ariseth  
 that many who read, take delight to hear of  
 variety of accidents, which are frequent  
 them, without further regard of imitating them,  
 deeming that not only hard, but impossible  
 as if the heavens, the sun, the elements

and men were alter'd from what they were of old, in the ir motion, order and power. Wherefore being desirous to withdraw men from this error, I thought fit to write upon these bookes of T: Livius, which have escap'd the malice of the times, what I thought, conformable to moderne and ancient affaires, of purpose for the better understanding of them, that they who shall well peruse these discourses of mine, may there reap that profit for which end the knowledg of historic ought to be sought after. And however this be a taske of great difficulty, yet by the helpe of those who have encourag'd me to undergoc this burden, I beleevc I shall carry it so far onwards, that there shall be left for him that comes after me, but very little way to bring it to a good end.

---

CHAP. I.

*What were in generall the beginnings of every city, and especially that of Rome.*

**W**Hosoever shall reade what beginning the City of Rome had, who were the Lawmakers, and how it was founded, will nothing marvaile that so great vertue was continued so many years in the city, and that from thence afterwards there grew so mighty an Empire, to which that Commonwealth attain'd. And therefore to discourse first of her birth, I say, that all Cities were built either by the Natives of the place they were built in, or by strangers. The first comes to passe when the inhabitants being dispers'd in many and small numbers finde they cannot live safe, each one not having

*Machiavels Discourses.*

having strength aparr, as well by reason of their situation, as their small number to resist the violence of those that would force them; or if they would joyn together for their defence, the enemy comming upon them, they cannot do it in time; and when they should be in one body, they must of necessity abandon divers of their retreats, & become a sudden prey to their enemies. Wherefore to escape these dangers, either of themselves, or upon the motion of some one of authority among them, they confine themselves to dwell together, in a place chosen as well for their better commodity of living as more facility of defence. Of this sort among many others were *Athens* & *Venice*. The first under the command of *Theseus*, was upon the like occasions built by the scattered inhabitants: the other, much people being retired into certain little Islands at the point of the *Adriatique Sea* (to avoid those wars which then were beginning in *Italy* by reason of those huge and continual inundations of *Barbarians* upon the declining of the *Roman Empire*.) began among themselves without the authority of any particular Prince, to live under those lawes they thought most proper for their preservation: which prov'd luckily to them, for the long quiet their situation gave them, that Sea having no outlet, and those people which then afflicted *Italy*, not having ships to annoy them, so that every little beginning was sufficient to give them that greatness they now have. The second sort is, when a City is built by strangers, which are either absolute of themselves, or depend upon others, & such

are

are colonies which are sent out either by a Commonwealth or Prince to disburden their Towns of inhabitants, or for the defence of some country which of late they have gotten, and would safely keep without much expence; of which sort the *Romans* built many throughtout all their dominions; others were built by some Prince, not to make his seate there, but for his glory; and so was *Alexandria* by *Alexander*: and because these cities have not their beginning free, they seldom attain to that greatness, as to be esteemed the head cities of Kingdomes. The like beginning had *Florenet* (whither it was built by *Syllaes* Souldiers, or by chance by the inhabitants of the mountains of *Fiesola*; who taking heart upon that long peace the world enjoyed under *Octavian*, came down & dwelt in the plain upon the *Arne*) for it was built under the *Roman* government, neither could it in the beginning make greater increase, then what the Princes favour allow'd it. The founders of Cities are then said to be absolute and free, when any people either led by a Prince, or of themselves, are forc'd by contagion, famine, or war to abandon their native Soyle, and seek a new dwelling and these are content to inhabite the Cities in the Country they have conquered, as *Moses* did, or build new, as did *Aeneas*. In this case appeares the ability of the founder, and the fortune of the City founded, the which is more or less admirable, as he who gave thereto the beginning was of greater or less abilities: which is seen in two kindes; the first in choyce of the situation, the second in making the lawes. And because men

act some things upon necessity, others by their own election, and the greater vertue is there seen where election hath the least power; it is to be consider'd, whether it were better to chuse barren places to build Cities in, to the end men being forc'd to labor for their sustenance, might live the better in agreement, the poverty of their Country giving less occasion of discord, as it was in *Raugia*, and in many other Cities built in like places, which choyce without doubt would be wiselier made and more profitable, if men were content to live of their own, and not seek to rule over others, but seeing it not possible for men to live in security without force, it is necessary to avoid a barren soyle, and to plant themselves in fruitful places, where they may be enabled by the plenty of their seat to enlarge and defend their territories against those that would assault them, and over-master all that would oppose their greatness. And to the end the riches of the country occasion not too much the ease of the people, it would be fit to provide that the laws oblige them to take these paines, the situation doth not, and to imitate those who have liv'd in pleasant and fruitfull countries, and apt to breed men given to Luxury, loth to use that industry vertue requires, and yet were so wise as to prevent those harmes the plenty of the soyle, and so consequently the peoples idleness might cause: having impos'd such a necessity of labour upon those they brought up to be Souldiers, as by means of their strict discipline, they far surpassed others who because of their rough and barren countries

were

were borne fierce ; such was the Kingdome of the *Egyptians* that notwithstanding the countries delicacies, the laws strictness prevail'd so far, as there were bred by them many great personages : and if time had not worne out their names, it would appeare they had deserv'd as much praise, as did *Great Alexander*, and many others whose memories stories continue fresh amongst us : and whosoever had considered the *Soldans* Kingdome, and the *Mamaluks* order, with their military discipline, before they were ruin'd by *Selimus* the great Turke, would have seen in that how the Souldiers were train'd up in continuall exercises, and therein have known how much they fear'd that ease to which the goodness of their Country invited them, unless it had been oppos'd with severe lawes. I avow therefore the choyce better in a fertile place, when that good government takes order for a moderate use of the abundance. When *Alexander* the great had a purpose to build a City for his glory, *Dinocrates* the Architect came to him and shewed him, how it might be built upon Mount *Atbos*, which place, besides that it would be strong, he could so order, that the City should be made in forme of a man : which would be a wonder worthy his greatness : and being ask'd again by *Alexander* whereupon the inhabitants should live, answerd he had not well advis'd of that point yet : whereat having laught, he left the mountain alone, & built *Alexandria* so, that people might resort thither, as well for the fertility of the soyle, as the commoditie of the sea, and the River *Nilus*. Who-

ever then shall examine the beginning of Rome, if *Aeneas* be taken for the first founder, it must be numberd among the cities that were built by strangers; If *Romulus*, among those that were built by the Natives. And in what manner soever it were, it will appear it had a beginning free of it self without dependence of any; and moreover that the Laws made by *Romulus*, *Numa*, and others, kept it under in an exact obedience (as hereafter shall be said :) so that neither the fertility of the country, the commodity of the Sea, the often victories, nor the vastness of the Empire, could in many ages corrupt it, but maintained it so eminent for verue, that never any commonwealth came near it. And because those exploits she did, and are recited by *T. Livius*, were acted upon publique or private Counsel, and either within or without the city, I will begin my discourse upon those things passed within land done upon publique advice, which I shall think worthy of remarke, adding likewise all the dependences thereupon; with which the first book or first part shall end.

C H A P. II.

*How many kinds of Commonwealths there are; and what was that of Rome.*

**I** will forbear to discourse of those cities which have had their beginnings in subjection under others, and speak of such only as were free in their births from forraign service, having had instantly the raines of their own government in their own hands, either



either as a Commonwealth, or as a Principality which have had, as divers beginnings, so likewise sundry lawes and ordinances: for some either in their beginning, or not long after receiv'd their laws from one alone, and that at once, as the *Spartans* did theirs from *Lycurgus*: others had theirs casually and at several times, and upon occasion, as *Rome*: so that it is a great happiness for a Commonwealth to light upon a man of such wisdom to order the State, as without need of alteration it may continue in security under them: as we see that *Sparta* kept the same without change or any dangerous tumult above eight hundred years. And on the contrary, that City may in some degree be termed unhappy, which having not met with a judicious founder, is forc'd to give it self a new frame: and of these the more unlucky is that which is the more amiss: and such is that which together with all its own new ordinances, hath much mistaken the right way to perfection: for it is almost impossible for those of this degree to be settled again by any accident: those others although their order be not exact, yet the beginning they have taken being good, and like enough to prove better, have a good possibility, as may fall out, to become perfect: but sure it is, will never be without danger: for the multitude seldom agrees to a new law, if it touch any change of government in the City, unless the necessity of doing it be shew'd them by some extremity, which never coming without danger, it is like enough the Commonwealth may be sooner ruin'd, then brought into good order. Of which that of *Florence* gives sufficient

proof, which upon that accident of *Aureo* in the second year was anew orderd, and by that of *Pirato* in the twelfth inbroyld again. Intending then to treat what were the ordinances of the City of *Rome*, and the accidents that brought it to perfection, I say, that some, who have writ of Commonwealths, will have it that there was one of these three kinds of States term'd by them a Principality, another an Aristocracy, and a third a Popular government: and that they who lay the first grounds of rule and order in a City, ought most to have regard to some one of these, as it seems fittest to their purpose. Some others (and that following the opinion of many more wise) think that there be six sorts of governments; of which three are bad in extremity, and three good in themselves, but so easie to be corrupted, that even they become pernicious. Those which are good, are the three aforesaid; the bad are the other three which depend on these, and every one of them in such sort resemble that which it approaches, that they change suddenly from one into the other: for the Principality easily becomes Tyranny; that of the Nobility falls into the hands of some few; and the Popular will as easily become tumultuous: so that if he that lays the foundation of a Commonwealth, ordaines in a City one of these three sorts, it is but for a small continuance: for it is beyond the power of any remedy to hinder that it slip not into its contrary, for the resemblances which in this case there is between the vertue and the vice. These differences of governments grew by chance among men; for in the beginning of the

the World, when the inhabitants were thin, they were scatter'd abroad for a time like wild beasts; afterwards man-kind increasing, they gather'd together, and that they might be able better to defend themselves, they began to cast their eyes upon him who had the most strength and courage among them, and made him their head and obeyed him. Hereupon began the discerning of things good and honest from bad and hurtful; for seeing that if any one hurt his benefactor, it caused hatred and pitty among men, blaming the ungrateful, and honouring the thankful; and thinking withal that the same injuries might as well be done to themselves; to avoid the like evil, they betook them to make laws and to make punishments against the offenders: Hence came the knowledge of justice, which was the occasion that when they were to chuse a Prince, they sought not after him that was the lustiest, but the wisest and justest. But afterwards when they had their Prince by succession, and not by election, suddenly the heirs began to degenerate from their ancestors; and forsaking vertuous actions, they thought that Princes had nothing to do but to exceed others in luxurie and wantonness, and in what belong'd to their pleasure: so that the Prince beginning to be hated, and because he was hated to fear, and passing on beyond this fear to hurt, hereon grew Tyranny. Thence afterwards grew those violences, conspiracies and treasons against Princes, which were not undertaken by those that were fearful or weak; but if any surpassed others in courage, valour, wealth, and birth, those were the actors, not being able to

to indure the shameful life of that Prince. The multitude then following the authority of those great ones, took armes against the Prince; and he being down, they yielded obedience to these as to their deliverers: and they hating the name of one head alone, fram'd a government of themselves, and in the beginning (in regard of the tyranny past) carried themselves fairly according to the laws they had made, preferring the publique good before their own advantage, and in summe, rul'd and maintain'd the state with exceeding diligence. This government afterwards falling into the hands of their children, who never knew the change of fortune, nor had the experience of adversity; not being content to live in a civil equality, but abandoning themselves to covetousness, ambition, and ravishing of women, so carried it, that they ingross'd in the hands of some few the government that belong'd to the whole Nobility, without any regard of the state, in so much that it befell to them quickly as to the Tyrant. For the multitude loathing their government, serv'd it self of any one that had any design against these governours, and so some there were quickly found that made head against them, who with the aid of the people put them down. And the remembrance of the Prince being yet fresh, and of the wrongs they suffered under him, having taken away this government of few, and being unwilling to restore that of a Prince, they chose the Popular, which they so ordain'd, that neither a few that were mighty, nor one Prince alone should have any power there. And because

all

all states in the beginning are venerable, this Popular state subsisted a while but not long, especially when that generation was out that ordain'd it: for suddenly they grew licentious, not fearing private men, nor publick Ministers, so that every one living as he list'd, they daily did one another divers outrages, and at length were forc'd by necessity, or by the perswasion of some good man, for to avoid such insolency, to change a new into a Principality, and so from thence by degrees, they grew exorbitant in their behaviour, and upon the occasions aforesaid: And this is the circle, in which all states turning about have been and are governed: but seldom do they returne into the self-same governments: for hardly any Commonwealth can be of so long durance as to undergoe so many changes, and yet stand afoot: but rather it comes to pass, the state while it is in tumult, counsell and force then alwaies failing, becomes subject to some neighbouring government which is better order'd then it self: but were it not for this, a state were always capable of revolution into these sorts of government: I say then, that all these kinds are pernicious for the short continuance of the three which are good, and the malignity of the other three which are bad: Whereupon the sage Law-givers having perceived this defect, avoiding each one by it self, chose one that might partake of all, esteeming that more sound and firme: for the one guards the other, being that in one and the same City, there was the Principality, Nobility, and Commonalty as parts of

of the governments. Among those, who by such like ordinances have deserv'd most commendations, is *Lycurgus*, who made his laws after such a manner in *Sparta*, that giving the King the Nobility, and the people their shares, he compos'd a government that lasted above eight hundred yeares, to his great credit and that Cities quiet. The contrary befell *Solon*, who made the laws in *Athens*, which because it was a popular state, prov'd but short liv'd, and he before he died saw the Tyranny of *Pisistratus* begun: and though after forty years his heires were driven from thence, and *Athens* recover'd its liberty (because it took again a popular government according to *Solons* institutions) it maintain'd it not above a hundred years, notwithstanding that to hold it, there were many lawes made by which the insolences of the great men were restrain'd and the licentiousness of all in general: which were never provided for by *Solon*: yet because he compounde'd not this with the authority of the Principality as also of the Nobility, *Athens* continu'd but a short time in respect of *Sparta*. But let us come to *Rome*, which though it had not a *Lycurgus* to put it so in order that it might long subsist free, yet such were the accidents that chanc'd in it, by reason of the disunion of the Commonalty and the Senate, that what their founder had not provided for, chance did: for if *Rome* lit not upon the best fortune, it lit upon the next to the best; for though the first ordinances were defective, yet they aim'd not amiss at the true perfection: because *Romulus* and all the Kings made many and good laws and these agreeing to the maintenance of liberty.

liberty. But because their design was to lay the foundations of a kingdom, and not of a Commonwealth, when the City became free, there wanted many things which were fit to be instituted in favour of liberty, but were never ordain'd by those Kings. And albeit their Kings lost rule upon the occasion and by the means alleiged, yet they that expel'd them presently setting up two Consuls who should stand in the Kings stead, chas'd out of Rome the Regal title only, & not the Regal power; so that there being in that Commonwealth the Consuls and the Senate, it was compos'd only of two of these forenamed qualities, that is to say, of the Principality & Nobility. There remain'd only to give the Commonalty a place in the government, whereupon the Roman Nobility being grown insolent, upon the occasions ( which shall be hereafter told ) the people rose up against them, so that rather then to lose all, they were constrain'd to allow the people their part; & on the other side, the Senate & the Consuls were likewise to continue with so great authority as they might well maintain their degree in that Commonwealth: & so began the creation of the *Tribuns* of the people, after which the state of that Commonwealth became more firme, all the three kinds of governments having their shares. And fortune did so much favour them, that though they proceeded from the rule of a King, & of the Nobility, to that of the people, by the same degrees, and for the same reasons set down before; yet to give power to the Nobility, they never took away all the authority from the Royalty; nor was the power of the Nobility quite diminish'd,

nish'd, to give it to the people: but being mingled, it made an exact Commonwealth, to which perfection it came by the departing of the Commonalty from the Senate, as it shall be shewed at length in the two next following Chapters.

### CHAP. III.

*Vpon what occasions the Tribuns of the people were created in Rome: whereby the Commonwealth became more perfect.*

**A**Ccording as it is shewed by all those that reason of civil government, and so every History is full of examples to that purpose, it is necessary that he who frames a Commonwealth, and ordaines Laws in it, should presuppose that all men are bent to mischief, and that they have a will to put in practice the wickedness of their minds, so oft as occasion shall serve: and that when any mischief lies covert for a time, it proceeds from an occasion unknown, which is not come to light, because trial of the contrary hath not yet been made, but time afterwards discovers it, which they say is Father of the truth. It seem'd that there was in Rome a perfect union of the People and Senate, when the *Tarquins* were banisht, and that the Nobility having laid by their Pride, were become of a popular disposition, and supportable to every one even of the meanest ranke. This deceit lay hid, nor was the occasion thereof known as long as the *Tarquins* liv'd, of whom the Nobility being afraid



afraid, and doubting that upon their ill treating of the people, they might side with them, behav'd themselves with good respect towards them: But no sooner were the *Tarquins* dead, and the Nobility delivered of that feare, but they began to spit against the people the poison that all this while had lurked in their breasts, and in all sorts possible to vex and molest them: which thing confirms what I said before, that men never do good, unless inforc'd thereto: but where cho ce is abundant, and liberty at pleasure, confusion and disorder suddenly take place. Wherefore it is said, that hunger and poverty make men laborious, and Laws make them good. But where one thing alone by it self without a Law does good, there is no need of the Law: but when that good custom failes, the Law becomes necessary forthwith. Yet the *Tarquins* being foil'd, who with feare of them kept the Nobility in awe, it was fit to think out a new way which should work the same effect the *Tarquins* did, when they were alive. And so at length after many broyles, tumults, and hazards of breaches between the people and the Nobility, at length for the peoples assurance, the *Tribuns* were created, and they bore such sway and had such credit, that they could alwaies inter mediate between the people and the Senate, and stop the Nobilities insolency.

CHAP

## CHAP. IV.

*That the disagreement of the People and the Senate of Rome, made the Commonwealth both free and mighty.*

**I** Must not fail to discourse upon these tumults, which were in Rome from the *Tarquins* death till the creation of the *Tribuns*; and afterwards upon some other things against the opinion of many, who say that Rome was a very disorderly commonwealth, and full of such confusion, that if good fortune and military verue had not supplied their defects, it would have been inferiour to any. I cannot deny that fortune and warlike discipline were causes of the Roman Empire: but methinks they do not consider, that where good discipline is, it is likely too that there is good order, and seldom also happens it but that there is good fortune. But let us come to the other particulars of that City. I say that they who condemne the troubles between the Nobility and the people, to me seem to blame those things which were the first occasion of Romes liberty: and that they think more of the stirs and noises which arose from those tumults, then they regard the good effects they brought forth: and that they consider not, how there are two severall humours in every Republique, that of the Commons, and the other of the great ones; and how all the laws that are made in favor of liberty, spring first from their disagreement, as easily we may perceive it follow'd in Rome. For from the  
*Tarquins*

Tatquins to the Gracchies more then 300. years, the tumults of Rome seldome times caus'd banishment, and very seldome blood : Infomuch as no man can well deem these stirres hurtful, nor say the Commonwealth was divided, which in so long a time through her discord, banish'd not above eight or ten Citizens, and put very few to death, nor yet condemn'd many in sums of money. Neither can that be term'd with reason in any sort a disorderly Commonwealth, whence we have so many rare examples of vertue : for good examples proceed from good education & a good education from good laws, & good laws from those tumults which many unadvisedly do condemn : for whosoever shall examine the end thereof, shall not find that they produce'd any banishment or violence in hindrance of the common good, but laws & ordinances in benefit of the publick liberty. And if any man should alledge that the means were extravagant, & in a manner outragious. To see the people together cry out against the Senate, and the Senate against the people, to run tumultuously through the streets, to shut up their shops, and the whole people of Rome to quiet the town, all which things frighen even those that read them. I say that every city ought to have its own waies whereby the people may vent their ambition, & especially those cities that in matters of importance wil availle themselves of their people; among which Rome had this way, that when the people would have a law made, either they did some of the things forenamed, or refus'd to have their names inrolled for the warres, so that to quiet them, there was a necessity

necessity in some sort to give them satisfaction. And it is but seldom seen, that the desires of free people tend to the hurt of liberty; for they arise either from their oppression, or from their suspicion they are falling into it. And in case these opinions were false, yet is there a meane to rectifie them, if some discreet Oratour in their assemblies perswade them of their error; and the people (as *Tully* says) though of themselves ignorant, yet are they of capacity to conceive the truth, being told them by any man worthy of credit, and do easily submit. Wherefore we ought more sparingly to blame the *Roman* Government, and consider the good effects issued from that Commonwealth, which never proceeded but from good causes. And for creating the *Tribuns*, they deserve exceeding great praise; for besides the giving to the people their share of Government, they were ordain'd as guardians of the *Roman* liberty, as it shall appear in the Chapter following.

CHAP.

CHAP. V. Whether the people or the nobility are the better Guardians of liberty; and which have greater occasions of being tumultuous; either they that strive to enlarge the state, or they that endeavour but to maintain it.

They who have judiciously laid the foundations of a Commonwealth, have, among other principal things ordain'd by them, provided a safeguard for liberty, which as it is rightly plac'd, so is it of long or shorter durance. And because in every Republick there are the Nobility and the Commons, question is made to which of these two more safely may be intrusted the Guard of liberty. And among the *Lacedaemonians*, and in our times among the *Venetians* it hath been given to the Nobility; but among the *Romans* it was committed to the peoples trust; and therefore is it necessary to examine which of these two Commonwealths made the better choyce. And if a man list to argue the case, there want not arguments on both parts; but if we look to the issue they had, we should yeeld it to the Nobility, because *Sparta* and *Venice* enjoy'd either of them their freedome, longer then *Rome*. And comming to argument I say (first taking part with the *Romans*) that they ought rather to be intrusted as guardians of any thing, who are least desirous to usurpe it, & without doubt considering the designses of the nobility & of the people, we must needs confess they are very ambitious of rule, these only desire not to be oppress'd, and consequently affect the continuance of their freedome, having less hope to usurpe it, then the Nobility; so that the people being for as guardians of the Common liberty,

it

it is probable, they are more careful of it; and being themselves out of hope of it, will never suffer that it fall into others hands. On the other side, he that argues for the *Spartan* and *Venetian* customes, sayes, that they who intrust it with them that are powerful, doe two good things at once; the one, that they rather give a satisfaction to their ambition, that having a greater part in the Commonwealth, by holding this staffe in their hand they have greater reason to be contented: the other is, that they free the peoples unquiet minds from such a kinde of authority which is the occasion of infinite discords and offences in the Commonwealth, and like enough to bring the Nobility to some desperation, which in time may do much mischief: and they give us *Rome* it self for an example hereof. that when the *Tribuns* of the people had this authority in their hands, they were not content to have one Consul to be a *Plebeyan*, but would have both, and thereupon they would have the Censor and the Pretour, and all other dignities in the rule of the City: nor was this enough, but led on still with the same rage, they began in after times to adore those men whom they saw fit to curbe the Nobility, whereupon grew the power of *Marius* and the ruine of *Rome*: and truly whosoever should sift this matter throughly, the one and the other, would much doubt which he should make choyce of for the guardians of liberty, not knowing which sort of men is more hurtfull in a Commonwealth, either that which desires to gain the honour it hath not, or the other which endeavours to maintain what they

they have already got; and at last, whoſoever ſhall examin the whole thoroughly, will make this concluſion; Either you reaſon of a Republick that aymes at ſuch a dominion as *Rome* had, or of one which ſeeks no farther then her own preſervation. In the firſt caſe, it is beſt to doe as *Rome* did, and follow her footſteps. In the ſecond, he may follow *Venice* and *Sparta* for thoſe occaſions, as it ſhall be ſaid in the Chapter following. But to return to the point, what kind of men are the more hurtful in a Republick? either they that would enlarge the State, or thoſe that are wary not to loſe what they have already gotten; I ſay that *Marcus Menenius* being made Dictatour, and *Marcus Follius* General of the horſe, both *Plebeyans*, to inquire after certain conſpiracies, which were made in *Capua* againſt *Rome*, authority was alſo given from the people to find out thoſe that in *Rome* by ambition or any extraordinary way did ſtrive to gain the Conſulſhip, and the other great honours of the City; whereupon the Nobility thinking this authority granted to the Dictatour as againſt them, they reported all about *Rome* that they were not the Nobles that ambituouſly ſought after dignities by unlawful means, but the *Plebeyans* who not confident of their births nor worths, ſought by extravagant wayes to attain to thoſe degrees, and particularly accuſed the Dictatour; and ſo powerfull was the accuſation, that *Menenius* in a publick aſſembly, where he complain'd of the calumnies the Nobility had laid on him, quit the Dictatourſhip, and ſubmitted himſelf to the tryal, which was made before the People, and after his  
cauſe

cause was heard; he was absolved: where it was argued, whether favour'd more of ambition, either he that would maintain, or he that would gain; for the one and the other appetite may occasion very great tumults. Yet notwithstanding most commonly are they caus'd by him who already hath the possession, because the feare of losing doth breed in them the same desires which are in those who aime at conquest; because men think they hold not surely what they have, unless they make a new addition of somewhat else; and besides this, the larger territories they are Master of, the greater force and power they are able to imploy in bringing their designs to effect; and this also may we adde, that their unlimited and ambitious behaviours kindle in the breasts of those that have not, a desire to have, or to be reveng'd on those that despoyle them, or else to become Lords themselves of that wealth and those honours, which they see others use ill.

CHAP.



## CHAP. VI.

whether in Rome there could have been such a State founded, or would quite have taken away the Divisions between the People and the Senate.

WE have discours'd upon the effects, which the differences, betwixt the People and the Senate, made. Now they continuing still the *Gracchus*, where they occasion'd the ruin of the common liberty, one man would wish, that Rome could have achieved these glorious acts she did, without those jarres in her. Yet it seems worthy consideration, to see, if it were possible, to frame a State in Rome, as could void all differences, and if a man would examine, he should have recourse to those Republics, which, without so many fallings out and bickerings, have been long free, and what kind of State theirs was, and whether Rome were capable of it. An example among the ancients is *Sparta*, among the moderns *Venice*, both by me formerly cited. *Sparta* made it self a King with a Senate to govern it. *Venice* divided the government with the names, but in the general term, all those that had a hand in it were call'd Gentlemen, which chance ever call on them, then the deliberation their founder: for many inhabitants betwixt together upon those rocks, where she stands that City upon the occasions fore-said, when they were grown to such a number, that for them to live together it

was necessary for them to ordain Lawes, they appointed a forme of government, and meeting also together in Counsel to advise touching the City, when they found themselves of sufficient number to make up a body politick, they excluded all others who afterwards in process of time should come to dwell there, from all power in State affaires. And in success of time, finding there were many inhabitants in the place out of the Government, to give the reputation that govern'd, they call'd the Gentlemen, and the others *Plebeians*. And that this order might well be begun and continued without the dislike of any: for when it was first made, every one that dwelt in *Venice*, did equally partake of the Government, so that none could complain: those who afterwards came to inhabit there, finding the State settled and limited, had neither occasion nor meanes to make any tumult: there was no occasion, because nothing was taken from them: and the meanes they had, nor, because they that govern'd kept them in subjection, nor trusted them so far as to give any employment that they could take advantage upon them. Add hereunto, that those who afterwards came to inhabit *Venice*, were not many, nor of so great a number, so that there was disproportion between the Governours and those that were governed; the number of the Gentlemen was either equal to them, or greater then they were: so that for these reasons *Venice* could well begin such a State and maintain it in continuance. *Sparta*, as I said, was govern'd by a King and a strict Senate, and might well maintain

it self so a long time; because there being in *Sparta* but few inhabitants, and they having set'd upon the Government in prevention of those that should afterwards come to inhabit there, and with reputation living in observance of *Lycurgus* Lawes, took away quite all occasion of discord, so that they might easily continue together in a long agreement; for *Lycurgus* by his Lawes ordain'd in *Sparta* more equality of estates, and less of dignities; for here poverty was to all alike; and the *Plebeians* less ambitious: for the Magistracies of the City were communicable only to some few Citizens, and were held apart from the People, neither did the Nobility ever with their harsh usage make them covetous of them. This came from the *Spartan* Kings, who being plac'd in that Principality, and set in the midst of that Nobility, had no surer means to maintain their dignity steadfast, then to defend the People from injurious oppressions: which made the People, that it neither feared nor affected the Government; and not having the rule nor fearing it, the contention they might have with the Nobility was quite avoided, and all occasion of tumults: and in this sort they might live in peace a long time. But two principal things the *Greeks* could this agreement; because the inhabitants of *Sparta* were few, and therefore might be either govern'd by few: the other, because not accepting of strangers into their Republick, so that they had not occasion, either of being corrupted, or making great increase, so as to become insupportable to those few that govern'd them. Wherefore considering these

C 3

things,

things, it appears; that the founders of Rome were to have us'd one of these two expedients; if they desir'd to make it quicker, like one of these Commonwealths we have spoken of: either not to imploy the common people in War, as the *Peruvians*; or not admit strangers into the City, as the *Spartans*; both of which they did, which gave the people force and increase, and sundry occasions of tumults. So that if the Roman State grew more quiet, the inconvenience follow'd, that it was weaker; because it disabled it self of the means to come to the greatness it attain'd. And therefore, if Rome would take away the occasions of disagreements, it took away the means of amplifying the State. And in all humane affaires it is plain, who soever does thoroughly examin it, that upon the cutting off one inconvenient, another will straight arise: therefore if thou wouldst make a numerous and a warlike people, enlarge far the bounds of the Empire, thou must mak'st them of such a temper, that they shall never be manageable at thy will; if thou keptst them weak and disarm'd, thou shalt have them at command: but if they get the rule into their hand, thou shalt not be able to bridle them; or else become so base, that thou shalt be made a prey to what enemies so e're assaults thee. And for this cause, in all our deliberations wee ought to advise where least inconvenients are, and to take that for the best course: for there is none absolutely free from hazard and suspicion. Rome then, like *Sparta*, could have made a Prince for life, and a small Senate, but could not

then, as hee, nor increase the number  
 of his Citizens, having a desire to enlarge  
 his dominions: which was the cause that  
 hee was for terme of life; and the little num-  
 ber of Senators, concluding their agreement,  
 should have nothing availed. Whereupon he  
 was answered by grounds of a Repub-  
 lick, he should first resolve, whether hee  
 would have it extend its power and rule,  
 to Rome, or confine it self to small limits;  
 in the first case then, hee must order it, as  
 hee sawe, and give place to civill and generall  
 differences, the best hee may; for without  
 a number of them, and those warlike,  
 hee could never any Commonwealth increase,  
 if it increase, continue. In the second  
 case then, hee must order it, as Sparta or  
 Venice. But by reason that civill and  
 generall differences, the possession of such  
 a Commonwealth, their founder ought  
 to much as may be, in all those waies for-  
 bid them to enlarge themselves; for all such  
 waies grounded upon a weak Commonwealth,  
 do quire ruine it, as befell Sparta  
 and Venice: whereof the first, having sub-  
 dued as it were all Greece, upon a very small  
 accident, discover'd its own weak founda-  
 tion, for the Rebellion of Thebes following,  
 and by Pelopidas, with other Cities milita-  
 ring, utterly ruin'd that Republick. In  
 the manner Venice, having possess'd her self of  
 a great part of Italy, and the greatest not by  
 force, but by money, and craft, when it  
 came to make trial of its force, lost all in a  
 day. I should well beleve, that the way to  
 have a Commonwealth of long continuance,  
 were to order it within as Sparta or Venice.

to place it in a strong situation, and make it of such resistance, that no man can hope to subdue it on a sudden; and on the other side, that it be not so great, to become a terror to the neighbors, and so likely it may long enjoy its State. For upon two occasions ordinarily men make War against a Republick, the one, to become master of it, the other for fear it become master of them. And the way I have spoken of, takes quite away these two causes; for if it be hard to overcome, as I presuppose it, being well furnish'd for defence, it will seldom, or never chance that any can make a design to conquer it; and if it containes it self within its own limits, and it be manifest by experience, that in it there is no ambition, it shall never come to pass, that any for feare interrupt its quiet. And this would the rather be, if in it were made a Law or order to forbid the amplifying of the State. And without doubt I believe, that the bringing of things to consist in these extremes and in the equality of temper, were the true civil Government, and the perfect quiet of a City. But being that all humane things are in continual motion, and nothing stands firm, they must ever be rising or falling. And to many things that reason doth not perswade thee, necessity blinds thee; so that having settled a Commonwealth, able to maintain it self, not augmenting; and necessity should force it to enlarge it self, it would manifestly loosen its own foundations, and suddenly bring it self to ruine. On the other side, if the heavens should prove so favourable, as to blow away all clouds

and tempests of War, thence would arise that sloth and idleness would either divide them, or make them effeminate. Which two things together, or either by it self, would occasion their ruine. And therefore, being impossible (as I think) to poise all things so justly by the balance, or reduce them to this perfection of temper, it is properest, in founding the Republick, to provide for the most honorable part, and so to order it, that when necessity shall inforce its enlarging, it may be able to keep what it hath gotten. And to return to our first discourse, I think it necessary to follow the *Roman* Ordinances, and not those of other Commonwealths; for to find a mediocrity between the one and the other, I think it not possible. And those civilities, which should grow betwixt the people and the Senate, ought to be tolerated, making them for a necessary inconvenient, to remain in *Roman* greatness. For besides other reasons alledged, where the authority of the *Tribunes* is prov'd necessary for the preservation of liberty, it manifestly appears what great benefit they make in Commonwealths of the power of accusing, which among other things was committed to the *Tribunes*, as in the Chapter following shall be declar'd.

CHAP.

## CHAP. VI.

*Humane accusations are in a Republic for the maintenance of Liberty.*

There cannot be a more profitable or necessary power given to those that in a city are appointed as guardians of the liberty, then is that of accusing the Citizens to the people, or before any Magistrate, or any council, whensoever they offend in any thing against the free State. This order workes two very useful effects in a Republick. The first is, that the Citizens for feare of being accused, attempt nothing against the State, and in case they do, forthwith without any respect given them, are suppressed. The other is, that it gives a way to vent the humours that grow in the City, in any manner against any Citizens. And when these humours have not ordinary vent, they burst out extraordinary waies, and so are the ruine of a Commonwealth. And therein nothing renders a Republick more settled and steady, then to ordain it in such a manner, that the alteration of these humours that stir it, have some outlet, appointed by the Lawes; which may be shew'd by divers examples, and especially by that of *Coriolanus*, which *Titus Livius* reports: where he saies, that the Nobility of *Rome* being angry with the people, as thinking them to have too much Authority, by creation of the *Tribunes*, who protected them; and *Rome* (as some time it chanceth) being in great want of provisions, and thereupon the Senate sent for Corne



Come into Sicily, Aristodemus an Enemy of  
 the popular faction advised, that now the  
 time was come, they had power to chastise  
 the people; and so took away the Authority  
 which they had held on an prejudice of  
 the Nobility, by keeping them in hunger  
 and want, distributing the Grains to them.  
 Which opinion of his they hearing of, took  
 such dislike against Aristodemus, that had were he  
 there, they desired him to appear to defend his  
 cause; the people had slain him in a tumult  
 as he came out of the Senate House: which  
 accident we note that which before was  
 said, to be fit and useful in this, that the Com-  
 monwealth with their Lawes give means  
 to secure the children; which the universality  
 hath conceived against any one Citizen. For  
 when they have thought of this, and then  
 they have recourse to extraordinary, and  
 one of questions depends of worse effort than  
 those. But if by an orderly course one Citizen  
 be suppressed, although it were wrongfully  
 done; yet followeth thereupon little or no dis-  
 order in the Republic, because the execution  
 is done without any private mans power, or  
 assistance of private forces; which are those  
 that take away the common liberty; but by  
 the publick and lawful power which have  
 their particular bounds; nor any way pass so  
 far as to endanger the Commonwealth.  
 And to confirm this opinion with examples,  
 this of Aristotle from the ancients shall suffice  
 me; upon which let every one consider, what  
 mischiefs thereby had fallen on the Common-  
 wealth of Rome, if in a tumult he had been  
 slain; for thereupon had grown offences be-  
 tween particular men; offences cause feare,  
 feare

scarcely seekes defence; for defence men make partisans; and thus parties grow up Cities, and from them the ruine of Cities. But the manner being order'd by publick authority, they took away all those mischiefs which might have happen'd, had it been carried by private power; we have seen in our days what innovations it hath brought on the *Florentine* Republick, in that the multitude had illegal meanes to vent their displeasure against single Citizens: as it hap'd in the time of *Franciscus Valorus*, who was as it were Prince of the City; and being by many thought ambitious, and a man that by his insolent and high stomach would not content himself to live within a civil Government, and there being no way in the Common wealth to resist him, unless with some faction opposite to his; thence it came that he had doubting other then some extraordinary meanes; began to seek favourers of his party, to defend him. On the other side, they that oppos'd him, having no ready way to suppress him, devis'd some extraordinary waies; insomuch, as they came at length to fight, and where (if by an ordinary course he could have been restrain'd) his power had sunk with his own loss only; now having to use extraordinary meanes in breaking it, there ensued not only his, but the ruine of many other Noble Citizens. There might also be alledged, to confirm our former conclusion, the accident chanc'd in *Florence*, upon the occasion of *Peter Soderinus*, which wholly proceeded from the want of meanes in that Republick, to accuse the ambition of some powerful Citizens; for, it was not enough to accuse a mighty

mighty man, before eight Judges in a Commonwealth. The Judges ought to be in great number; for a few do after the manner of two or three also that if such courses were taken, either the Citizens would have accus'd him living ill, and thereby, without calling the Spanish Army to aid, would have wreak'd their anger on him; or not behaving himself ill, they durst not have ventur'd to seek his ruine, for feare themselves of incurring danger. And for on all sides hallders d that ravenous cruelty, which was the chief occasion of offence. Whereupon we may conclude this, that so oft as we see forrein forces call'd upon by any party of Citizens, we may well beleve that in that City there is lack of good Ordinances: even lack of that ordinary means to vent without extraordinary waies the malignant humors which grow in men; wherunto it is sufficiently remedied by allowing of accusations before many Judges, and withall countenancing them, which courses were so well order'd in Rome, that in so many quarrels between the people and the Senate, neither the one nor the other, nor any particular Citizen ever intended to avale themselves by any forreign strength; because they having a remedy at home, were not necessitated to go seek it abroad. And though the examples above written are sufficient to prove this, yet I will alledge another, related by *Titus Livius* in his History: who reports, that in *Clusia*, the Noblest City in those daies in all *Tuscany*, by one *Lucumum Aruns* was ravished, and he, not being able to work his revenge by reason of the ravishers might, went and found out the *Prætor*

who then reign'd in that place we now call  
*Lombardy*, and encourag'd them to bring an  
 Army to *Clus*, shewing them that with  
 their gain they might revenge him of the in-  
 jury done him: and if *Arms* had seen possi-  
 bility to have been righted by any means in  
 the City, he never would have inquir'd after  
 any barbarous power. But as these accusa-  
 tions are profitable in a Commonwealth: so  
 are calumnies unprofitable and hurtful, as it  
 shall appear by our discourse in the next  
 Chapter.

# CHAP. VIII.

*Accusations are not more beneficial to Common-  
 wealths, than Calumnies pernicious.*

**N**Orwithstanding, that the virtues of *Fa-  
 rius Camillus*, after he had freed the  
 City of *Rome* from the siege and oppression of  
 the *Frenchmen*, had brought to pass, that none  
 of the Citizens of *Rome* thought it took any  
 way from their credit or degree, to give  
 him place: yet *Manlius Capitolinus* could  
 not endure that so much honor and renown  
 should be ascribed to him. Being of opinion,  
 that touching the safety of *Rome*, in that he  
 had defended the Capitol from the Enemies  
 he deserv'd as much as *Camillus*; and in re-  
 gard of other warlike glories, he was no way  
 second to him. So that overburden'd with  
 envy, not being able to take rest for this man's  
 honor, and perceiving he could sow no dis-  
 cord among the Fathers, he made his address  
 to the people, scattering among them divers  
 sinister

Seiler opinions. And among other things,  
 he said this also, that the treasure which  
 was collected for the Surnubers, and after  
 not given them, was usurp'd by some private  
 Citizens; and if it were had again, it might  
 be turn'd to the publick good, easing the  
 people of their tributes, or some private  
 debts. These words were of force with the  
 people, so that they began to run together,  
 and as they lifted to raise many tumults in the  
 City: Which thing much displeasing the  
 Senat, and they taking it for a matter of great  
 moment, and dangerous, created a Dictator,  
 that he might examine the case, and bridle the  
 violence of *Manlius*. Whereupon the Dicta-  
 tor cited him, and they met in publick one  
 against the other, the Dictator environ'd  
 with the Nobility, *Manlius* with the People.  
*Manlius* was demanded, who had the treasure  
 he spoke of, for the Senat was as desirous  
 to understand as the people. Whereunto  
*Manlius* answer'd not particularly, but as  
 by excuses, said there was no need to tell  
 them what they already knew, so that the  
 Dictator caus'd him to be spurr'd in prison.  
 Hereupon may we observe, how extremely  
 pernicious and damnable are calumnies, as  
 well in free Cities, as in any other kind of  
 Government; and therefore to repress them  
 ought not any Law or Ordinance be spar'd,  
 that may serve to the purpose. Neither can  
 there be found any better expedient to ex-  
 tinguish them, then to open many waies to  
 accusations; for as they do much hurt a  
 Republick, so calumnies hurt it: and for  
 the other part, there is this difference, that  
 calumnies have no need of Testimonies, nor

of

of any particular encounter to prove them; so that every one may be calumniated, but not accus'd; accusations being tied to certain particulars and circumstances, to demonstrate their truth. Men are accus'd before Magistrates, the People and Councells; slander'd they are by calumnies, as well in private as in publick. And there slander is most in use, where accusations are not accustomed, and where the Cities are loth to receive them. Therefore every founder of a Republick ought so to order it, that therein any Citizen may be accused without feare or suspect. And this done and well observ'd, he ought sharply to punish the slanderers, who have no reason to complain when they are punish'd, there being publick places to hear his accusations; whom they in private would have slandered. And where this part is not well order'd, there alwaies follows much confusion; for calumnies do provoke and not chastise the Citizens; and those that are provok'd, thinke to avails themselves rather by hating, then fearing the things that are laid against them. This part (as he is said) was well order'd at Rome, and alwaies ill in our City of Florence. And as at Rome this order did much good, so at Florence this disorder did much harme: And whosoever reads the stories of this City, shall see, how many slanders have from time to time been lev'd against those Citizens, who have been employed in the most important affairs of it. Of one they said, he rob'd the common Treasury; of another, he fail'd off such an attempt, being corrupted; and of a third, he ran into this or that inconvenient through

through ambition. From whence proceeded, what on every side grew hatred; whereupon came division, from division they came to factions, from factions to ruine. But had there been a means in *Flavins* to accuse the Citizens, and punish slanderers, that infinite number of calumnies, that afterward grew, had never followed; for those Citizens either condemned or assailed that they had been, could never have hurt the City, and would have been less accused, then they were slander'd; every one (as I have said) being not so readily able to accuse as to slander. And among other things, some Citizens have serv'd themselves of these calumnies, as steps and helps to their ambitious ends; who having to encounter powerful men opposed themselves as they list'd, and left nothing undone to work their intent; for taking part with the people, and confirming them in their evil opinion, already conceived of these, have made the people their own friends. And though I could bring examples enough, I will be content with this one. The *Florentine* Army was in the field at *Lucca* commanded by *John Guicciard* an able Captain. Either his Government was so ill, or the success prov'd so unlucky, that he fail'd in taking the Town. So that howsoever the case stood, *John* was blam'd for it, saying, he had been bribed by the *Luccheses*: which slander being favour'd by his Enemies, brought *John* to extreme despair. And though to justify himself he offer'd his submission to trial and imprisonment, yet could he never wipe away that blot, because in that Commonwealth there were not the

means

meanes to do is, whereupon grew much  
dissast betweene their friends, who were the  
greater part of the potent men, and his ad-  
versaries, who were some that desired to  
make innovations in Florence. Which sur-  
rowed upon these and otherlike occasions, increased  
so, that thereupon ensued the ruine of that  
Republique. As Caputinus therefore was  
a slanderer, and not an accuser, and the  
Romans shewed directly in this case, how  
slanderers ought to be punish'd. And they  
ought to make them become accusers: and  
when the accusation proves true, either re-  
ward them, or at least not punish them,  
and when false, punish them, as *Martius*

*Caputinus* did. **CHAPTER III.** *How needfull it is, that he who frames anew  
the Laws, and layes new foundations of a  
Common wealth, be alone without Com-  
petition or Competitor.*

**A**ND perchance some will think, that I  
have run too far, within the Roman  
History, not having made any mention yett,  
of the foundera of that Republick, nor of the  
Laws which belong'd, either to their Reli-  
gion, or their military discipline. And there-  
fore not willing to hold them longer in sus-  
pence, who are desirous to understand some-  
what in this case, I say, that many perad-  
venture will think this a matter of civil  
example, that the ordainer of a civil Go-  
vernment, as was  
*Romulus*, should first  
have

\* Without question  
the



have taken his brother's life from him, and after have consented to Titus Tatius the Sabine's death, chosen by him his companion in the Kingdom: judging hereby that his own Citizens might by Authority taken from their Prince for ambition, or desire to rule, endanger those that should oppose their power. Whose opinion we should acknowledge true, if we consider not the end which induc'd him to commit this homicide. And we may take this for a general rule, that never of seldom it chances, that any Republick or Kingdom is from the beginning well order'd or thoroughly new reformed of its old customs, unless the disposing of it depend absolutely upon the will of one. Nay rather there is a necessity of it, that that one be ab-

olute,

the end was ambition, Royalty admitting no companion. Of whom to free himself, it seems that Romulus stood not much upon how lawful means be used for this like he slew his brother, and consented to Titus Tatius his death, without doubt, for venturing to take part in the Authority. And touching this, it may be Machiavel will speak truer here the latter end of his 12. Chap. Where he saies, Because the restoring of a City to a civil and politick Government presupposes a good man, and by violence to become a Prince of a Commonwealth presupposes an evil man, for this cause it shall very seldom come to pass, that a good man will ever strive to make himself Prince by mischievous waies, although his ends therein be all good; nor will a wicked man, by wicked means, attaining

solute, that appoints the manner how, and by whose understanding all such ordination is regulated. Wherefore a wise founder of a Republick, who seeks not his own advantage, but the publick good; not to strengthen his own succession, but seeks his Countries profit, ought indeavor to get the power wholly into his own hands; neither will any man of good judgment ever blame any extraordinary action he shall put in practice, for the setting of a good Government in a Kingdom, or framing sure foundations in a Commonwealth. It holds well together, though the act accuse him, that the effect excuse him; and when that is good, as it prov'd to *Romulus*, it will alwayes excuse him; for he that uses violence to waste, is blameable, not he that uses it for redress and order. And therefore ought he be so wise and virtuous, that the Authority he hath possess himself of, he leave not to descend hereditarily on another. For men being more inclined to ill then good, his successor may turne that to ambition which he manag'd virtuously. Besides this, though one be

training to be Prince do good, nor ever come into his heart to use that Authority well, which by evil meanes he came to. And so at the very end of the same 18. Chap. he concludes, that though the intent were not good, there might be a faire colour set upon it by a good success. Whereby our Polititian, however he winds and turns, comes at length to discover his evil ground he took, that *Ius regnandi gratis violandum est; alius in rebus pietatem colas, at is that of Euripides.*

be fit to ordain a thing, yet its not so ordain'd to last long, when it rests upon the shoulders of one man; well may it indure, being committed to the care of many, to whom it belongs to maintain it. For even so, as many are not proper for the framing of one thing, because all of them hit not on the true good of it, by reason of their several opinions among them so; after they have known it, neither agree they to let it proceed to its advantage. And that *Romulus* was one of those, who for the death of his brother and companion, might be excus'd: and that what he did was for the common good, and not for his own ambition, it appears, in that he forthwith ordain'd a Senate, with whom he might take counsell, and by their opinions be advis'd. And he, who considers well the Authority *Romulus* reserv'd himself, will perceive it was no more than to command the Armies, when they had resolv'd on War; and to assemble the Senate; which was apparent afterwards, when Rome became free upon the banishment of the *Tarquins*: whereupon the Romans were never brought in any new order, unless that in lieu of a King during life, they made two Consuls yearly: Which confirms, that all the first ordinances of that City were more agreeable to a civil and free Government, then to one absolute and Monarchical. To verify the thing abovesaid, we might bring many examples, as *Moses*, *Lycurgus*, *Solon*, and other founders of Kingdomes and Commonwealths, who could well, having an absolute power in their hands, ordain laws for the common good; but I will let them

.Salomon

them

them pass, as well known. I shall allude  
 only one, not so famous, but well worthy  
 their consideration, who desire to be good  
 Law-makers: which is, That *Agis* King of  
*Sparta* advising to reduce the Spartans with  
 in those bounds the Laws of *Licurgus* had  
 included them; thinking that, because they  
 had broken out of that strictness, his City had  
 lost very much of the ancient vertue, and by  
 consequent of force and government, was  
 in the beginning of his attempts slain by the  
 Spartan *Exhores*, as one, that aim'd to possess  
 himself of the Tyranny. But *Cleomenes* after-  
 wards succeeding him in the Kingdom, upon  
 his reading of *Agis* Records and Writings,  
 which fell into his hands, he understood his  
 intension, and grew desirous himself, to  
 bring the same thing to pass; but found it  
 was impossible to do that good to his Coun-  
 try, unless he became absolute of authority,  
 it seeming to him by reason of mens ambition,  
 that he was unable to do good to many, a-  
 gainst the will of a few. And taking a fit  
 opportunity, at length has brought in all the  
*Exhores*, and every one else that could with-  
 stand him, and afterwards restor'd into  
 force *Licurgus* his Lawes: Which delibera-  
 tion had bin able to have a new reviv'd *Sparta*,  
 and gain'd *Cleomenes* the reputation *Licur-  
 gus* had, if then the *Macedons* power had not  
 grown so vast, and the other Grecian Re-  
 publick been so weak. For after such order  
 given, being set upon by the *Macedons*, and  
 finding himself single too weak to deale with  
 them, there being none could give him  
 assistance, was overcome; and his project  
 (though just and commendable) became  
 imperfect.

imperfect. Wherefore, upon the weighing of all these things together, I conclude, it necessary that a founder of a Republick ought alone to have an absolute authority; and that *Romulus*, for the death of *Remus* and *Tullus*, deserves rather excuse than blame.

## CHAP. X.

*As the Founders of a Commonwealth or Kingdom are exceedingly praise-worthy, so the Beginners of a Tyranny deserve much infamy.*

**A**Mongst all commendable men, those deserve esteem in the first place, who have taken care in laying the grounds of divine worship, and true Religion: the next belongs to them who have been the founders of Commonwealths or Kingdoms. After those are they famous that commanding over Armies have enlarg'd either their Kingdom or Country. To these wee may adjoyn learned men. And because they are of different dignities, every one of them are valued according to their degree. And to all other men, whose number is infinite, wee use to give that share of commendations, which their Art and Skill deserves. On the contrary, infamous are they and execrable, that are the perverters of Religion, the dissipatours of Kingdoms and Republicks, enemies of vertue and learning, and of any other art, that brings profit, and renown to mankind; as also are the irreligious, the mad-brained, the ignorant, the slothful, and base. And there will never be  
any

any so foolish, or so wise, so mischievous or so good, that the choice of the two qualities of men being made him, will not commend that which is commendable, and blame the blameable. Notwithstanding seeing that the most part, as it were, beguiled by counterfeit good, and vain glory, suffer themselves either voluntarily or ignorantly to be counted in the number with those that merit more blame than praise: And having means with their perpetual honor to frame a Republick or Kingdom, yet affect they a Tyranny: neither are they advis'd by this course, what reputation, what glory, what honor, security, quiet, and satisfaction of mind they flee from, and into what infamy, dispraise, blame, danger, and unquietness they plunge themselves: And it is impossible, that, they that live private men in a Common-wealth, or that by fortune, or by their virtues become Princes, if they read the histories, or make any account of antiquities therein related, that those private men, I say, had not rather be *Scipios* in their native Country, than *Cesars*; and those that are Princes, rather *Agessilaus*, *Timoleon*, or *Dion*, than *Nabis*, *Phalaris*, or *Dionysius*: for they would perceive these exceedingly in all mens hatred, and, these as much beloved. They would see also how *Timoleon* and those of his like had no less power in their Country, then had *Dionysius* or *Phalaris*; but they would find also they had far more security. Nor let any be deceived by *Cesars* glory, seeing his memory much celebrated by writers: for they that Praise him, were corrupted by his fortune, and frighted by the continuance of the Empire,

pire, which being govern'd under that name, gave not writers leave to speak freely of him. But he that would know what free writers would say of him, let him look upon that they say of *Cataline*: and *Cesar* is so much the more to be disprais'd, in that he executed the ill, the other did but intend. Let him see also how much they praise *Brutus*, so that not daring to blame the other, because of his power, they attributed much honor to his Enemy. Let him consider also him that is become Prince in a Republick, what praises, after *Rome* was made an Empire, those Emperors rather deserv'd, that liv'd under the Laws, as good Princes, than they that went a contrary course to them; and he shall find, that *Titus*, *Nerva*, *Trajan*, *Adrian*, and *Antoninus* and *Marcus* had no need of *Prætorian* soldiers, nor a multitude of the legions to guard them; for their own virtues, the good will of the people, and the love of the Senate did defend them. Moreover he shall see, that the Eastern and Western Armies were not enough to save *Caligula*, *Nero*, *Vitellius*, and the other wicked Emperors from their Enemies, whom their vile conditions and damned lives had procured them. And if their Story were well read over, it might serve to give good instruction to any Prince, to shew him the way of glory and of disgrace, the way of security, and of distrust. For of 26 Emperors, that were from *Cesar* to *Maximinus*, 16 were slain, 10. only died natural deaths. And if any of those that were slain were good, as *Galba* and *Pertinax*, it proceeded from the corruption the predecessor had left among the soldiers. And if among those, that

those that died natural deaths, any were wicked or lewd, as *Severus*, it was caus'd by his great fortune and valour, which two accompany very few. Hee shall see also by reading this Story, how a man may order a good Kingdome: for all those Emperours that succeeded in the Empire by inheritance, except *Titus*, were mischievous; those that were adopted, were all good, as were those five from *Nero* to *Marcus*. And as the Empire fell upon the heyres, it return'd alwaies to its destruction. Let a Prince be put in mind of the times from *Nero* to *Marcus*, and compare them with those that went before them, and that follow'd them; let him choose in which he would have been borne, or over whether he would have had command. For in those that were govern'd by the good, he shall see a Prince live in security in the midst of his secure Citizens, the world replenish'd with peace and justice, the Senate enjoying their authority, the Magistrates their honours, and the wealthy Citizens their estates, nobility and vertue exalted, and with these all rest and good. And on the other side all rancour, dissoluteness, corruption, and ambition extinguished, he shall see a returne of the golden age, where every one may keep and defend what reputation he pleases, and in the end shall see the world triumph, the Prince reverenc'd and honour'd, and the people in agreement and security. If afterwards he consider severally the times of the other Emperours, he shall find the warres made them terrible, and seditions full of discord; as well in peace as in war cruell; so many Princes slain with the sword, so many civil, so many forraign



forraign warres, *Italy* afflicted, and full of  
 new misfortunes, the Cities thereof having  
 been sackt and ruin'd; he shall see *Rome*  
 burnt, the *Capitol* by her own Citizens de-  
 fac'd and spoyl'd, the ancient temples desola-  
 ted, and their ceremonies neglected, the cities  
 replete with adulteries, the sea full of ba-  
 nishments, and the rocks besmeard with blood.  
 He shall see follow in *Rome* a numberless  
 number of cruelties; and Nobility, wealth,  
 honours, and above all, vertue reputed as a  
 most capital crime. He shall see accusers re-  
 warded, servants corrupted against their  
 masters, children against their parents, and  
 they, who had not enemies, oppressed by  
 their friends, and then he shall know very  
 well, how much *Rome*, *Italy*, and the world  
 was beholding to *Cesar*. And without  
 doubt, if he be borne of mankind, he will be  
 frighted from imitating those wicked times,  
 and inflam'd with zeale to trace the good.  
 And truly a Prince ayming at glory, would  
 wish to be Lord of a disorder'd City, not to  
 ruine it wholly, as did *Cesar*, but to recom-  
 pose and restore it, as *Romulus*. And be-  
 lieve me, the heavens cannot give men greater  
 occasion of glory, nor men desire it. And if  
 to renew and restore the frame of a City,  
 there were necessity for a man to depose his  
 Principality, the man that did not see it in  
 order because he would not fall from his  
 dignity, should yet deserve excuse. But  
 when he could hold his Principality, and yet  
 restore the government, he is no way excusa-  
 ble. And in sum, let them be well advis'd,  
 to whom the heavens present such opportu-  
 nity, that either of these two waies be pro-

D

pounded

pounded them, the one that gives them security in life, and makes them glorious after death; the other that causes them to live in continual troubles, and leave behind them in everlasting infamy.

## CHAP. XI.

### Of the Romans Religion.

**T**Hough *Romulus* were *Rome's* first founder, and she was to acknowledge from him her birth and bringing up; notwithstanding she heavens judging that *Romulus* his lawes were not sufficient for such an Empire, put it into the Roman Senat's mindes to elect *Numa Pompilius* to succeed *Romulus*, that what he left unfinished, the other might supply. Who finding a very fierce people, and being desirous to reduce them into civil obedience by peaceable waies, applied himself to Religion, as a thing wholly necessary to preserve civility; and ordain'd it in such a sort, that for many ages there was not such a feare of God, as in that Commonwealth. Which facilitated much any enterprize, whatsoever either the Senate, or those brave Roman courages did undertake. And whosoever shall discourse of the innumerable actions of the people of *Rome* jointly, and of many of the *Romans* by themselves in severall, shall perceive that those Citizens fear'd more to break an oath, than the lawes; as they that made more account of the power of God, than of man; as it appears manifestly, by the examples

ple of *Scipio* and *Manlius Torquatus*; for after that *Hannibal* had given the Romans an overthrow at *Canna*, many Citizens assembled together, and being affrighted solely to quit the country, and go into *Sicily*; which *Scipio* understanding went and found them out, and with his sword drawn in his hand compelled them to swear, they would never forsake their native country. *Lucius Manlius*, that was afterwards call'd *Torquatus*, was accus'd by *Marcus Pomponius* Tribune of the people, and before the judgment day came, *Scipio* went to find *Marcus*, and threatening to kill him if he swore not to take the accusation off from his father, bound him by his oath: and he though by fear compell'd to swear, yet took the accusation off: and for those Citizens, whom neither the love to their country, nor the lawes thereof could strain in Italy, were kept by force of an oath they were constrained to take: and that Tribune laid aside the hatred he bore to the father, the injury he receiv'd of the son, and his own reputation, to keep the oath he took: which proceeded of nothing else, but the Religion *Numa* brought in among them. And it is manifest, if a man consider well the Roman histories, of how much avails their Religion was for the commanding of armies, to reconcile the common people, to preserve good men, and to shame the lewd. So that if we were to dispute, to whether Prince *Numa* were more oblig'd, *Romulus* or *Numa*; I believe *Numa* wou'd be prefer'd; for where Religion is, military Discipline is easily brought in; and where they are already warlike, and have no Religion, this hardly followes.

And it is plain, that *Romulus* to order the Senate, and frame certain other civil and military ordinances, had no need of the authority of a God, which to *Numa* was necessary, who feign'd to have familiar conversation with a Nymph, who instructed him wherewith continually to advise the people. And all sprung from this, because he desiring to settle new orders, and unaccustomed in the City, doubted that his own authority was not of full force. And truly never was there yet any maker of extraordinary laws in a nation, that had not his recourse to God; for otherwise the laws had not been accepted. For many several goods are known by a wise man, which have not such evident reasons in themselves, that he by perswasion can quickly make others conceive them. Therefore the wise men, that would free themselves of this difficulty, have recourse to a God: so did *Lycurgus*, so *Solon*, so many others, whose design was the same with theirs. Thereupon the people of *Rome* admiring his goodness and wisdom yeelded to all his purposes. But it is true, because those times were then full of Religion, and those men rude and gross, on whom he spent his pains, this much facilitated his designs, being thereby able to mould them into a new forme. And without question, if any one in these daies would frame a Republick, he should find it easier to deale with rude mountaineers, who had never known any civility, than with those who had been accustomed to live in Cities, where the government is corrupted; and a carver shall easier cut a faire Statue out of a rough marble, than out of one that hath been bungled

upon

upon by another. Wherefore having well considered all, I conclude, that the Religion introduc'd by Numa was one of the principal occasions of that cities happiness; for that caus'd good orders, good orders brought good fortune, and from their good fortunes grew all the happy successes of their enterprises: and as the observance of divine worship occasions the greatness of a Commonwealth; so the contempt of it destroys it. For where the feare of God is wanting, it must needs be that either that Kingdom goes to ruine, or that it be supported by the awe it stands in of the Prince, who may supply the defects of Religion: and because Princes are but short-liv'd, that Kingdom must needs have an end quickly, according as the vertue thereof failes: from whence it comes, that governments which depend upon the vertue of one man, abide but a while, because that vertue ends with his life; and it seldom chances that it is renew'd by succession, as well saies the Poet Dante.

*Rade volte discende  
per li rami*

*Humana probitate  
e questo vuole,*

*Quel, che lada, per-  
che da lui si chia-  
mi.*

Vertues continue seldome  
by descent.

And this to shew their  
spring, the government.

And that his gifts best  
term'd, and by him  
sent.

Therefore the safety of a commonwealth or kingdom consists not wholly in a Prince that governs wisely while he lives, but in one that so orders it, that he dying, it can preserve it self. And although it be easier to

work rude and untaught people to a new course and frame; yet argues it not therefore an impossibility to prevaile with men that have liv'd in a civill government, and presume somewhat to understand themselves. The *Florentines* think not themselves either ignorant or rude, yet were they perswaded by *Friar Jerom Savanarola*, that he talked with GOD. I will not judge whether it were true or no, because we ought not to speak of such a great personage, but with reverence. But truly I say, that very many beleev'd him, notwithstanding seen any great matter to perswade them thereto: for his life, doctrine, and the subject he took, were sufficient to make them credit him. Wherefore let no man be discouraged, as if he could not reach to what another hath heretofore attained; for men, as we said in our preface, were born, liv'd and died, under the same laws of nature.

## CHAP. XII.

*Of what importance it is to ha'd a worthy esteem of Religion, and that Italy for having fail'd therein, by means of the Church of Rome, hath gone to wrack.*

THose Princes or those Republicks which would keep themselves from ruine, are above all other things, to preserve the ceremonies of their Religion incorrupted, and maintain it alwaies venerable. For there is no greater sign of a countries going to destruction, then to see in it the contempt of divine worship. And this is easie to be understood,

Good, is being once known upon what ground the Religion is built where a man is born. For every Religion hath the foundation of its being upon some principal thing. The life of the Gentiles Religion subsisted upon the answers of the oracles, and upon the sect of the conjectures and soothsayers: all the other ceremonies, sacrifices, and rites depended on these. Because they easily believ'd, that that God that could foretell thee thy future good or evil, could also send it thee. From hence came the Temples, the Sacrifices and supplications, and all other ceremonies in their veneration: for the Oracle of Delos, the Temple of Jupiter Ammon, and other famous Oracles held the world in devotion and admiration. As they afterwards began to speak in imperious manner, and their falsehood was discover'd among the people, men began to be incredulous, and apt to disturb all good orders. Therefore the Princes of a Republick or Kingdom should maintain the grounds of the Religion they hold; and this being done, they shall easily keep their Commonwealth religious, and consequently virtuous and united. They ought also to favour and increase all those things that advantage it, howsoever that they think them false; and the rather should they do it, the wiser they are and understand the causes of natural things. And because this course hath been taken by many wise men, hence grew the opinion of miracles which

*Amiratus takes him, saying, it was rather the opinion of a cunning and crafty man, then of one that had either any religion or morality in him, whose plain and sim-*

which are celebrated even in false Religions; for wise men augment them what beginning so ever they have, and their authority afterwards gives them credit. Of these miracles there was great quantity at Rome; and among others there was this one; the Roman soldiers sacking the Veientes City, some of them went into the Temple of Juno, and coming to her image ask'd her, wilt thou go to Rome? some thought she nodded, another thought she said, yes. For those men being very religious (which T. Livius shews, for that entry into the Temple was without tumult) all devout and full of reverence, imagined they heard that answer, which peradventure they presuppos'd before hand would be made them; this opinion and belief was altogether favour'd and augmented

ple conditions ought to be free from all fraud and falshood; and however the Romans were deceiv'd herein, which cannot be deny'd, yet without doubt they never did this, thinking to deceive themselves, or with intention to deceive others. Thus Ammi. And indeed it favours of Atheisme, bringing the mistress to serve the hand-maid, religion to serve policy, or if the seasons of the year ought to accommodate themselves to men, rather then men accommodate themselves to the seasons; nor considering that Religion propounds to a man a further end then policy points at. A Prince therefore should be well aware of such evil devices, believing heartily that the true Religion hath no need of helpe from falshood; nor can gain any strength by lies. mented



mented by *Camillus* and the other principal men of the City. Which Religion if it were maintained among the Princes of the Christian Republick according as by the institutor thereof it was ordain'd, the Christian States and Republicks would be far more in unity, and enjoy more happiness far then now they do: nor does any thing give us so shrewd a conjecture of the declining of it, as to see, that those people that are neereſt neighbours to the Church of *Rome*, head of our Religion, are the most irreligious. And whosoever would well consider the original grounds thereof, and look upon the present use how much this differs from those, without question he would judge the ruine or scourge thereof were not at hand. And because some are of opinion, that the welfare of *Italy* depends upon the Church of *Rome*, yet the contrary might rather be proved, considering those that in the Church of *Rome* observe not the precepts they ought, but rather adulterate the holy and Catholick Ordinances which were wont to be kept. Moreover this comes to pass, because the Church hath alwaies held, and still holds this Country divided: and truly never was any Province either united or happy, unless it were wholly reduc'd to the obedience of one Commonwealth, or Prince; as it beſel *France* and *Spain*. And the cause that *Italy* is not in the ſame terms, nor hath not one Republick or one Prince to govern it, is only the Church; for having inhabited there and held the temporal Government, it hath never been so potent, nor of such powers, that it could get the rest of *Italy* into its hands, and become Lords thereof. And on the other ſide, it was,

D. 5.

never

never so weak, that for fear of losing the temporal dominion it could not call in a powerfull friend to defend it against him that were grown too puissant in *Italy*; as anciently it hath been seen by sundry experiences, when by means of *Charles* the Great it drove out the *Lombards*, who had as it were the absolute power of all *Italy*; and when in our daies it took the *Venesians* power from them by the *Frenchmens* ayd, and afterwards chased away the *French* by help of the *Swisses*. Therefore the Church being not powerfull to subdue all *Italy* itself, nor yet suffering any other to master it, hath been the cause, that it could never be brought to have but one head; but hath alwaies been under more Princes and Lords; whereupon is grown such a disunion, and so much weakness, that *Italy* hath been made a prey not only of powerfull *Barbarians*, but of any the next assylant. For which we and other *Italians* are beholding to the Church & none else. And whosoever would readily see the truth by certaint experience, it were needfull he were of such power, as to send the Court of *Rome*, with the authority it hath in *Italy*, to dwell in the *Switzers* Country, who at this day are the only people that live, for their Religion and military discipline, as their ancestors did: and he should find that in a short time the ill orders and customs of that Court would breed more disorder in that Country, then any accident else could, that should ever grow there.

## CHAP. XIII.

In what manner the Romans serv'd themselves of their Religion, in ordering the City, in undertaking their designs, and in stopping of tumults.

I Think it not out of purpose, to bring some Example, wherein the Romans serv'd themselves of their Religion, for the ordering of their City, and the following of their enterprises. And though many there are in T. Livius, yet I will content my self with these. The people of Rome having created their Tribunes of Consular power, and except one, all Plebeians, and it falling out that year, that there was pestilence, and famine, and certain other prodigies, the Nobility of Rome took hold of this occasion, at the Tribunes new creation, to say that the Gods were angry, because Rome had abus'd the Majesty of their Empire, and that they had no other means to appease them, then to reduce the election of the Tribunes to the former course. Whence it came, that the people frighted by this superstition made the Tribunes all of the Nobility. The like was also in their Conquest of the Veientis City, that the Commanders of their Armies did serve themselves of the Religion, to keep them in heart for any enterprise: for that year the Alban Lake being miraculously sweld, and the Roman Soldiers wearied with the long siege, and intending to return to Rome, the Romans found, that Apollo and certain other Oracles told them, that that year the Veientes City

should

should be taken, that the water of the *Alban Lake* should be pour'd out: which thing made the soldiers endure the tediousness of the war and the siege, perswaded by the hope they had to take the Town, and were contented to continue the enterprise; so that *Camillus* being made Dictator subdued the City after ten years siege. And so the accustomed Religion help'd well, both for the raking in of that Town, and for the restitution of the Tribuneship to the Nobility; for without the ayde thereof, the one or the other had hardly had their success. And this other example I must also add to this purpose. There were in *Rome* a great many families rais'd upon the occasion of *Terentillus* a Tribune, he desiring to make a law, for causes which hereafter we shall declare in their place. Among the first remedies which the Nobility serv'd themselves of, was the Religion, whereof they made use two waies: In the first, they made the *Sibill's* books be searcht, and answer as it were to the City, that by means of civill discord they should hazzard the loss of their liberty that year: which thing, though the Tribunes had herein discover'd their subtilty, yet it so frighted the people, that it quite took off their eagerness in the pursuit. The other way was, that when *Appius Herdonius* with a great number of outlaws, and slaves, near upon four thousand men, having possess'd themselves by right of the Capitol, so that it might be fear'd that if the *Aequi* or *Volscei*, the *Romans* sworn enemies, had approacht the Town, they might have taken it: the Tribunes not forbearing for all this to continue in their obstinacy, and to enact the law made by *Terentillus*, saying  
this

This assault of theirs was feigned, and not true, one *Publius Valerius* a grave citizen, and of good authority, went out of the Senate, and told them partly in friendly termes, and partly in threatening, the dangers in which the City stood, and the unreasonable of their demand, and thereby brought the people to swear, they would not forsake the Consuls command. Whereupon the people being return'd to obedience, recover'd the Capitoll by force. But the Consul *Publius Valerius* being slain in this conflict, there was forthwith another Consul made, one *Titus Quintius*, who to keep the people from idleness, and to give no space to think again of *Terentillus* his law, commanded them to go forth of Rome with him against the *Volsca*, saying that by the oath they had taken not to abandon the Consul, they were bound to follow him; whereunto the Tribunes oppos'd, saying, that oath was made to the Consul now slain, not to him. Yet *Titus Livius* shews that the people in awfulness to their Religion would rather obey the Consul than believe the Tribunes, saying these words in favour of the ancient Religion: *Men did not then adores so little reverence*

*the Gods, as now; nor people* Nondum hæc quæ nunc tenet sæculum negligentia  
*wrest their oaths, nor the laws,* Deum venerat, nec inter-  
*to their own ends. Whereby,* pretando tibi quisque jus  
the Tribunes doubting then jurandum & leges apras  
to lose their whole dignity, faciebat.

agreed with the Consul to submit to his obedience, and that for a whole year they would treat no more of *Terentillus* his law, and the Consuls for a year should not draw the people out to war; and thus the Religion gave the

Senate

Senate means to overcome that difficulty, which, without it, they could never have mastered.

## CHAP. XIV.

*The Romans interpreted their Auspices, as necessity requir'd, and with discretion made a shew to observe their Religion, yet upon occasion they neglected it; but if any did rashly contemn it, they punisht them.*

**T**HE Soothsayings were not only (as before we have discours'd) for the most part, the ground of the Gentiles ancient Religion, but they were also the occasions of the Roman Republics welfare. Whereupon the Romans had more regard of them, than of any order else, and made use of them, in their Consular assemblies, in the beginning of their enterprises, in drawing forth their armies into the field, in fighting of pitched battells, and in any other action of theirs of importance either civill or military. Nor ever would they have undertaken any expedition, till first they had perswaded the soldiers, the Gods had promis'd them the Victory. And among the other orders of Soothsayers, they had some in their Armies, they call'd *Pollarij*. And whensoever they intended to fight a battell with the Enemy, they would have the *Pollarij* to make their conjectures: and when the Chickens peckt, they went to fight with good Auspices; and not pecking, they forbore to fight. Notwithstanding when reason shew'd something was to be done, though the divinations were averse, yet were they not scarr'd from

from it: but they turn'd and wound it with such terms and fashions so properly, that it appear'd, they did it not with an contempt of Religion. Which course was us'd once in a fight, by *Papirius* the Consull, which he had (of great importance) wth the *Samnites*, after which they were much worn and broken. For *Papirius* encountering with the *Samnites*, and perceiving in the skirmish that the victory was sure, had a mind hereupon to fight a full battell, and therefore commanded the *Pollarij*, they should make their conjectures; but the Chickens not Pecking, and the chief soothsayer seeing the forwardness of the army to fight, and the opinion the General and all the soldiers had of the victory, that he might not take away the occasion of well doing from the army sent back to the Consull, that the soothsayers answer'd well; so that while *Papirius* was ordering his squadrons, some of the *Pollarij* having told certain soldiers, that the Chickens had not peck'd, they told it to *Spurius Papirius* the Consulls nephew, and he again to the Consull; whereto he suddenly reply'd, that he should take a care to perform his own duty well, and that for himself and the army the conjectures were faire; and if the Soothsayer had told lyes, it would turn to his own loss: and that in effect it should succeed according to his prognostication, he commanded the *Legionaries* to place the *Pollarij* in the fore-fronts of the battell. Whereupon it chanc'd that going forward against their enemies, one of the Roman Soldiers threw a dart, and as it hap'd, slew a principal Soothsayer: which being come to the Consulls care, he said that all things went forward luckily, and with the  
Gods

Gods favour, for the Army by the death of that Iyer was purg'd of all crime, and excus'd of the wrath conceiv'd against them. And thus by knowing how to accommodate his designs to the divinations, he chose to fight, the Army never perceiving that he had any while neglected the rites of their Religion. *Appius Pulcher* went a contrary course to this, in *Sicily*, in the first *Carthaginian* wars; who desirous to fight with the enemy, caus'd the *Pollarij* to make their divinations; and they answering that the Chickens did not feed, he said, let us see then if they will drink, and so made them be thrown into the sea, and then fighting, lost the day. And thereupon he was afterwards condemn'd at *Rome*, and *Papirius* honour'd; not so much, the one for having won, and the other for having lost, as the one for having crost the soothsayers with much discretion, the other very rashly. Nor was there any other end of this manner of soothsaying, then to encourage the soldiers to fight, for boldness always wins the victory: which thing was not only in use with the *Romans*, but with forrainers also; whereof I have a purpose to bring an example in the Chapter following.

CHAP.



## CHAP. XV.

The Samnites, for the extreame remedy to their broken State, have recourse to Religion.

**T**HE Samnites having been sundry times routed by the Romans, and at last overthrown in Tuscany, their Armies and their Captains slain, and their confederates overcome, who were the Tuscans, French, and Umbrians: They could not subsist, neither by their own, nor their friends forces, yet they would not quit the war, nor regarding though they had but ill success in the defence of their liberty; but had rather be overcome, then forbear to vie if they could get the victory. Whereupon they put it to the last proof. And because they knew the obstinacy of the soldiers minds would help the victory well forward, and to induce them hereto, there was no better means then Religion, they advis'd to renew an old sacrifice of theirs by the help of *Ovius Pattius* their Priest: which they order'd in this manner; the solemn sacrifice being made, and amidst the slain beasts, and the altars set on fire, having caus'd the chief of the Army to swear never to forsake the fight, they call'd the soldiers one by one, and in the midst of those altars enclos'd by many Centurions with their swords drawn, first they made them swear, they should not disclose any thing they either heard or saw: afterwards with words of execration, and

Nec sula nec externis  
viribus jam stare poterant,  
tamen bello non abstin-  
bant alio ne infelicer  
quidem de secula libertatis  
tadebat, & vinci quam non  
tentare victoriam malebant.

verses full of horreur made them vow and promise to the Gods, to be ready in whatsoever their General should command, never to abandon the fight, and kill whomsoever they saw fly, which if they fail'd in, might it light upon their family and kindred. And some of them being amaz'd, and refusing to swear, were presently slain by their Centurions, so that the rest that followed them, frighted by the fierceness of the spectacle, swore all. And to augment the magnificence of their meeting, being sixty thousand men, half of them were clad with white cloath, with plumes and feathers upon their helmets, and thus array'd they incamp'd themselves in *Aquilonia*. Against these came *Papirius*, who in his speech to encourage his soldiers, said, Surely their

*Non enim cristas vulnera facere, & picta atque aurata scuta transire Romanum palum.* *plumes could make no wounds, nor their painted and golden shields defend the blows of the Roman Pikes.* And to

take away the doubt his soldiers had of their enemies because of the oath taken, said, it was rather a discouragement to them then otherwise; for they were afraid of their own people, the Gods, and their enemies. And when they came to the fight, the *Sannites* were overthrown, for the *Roman* vertue, and the feare conceiv'd by reason of their former losses, overcame what ever obstinacy they could have resolv'd on by force of their Religion or oath taken. Yet it is plain, how they thought they could have no other refuge, nor try other remedy, that could give them hope to recover their lost vertue. Which fully shewes, how great confidence Religion well us'd can give. And though haply this

part

part would be fit rather to have place among the extrinsecall matters, yet depending upon one of the most important ordinances of the Roman Republiek, I thought better to insert it in this place, that I might not be driven to interrupt my discourse, and have need to return herunto many times.

## CHAP. XVI.

*People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident they become free, have much ado to maintain their liberty.*

**H**OW hard it is for a people, us'd to live in subjection to a Prince, afterwards to maintain their liberty, if by any accident they get it, as Rome did upon the Tarquias banishment, very many examples shew us, which we read in the memorialls of ancient histories. And not without good reason: for the people is nothing different from a brute beast, which (though fiercer of nature and wilde) hath been bred alwaies in a den and under command; and though by chance it hath got loose into the fields, yet not being used to seek the food, nor being acquainted with the covert, where to hide itself, becomes the prey of the first that seeks to take it. The self-same thing befalls a people used to live under the government of others; the which not having knowledge to treat of publick defences or offences, not knowing the neighbour Princes, nor yet known by them, quickly returns under the yoke, which oftentimes is heavier, then that which before was taken from their neck; and

and they come to fall into these difficulties, though as yet there be not entred among them much disorder. For a people that is quite debauch'd cannot for a little while, no nor a while, enjoy their liberry, as it shall after appear. And therefore our speeches are not of those people, where corruption is overgrown, but where there is more good then naught. To this former we may add another difficulty, which is, that the State that becomes free, procures enemies that side against it, and not friends to side with it. Those hold together as enemies, who got advantages by the tyrannical government, feeding upon the Princes riches whereby they used to help themselves, which being now taken from them, they cannot rest content, but every one is necessitated to try if he can again recall the Royalty, that so they may recover their former advancements. They get not, as I have said, friends to side with them; for the free government propounds honours and rewards upon some worthy and determinated occasions, otherwise it rewards none, nor honours none. And when a man hath received those honours and those advantages, which he thinks he deserv'd; he acknowledges no obligation to them that reward him. Moreover, that common good which men reap of free government, is not known by any, while it is possest; which is, to enjoy freely ones own without suspicion, not to doubt of his wives or daughters honours, not to be in fear for his sons, or for himself. For no man thinks himself beholding to one that offends him not. And therefore if they come to have a free State, as it is above mentioned, there arise those that will be partisans against them,

them, and not side with them: and to prescribe a remedy for these inconveniencies and disorders, which these difficulties might bring us, there is none more potent, nor sovereign, nor necessary, than to kill Brutus his sons, who as the Story shews, were indued together with other young Romans, to conspire against their native country, for no other reason, than because they could not so extraordinarily advantage themselves under the Consuls, as under the Kings; so that they thought the peoples liberty was become their slavery. And he that undertakes to govern a multitude either by way of liberty, or by way of Principality, and assures not himself of those that are enemies to his new State, is not like to continue long. True it is, that I judge those Princes very unfortunate, who to secure their dominions are to go extravagant waies, having the vast multitude for their enemies; for he that hath but few enemies, easily and without many offences secures himself; but he that hath the universality against him, is never out of jealousy; and the more cruelty he uses, the weaker becomes his power. So that the greatest remedy he hath, is to make the people friendly. And though this discourse be different from the former, treating here of an exceeding good Prince, and there of a Republick, yet that I may not return here often upon this occasion, I shall say somewhat of it, but briefly. And therefore if a Prince would gain the good will of a people, that was enemy to him (speaking of those Princes, that are become Tyrants of their native country) I say, he ought to examine first, what the people desire; and he shall alwaies find, that they

they desire two things; the one, to be reveng'd of him that occasion'd their slavery; the other, to have their liberty restor'd. To the first, the Prince can satisfy in whole, to the second in part. As for the first, there is an example to the point. *Clearchus* a Tyrant of *Heraclea* being in banishment, it happen'd that upon a difference risen between the people and the nobility of *Heraclea*, that the nobility, finding themselves too weak, turn'd to favour *Clearchus*, and conspiring with him, against the will of the people, let him into the Town, and took away the peoples liberty; so that *Clearchus* being in a strait between the insolence of the nobility, whom he could not any way content, nor rectify, and the rage of the people, that could not indure thus to have lost their liberty, resolv'd in one, to free himself of the importunity of the Nobles, and withall to gain the people. And to this purpose having taken a convenient opportunity, cut in pieces all the Nobility, to the peoples great satisfaction. And thus he satisfy'd one of the desires the people have, that is, to be reveng'd. But as for the peoples other desire, to recover their liberty, if the Prince cannot satisfy them, let him examine, what are the reasons make them desire freedom, and he shall find, there is but a small number of them would be free, to command. But all the rest, which are the many, desire liberty to live securely. For in all Republicks of what manner soever ordered, not above forty or fifty Citizens attain to the degrees of authority: and because these are but few, it is an easie thing to be sure of them, either by taking them out of the way, or by letting them share of

such

such honours, as agree to their conditions, which they may very well be contented with. Those others, whom it suffices, If they can live securely, are easily satisfied by making ordinances and laws, wherewith together with his power, he may comprehend their safety in general. And when a Prince does this, and that the people perceive it, that by no accident he breaks those laws, they will begin in a short time to live secure and content. Wee have an example of the Kingdom of France, which continues not in quiet by other means, than that their Kings are tyed to many laws, wherewith the security of all his people is containd. And he that was the founder of that State, ordain'd, that the Kings should dispose of the wars and the moneys at their pleasures, but with all other matters they had nothing to do, but they were at the laws appointment. That Prince therefore or Republick, which comes not themselves at their entrance into the government, ought at least take hold of the first occasion, as the Romans did. He that lets that pass, repents himself too late, of not having done what he should. The people of Rome being not as yet debauch't, when they recovered their liberty, might well maintain it, when Brutus his sonnes were slain, and the Tarquins dead, by those remedies, and orders, which we have at several times recounted. But had the people been corrupted, neither in Rome, nor any where else, could they have found means strong enough to preserve it, as in the Chapter following we shall shew.

## CHAP. XVII.

A disorderly people, getting their liberty, cannot keep themselves free without very great difficulties.

I think it necessarily true, that either the Kings were to be expelled out of Rome; or else Rome it self would have grown feeble and of no worth; for considering how exceedingly the Kings were corrupted, if after that rate two or three successions had followed, and that corruption that was in them had distended it self throughout the members, so that they likewise had received of the corruption, it had been impossible even to have reformed it. But losing the head when the body was sound, it might easily be reduced to a free and orderly government. And this should be presupposed for certain, that a debauchte City living under a Prince, though that Prince with all his stock be rooted out, yet can it not become free, but rather fall still into the hands of new Lords, who continually make an end one of another. And without the creation of some new Prince, they shall never have an end, unless he by his goodness and valour maintain them free. But their liberty is of no longer continuance than his life, as was that of Syracuse for Dions and Timotheus lives: whose virtues in several times, while they liv'd kept that City free; so soon as they were dead, it fell into the former servitude. We find not a braver example then that of Rome, which upon the Tarquins banishment, could presently lay



by hold off, and maintaine that liberty. But  
*Cesar* being slain, *C. Caligula*, *Nero*, and the  
 whole race of the *Cesars* blotted out, it could  
 not, not only keep, no nor so much as give  
 a beginning to their liberty. Neither did so  
 great variety of accidents in one and the same  
 one proceed from other, than that, when the  
*Tarquins* were expell'd, the people of Rome  
 were not toucht with this corruption, and  
 in these latter times they were thoroughly  
 infected. For then to settle their mindes in  
 a resolution against King, it was enough to take  
 an oath of them, that never any King should  
 raigne at Rome. But in the after ages, the au-  
 thority and severity of *Brutus*, with all the Ori-  
 entall Regions, were not of force to hold them  
 in disposition to maintain that Liberty, which  
 helike the first *Brutus* had restored them. Which  
 sprung from that corruption, which *Marinus*  
 his faction spread among the people; whereof  
*Cesar* coming to be the Chiefe, could so  
 blind that multitude, that they could not per-  
 ceive the yoke, which he himself put on their  
 neck. And though this example of Rome be  
 better than any other, yet will I alledge to  
 this purpose, some people known in our  
 eyes. And therefore I say, that no meanes  
 could ever bring *Milan* or *Naples* to their free-  
 dome, by reason of the infection of all their  
 members. Which appeared after the death of  
*Philip Visconti*, when *Milan* desiring to recover  
 her liberty, neither was able, nor knew how  
 to keepe it. Yet that of Rome was a great hap-  
 piness, that their Kings grew naught suddenly,  
 that they were banishd, and that before the in-  
 fection was gone down into the bowels of that  
 Citie, which was the occasion that those

E

many

many tumults, which were raised in Rome (men doing it to a good end) did not hurt, but help the Commonwealth: And we may make this conclusion, that where the matter is corrupted, lawes, though well made, profit little, unless they have such a maker, that with strong hand forces obedience to them, till the matter become good: which, whether it hath ever happened, I know not, or whether it be possible it can happen: for it is plain, as a little before I said, that a City declining by corruption of matter, if ever it chances to rise again, it is meerly by the vertue of one man, whom then living, and not by the vertue of the generality, that keeps the good lawes in force: and suddenly when that man is dead, it returns to the old guise, as it came to pass at *Thebes*, which, by the vertue of *Epaminonda* while he liv'd, could subsist in forme of a Republique and government, but he being gone, it fell into the former disorders. The reason is, because a man cannot live so long a time as is sufficient to disaccostome them to the ill, and accostome them throughly to the good. And if one man of a very long life, or two vertuous Governors successively continued, do not dispose of them to good, when one of them failes, as I have said before, they are presently ruined, unless the other with many dangers, and much bloodshed recover them out of destruction. For that corruption and unfitness for freedome, arises from an inequality, that is in the City: and if a man would reduce it to equality, he must use many extraordinary wayes, which few know or will serve themselves of, as other where more particularly shall be said.

## CHAP. XVIII.

*In what manner in a corrupted City a free state may be maintained, being gotten; or how when they have it not, it may be gotten, and well order'd.*

I Thinke, it will not be out of the way, nor disagreeing to the former discourse, to consider whether in a City disordered, a free State can be preserv'd, that being there a foot already; or not being there, how it may be attain'd, and then reduc'd to good order. Whereupon, I say, that it is very hard to do the one or the other: and though it be almost impossible to give a strict rule thereof (because we should necessarily proceed according to the degrees of the corruption) yet it not being unfit to reason of every thing, I shall not let this pass. And I presuppose a city corrupted in extremity, from whence I shall come more to augment such a difficulty, because there are no lawes nor ordinances sufficient to bridle a universall corruption. For as there is need of lawes, to preserve good customes; so, to have the lawes well observ'd, there is need of good customes. Besides this, the ordinances and lawes made in a Republique at birth thereof, when men were good, serve not to purpose afterwards, when once they are growne vicious. And if the lawes vary being accommodated according to the accidents, seldome or never vary the old orders of the city: which makes that the

new lawes suffice nor, because the orders that continue in force do corrupt. And to lay this part more plain to the understanding, I say, that in Rome there was the order of government, or rather of the state, and the lawes afterwards which together with the Magistrates did bridle the Citizens. The order of the state was the authority of the people, of the Senate, of the Tribuns, and of the Consuls the manner of demanding or creating of Magistrates and the manner of making lawes. These orders little or nothing did they vary among the Citizens; the lawes varied which bridled the citizens, as did that law against adulteries, against expences, against ambition, and many others, according as by degrees the citizens grew corrupted. But the orders of state standing steadfast, which in the time of corruption were no longer good, those lawes which were renew'd again, were not of force to keep men good, but would have been well helpt, if when the lawes were renew'd, the orders also had been chang'd. And that it is true that such orders in a corrupted city were not good, it is expressly seen in two principal heads. As for the creation of Magistrates, and making lawes, the people of Rome gave the Consulate and the other Prime degrees of the city, onely to those that sued for them. This order was in the beginning good, because none stood for them, but those citizens that esteem'd themselves worthy of them, and to receive the repulse was a shame; so that to be thought worthy, every one did well. But this way afterwards in a corrupted City prov'd very hurtfull; for not the best deserving men, but the most powerfull, sued for the magistracy, and those of

(small)

small power (howsoever vertuous) forbore to demand them for fear.

It came not to this inconvenient, at once, but by degrees, as men fall into all other inconveni-  
nents. For the Romans having brought under Africa, and Asia, and reduc'd well nigh all Greece to their obedience, doubted no way of their liberty, and thought they had no more enemies could scare them. Thus farre their security, and the weakness of their enemies workt, that the people of Rome in bestowing the Consulate, regarded not vertue so much as favour, raising to that dignity those that could make most friends, not those that knew best how to subdue their enemies. After, from those that had most favour, they fell to give them to those that had most power. So that the good, by reason of the defect of this order, were quite excluded. A Tribun of the people and any other Citizen might propound a law to the people, and thereupon every Citizen had the liberty to speak either in favour of it, or against it, before it were determin'd of. This order was commendable, while the integrity of the Citizens held: for it was alwayes well, that every one may give his opinion thereupon, that the people, having heard every one, may after make choyce of the best. But the Citizens being grown mischievous, this order became naught; for those that were powerfull onely propounded lawes, not for the common good, but to advance their own powers, and against those dar'd none to speak, for fear of these. So that the people was brought either by falshood or force to determine their own ruine. Therefore it was necessary, to the end that Rome in her corrupted age should maintaine her liberty,

that as in the progress of her life she had made new lawes, so should she have made new orders: for other orders and other manners of living ought to be ordain'd in a good subject, and others in a bad; nor can the forme be like, where the matter is quite contrarily dispos'd. But these orders are either to be renewed all of a sudden when they are discovered to be no longer good, or else by little and little, when their defaults be taken notice of by every one; I say, that either the one or the other of these two things are almost impossible. For to renew them by degrees, it is fit a very wise man should be the cause of it, who should foresee this inconvenient as farre off: and when any of these arise, it is a very likely thing that none of these may step forth, and when they should they would never be able to perswade another what they conceiv'd; because men accustomed alwaies to live in one manner, will not alter it; and the rather not seeing that evil present, which is to be shew'd by conjectures. Touching the innovation of these orders on a sudden when every one knowes they are not good; I say, that this unprofitableness, which is easily knowne, is hard to correct; for to effect this ordinary meanes serve not, they being rather hurtfull; but of necessity extraordinary remedies are to be put in practise, as violence and war; and in any case ought a man strive to become prince of that city that he may have power to order it at his pleasure. And because the restoring of a city to a politique and a civil government, presupposes a good man; and by violence to become Prince of a Commonwealth presupposes an evil man, for this cause it shall very seldome come to pass, that a good man will  
ever

ever strive to make himself Prince by mischievous wayes, although his ends therein be all good; nor will a wicked man by wicked meanes aiming to be Prince, do good; nor ever comes it into his heart to use that authority well, which by evil meanes he came to. From all these things above written arises the difficulty or impossibility, that is in corrupted cities, thereto maintaine a Republique, or to create one anew. And when it were to be created or maintained, it were fittest to reduce it rather towards a popular state; to the end that those men, who by reason of their insolence cannot be amended by the lawes, might in some manner be restrained as it were by a regal power. And to constrain them by any other way to become good, would either be a most cruel attempt, or altogether impossible. As T. said before, that Cleomachus did, who that he might command alone slew the Ephors; and if Romulus for the same reasons slew his brother, and Titus Tatius the Sabine, but afterwards exercised very virtuously their authority: yet it is to be noted that neither the one nor the other of them had the subject staid with that corruption, whereof we have discoursed in this Chapter: and therefore they might intend well; and when they did not, give colour to a bad designe with a good success.

## CHAP. XIX.

*A very mean Prince may easily subsist, succeeding a brave and valourous Prince: but a mean one following a mean, brings a State into great hazard.*

**W**Hen we consider the valour, and the manner of *Romulus*, *Numa*, and *Tullus* proceedings, the first Roman Kings, we shall find, that Rome hit upon a very great fortune, having the first King fierce and warlike, the second peaceable and religious, the third of like courage to *Romulus*, and a lover of war rather than peace. For in Rome it was necessary, that in her infancy there should arise some one to order her in the course of civil government; but in like manner it was afterwards needfull that the other Kings should, betake themselves again to *Romulus* his valour, otherwise that City would have become effeminate, and been prey'd on by her neighbours. Whence we may observe, that the successor, though not of so great valour as the predecessor, is able to maintain a State by the valour of him that hath govern'd it before, and enjoy the fruits of his labour: but if it come to pass, either that he be of long life or that after him there follows no other of like valour as the first, of necessity that kingdom must go to ruine. So on the contrary, if two of great valour successively follow one the other, it is often seen, they effect mighty things, and eternize their names. *David* was a man for armes, for learning and judgement excellent: and



and such was his valour, that having overcome and subdued his neighbours, he left his son *Solomon* a peaceable Kingdom, which he might well maintain by peacefull meanes, without any war, and happily possess the fruits of his fathers vertue. But he could not leave it now to *Roboam* his sonne, who not resembling his Grandfather in vertue, nor having the like good hap his father had, with much ado remain'd heire to the sixth part of the Kingdom. *Bajazet* the Turkish Sultan, although he gave himself rather to peace then war, yet could he also enjoy his father *Mahomets* labors; who having as *David* beaten all his neighbours left him a settled Kingdom, easie to be continued by peace: but if his sonne *Selimus*, now reigning, had resembled the Father and not the Grandfather, that Kingdom had gone to wrack. But we see this man like to ourgoe his Grandfathers glory. Whereupon I agree with these examples, that after an excellent Prince a feeble one may subsist, but after one feeble one a Kingdom cannot stand with another. unless it be such a one as *France*, which subsists by force of her ancient ordinances. And those are weak Princes, that are not in the exercise of war. And therefore I conclude with this discourse, that such was *Romulus* his valour, that it could give space to *Numa Pompilius* for many years by peacefull means to govern *Rome*. But him followed *Tullus*, who by his courage recover'd *Romulus* reputation: after him came *Anus*, so endowed by nature, that he knew how to use peace, and support war. And first he address'd himself in a peaceable way; but presently when he knew that his neighbours, thinking him effeminate, undervalu'd

him, he consider'd that to maintain Rome, he was to apply himself to the warres, and rather to follow *Romulus* his steps, than *Numa*. Hence let all Princes, that hold a State, take example, that he that resembles *Numa*, shall either keep it or lose it, as the times prove, and fortunes wheele turns; but he that takes after *Romulus*, arm'd as he with wisdom and force, shall hold it in any case, unless by an obstinate and overmightie power it be wrested from him. And certainly we may well think, if Rome had light upon a man, for her third King, who knew not how by armes to recover her reputation, she could never afterwards, or not without much adoe, have raken root, or attain'd that grow'th she after grew to. And thus whiles she liv'd under the Kings, she ran the hazzard of ruining under a weake or naughty King.

---

#### CHAP. XX.

*Two continued successions of vertuous Princes worke great effects; and Commonwealths well ordered of necessity have vertuous successions: And therefore are their gains and increases great.*

**A**FTER Rome had banisht her Kings, she was deliver'd of those dangers which, as is before said, she hazzarded, a feeble or naughty King succeeding in her. For the sum of the Empire was reduc'd unto Consuls, who came not to the government, by inheritance, or treachery, or by extream ambition, but by the voices of the Citizens; and they were alwaies very worthy men, whose vertue and fortune

time Rome enjoying, could from time to time attain to her vastest greatness, in but so many more years, as she had been under her Kings. For we see, that two continued successions of brave Princes are of force enough to conquer the whole world, as was *Philip of Macedon*, and *Alexander the great*. Which so much the rather ought a Republick do, having the means to choose not only two successions, but an infinite number of valorous Princes, who follow one the other, which valourous succession may alwaies be in every well order'd Common-wealth.

## CHAP. XXI.

*What blame that Prince or Republick deserves, that wants soldiers of his own subjects.*

**T**H E Princes of these times, and the modern Republicks, who for defences or offences want soldiers of their own, may be ashamed of themselves, and consider by the example of *Tullus*, that this defect is not for want of men fit for war, but by their fault, who had not the understanding to make their men soldiers. For *Tullus*, Rome having been forty years in peace, found not (when he succeeded in the Kingdom) a man that had been ere at war. Yet he intending to make war, serv'd not himself either of the *Sannites* or *Tuscan*, nor of others train'd up in armes, but us'd as a very prudent man, to make use of his own people. And such was his vertue, that on a sudden with his discipline he made them very good soldiers. Truer it is than any other truth,

truth, if where men are, there want soldiers; it is the Princes fault, nor any other defect either of situation or nature. Whereof we have a very late example: For every one knows, how of late daies the King of England assayl'd the Kingdom of France, and took no other soldiers than his own people. And by reason that Kingdom had not been at war above thirty years before, it had neither soldier nor Captain that ever had been at war; yet he nothing doubted with those to set upon a Kingdom furnish with Captains and good Armies, who had continually born armes in the warrs of Italy. All this proceeded from that this King was a very wise man, and that Kingdom well govern'd; which in time of peace neglected not military discipline. Pelopidas and Epaminondas, Thebans, after they had set Thebes at liberty, and drawn her out of bondage of the Spartan government, perceiving well they were in a City accustomed to servitude, and in the midst of effeminate people, yet made no difficulty (such was their vertue) to train them up in arms, and with those to go and meet the Spartan Armies in the field, and overcome them. And he that makes relation of it, saies, that these two prov'd in short time, that not only in Lacedemon soldiers were bred, but in any other place where men are bred, if they found any could train them in the exercise. As it appears that Tullus knew how to train them to the war. And Virgill could not better express this opinion, nor with other words come near it, where he saies:

Residesq; movebit

Tullus in arma vires

People

People with peace grown dull, that were us'd  
 armes.

Tullus shall soldiers make

# CHAP. XXII.

What we may observe in the case of the three  
 Horatij Romans, and the three Curiatij Al-  
 bans.

**T**ULLUS the Roman King and Metius  
 the Alban made an agreement, that that  
 people should be Lord of the other, whose  
 three, above mentioned, champions vanquish'd  
 the others. All the Curiatij, Albans, were  
 slain; there remain'd alive onely one of the  
 Horatij, Romans; and by this, Metius King of  
 the Albans with his people became subject to  
 the Romans. And this Horatius the Conque-  
 rour returning into Rome, and meeting one  
 of his own sisters, who had been married to  
 one of the three dead Curiatij, that lamented  
 the death of her husband, slew her. Where-  
 upon that Horatius was brought into judge-  
 ment, and after many disputes freed, rather  
 at his Fathers suite, than for his own merits,  
 Where three things are to be considered. One,  
 that the whole fortune of the State ought ne-  
 ver be hazzarded with a part of the forces.  
 The other, that in a City well govern'd  
 faults be never made amends for with deserts:  
 The third, that matches were never wisely  
 made, where a man ought or can doubt the  
 performance will not follow. For so much  
 imports it a City to become subject, that a  
 man

man ought not believe, that any of those Kings or people would rest content, that three of their fellow citizens should have brought them to this yoke; of which mind we saw *Metim* was: who, though presently after the Romans victory, he acknowledg'd himself vanquish't, and promis'd obedience to *Tullus*, yet in the first expedition they were to meet against the *Vesentes*, it appear'd, how he sought to deceive him; as he, that was too late aware of his rashness in the bargain he made. And because we have spoken enough of this third thing to be noted, we shall speak onely of the other two, in the two following Chapters.

### CHAP. XXIII.

*That the whole fortune ought not be laid at stake, where the whole forces try not for it: and for this cause it is often hurtfull to guard the passages.*

**N**Ever was he thought good gamester, that would hazzard his whole rest, upon less then the strength of his whole game: And this is done divers waies. One is, doing as *Tullus* and *Metim* did, when they committed the whole fortune of their countrey, and the valour of so many men as the one and the other had in their armies, to the valour and fortune of three of their citizens, which were but a very small part of either of their forces. Nor did they consider, how by this adventure all the toyle their ancestors had taken in ordering the Commonwealth

so,

to, that it might long continue free, and to make the citizens defenders of their liberty, was all in vain, it being left in the hands of so few to lose it. Which thing those Kings could not have known how more to have undervalued. And for the most part they likewise fall into the same inconvenient, who (upon the enemies approach) intend to keep the hard places and guard the passages. For this resolution will alwayes be hurtfull, unless in that hard passage thou canst bring together all thy whole forces. And in such case, this course may be well taken. But the place being rough, and it not being possible to hold all thy forces there, there is loss in it. And to judge thus I am perswaded by the example I finde of those, that when they are assaulted by a powerfull enemy, their country being environed with mountaines and rocky places, have never endeavoured to fight with the enemy upon the passages or mountaines, but have gone beyond to encounter them: or when they would not do this, they have expected them among the mountains, in plain and easy places and not mountainous; and the reason thereof hath been given before. For it is not possible to bring many men together to the guard of mountainous places, because provisions for long time cannot easily be furnish'd, and because the passages are streight and capable of few, and therefore not possible to withstand an enemy pressing on with the gross of his army. And it is an easy thing for the enemy, to come on with his gross; because his intention is but to pass on, and not to stay. And it is impossible for him that awaits him, to await in gross, having to lodge there for a longer

ger time, not knowing when the enemy will pass in places ( as I said ) streight and barren. Loosing therefore that passage which thou hadst intended to keep, and wherein thy people and thy army repos'd some trust, most commonly there enters such a terror into the rest of thy people, that without any means to make trial of their valor, thou art left the loser, and with part of thy forces thou hast lost all thy fortunes. Every one knows with what difficulty *Anniball* past the *Alpes*, which divides *Lombardy* from *France*, and those, which divide *Lombardy* from *Tuscany*; yet the *Romans* first expected him upon the *Tesin*, and afterwards upon the plain of *Arezzo*; and would rather have their army wasted by their enemies, in places where they might overcome, then bring it upon the *Alpes*, where likely it would have been destroyed by the malignity of the place. And whosoever shall with discretion read histories, shall find that very few expert Commanders have assayed to keep the like passages, for these reasons we have said; and because they cannot all divide themselves, the mountains being as open fields, and not having only ordinary and accustomed, but many by-waies, though not known to strangers, yet to the inhabitants, by whose help thou shalt be guided any way in despite of the opposers. Whereof we can alleadg a very late example. In the year 1515 when *Francis* the first King of *France* intended to pass into *Italy*, to recover the State of *Lombardy*, the greatest ground they had that dissuaded his enterprise, was, that the *Swisses* would stop his passage on the mountains. And as after experience shew'd it, this ground of theirs was slight. For that King having

left



left aside two or three places kept by them, came from thence by another way unknown, and was sooner in *Italy* then any were aware of him. So that herewith being daunted, they retir'd into *Milan*, and all the people of *Lombardy* took the *French* party, having fall'd in the opinion they had, that the *French* men would be stop'd on the top of the mountains.

## CHAP. XXIII.

*Commonwealths* well order'd appoint rewards and punishments for their people, and never recompence the one with the other.

THE deserts of *Horatius* had been exceeding great, having by his valour vanquish'd the *Curiatij*. His offence was horrible, having slain his sister. Norwithstanding such a kind of homicide so much displeas'd the *Romans* that it brought them to dispute, whether they should grant him his life, though his merits were so great and so fresh: Which thing, to him that looks but superficially on it, would seem an example of popular ingratitude. Yet he that shall examin better, and with more consideration inquire, what the orders of *Commonwealths* ought to be, shall rather blame that people for having absolv'd him, then for having had a mind to condemn him. And this is the reason, For never any *Republick* in good order, cancell'd the faults of their citizens with their deserts. But having ordain'd rewards for good service, and punishments for deservice, and having rewarded one when he had done well, if afterwards he commit any offence, they chastise him without any regard

gard to his former merits. And when these rewards are strictly observ'd, a city continues long free, otherwise it would soone go to ruine. For if a man grown into great reputation for some notable peece of service done to the state, should take upon him the confidence that he could without danger of punishment commit any offence, in a short time would he become so unreasonably insolent, that the civill state could no longer consist. It is very necessary, if we would have punishment for offences fear'd, alwayes to reward good deserts, as it appears they did at Rome. And though the Republique be but poore, and can bestow but little, yet may the subject well content himselfe with that little; for for even a small gift bestowed on any one, for requitall of a good, though great, shall finde with him that receives it an honourable and thankfull acceptance. The story of *Horatius Cocles* is very well knowne, and that also of *Mucius Scaevola*; how the one bore up the enemies upon a bridge, till it was cut off behinde him; the other burnt his owne hand, for having mistaken, when he meant to have killed *Porsena* the *Tuscan* King. To these for two such notable acts was given by the publick two acres of ground to each of them. And marke also the story of *Manlius Capitolinus*. To him for having delivered the Capitoll from the French, which were encamp'd before it, they who together with him were within besieg'd gave him a small measure of flour, which reward (according to the then present fortune of Rome) was large, and of such a quality too, that afterwards *Manlius*, either moov'd by envy, or his owne ill nature, occasion'd a sedition in Rome, and seeking

seeking to get the people of his faction, was without any regard had of his good desert, thrown headlong downe from that Capitoll which he, to his great renowne, had formerly deliver'd.

# CHAP. XXV.

*Whoſoever would reforme an ancient ſtate in a free city, let him retain at leaſt the ſhadow of the old cuſtomes.*

**H**E that hath a minde to reforme the ſtate of a City, to bring it into liking, and the better with every ones ſatisfaction to maintaine it, is forc'd to keep the forme or ſhadow of the ancient cuſtomes, to the end the people perceive not the change of them, though indeed they are quite new, & farre different from the fore-paſt. For they generally ſatisfy themſelves as well with that that ſeemes to be, as that that is. Nay rather are they many times more mov'd with appeaſances, then truths. And for this cauſe, the Romans knowing this neceſſity, when firſt they lived free, having in change of one King created two Conſuls, would not ſuffer them to have more then twelve Liſtors, becauſe they ſhould not ontgo the number of thoſe that attend on the King. Moreover, when the yearly ſacrifice was made in Rome, which could not be done without the preſence of the King, and the Romans willing that the people, by the abſence of a King, ſhould not find a lacke of any of the old ceremonies, created a head of the ſaid ſacrifice, whom they call'd the King Prielt; who yet was lower in degree;

degree, then the high Priest: So that this way the people was satisfied of that sacrifice, and never had any occasion by any default in it, to wish their Kings again restored. And this they all ought to observe, that would cancell the old manner of living in a city, and reduce it to a new and free course. For being these novelties somewhat moove mens mindes, therefore thou shouldst do well to call thy wits about thee, and work these alterations in the old mould, as much as might be. And if the magistrates, both in number, and authority, and durance, differ from the ancient, at least let them keep the same name: And this (as I have said) rather ought he to observe, who meanes to take upon him an absolute authority, which is call'd a Tyranny, for he is to innovate every thing.

---

#### CHAP. XXVI.

*A new Prince in a city or Province taken by him, should make innovations in every thing.*

**W**hosoever becomes Prince of a city or state, and the rather, when his forces are but weake to keep it, and means not to hold it neither as a Kingdome, nor as a regular Republique, the best expedient he can find, for the maintenance of that Principality, is, that he (himself being a new Prince) make every thing new in the state, as it is ordinary in the cities to make new governments with new names, with new jurisdictions, with new men, and to enrich the poore, as *David* did, when he came to the crowne. That filled the hungry  
with

with good things, and the rich sent empty away:  
 To build moreover new cities, and to pull  
 down some that are built, to remove the in-  
 habitants from one place to another, and in-  
 some to leave nothing untouched in that Pro-  
 vince, that there be neither degree, order, nor  
 state, nor wealth, but he that possesses it, ac-  
 knowledges it from these. And to take for pa-  
 terne Philip of Macedon Alexanders father,  
 who by these means became of a little King,  
 Prince of all Greece. And he that writes of him  
 sayes, that he chang'd his people from Province  
 to Province, as herds-men change their herds  
 from pasture to pasture. These courses are  
 very cruel, and against all Christian and  
 humane manner of living. And every man  
 ought refuse to be a King, and desire rather to  
 live a private man, then reigne, so much to  
 the ruine of mankind. Yet he that will not  
 use that first way of good, if he will preserve  
 himself, must enter into this of evil. But men  
 take to certain middle wayes, which are very  
 naught; for they know not how to be all good,  
 nor all evil: as shall be shewed for example in  
 the next chapter.

## CHAP. XXVII.

It is very seldom, that men know how to be alto-  
 gether mischievous, or altogether good.

Pope Julius the second going in the year  
 1503 to Bolonia to chase out of that state the  
 house of the Bentivogli, which had held the  
 Principallity of that city a hundred years, had  
 a minde also to draw John Pagolus Baglioni out  
 of Perugia, whereof he was a Tyrant, as he  
 that had conspired against all Tyrants, that  
 were

Qui e-  
 farien-  
 res im-  
 plevit  
 bonis  
 & di-  
 vites  
 dimisit  
 laanes.

were seized of any of the Churches lands: and being come near *Perugia*, with this resolution knowne to every one, stayed not to enter the City with his Army to guard him, but went in without a guard, notwithstanding that *John Pagolus* was therein with much people, which he had got together for his defence. So that carried forward by that rage wherewith he governed all things, with his ordinary guard he put himself in his enemies hands, whom afterwards he led away with him, leaving a governor in that city, to keep it for the Church. By the wise men, that were with the Pope, was noted the rashness of the Pope, and the base cowardise of *John Pagolus*; nor could they conceit, whence it came, that he did not to his perpetual renown suppress then at once his enemy, and enrich himself with the prey, all the Cardinalls being then with the Pope, who had the best of all their Jewels with them. Neither could any man think that he abstain'd either for goodness or conscience sake, that withheld him. For into the heart of a wicked man, that incestuously convers'd with his sister, and that had slain his cousins and nephewes, to rule, there could never enter any religious respect. Whereupon every one concluded, that men knew not how to be honourably mischievous, nor perfectly good. And where a mischief hath in it greatness, and is generous in some part, they know not how to enter into it. So *John Pagolus*, who made no account of being an incestuous and publique parricide, knew not (or to say better) had not the courage, though upon just occasion, to do an exploit that every one should have admir'd him for, and he left of himself an everlasting memory

memory, being the first that shew'd the  
 Prelate, what a thing it is to see at naught, him  
 that liues, and reignes, as they did; and so had  
 done an act, whose greatness had surpass all  
 infamy, and what ever danger could depend  
 on it.

# CHAP. XXVIII.

*For what reason the Romans were less ungratefull  
 to their citizens, than the Athenians.*

**W**Hosoever reads the actions of Repub-  
 liques, shall find in all of them some  
 kinde of ingratitude towards their citizens,  
 but less in Rome, than in Athens, or perad-  
 venture than in any Commonwealth else. And  
 if we would enquire after the reason thereof,  
 speaking of Rome and Athens, I think it hap-  
 pen'd, because the Romans had less occasion to  
 suspect their citizens, than had the Athenians.  
 For at Rome, considering her from the  
 banishment of her Kings till Sylla, and Ma-  
 rium, her liberty was never taken away by  
 any of her citizens, so that she had no great  
 reason to suspect them, or by consequence  
 suddenly to offend them. The contrary befell  
 Athens; for her liberty being taken from her  
 in her most flourishing time, and under colour  
 of doing her some good, so soon as she became  
 free, remembring the wrong she had receiv'd,  
 and the slavery she had indur'd, became a sharp  
 revengeress, not only of her citizens faults,  
 but of the shadow of their faults.

From hence came the banishment and the  
 death of so many rare men. From hence the  
 order of the Ostracisme, and all other violence,  
 which

which in several times by her was done to the prime of her citizens, And that is very true which those that write of civil government say, that the people bite more fiercely, after they have recover'd their liberty, than while they have continually maintain'd it. Whosoever then considers what is said, will neither in this blame Athens, nor commend Rome: but will accuse onely the necessity, because of the diversity of accidents which did arise in this city. For he shall see, if narrowly he look into affairs, if Romes liberty had been taken away, as was that of Athens, Rome would not have been more pitifull to her citizens, than was Athens. Whereof one may make a very good guess, by that which chanc'd, after the banishment of the Kings, against *Collatine*, and *Publius Valerius*: whereof the first (although he had his hand in the setting of Rome at liberty) was banisht, for no other occasion, than that he was surnamed *Tarquin*. The other having onely given suspicion of himself, by building a house upon the hill *Celium*, was like to have bin banisht. So that we may well think (seeing how suspicious and severe Rome was in these two things) that she would have bin as ungratefull, as Athens, if, as she in her infancy and before her growth, had bin so much wrong'd. And that I need not turn again to this subject of ingratitude, I shall speak further of it in the Chapter following.



## CHAP. XXIX.

Whether of two be the more ungratefull; a people,  
or a Prince.

**M**E thinks it is not out of the purpose  
of our former matter, to discourse, whe-  
ther a Prince or people give us greater exam-  
ples of ingratitude. And the better to argue this  
part, I say, this vice of ingratitude growes richer  
of covetousness or suspitions. For when a  
people or Prince have sent out a Commander  
of theirs, in any expedition of importance,  
where that Commander overcoming hath  
gain'd a great deale of glory, that Prince or  
people is in like manner bound to reward him:  
and if in lieu of reward he disgraces him, or  
wrong's him, incited thereunto by avarice, not  
willing by reason of this covetousness, to sat-  
isfie him, he commits an error, without excuse,  
and drawes upon himself everlasting infamy. Yet  
there are many Princes, who offend in this kind.

And *Cornelius Tacitus* declares in this Sentence Pro-  
the occasion. It is more pleasing to revenge an inju-  
ry, then to requite a courtesy: for thank is thought a  
burden, but revenge a gain. But when he rewards  
him not, but rather hurts him, not through  
avarice, but upon suspicion, then the people  
or Prince deserves some excuse. And of these  
ingratitude's practis'd for such cause we read  
many; for that Commander who valorously  
hath gain'd his Lord a Kingdom, by conquer-  
ing his enemies, replenishing himself with glo-  
ry, and his souldiers with riches, he ferce gets  
such reputation with his own souldiers, with  
his tur.

his enemies, and his Kings own subjects, that that victory can no wayes favour well to his Lord that put him in the imployment. And because mens natures are ambitious, and full of suspicion, and know not how to set limits to their fortune, it is impossible, but that suspicion which grows in the Prince after that Commanders victory, shall by himself be increased upon some way or terme insolently used; so that the Prince cannot advise himself otherwise, than to provide for his own safety. And to this end, thinks either to put him to death, or to take away his reputation, which he hath gotten in his army, or among his people; and with all diligence to shew, that his valour got not the victory, but rather it came by chance, or by the enemies cowardise, or by the direction of the other Capitaines, who were together with him in that imployment. After that *Vespasian*, being in *Judea*, was by his army declar'd Emperor, *Antonius Primus*, who was then with another army in *Illiria*, took his part, and came thence into Italy against *Vitellius*, who commanded at Rome, and valorously conquer'd two *Vitellian* armies, and made himself Master of Rome; so that *Mutianus* sent by *Vespasian* found all already gotten by *Antonius* his valor, and all difficulties surpassed. The reward *Antonius* gain'd hereby, was, that *Mutianus* took away his command of the army, and by little and little made him of no authority in Rome; whereupon *Antonius* went away to *Vespasian*, who was yet in *Asia*, by whom he was so coldly receiv'd, that in a short time depriv'd of all dignity he dyed in despair. And of these examples stories are full. In our daies, every one living knows, with

with what industry and valour *Gonsalvus Ferdinand*, warring in the Kingdom of *Naples* against the Frenchmen for *Ferdinand* King of *Aragon*, brought that Kingdom under his obedience; and how he had for reward of his conquest, that *Ferdinand* parted from *Aragon*, and came to *Naples*, and first discharged him of his command of soldiers, afterwards took from him the fortresses, and then brought him away with him into *Spain*, where a while after he dyed in disgrace. Therefore this suspicion is so natural in Princes, that they cannot escape it; and it is impossible they prove thankfull to those, who by victory have under their banners made great conquests. And from that which a Prince is not free, 'tis no marvaile, nor a thing worthy of greater note, that a people is not free. For a city living free hath two ends, the one to gain, the other to keep it self free; and it cannot be, but in the one or the other by excess of love it may erre. Touching the errors in getting, they shall be spoken of in their place: as for the errors in maintaining their liberty, there are these among others, to hurt those citizens they should reward, and to suspect those they should repose upon. And though these wayes in a Republique come to corruption, cause great evil, and that many times they hasten it to a Tyranny, as at Rome it befell *Caesar*, who by strong hand took away that, which unthankfulness denied him; yet in a Commonwealth not corrupted, are they causes of great good, and make a free more free, keeping men for fear of punishment more reverent and less ambitious. It is true, that of all people that ever reign'd, upon the

causes above alleadg'd, Rome was the least ungratefull; for of her ingratitude we may say, there is no other example, but that of *Scipio*; for *Coriolanus* and *Camillus* were banish'd for the injury, the one and the other had done the people. But the one was not pardoned, because he alwaies continued his malicious mind against the people; the other was not only recall'd, but all his lifetime after, ador'd as a Prince. But the ingratitude us'd towards *Scipio*, grew from a suspicion the citizens began to have of him, which was never conceived of the others; which arose first from the greatness of the enemy *Scipio* had overcome; from the reputation that the conquest of so long and perilous a war had given him; from the quick dispatch of it: from those favours which youth, wisdom, and other, his memorable virtues had gotten him. Which things were so great, that the Magistrates of Rome fear'd his authority, more than any thing. Which displeas'd the grave men, as a matter not accustomed in Rome. And his manner of living was thought so extraordinary, that *Priscus Cato*, reputed a man of great integrity, was the first that stir'd against him, and said, that a city could not be called free, where the Magistrates stood in fear of one citizen. So if the people of Rome in this case followed *Cato's* opinion, they deserve that excuse, which I said before, those Princes and people merit, who through suspicion prove unthankfull. Wherefore concluding this discourse, I say, that whether this vice be used either through suspicion or covetousness, it shall appear that the people never put it in practise upon covetousness, and upon suspicion less than Princes, having less cause to be suspicious, as quickly it shall be declared. CHAP.

## CHAP. XXX.

What means a Prince or Republique should use to avoid this vice of ingratitude: or what A Commander or Citizen, to be free from their danger.

A Prince to avoyd this necessity of living with suspicion, or being ungratefull, ought personally go to the warrs, as in the beginning did those Roman Emperors, and in our daies the Turk does; and as those that are valorous have done, and yet do. For overcoming, the glory and the gain is all their own. And when they are not there in person, (the glory of the action belonging to another) they think, they cannot well make that conquest their own, unless they part out that glory in another which they themselves knew not how to get, and so become ungratefull, and unjust. And without doubt greater is their loss, than their gain; but when either through negligence, for lack of judgment they stay idle at home, and send out a Commander, I have no other precept to give them, than what they know of themselves. But I advise that Commander, because, as I think, he can hardly escape the nips of unthankfulness, that he betake himself to one of these two expedients; either presently upon his victory let him leave his army, and put himself into his Princes hands, abstaining from any action favouring of insolence or ambition, that so he having no occasion given of suspicion may have reason to reward him, or at

least not hurt him: Or when he likes not to do thus, let him resolutely take part against him, and use all those means whereby he may think to hold from his Prince what he hath gotten, procuring the soldiers and the subjects good will; let him make friendship with his neighbors, possess with his men the strong places, corrupt the Chief of his army, and assure himself of those he cannot; and this way endeavor to punish his Lord for the ingratitude he would have us'd towards him. Otherwaies there are not; but (as it was said before) men know not how to be wholly vicious, nor wholly good. And alwaies it comes to pass, that presently after the victory, they will not part with their army; behave themselves with modesty they cannot, and to stand upon defiance in some honorable termes they know not how. So that being irresolute which way to take, between delay and doubt they are suppressed. But to a Republique which would avoyd this vice of ingratitude, we cannot apply the same remedy, we may to a Prince; that is, that she go herself, and not send out in her employments, being necessitated to make use of some one of her citizens. It sures well therefore, that for her best remedy, she take the same course the Commonwealth of Rome took, to be less unthankfull then all others. Which grew from her manner of government; for the whole city, both Nobles and Plebeians being train'd up to war, there arose alwaies in Rome in all ages men of such valour, experience, and reputation, that there was no occasion to doubt of any one of them, they being many who kept one another in order. And so long they continued in integrity,

tegrity, and with regard not to make others jealous of their ambition, nor give occasion to the people to do them harme, taking them for ambitious persons; for if any one were made Dictator, he got most honor by it, that laid down his Dictatorship soonest. And so such like way not being sufficient to raise suspect, could not breed ingratitude. So that a Republique that would not have cause given her to be unthankfull, should governe her self in the same manner Rome did. And a citizen, that would be free from all their despights, should follow the same steps the citizens of Rome went.

## CHAP. XXXI.

*That the Roman Commanders were never extraordinarily punish'd for any error committed; nor at all punish'd, when either by their ignorance, or upon some untucky resolution taken by them the Commonwealth suffer'd loss.*

THE Romans, as formerly we have discours'd, were not only less ungrateful, than other Commonwealths, but also were more pitifull, and more advised in the punishment of the Generalls of their armies, than any else. For if their fault proceeded from malice, yet they gently chastis'd them; but if it was through ignorance, they were so far from punishing them, that they rewarded and honour'd them. This manner of proceeding was well consider'd by them.

For they judg'd it a matter of great importance to those that commanded their armies, to have their mind free, without any clog upon it, and without any outwards respects to restrain them in their resolutions; because they would not add new difficulties and danger to a thing by itself hard and dangerous: advising well that with these hindrances a man cannot bravely execute his designs. For example, when they sent an army into Greece, against *Philip of Macedon*, or into Italy against *Anniball*, or against those people they first overcame; That Commander to whom the employment was committed had the vexation of all those cares that follow such charges which are of weight and importance. Now if to such cares, this were added, that many examples of the Romans were recorded, where they had crucified or otherwise put to death those that had lost any battels, it was impossible, that that Captain among so many suspicions cou'd resolve any thing courageously. Therefore they deeming these sufficiently punish'd with the shame of their loss, they were not willing to startle them with any more grievous punishment. Here is one example, of a fault committed, and not through ignorance. *Sergius* and *Verginius* were incamp'd against the Veyans, each of them commanding a part of the army: *Sergius* was to encounter the Tuscans, and *Verginius* was to lie upon the other side: It chanc'd, that *Sergius* being assaulted by the *Falisci*, and other people, endur'd rather to be quite routed and put to flight, before he would send for ayd to *Verginius*. And on the other side, *Verginius*, staying til he should humble himself, would rather see the



the dishonour of his country, and the ruine of the army, than succour him. A case indeed very exemplary, and of much malice; neither would it have bin for the Commonwealch of Romes reputation, to have let the one or the other pass without censure. True it is, that where another Republique would have punish'd them with death, this punish'd them only in a sum of money. The cause hereof was, not that their offences deserv'd not greater punishment, but because the Romans would in this case, for the reasons already alleadg'd, continue their ancient customes. And touching errors of ignorance, we have no better example, than that of *Maro*; through whose rashness the Romans having bin broken at *Canne* by *Hanniball*, where the Republique came in danger to lose her liberty, yet because it was ignorance and not malice, they not only did not chastise him; but honor'd him, and the whole order of the Senators in him upon the way in his return to Rome; and because they could not thank him for the battel fought, they thank him yet that he was return'd to Rome, and had not despair'd of the Roman State. When *Papirius Censor* would have put *Fabius* to death, for having contrary to his command fought with the *Sampites*, among other reasons which *Fabius* his Father brought against the Dictators obstinacy was this, that the people of Rome, in any loss that ever her Captains had made, had never done that which *Papirius* in a victory would have done.

## CHAP. XXXII.

*A Republique or Prince should not defer to do good unto men, until their necessity requires it.*

**A**Lthough it succeeded happily to the Romans, to have us'd liberality towards the people upon occasion of a sudden danger, when *Porfenna* made war against Rome, to restore the *Tarquins*, where the Senate doubting of the people, lest they would sooner accept of the Kings, than endure out the war; to make themselves sure of them, they took off from them the taxes of salt, and every kind of grievance, saying, the poor contributed enough to the common good, if they did but nourish their children; and thereupon in regard of this benefit, the people expos'd themselves to indure the siege, the famine, and the war. Yet let none, presuming upon this example, delay to gain the good will of the people til the times of danger; for it will never prove so well to them, as it did to the Romans; for the generality will think they have not this good from thee, but from thy adversaries; and being to fear, that, when that necessity is past, thou wilt withhold from them that good which of force thou didst them, they will not think themselves any way beholding to thee. And the reason why this business succeeded well to the Romans, was, because the State was new, and not well settled yet; and that people also had seen, that formerly laws had bin made for their advantage,

as that of appeal to the people; so that they might well persuade themselves, that the good they had, was done them, not so much upon occasion of their enemies coming, as from the good disposition of the Senate towards them. Moreover, the Kings were yet fresh in their memory, by whom they had bin many waies scorn'd, and abus'd. And because such like occasions seldom fall out, it seldom also comes to pass, that the like remedies are of use: whosoever therefore sit at the helme in a state, be it either a Commonwealth, or a Prince, should consider before hand, what contrary times may come upon them, and what men in their troubles they may stand in need of; and therefore should live with them alwaies in such a manner, that upon any accident chancing, they may find them ready and willing to serve their occasions. And he that governs otherwise, either Prince or Republique, but especially a Prince, and afterwards upon the exigent, when danger is at hand, thinks with any benefits to recover or oblige men to him, is much deceiv'd; for he does not onely not secure himself, but hastens his own destruction.

## CHAP. XXX III.

*When an inconvenient is much grown, either in a state, or against a state, it is better to beare with it for a while, then presently to struggle with it.*

**W**Hen the commonwealth of Rome grew in reputation, force, and rule, the neighboring people, who at first were not aware of the harme this new Republique might do them, began, though late, to know their fault, and desiring to remedy that which at first they had neglected, nigh forty several people were joyned together against Rome; whereupon the Romans, among the remedies they were wont to make use of in their extreamest dangers, betook them to create a Dictatour, that is, to give power to one man, that without calling any Councill he might resolve, and without any appeal, he might execute his resolutions. Which remedy, as then it serv'd to purpose, and was the occasion they overcame those eminent dangers: so it was alwaies exceeding profitable in all those occasions, which in the grow'th of the Empire at any time did rise against the Republique. Upon which accident we are first to discourse, how that, when an inconvenient that rises either in a Commonwealth or against a Commonwealth, caus'd by an inward or an outward cause, is become so great, that it begins to make every one afraid, the safer course is, to temporise with it, then strive forthwith to extinguish it. For most commonly it proves, that they who indeavor to quench it  
kindle,

kindle it much more, and suddenly pluck down that mischief upon their heads, which was then but fear'd from thence. And of such like accidents many arise in the Commonwealth, oftner upon inward occasions then outward. Where oftentimes, either a citizen is suffered to lay hold of more forces then is reasonable; or else some law begins to be corrupted, which is the very nerve and life of liberty. And this error is suffer'd to pass on so far, that there is more danger in the remedy, then in the evil. And so much the harder is it to know these inconvenients at their birth, by how much more it seems to agree with mens natures, alwaies to favor things in their beginnings: and these favors are of more force, rather then in any thing else, in those works that seem to have somewhat of vertue in them, and are done by young men. For if in a republique any young nob'e man put forward himself, having in him extraordinary vertue, all the citizens begin to cast their eyes on him, and agree together without any consideration to honor him; so that if he hath any touch of Ambition, meeting with those favors nature affords him, and this accident coming suddenly in place, before the Citizens perceive the errors they are in, it falls out that they have small means to help themselves. And when these, that have the remedies in their powers, wou'd put them in practise, they do but with haste augment his authority. Hereof we might alledge sundry examples; but I will give onely one out of our own city. *Cosmus* of *Medici*, from whom the house of *Medici* in this city took the beginning of their greatness, came into such reputation, through the favor that his own

own wisdom and the other citizens ignorance gave him, that he began to make the state somewhat afraid of him, so that some citizens held it very dangerous to offend him, and others as dangerous to let him alone. But *Nicholas* of *Vizzano* living at the same time, who was esteem'd a very expert man in civil affairs; and being that the first error was made in not knowing the dangers that might arise upon *Cosmus* his reputation, while he liv'd, would never suffer, that they should make the second, which was, that they should endeavor to put him down; judging that such an assay would be altogether the ruine of their state, as in effect it came to pass, which was a'ter his death. For those citizens that were left, not following this advice, made themselves strong against *Cosmus*, and chaf'd him out of *Florence*. Whereupon it follow'd that his faction resenting the injury, a while after recall'd him, and made him Prince of the Commonwealth; to which step he could never have climb'd, without that manifest opposition. The selfsame befell *Rome* with *Caesar*, whose vertue being favor'd by *Pompey* and others, at length came to change their favor into fear, whereof *Cicero* witnesses, saying, that *Pompey* had late begun to fear *Caesar*. Which fear caus'd them to think upon the remedies, and the remedies they us'd hasten'd the ruine of their Commonwealth. I say then, that seeing it is a hard thing to know these evils when they arise, this difficulty being occasion'd by a deceit, where-with most things in their beginning do deceive, the wiser way is to dissemble them, when they are knowne, then to oppose them. For temporizing with, them they either  
are

are extinguish'd of themselves, or at least the  
evill is put off for a longer time. And in all af-  
faires Princes ought to be well advis'd, who in-  
tend either to suppress evils, or to oppose their  
forces and their invasions, that in lieu of hurt  
they do them not good; and thinking to thrust  
on forward a businesse, they draw it not after  
them; or instead of choaking a plant, they water  
it not. And they should well consider, wherein  
the greatest force consists, and when they  
find their powers sufficient to heale what is a-  
misse, they should then apply their strongest re-  
medies; or otherwise, let it alone, nor  
in any case meddle with it; for it would  
fall out as before hath bin said, and as  
it befel the neighbours of Rome; for whom it  
had bin better, after that Rome was so growne  
in strength, with treaties of peace to indeavour  
to quiet it and so yet keep it backward, rather  
then by making a strong warre against it, to  
force it to new courses, and new defences.  
For to what other purpose serv'd their  
conspiracy, then to make them more lively,  
and to thinke upon new wayes, whereby in a  
farre shorter time they much enlarg'd their  
power? Among which, was the creation of a  
Dictatour, by which, new order they not  
onely overcame the dangers that hung over  
their heads, but it was an occasion to stop  
very many mischiefes, which without that  
remedy the commonwealth must needs  
have incur'd.

## CHAP. XXXIIII.

*The Dictatours authority did good, and not harme, to the Commonwealth of Rome; and how authorities which the citizens take upon them of themselves, and not those that are given them by the peoples free voices, are but full to the civill government.*

**T**Hose Romans are by some writer condemned, that found out in that city the way to create a Dictatour, as a thing that in time might occasion the Roman Tyranny; alleadging, that the first tyrant that was in that city, commanded it under the title of a Dictatour, saying, that if this had not bin, *Cesar* could never with any publike title have given any honest colour to his tyranny. Which matter was never well examined by him that holds this opinion, but beleeved without ground. For it was not the name, nor the degree of the Dictatour, that brought Rome into bondage, but it was the authority the Citizens tooke upon themselves through the long continuance of their rule. And if in Rome there had bin wanting the title of a Dictatour, they would have taken another: for forces will easily gaine titles, but not titles forces. And we see it, that the Dictatour, while he was made according to the publike orders, and not by his owne authority, alwayes did good to the city. For those magistrates that are created, and those authorities that are given by extraordinary courses wrong the Republicques, and not those that come the ordinary way. As it appeares it followed in so long a processe of time, that never any Dictatour did otherwise, then



then good to the Commonwealth. Whereof there are very evident proofes. First because to put a citizen in case that he can do hurt, and take extraordinary authority upon him, we must suppose him to have many conditions, which in a Republique not corrupted he can never have; for he must be very rich, and have many adherents and partisans, which he cannot have, if the lawes be strictly observ'd; and in case they ha'l, such kind of men are so doubted; that the citizens free votes seldom meete in them. Moreover, the Dictator was created onely for a time, and not for ever, and onely to remedy the present necessity, for which he was created. And by his authority he had power to resolve by him what courses to take against urgent danger, and to execute any thing without calling a counsell, and to punish any one without appeale. Yet could he do nothing, tending to the diminution of the state, as it would have bin, to take away the Senates authority, or the peoples, to disannull the old ordinances of the city, and to make new, so that, the short time of his Dictatorship meeting with his authority, which was limited to him, and the people of Rome not corrupted, it was impossible he should exceed his bounds, and hurt the city: and, we finde by experience, that he evermore advantag'd it. And indeed among other Roman ordinances, this is one deserves consideration, and worthy to be reckoned among those which contributed to the enlargement of that Empire: for without such like course taken, cities could hardly escape out of such extravagant mischiefs; for the wayes ordinarily us'd in Republicques, which more slowly (being that no counsell, nor magistrate hath

hath power of himselfe to go through with any matter, but in many things have neede of one another, because there goes time in getting together their consents) their remedies are very dangerous, when they are to cure that which cannot stay for time: and therefore Commonwealths among their orders should have some such like way; and the Republique of *Venice* (which is excellen among these modernes) hath reserv'd the authoriry to a few citizens, that in occurrences of importance, without more advice, all of them joyntly of accord may resolve; for when in a Republique there wants such an expedient, it must needs by keeping the old customes go to ruine, or to escape it, break them. And in a Commonwealth, it were to be desir'd, that nothing should chance, which might call in the use of extraordinary courses. For though that extraordinary way at that time did good, yet the example proves of ill consequence: for the custome is brought in, to breake the old orders at first for good, which afterwards under that colour are broken to ill intent. So that a Republique can never be perfect, unlesse with her lawes she hath provided for all things, and for every mischance ordain'd the remedy, and tract out the way of her government: and therefore concluding I say, that those Republicques which in their dangers have not recourse to a Dictatour, or such like authorities, will alwayes in those heavy accidents fall to ruine. And, in this new ordinance the manner of making the choice is to be noted, how judiciously it was provided for by the Romans; for the creation of the Dictatour being some what a disgrace to the Consulls, the heads of the City being as well to come under obedience

obedience, as others; and presupposing, that some distaste hereof might arise among the citizens, they ordein'd the power of making this choice should be in the Consuls; thinking, that when the occasion came, that Rome should stand in need of this Royall power, they would do it with a good will, and that they doing it themselves, it would lesse grieve them: For the hurts, or any evil that a man brings voluntarily upon himself, and of his owne choyce, are farre lesse troublesome, then those that are done him by another: although that afterwards in the latter times, the Romans us'd in lieu of a Dictator, to give such authority to the Consul in these words, *Let the Consul take care the Commonwealth receive no damage.* And to retorne to our matter, I conclude, that the neighbouring inhabitants of Rome by seeking to suppress them, made them not onely provide for their defence, but also gave them the way how they might with more force, better advice, and greater authority offend them.

## CHAP. XXXV.

*The reason, why in Rome the creation of the Decemvirate was hurtfull to the liberty of that Republique, notwithstanding that it was made by publique and free voices.*

AND it seemes contrary to that which was said before, that the authority which is seisd on by violence, not that which is given by suffrages, is hurtfull to Commonweales, as the election of the tenne Citizens created by the people of Rome to make lawes therein, who in time became tyrants in it, and without any respect laid hold on the liberty thereof. Where we ought

ought well consider the manner of giving the authority, and the time for which it is given: and when an absolute authority is given for a long time (calling a yeare or somewhat more a long time) it will alwayes be dangerous, and will produce either good or bad effects, according as the persons to whom it shall be intrusted shall prove good or bad: and if we looke into the authority the ten had, and that which the Dictatours had, we shall find that of the ten farre to outreach the other. For when the Dictatour was created, the Tribuns, the Consuls, and the Senate remain'd still in their authority, nor could the Dictatour take it from them. And if he could deprive one of the Consulship, and remove a nother from the Senate, yet could he not disannull the whole order of Senatours, and make new lawes: so that the Senate, the Consuls, and the Tribuns continuing with their authority, came to be as a guard upon him, to keepe him from swerving out of the right way. But in the creation of the ten there fell out the cleane contrary; for they cashier'd the Consuls and Tribuns, and gave authority of themselves to make lawes and every thing else, as absolutly as the people of Rome. So that being absolute of themselves without Consuls, without Tribuns, without appeal to the people, and hereby having none to looke into their courses, the second yeare they had the meanes, especially moov'd by the ambition of *Appius*, to become insolent. And hereupon it is to be noted, that when it is said, that a power given by free suffrages, never hurt any Commonwealth, we must presuppose, that the people suffer not themselves to be induc'd to give it, unlesse with due circumstances, and at due

due seasons. But when, either being deceiv'd, or upon some other occasion leading them blindfold, they are brought to give it unadvisedly, and in that kind as the people of Rome gave it to the ten, it will befall eternally, as it did to these. Which is easily prov'd, considering the causes that held the Dictators in goodnesse, and those that gave the ten occasion of becomming evill. And advising also how those Republicques have done, that have bin thought well governed, in the giving of authority for a long time, as the *Spartians* gave their Kings, and the *Venetians* their Duke; for a man may perceave that in one or other sort they had their guards upon them, that they who were ill dispos'd could not at their pleasures abuse that authority. Nor avails it in this case, that the master is not corrupted; for an absolute authority corrupts the master in a very short time, gathers friends, and makes partisans, neither is poverty or want of good kindred a let; for wealth, and every other advantage presently runnes after them, as particularly in the creation of the ten we shall see.

## CHAP. XXXVI.

The citizens who have possessed the greatest charges in the Commonwealt, ought not to disdain the lesse, as unworthy of them.

**T**He Romans had made *Marcus Fabius*, and *Caius Marcius* Consuls, and gain'd a very glorious battell of the *Veyentes* and the *Eruticans*, where in *Quintus Fabius* was slaine, the Consuls brother, who had bin Consul the year before. Where we should well consider, how proper

proper the lawes of that citie were for her advancement, and how much those other Republique that trace not her foote steps, deceive themselves. For though the Romans were zealous lovers of glory, yet never did they esteeme it dishonourable at one time to obey, where other whiles they had commanded; and to serve in that army whereof they had bin Commanders, which custome is contrary to the opinion, lawes, and courses of the citizens of our times. And in Venice yet is this error, that a citizen having borne a great office, esteemes it a disgrace to accept of a lesse, and the citie allowes him to refuse it. Which thing though it were honourable for the private, yet is it wholly unprofitable for the public; For a Commonwealth may expect better performance from, and repose more trust in that citizen, who descends from a greater charge to undertake a lesse, then in him that from a lesse arises to the command of a greater. Because they cannot with good reason trust him with their weighty affayres, unless they see men about him of such reverence and vertue that his inexperience may be guided and directed by their vertue and authority. And if in Rome there had bin that custome which is in Venice, and other Republiq; and moderne Kingdomes, that he who had once bin Consul would never goe to the warr after wards, but as Consul, many things very prejudiciall to the free government of the state would have growne thereupon; and through the errors committed by these new men, and by their ambition, which they might have by'd with more freedom, not having those grave men about them, by whose presence they might be kept in awe, that they should not dare to repaite: and

and so they would have become dissolute; which would all have turn'd to the publique losse.

## CHAP. XXXVII.

*What distaste the Agrarian law gave in Rome, and that it is very offensive to make a law in a Commonwealth, that looks far backwards, and yet goes directly against an ancient custome of the Citty.*

**I**T is an opinion of the ancient writers, that men are wont to vex themselves in their crosses, and glut and cloy themselves in their prosperity; and that from the one and the other of these two passions proceede the same affects: for at what time soever men are freed from fighting for necessity, they are presently together by the ears through ambition; which is so powerfull in mens hearts, that to what degree soever they arise, it never abandons them. The reason is, because nature hath created men in such a sort, that they can desire every thing, but not attaine to it. So that the desire of getting being greater then the power to get, thence growes the dislike of what a man enjoyes, and the small satisfaction a man hath thereof. Hereupon arises the change of their states, for some men desiring to have more, and others fearing to lose what have they already, they proceede to enmities and warre, from whence comes the destruction of one country, and the advantage of another. This discourse I have made, because it suffis'd not the Commons of Rome, to secure themselves from the Nobility by creating the Tribunes, to which desire they were forc'd by necessity;

necessity; but that they suddenly, upon the obteining thereof began to contend out of ambition, and thinke to share equally with the nobility both in honours and fortunes; as the things that are in most value with men. Whereupon grew that disease that brought forth the quarrell touching the *Agrarian* law. And in conclusion, caus'd the destruction of the Roman Republique. And because Commonwealths well ordered are to maintain the publique wealthy, and the particulars peore, it is likely there was in Rome some defect in this law, which either was not so exactly fram'd at the beginning, but that every day it had need of some revising and amending; or that the making of it was so long put off, that it became scandalous to look so farre backwards; or that being well instituted at first, in time it grew by use corrupt. So in what manner soever it were, that law was never mention'd in Rome, but that the whole city was in a tumult. This law had two principall heads. By one they order'd that no citizen could possesse more then so many acres of ground: by the other, that the lands which they tooke from their enemies should be divided among the people of Rome. It came therefore to thwart the Nobility two manner of wayes; because they that had the greatest states in possession, were not permitted by the law who were the greater part of the Nobility; and there upon ought not to enjoy it: and when the enemies goods should be divided among the common people, they tooke from the Nobility the means to grow rich. These quarrells then being taken up against potent persons, and they by their resistance thinking to defend the publique, whensoever (as it is said) mention

was





meane, or order. So that the publique magistrates having no power to give remedy hereto, nor either of the factions relying on them, they sought private helpes, each party thinking to make a head should defend them. In this quarrell, and disorder, the people chose *Marius*, and made him foure times Consull; and so long he continued his Consulship, with small intervalls, that he had power of his owne selfe to make himselfe thrice more Consul. Against which pestilence the Nobility having no other remedy, began to favour *Sylla*; and having made him head of th-ir faction, they came to civil warres, and after much bloodshed and change of chance, the Nobility remain'd conqueror. These quarrells were anew reviv'd in *Caesar* and *Pompeyes* time; for *Caesar* being made head of *Marius* his party, and *Pompey* of *Syllas*, coming to fight, *Caesar* remain'd victour, who was the first tyrant in Rome. (so that that city never after enjoy'd her liberty, such beginning then, and end had the *Agrarian* law. And although we shew'd otherwise, how the discords of Rome between the Senat and the People preserv'd Romes liberty, because they sprung from those lawes in favor of liberty, and therefore the end of this *Agrarian* law may seeme disagreeing to such a conclusion; yet I say, that upon this I no way change my opinion; for so great is the Nobilities ambition, that if by divers wayes and sundry meanes it were not abated in a city, it would suddenly bring that city to destruction: so that if the strife touching the *Agrarian* law had much adoe in three hundred yeares to inthrall Rome, it is like enough it wou'd have bin brought much sooner into servitude, when the people both with this law, and also with their other

other humours, had not alwayes bridled the Nobilities ambition. We see by this also, how much men esteeme wealth rather then honour, because the Nobility of Rome, if it toucht matter of honour, ever gave way to the people without any extraordinary distasts: but when it concern'd their wealth, so obstinately did they defend it, that the people to vent their humour had their recourse to those extravagant wayes that are above discours'd of. The Authors of which disorder were the *Gracchi*, whose intention ought to be commended, rather then their discretion. For to take away a disorder grown in a Commonwealth, and hereupon to make a law that lookes faire backwards, is a course ill advis'd of, and (as formerly it hath been said at large) it doth nothing else but hasten that evill to which the disorder guides thee, but giving way to the time some what, either the mischief comes slower, or of it lesse in length before it comes to the upshot goes out

---

### CHAP. XXXVIII.

*Weake Commonwealths are hardly drawne to a certaine resolution, and know not how to determine: and the course they ordinarily take, they are rather forc'd to, then choose of them selves.*

**T**Here being in Rome a very grievous pestilence, and thereupon the *Volsci* and the *Equi* thinking a fit time, presented to bring the City of Rome into subjection, these two people having got a very great army together, set upon the *Latini* and the *Hernici*, and wasted their country: this the *Latini* and *Hernici* were

constrain'd to give notice of at Rome, and intreat, that the Romans would undertake their defence: to whom the Romans, exceedingly afflicted by the plague, answer'd that they should take a course to defend themselves with their owne forces, because they were not then able to do it. Wherein appears the magnanimity and wisdom of that Senate, that even in all fortunes they would reigne and give law to those deliberations their vassalls should make; nor were they asham'd to resolve any thing, when necessity press'd them to it, though contrary to their manner of living, and the resolutions usually made by them. This I say, because at other times the same Senate had forbidden the said people to arme and defend themselves; and therefore to a Senat, whose judgment had bin weaker then was theirs, it would have seem'd an abatement of reputation, to have granted them such a defence. But they alwayes weigh'd businessses in their due balance, and ever chose the lesser ill in lieu of the greater good: for it agreed ill with them, to see themselves unable to defend their subjects; and they were as little content, that they should arme without them, for the reasons already ledged, and others also that are evident. Yet knowing, that in any case upon necessity they were to take armes, having the enemy upon their backes, they tooke the more honourable part, and would rather, that what they were to do, they should do it with their leave, to the end that having disobeyed upon necessity, they should not be accustomed to disobey voluntarily. And though this may well appeare a course fit for every Republique to take, the weake and ill advised  
Commonwealths

Commonwealths cannot do the like, nor know not how to stand upon termes of honour in the like niceries. The Duke *Valentine* had taken *Ravenna*, and made *Bologna* yeeld to his conditions; afterwards desiring to returne from thence to *Rome* through *Tuscany*, sent a confident of his into *Florence* to aske passage for himselfe with his army. Hereupon they consulted at *Florence*, how to manage this businesse, nor did any one advise them to grant it him. Wherein they followed not the course the *Romans* tooke: for the Duke being exceedingly well armed, and the *Florentines* in a manner disarmed, that they could not hinder his passage, it had bin much more for their honour, if it had seem'd that he had pass'd with their licence, rather then by force; for there it was wholly their disgrace, which had bin in part lesse, if they had carried it otherwise. But the worst condition these weak *Republiques* have, is to take to no resolution, so that what party soever they take, they take it perforce; and if any good be done them, it is forc'd upon them, for which they owe no thanks to their owne wisdom. I will give two other examples, that happen'd in our dayes in the state of our city. In the year 1500, when *Lewis* the 12. of *France* had recover'd *Milan*, being desirous to put *Pisa* into our hands, for the summe of 50000 ducats, which the *Florentines* had promis'd him, after such restitution, he sent his army commanded by the Lord *Beaumont* towards *Pisa*, in whom, (although he were a French man) yet the *Florentines* repos'd much trust. This army and Captaine came on betweene *Cascina* and *Pisa*, to assaile the walls, where staying some daies to give order for the siege, there came some

Deputies of Pisa to Beaumont, who offer'd to yeeld up the city to the French army with these conditions, that upon the Kings word he should promise, not to give them into the Florentines hands, till after foure monthes, which termes were utterly refus'd by the Florentines, whereupon ensued, that after a while they left the siege with disgrace. Nor was that accord refus'd for other reason, then because they doubted of the Kings word; although (such was the weaknes of their counsell) that they were fore't to put themselves into his protection, though they trusted him not. Nor in the meane while did they consider, that the King coull easier deliver Pisa into their hands, having gotten possession of it, than promise hee would deliver that which hee had not yet in his power: wherein if hee had say'd, it had bin easy to discover the Kings intention, and so have spar'd their cost. In such sort that it had bin a great deal more to their advantage, had they agreed, that Beaumont should have taken it upon any promise; as it was seene afterwards by experience in the yeare 1502. when upon the rebellion of Arezzo, the Lord Judah was sent by the King of France with succours to the Florentines. Who being come neare to Arezzo; began to treat agreement with the rowne, which upon certaine termes would have yeelded, as before the Pisans, but were againe refused by the Florentines. Which Judah perceiving, and thinking that the Florentines did little understand themselves, hee began to practise an agreement with them by himself, without admitting the commissaries into the party, so that hee concluded a peace of his owne head, and thereupon entred Arezzo with his

owne

owne people, shewing the *Florentines*, they were  
fooles, and understood not the affaires of the  
world; and if they desir'd to have *Arezzo* in  
their hands, they should let the King know of  
it, who could more easily deliuer it them, having  
his people already in the towne, then if they  
were without before the walls. In *Florence*  
they forbare not to rayle upon, and blame  
the said *Jubalt*, till they understood, that if  
*Beaumont* had bin like *Jubalt*, they should have  
had *Pisa* as well as *Arezzo*. And thus to retorne  
to our purpose, *Republiques* which will not  
come to resolution, seldome make any party  
much to their advantage, unlesse they are forc'd  
thereupon: because their weaknesse will never  
suffer them to determine, where there is any  
doubt: and unlesse that doubt bee cancell'd by  
a necessitie that violently thrusts them forward,  
they remaine always in suspence.

## CHAP. XXXIX.

*The same accidents are scene to befall severall  
peoples,*

**T**HIS is easily knowne by any one that  
considers things present and things long  
past, that in all Cities and all peoples there are  
now the same desires and the same humours,  
there were alwayes; So that it is very easy for  
him that examines with diligence the things  
that are past, to foresee the future in any  
Commonwealth, and to serve himself of those  
remedies, which were in use among the  
auncients; or not finding of those which were  
us'd, to devise new, for the resemblance these

accidents have with the auncient. But because these considerations are neglected, or not understood by the Reader; or if understood, not knowne to him that governs, it followes, that continually in all successions of ages the same offences happen. The Citie of Florence after 94 yeares having lost a part of their dominions, as *Pisa* and other Townes, was forc't to make warre against those that held them. And because hee that had them in his hands, was of great power, it came it passe, that they were at great expence in the warrs, without good successe. From these great expences they proceeded with impositions to grieve the people, and from those grievances came the peoples murmurings and complaints. And for that this warre was order'd by a Magistracie of tenne Citizens, who were call'd the Councell of tenne for the warre, they were malic't by the whole body of the Citie, as the Authours of the warre, and the expences of the same; and they began to perswade themselves, that by taking away that Magistracie, they should end their war; so that having to make new, they would not supply the places, but rather suffering that Magistracie to expire, they referr'd their imployments all to the Senate: Which resolution was so hurtfull, that not onely it ended not the warre, (as the generality was perswaded) but those men being put out of the imployment, who guided it with understanding, there followed such confusion, that besides *Pisa*, they lost *Arezzo*, and many other places, in so much that the people perceiving their errour, and that the severer occasion'd the mischief, and not the Physitian, they created anew the Magistracie of tenne. The selfe same humour grew up in Rome against



against the name of the Consuls; for the people seeing one warre arise from another, giving them no rest, where they ought to have attributed it wholly to their neighbours ambition, who desir'd to suppress them, they imputed it rather to the ambition of the nobilitie, who not being able in Rome to chastise the people protected by the Tribuniall power, indeavour'd to draw them out of Rome under the Consuls, and there to oppress them, where they had no assistance. And hereupon they thought it necessary to take away the Consuls, or so to limit their power, that they should have no authority over the people neither at home nor abroad. The first that assur'd to put that law in practise, was one *Terentillus* a Tribun, who proponned they should create five men, to consider the Consuls power, and moderate it. Which thing much angered the nobilitie, giving them to thinke, that the Majestie of the Empire was wholly declined, and that there was not left to the Nobilitie any dignity more in the Commonwealth. Yet such was the Tribuns obstinacie, that the Consuls name was quite put out, and in the conclusion they were contented after some other order taken, rather to create Tribuns with Consular power, than the Consuls; in such hatred had they their name and their authority. And so they proceeded a long time, till at length, having knowne their error, as the Florentins return'd to the Counsell of tenne, so they anew created their Consuls.

## CHAP. XL.

*The Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what the vein is to be noted; where among many other things is consider'd, how by the like accident a Republique may be preserv'd, or suppressed.*

**H**AVING a purpose to discourse particularly of the accidents that happen'd at Rome upon the creation of the Decemvirate, methinks it is not much out of the way first to relate summarily the story of that creation; and afterwards to sift out the parts that are in those notable actions; which are many and of good consideration, as well for those that endeavor to maintain a Republique free, as for them that intend to bring it under the yoke; for in this discourse there will appear many errors committed by the Senate, and by the people, in prejudice of the Common liberty, and many faults made by *Appius* Chiefe of the Decemvirate, damageable to that tyrannie which he had presupposed already founded in Rome. After many disputes and strifes past between the people and the Nobility, about the framing of new lawes in Rome, whereby they might firmly establish the liberty of that State, with one accord they sent *Spartius Postumius* with two other Citizens to *Athens*, for the copies of those lawes which *Solon* gave to that City, that thereupon they might sound the Roman Ordinances. After their returne, they came to appoint the men that were to examine and frame the said lawes. And they ordained ten Citizens for

for a year, of which *Appius Claudius* was one, a cunning and a turbulent man. And that they might without any respect make such lawes, they took away the power of all other Magistrates in Rome, especially of the Tribuns and Consuls. They took away also all appeal for the people; so that these new officers became absolute Princes of Rome. After wards *Appius* gain'd the authority of all his other companions, by means of the favors the people did him, for he was grown so popular in his behavior, that it seem'd a mervail, how so suddenly he had chang'd his nature and disposition, having alwayes before this time bin thought a cruel persecutor of the common people. These ten governed themselves very moderately, not having above twelve Lictors, who always went before him that was Chief among them. And although they had the absolute authority, yet when they were to punish any Citizen of Rome for homicide, they cited him in presence of the people, and made them judge him. They writ their laws in ten Tables; and before they confirm'd them, published them to the general view, that every man might read and understand them, whereby it might be known if there were any fault in them, which before their confirmation should be amended. After this *Appius* caus'd a rumour to be spread throughout Rome that if to these ten Tables an addition of two others were made, they would be perfect. So that the conceit hereof gave the people occasion to make the Councell of ten new againe for another yeare, whereunto the people consented willingly, as well because they would not have the Consuls anew created, as for that they hop'd they might well subsist without Tribuns, these

these being judges of the causes, as is aforesaid :  
It being then agreed to make a new election,  
the whole nobility betook themselves to sue  
for these honors, and Appius was amongst the  
formost of them, and behav'd himself in his  
suit with so much courtesie towards the people,

*Credebant enim haud gratulanti in tanta superbia commo- tem fore.* that all his competitors were jealous of it.  
*They did not beleeve, that he being so proud a man, used all this courtesie for nought. And being in doubt publicely to oppose him, they resolved to do it cunningly, and so*

though he were the youngest of them all, they  
gave him the authority to propound to the  
people the ten that were to be elected, think-  
ing he would use the same terms as they did, not  
to name himself, being a thing unusual and dis-

*Nelevero impedimentum pro occasione arripuit.* gracefull in Rome. But he took this im-  
pediment for an opportunity. And na-  
med himself among the first, to the ad-  
miration, and displeasure of all the Nobility ;

and after named nine others to his own pur-  
pose. which new creation made for another  
yeer, began to shew the people and the No-  
bility their error : for suddenly, Appius

*Appius finem fecit ferenda aliena perior.* made an end of dissembling to be what he  
was not : and began to show his inbred  
pride : and infected his companions with

his own evil conditions : and to fright the peo-  
ple and the Senate, in exchange of twelve  
Lictors, they made a hundred and twenty.  
The fear was equall in all, for a while; but  
they began afterwards to give respect to the Se-  
nate, and rudely to handle the Commons.  
If any one being wrong'd by one of these  
Judges did appeal to another, he was worse  
abused in his appeal, than in his first tryal.  
So that the people having perceived their er-

ror,

res, began to look the Nobility in the face,  
 with a great deal of sorrow; And thence  
 they took occasion to seek after their liberty,  
 from whence by fearing their bondage, they  
 had brought the Commonwealth into that  
 misery. And the Nobility was wel pleased  
 with this their affliction: That being  
 weary of their present condition, they  
 might desire to have their Consuls restored.  
 The dayes came at length that ended  
 the year: the two Tables of the lawes  
 were finished but not published. The ten here-  
 upon tooke occasion to continue on their  
 Magistracie, and hold the State by violence, and  
 make the young Nobilitie their guard, on whom  
 they bestowed the goods of those they con-  
 demned. With which gifts the youth  
 being corrupted, lov'd rather their  
 own licentious life, than the common  
 liberty. It fell out about this  
 time, that the Sabini and the Volsci  
 made war against the Romans. Upon which  
 fear the ten began to see the weakness of  
 their own estate: for without the Senate  
 they could not take order for the war; and  
 assembling the Senate together they thought  
 they lost their authority: yet upon meer  
 necessity they took this last course; and  
 having gotten the Senators together,  
 many of them spake against the pride of the  
 ten, and in particular *Valerius* and *Horatius*;  
 and their authority had bin quite abolished,  
 but that the Senate, of meer envy to the  
 Common people, would not shew their au-  
 thority, thinking, that if the ten should vo-  
 luntarily depose their Magistracy, the making  
 of Tribuns of the people might perhaps be  
 less.

Ex inde liber-  
 tatis captare  
 auram, unde  
 servitutem ti-  
 mendo in eum  
 statum Romp.  
 adduxerat.  
 Ut ipsi talio  
 praesentium  
 consulens desi-  
 derarent.

Quibus donis ju-  
 ventu eorum  
 pebatur, & male-  
 bat licentiam su-  
 am, quam ot-  
 niu libertatem.

left. The war was then resolved of, and two armies were led forth commanded by part of the ten: and *Appius* staid at home to govern the City. Whereupon it happen'd, that he fell in love with *Virginia*; and when he would have taken her by force, her Father *Virginus* to free her, slew her; whereupon ensued divers tumults at Rome, and in the armies, which being brought back again and joyn'd with the remainder of the people at Rome, went apart thence to the holy mount: where they staid, till the ten had deposed their Magistracy, and that the Tribuns and Consuls being created, Rome was restor'd to the ancient forme of liberty. It is noted then by the text, that the inconvenient of setting up a Tyranny grew first upon the same occasions, that the greater part of Tyrannies ordinarily use to arise upon in Cities, and this is from the overmuch desire the people have of liberty, and the excessive ambition the Nobility have to command. And when they agree not to make a law in favour of liberty, and either party betakes it self to favour some one, then suddenly starts up a tyranny. The people and the Nobility of Rome consented to create the ten; and to create them with so great authority, as they did for the desire they both had, the one to extinguish the memory of the consuls, the other of the Tribuns. When they were created, the people thinking that *Appius* was become of the popular faction, and rudely handled the Nobility, the people betook themselves to favour him. And when a people is led into such an error, as to give reputation to any one, because he creates

those

those evil that they hate if he hath wit, it will  
alwaies come to pass, that he shall make himself  
Lord of that City; for he will wait his op-  
portunity together with the peoples favor  
to extinguish the Nobility, and will never en-  
deavor to oppress the people, till he hath quite  
suppressed the Nobles; at which time when the  
people shall perceive themselves to be in bon-  
dage, they shall not know whether to have  
recourse for help. This course have  
they all held, that have laid the foundations of  
a Tyrannie in any Commonwealth. Which if  
*Appian* had likewise held, his tyrannie would  
have bin of longer durance, and not have  
fail'd so quickly; but he went the clean con-  
trary way; nor could a man have done more  
unwisely, than he, who to maintain a ty-  
rannie, made those his enemies that bestowed  
it first upon him, and could still make is good,  
and sought to gain those to be his friends, who  
neither agreed to give it him, nor could main-  
tain it to him, and so lost those that were his  
friends, and strove to make those his friends,  
that could not be so. For though the nobility  
desire to tyrannize, yet that part of the nobility  
that hath not a share in the tyrannie, is alwaies  
enemy to the tyrant; nor is it possible ever  
to gain them all to his side, by reason of the  
nobilities exceeding ambition and excessive a-  
varice, seeing that the tyrant cannot have so  
great wealth, nor so many honors, as to satis-  
fie them all. And thus *Appian*, forsaking the  
people, and cleaving to the nobility, committed  
a most evident error, and so for other reasons  
abovesaid; and because, if a man will hold  
anything by violence, he that forces must needs

be

be stronger than he that is forced. From whence it comes, that those Tyrants who have the generality to friend, and the great ones their enemies, are in the more safety, because their violence is supported with greater forces, than that which is favored by the Nobility, and hated by the people; for with the peoples favor the Forces within are sufficient to maintain themselves, as they were to *Nabis* Tyrant of *Sparta*, when all Greece and the people of *Rome* assaulted him, having made himself sure of some few of the Nobility, and alwaies having the people his friend, where-with he defended himself: which he could not have done, if they had bin otherwise. In that other degree, to have but few friends at home, the forces within suffice not, but must be sought after abroad; and they are to be of three kinds, the one to have a guard of strangers, to assure thy person; the other, to have an army in the country, which may serve the same turn the people could; the third, to hold correspondence and friendship with thy puissant neighbours, who may defend thee. And whosoever takes these courses, and observes them rightly, though the people be his enemy, yet in some sort may he save himself. But *Appius* could not by any army make himself master of the Country, the country there and *Rome* being one and the same thing; and what he could do, he knew not how to do, and so perished in his beginning. The Senate also and the people in the creation of the Decemvirate committed very great errors. For, though it be formerly said in the discourse touching a Dictator, that those Magistrates who are made of themselves, not those that are chosen by the



people, endamage the liberty, yet the people ought, when they make their Magistrates, take such order in their making, that they restrain them by some regards from growing wicked. And where they should set a guard over them, to keep them good, the Romans took it away, creating that the sole Magistracy in Rome, nullifying all the rest, for the excessive desire (as we before said) The Senate had to suppress the Tribuns, and the Common people the Consuls: which blinded them both so, that they consir'd in this disorder: for men (as King Ferdinand said) do oftentimes like certain lesser birds of prey, who so eagerly pursue the prey, whereunto they have a natural provocation, that they perceive not a greater bird over their heads with like eagerness ready to seize on them. The people of Romes error then is made plain by this discourse, as I propounded it in the beginning, in going to save their liberty; as *Appian* his errors also in going to seize upon the Tyranny.

---

CHAP.

## CHAP. XLI.

*Of humble to become proud; of mercifull cruel; without passing through the due means between these extremes, argu'd indiscretion; and turne nothing to advantage.*

**A**Mong other terms ill us'd by Appian, to maintain his tyranny, it was not of small moment, to leap too suddenly from one quality to another: for his craft in deceiving the people, by dissembling popularity, was used to good purpose. The terms likewise he held to cause a new creation of the ten, were well us'd: As also his boldness in creating himself one of them, contrary to the nobilitie opinion. It was a course rightly taken, to chase his colleagues to his own turn: but it was not advisably done, presently upon this (according as I sayd above) to change his disposition at an instant, of a friend to shew himself enemy to the people, of courteous to become insolent, of mild haish, and to do this so suddenly, that without any excuse he discovers to all the falshood of his heart. For he that hath seem'd good for a while, and would, to serve his own turn, become wicked, should come to it by the due degrees, and in such sort go on with his occasions, that before the different disposition deprive him of his ancient favors, it may have given him so many new, that his authority be no way diminished: otherwise being found unmask'd and without friends, he perishes.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XLII.

*How easily men may be corrupted.*

IT is remarkable also in this matter touching the *Decemvirate*, how easily men are corrupted, so that they make themselves become of quite contrary nature, though at first good, and well brought up: considering how that youth, which *Appian* had taken near to him for guard of his person, began to favor the tyranny, for a very small profit, which they made thereof. And how *Quintus Fabius*, one of the second ten that were chosen, being an excellent man, blinded with a little ambition, and persuaded by the malignity of *Appian*, chang'd all his good conditions into very bad, and became like him, which being thoroughly examined, shall cause those that institute the lawes of Republicques or Kingdoms to be more exact, in bridling humane desires, and in taking from them all hope of escaping scot-free whensoever they offend.

## CHAP. XLIII.

*They that fight for their own glory, are the good and faithfull soldiers.*

IT is considerable also upon the above written treaty, what difference there is between an army satisfied and contented in it self, fighting for its own glory, and that which is ill dispos'd, fighting for other mens ambition; for where  
the

the Roman armies were alwaies wont under the Consuls to be victorious, under the Decemvirate they were alwaies losers. From this example may we know in part the reasons why mercenary soldiers are unprofitable, who have no other obligation to make them stand true to thee, but some small stipend thou bestowest on them. Which cannot be a motive so sufficient, or of such weight, as to gain thee their truth and love so far, as to die in thy behalf. For in those armies, wherein there is not that affection towards him for whom they fight, which makes them become his partisans where can never be so much valor, as to subdue or resist an enemy that hath never so little vertue or courage. And because neither this affection, nor contention can grow in others, more then in thy natural subject, it is necessary in the maintaining of a state, whether it be Commonwealth or Kingdom, to arme the native subjects, as we see all they have done, who with their armies have made any great conquests. The Roman armies under the Decemvirates were valorous as formerly: but because the same disposition was not in them, they atchiev'd not the like exploits. But so soon as the Decemvirate had an end, and they, as free men, began to war, they took to them again their former courag's, and by consequence their undertakings prov'd successfull, according to their ancient wont.

## CHAP. XLIII.

*A multitude without a head is unprofitable: and a man should not first threaten; and afterward demand the power.*

**T**He Common people of Rome, upon the occasion of *Verginius* being gone apart armed into the Holy Mount, the Senate deputed some unto them to demand, by what authority they had forsaken their Caprains and retired into the mountain; and such was the esteem of the Senates authority, that the people having no head of their multitude, no man durst make answer. And *Titus Livius* sayes, they wanted not what to answer, but they wanted who should answer: Which thing does punctually shew the unprofitableness of a multitude without a head, and therefore *Verginius* perceiving the disorder, found the expedient of creating twenty Tribuns of war who should be their head to answer, and confer with the Senate. And having demanded, that *Valerius* and *Horatius* should be sent them, to whom they would declare their mindes, these refused to go, til the ten had deposed their magistracy: and being come to the mountain where the people was, the demands were, that they would have the Tribuns of the people created again, and that they might appeal to the people from every magistrate, and that all the ten should be deliver'd into their hands, and they would burn them quick: *Valerius* and *Horatius* commended their first demands: and  
blam'd

Crudelitatem  
damnatis, crude-  
litatem inisist.

blam'd their latter, as *Impious*, saying,  
*You condemn cruelty, and yet you use it*  
*your selves.* And they were advis'd

to leave making mention of the ten, and at-  
tend onely to lay hold of their authority and  
power, and afterwards they should not want  
means of satisfaction; where plainly it ap-  
pears, how much it favors of folly, and little  
of wisdom, to demand a thing, and before-  
hand to say, *I will do ill with it.* For a man  
ought not herein discover his intention; but  
first in any case endeavor to be master of what  
he desires. For it is enough to ask a man his  
weapons, without saying to him, *I will kill*  
*thee with them, being thou hast power, when*  
*thou art possesst of them, to do as thou list.*

#### CHAP. XLV.

*It is a matter of very evil example, when he*  
*that makes a law neglects the observing of it:*  
*and it is very dangerous in a state, to make a*  
*continuall practise of treachery and executions.*

The agreement being made and Rome re-  
volved to her ancient forme, *Virginius* cited  
*Appian* before the people, to defend his own  
cause: whom appearing accompanied with  
many of the Nobility, *Virginius* commanded  
to be cast into prison: *Appian* began to cry out,  
and appeal to the people: *Virginius* said, he  
was not worthy to be allow'd that appeal  
which himself had destroy'd, or have the peo-  
ple defend him, who had so much endammag'd  
them: *Appian* replied, that they ought not to  
violate that appeal, which they with such earnest  
desire

desire had obtain'd. For all this he was imprison'd, and before the day of giving judgment, he slew himself. And though Appian his lewd life deserv'd any punishment, yet favor'd it but little of civil government, to violate the lawes, and especially that which was but then made. For I beleeve not, there is any thing of worse example in a Republique, then to make a law, and not observe it; and the more, when he that makes it breaks it. Florence after the ninety fourth year having its state reestablish'd by the aid of Frier Jerom Savanorola, whose writings shew his learning, wisdom, and vertue, and having among other ordinances to assure the citizens, caus'd a law to be made, that a man might appeal to the people from the sentences, which for matter of state, the Eight, or the Seignory should give: which law he long perswaded, and with much ado at length obtain'd. It happen'd that a while after the confirmation of it five citizens were condemn'd to death by the Seignory for some offence touching the state; and they desiring to appeal, were not suffer'd; and so the law not observ'd, which more wrong'd the reputation of that Frier, then any other accident. For if that appeal was profitable, he should have caus'd it to be observ'd, if otherwise, he should never have so urg'd the making of it. And so much more remarkable was this accident, in that the Frier in those many sermons which he made, after the breach of this law, never either condemn'd him that broke it, or excus'd the breach, as he that would not condemn any thing that serv'd to his purpose; and excuse it he could not. Which having discover'd his ambitious and factious mind, took much from his credit

credit, and charg'd him with blame enough. It is a very great fault also in a state, every day in the citizens mindes to renew the memory of old wrongs done to this or that man with new punishments, as it befell at Rome after the Decemvirate. For all the ten, and other citizens at sundry times were accus'd, and condemn'd, so that all the Nobility were exceedingly affrighted, thinking they would never leave condemning them, til they had destroyed the whole Nobility. And certainly it had produc'd some inconvenient in the city, if *Marcus Duellius* the Tribunn had not taken order for it. Who made a decree, that for a whole year it should not be lawfull for any man to cite or accuse any citizen of Rome, which assur'd all the Nobility. Where we see, how great a hurt it is to a Republique or Prince, to hold their subjects minds in suspicion and fear with continual persecutions and punishments: and without doubt a worse course cannot be taken. For men that begin to doubt of mischief, in any case provide for themselves in their dangers, and grow bolder, and less respectfull how they venture on novelties. Wherefore it is necessary either never to hurt any, or the hurt that is to be done to do at once, and afterwards let men injoy some assurance, that may give them cause to quiet and settle their minds.



## CHAP. XLVI.

*Men arise by degrees from one ambition to another: and first they aime no further, then that they themselves suffer no hurt of others, afterwards they strive to be able to hurt others.*

**T**HE people of Rome having recovered their liberty, and being return'd into their former state, or rather greater, insomuch as they had made new laws, which were as new foundations laid to establish their power, it seem'd probable, that Rome for some while would have bin at quiet; yet by experience the contrary was seen, for every day there sprung up new rumules and new disagreements. And because *Titus Livius* very judiciously gives the reason from whence they grew, methinks it is not out of purpose, punctually to relate his words where he saies, that alwaies either the people or the Nobility waxed proud, when the other grew humble; and when the Commons contain'd themselves modestly within their bounds, then began the youth of the Nobility to provoke them with all manner of injuries; nor could the Tribuns much remedy this, for they also had their shares in the sufferance. The Nobility on the other side, although well they wot that their youth was too insolent, yet being that insolency was to be committed by one side, they wished rather their own should be the actors, then the commonalty. And thus the desire of maintaining the liberty caused each to proceed so far til they oppressed the other.

H

And

And the order of these accidents is, that while men endeavor to be out of fear themselves, they begin to put others in fear; and that injury which they chase from themselves, they thrust upon another, as if there were a necessity either to hurt or to be hurt. Hereby is seen in what manner among other things Commonwealths come to dissolution, and men rise from one ambition to another. And as that sentence of *Salust* put in *Casars* mouth, was very true; *That all evil examples first spring from good beginnings.* The first thing that those citizens (as is above said) endeavor, who behave themselves ambitiously in a Republick, is, not onely to be out of the reach of private mens wrongs, but out of the Magistrates power. To attain hereto, they seek after friendships, which they gain by means, in appearance honest, either by supplying their want of moneys, or by protecting them from those that are too mighty for them. And because this seems worthy and noble, every one is easily deceived, and thereupon nobody seeks to remedy it, till he persevering in the same course without let, becomes such a one, that the private Citizens stand in awe of him, and the Magistrates bear him respect. And when he is grown to this height, and no order first taken for restraint of his greatness, he comes to be in such termes, that it proves very dangerous to juggle with him, for the causes I have formerly alleaged, of the danger there is to strive with an inconvenient, which is already come to some growth in a city, because then it is brought to such an exigent, that there is a necessity to seek either to extinguish it with danger of sudden ruine: or letting

it alone, to submit to the yoke of bondage, unless death, or some other accident prevent it. For being once come to the terms above written, that both citizens and Magistrates stand in fear to offend him, and his, without much ado after will they understand their own strength, and hurt at their own pleasure. Whereupon a Republicke among her wayes of government thought to use this, to watch carefully over her citizens, that they have no power under the colour of good to do mischief: and that their reputation be such as may advantage the Commonwealth, and not wrong it, as in its own place we shall argue it.

*But when they came to pass their judgement in particular upon their own men, they perceived on this point, that they were not so much to be guided by the multitude, as by the few. And thus they came to the conclusion, that they were not so much to be guided by the multitude, as by the few.*

**T**HE people of Rome (as is above said) having taken in mistake the very name of Consuls, being desirous that the Plebeians might be much less, and their authority limited, the Nobility chose the Consular authority might as well be chosen out of the Commons as the Nobility. The people were herewith contented, thinking to abolish the Consulate, and to have in its stead a new highest dignity. Hence grew a notable accident, that when they came to elect these Tribunes, which they could have made all Plebeians, the people chose them all out of the Nobility, whereupon Titus Livius uses these words: *The event of these assemblies, was, that the Tribunes were chosen out of the Nobility, and the Consuls out of the Plebeians. In contention of liberty and honour, the Tribunes were chosen out of the Nobility, and the Consuls out of the Plebeians.*

Assemblies, or Councils, shewed, that mindes differ much; when contention is made for liberty or honour, and when all strife being appeas'd, the judgments rest clear. And examining from whence this proceedeth, I beleieve it is from thence that men are more deceiv'd in generalities, than in particularities. The Common people of Rome thought generally, they deserv'd the Consulate, because they were the greatest part of the City, because they underwent the greater dangers in the wars, because they were they, by force of whose armes Rome maintain'd her liberty, and became mighty. And thinking (as is said) this their desire reasonable; they would have this authority in any case. But when they came to pass their judgments in particular upon their own men, they perceiv'd their weakness, and judg'd that no one of them deserv'd that, which taking them all together, they thought they had bin worthy of. So that being ashamed of them, they had recourse to those that were of merit: At which resolution *Tullius Livius* worthily marveling, sayes thus;

*Hanc modestiam equitatemque* This modesty, uprightness, and  
*Realitudinem animi absque* greatness of mind, where shall  
 in uno invenietis, quae tunc you now adayer find it in one  
 populi universi fuit. man, which then was in whole

people? In confirmation hereof, another notable example may be brought which happen'd in Capua, after that Hanniball had broken the Roman army at Cannae: upon which occasion all Italy being in an uproar, Capua was ready to rise too, for the hatred there was between the people and the Senate. And at that time *Pacuvius Calenus* being the principal Magistrate, and perceiving the great hazzard they went to be slain by them, and the city yielded

yielded up to *Hannibal*, now that the State of Rome was in distress. Afterwards he added, that if they would let him order the business, he would provide so, that they should be both friends; but he would shut them all up in the Palace, and by giving the people power over them to chastise them, save them. The Senators yielded to his advice, and he call'd the people together, having the whole Senate shut up in the Palace, and said, that the time was come wherein they might take down the Nobilities pride, and revenge themselves on them for the injuries they had received at their hands, he holding them all prisoners in his keeping: but because he thought they liked not their City should be without government, it was fit (being they intended to kill the old Senators) to create new ones first. And therefore he had put the names of all the Senators in a bag, and so would begin to draw them forth one by one before them, and so put them to death presently, as soon as they should have made choice of a Successor. And having begun to take out one, when he was nam'd, there was a great noise made, calling him a proud, cruell, and arrogant man. And *Pacuvius* requiring that they should make an exchange of him, the whole multitude stood silent. And after a little while one of the Commons was named: whereat one began to whistle, another to laugh, some to speak in one sort, some in another. And so followed all the rest one after another as they were nam'd, being thought unworthy to be made Senators, so that *Pacuvius* hereupon taking occasion, sayd: seeing that you judge that this City must needs be in ill case without a Senate, and you are not agreed to change your old Senators, I

think it would be well that ye were made friends; for this fright wherein the Senators have bin put will so humble them, that the courtesie which ye sought otherwhere, ye shall find with them. And hereunto being agreed, there followed the union; and it was plain, how they were deceived, when they were forc'd to come to particulars. Besides, people in judging generally of affairs and their accidents are beguill'd, which they afterwards understand in particular, and perceive the deceit. After the year 1494. the Principal men of the City being chace out of Florence, and there being not any orderly government, but rather an ambitious licentiousness, so that things went from bad to worse, many of the popular faction perceiving the destruction of the City, and understanding no other cause thereof, they blam'd the ambition of some powerfull man, that nourish'd these disorders, to the end he might make of it a State to his own purpose, and take away the liberty; and these men were alwayes in the publique places of meeting, speaking evil of many Citizens, and threatening them, that if ever they came to the government of the State, they would discover this their treachery and chastise it. It happen'd oftentimes, that some of these or the like were prefer'd to the Principal magistracy, and when they were once in the place, and saw things nearer, they knew well the disorders from whence they grew, and the dangers that hung over them, and the difficulty to remedy them. And having seen how the times and not the men caus'd the disorder, became forthwith of another mind, and chang'd their opinion. For the knowledg of things in particular took  
away

away that deceit, which when they considered generally, was presupposed in them: so that they that had first, when they were private men, heard them speak, and saw them afterwards being prefer'd to the chief Magistracy stand quiet, though it came not from an exacter knowledge of things, but because they had bin carried away, and corrupted by the greater ones. And this befalling many men many times, it came to a Proverb, that said, these are of one mind in the piazza and of another in the palace. Considering therefore this whole discourse, we see, how a man may quickly open the peoples eyes; for seeing that a generally deceives them, it is expedient to bring them to descend to particulars, as *Pacuvius* did in Capua, and the Senate in Rome. I think also, this may pass for a conclusion, that no wise man ought to avoyd the peoples judgment in particular things, about the distributions of degrees and dignities: for onely in this the people are not deceived; or if sometime they are deceived, it is very seldom; but a few men are oftentimes deceived, when they are to make the like distribution: Nor do I take it to be superfluous, to shew, in the next Chapter, the order the Senate held to clear the peoples judgments in these distributions.

## CHAP. XLVIII.

*He that would not have a Magistracy given to one that is base and lewd, let him cause it to be demanded either by one that is very base and lewd, or by one that is noble and very good.*

**W**HEN the Senate was afraid that the Tribuns with Consular authority would be chosen out of the Plebeyans, they held one of these two courses to prevent it; either they made some of the best reputed men of Rome stand for the magistracy, or they used fit means to corrupt some forbid Plebeyan and of the basest condition, who crept in to be competitor with the Plebeyans that usually of the best quality stood for it. This last way made the people asham'd to bestow it, and the first asham'd to refuse it; all which turnes to the purpose of our former discourse: where its shewed, though the people be deceived in generals, yet is it not in particulars.

## CHAP. XLIX.

*If those cities that have had their beginning free, as Rome, have found difficulty to make lawes that can maintain them, so those that have had their beginning immediately servile, find almost an impossibility of it.*

**H**ow hard a thing it is, in the ordering of a R<sup>e</sup>publique to make provision of all such laws



laws as may keep it free, the proceedings of the Roman Republique does well shew; Where notwithstanding that many lawes were made first by *Romulus*, after by *Numa*, *Tullius Hostilius*, and *Servius*, and last by the ten Citizens created for the like work, nevertheless alwaies in the managing of that city new necessities were discover'd, and it was needfull to make new laws: as it befell when they created the Censours, which was one of those orders that help'd to keep Rome free at that time when she liv'd in liberty: for being made Arbiters of the fashions and manners of Rome, they were a special reason that Rome held off so long from being corrupted. Indeed in the beginning of that Magistracy they committed one error creating it for five years: but not long afterwards it was amended by the wisdom of *Mamercus* the Dictator, who, by a new law he made, reduc'd the said magistracy to the term, of eighteen moneths. Which the Censour, that were then in office took so much amiss, that they put *Mamercus* out of the Senate, which thing was much blam'd both by the people and the fathers. And because the story shews not any where, that *Mamercus* could defend himself, it must needs be, that either the historian was defective, or the laws of Rome in this part not perfect: for it is not well, that in a Commonwealth it should so be ordain'd, that a citizen for publishing a law agreeable to the liberty they liv'd in, should be wrong'd without any remedy. But returning to the beginning of this discourse, I say, that a man ought to consider by the creation of this new magistrate, that if those cities that have had their beginnings free, and were under the r

own government, as Rome, with much ado  
 can find out good laws to maintain them free,  
 it is no marvel, that those cities which have  
 had their beginnings immediately servile, have  
 not found nor onely difficulty, but impossibi-  
 ty ever so to order themselves, that they can  
 quietly come to a civil government, as appears  
 it befell the city of Florence, because her be-  
 ginning was in Subjection to the Roman Em-  
 pire, and having gotten leisure to breathe, be-  
 gan to make her own laws, which having bin  
 mingled with the ancient, that were naught,  
 could not work any good effect, and thus she  
 proceeded in a government for 200 years (as  
 we have by certain relations) without ever at-  
 taining to such a condition, that she could truly  
 be term'd a Republique: and these difficulties  
 which she hath had, have those Cities alwaies  
 had, whose beginnings have bin like hers. And  
 though many times by publicke and free voic-  
 ces ample authority hath bin given to some  
 few Citizens to reforme this, yet never have  
 they order'd it to the advantage of the pub-  
 lique, but to serve the turn of their own fac-  
 tion, which hath caus'd more disorder, then or-  
 der in the City. And to come to some parti-  
 cular example, I say, among other things  
 which he that ordains a Republique should  
 consider, is, that he well advise to what men he  
 gives the power of life and death over his Ci-  
 tizens. This was well provided for in Rome;  
 for by ordinary course they might appeal to  
 the people: yet if there were any occasion of  
 importance, where, to delay execution, by  
 means of the appeal, was dangerous, they  
 had the help of a Dictator, who had power  
 immediately to execute, which remedy they  
 never

never us'd, but upon necessity. But Florence and other Cities beginning as she did, that is servile, had this authority committed alwayes to a stranger, who was sent by the Prince, to this purpose. When afterwards they became free, they continued this authority in a stranger, whom they called their Captain. Which thing, because he might easily be corrupted by the potent Citizens, was very pernicious. But afterwards this order chagning upon the alteration of the states, they ordained eight Citizens, to supply the Captains place. Which order of evil became very evil, for the reasons we have other where alleadged, that a few are alwayes servants of a few, and especially of the most wealthy: from which the City of Venice is well guarded, which hath ten citizens, who have power to punish any Citizen without appeal: and because they would not be of sufficient force to punish those that are potent, though they have the authority they have obtained the Quarantie, or council of forty: and besides, they have taken care, that the council of the Pregon, which is the chiefest council, may punish them: so that, where there is no want of an accuser, they are never destitute of a Judge, to restrain the great mens insolency. There is then no marvail seeing that in Rome order'd by it self, and by so many sage persons, there grew every day new occasions, whereupon new lawes were to be made in favor of the Common liberty. In other Cities which have had their beginnings more disordered, there arise such difficulties, that put them quite past all recovery.

## CHAP. L.

The power of stopping the publique actions of the city, should not be given into the hands of one council, or one magistracy.

**T**hus *Quincius Cincinnatus*, and *Cneus Iulius Mentus* were Consuls together in Rome, who upon a quarrel arisen between them two, made a stay in all the actions belonging to the Republique: which the Senate seeing, perswaded them to create a Dictator, to the end that might be done, which, by reason of their discord, was hindred. But the Consuls disagreeing in every thing else, in this alone were of accord both of them, not to make a Dictator: so that the Senate finding no other help, desir'd assistance from the Tribuns, who with the Senates authority forc'd the Consuls to obey. Where the profitable use of the Tribunate is in the first place remarkable, which serv'd to good purpose to bridle the great mens ambitions exercis'd not onely against the Common people, but also among themselves: in the next place, that it should never be so ordain'd in a city, that a few should resolve of those things that are the ordinary maintenance of a Commonwealth. For example, if thou givest the power to one Consul to make a distribution of honors and profits, or to a Magistrate to dispatch some business to be done, it is fit to impose a necessity on him, that he do it in any case, or so provide that another might and should do it: otherwise the order would be defective, and perilous, as we see it was in Rome, unless they could have oppos'd the Consuls obstinacy with the Tribuns authority. In the Commonwealth of *Venice* the great council bestows both the honors and the profits.

It

It sometime chanc't, that the universality upon some dislaine conceiv'd, or by reason of some false suggestion did not make choice of any successours to the Magistrates of their Cities, nor to their Ministers of State abroad, which was a very great disorder; for all at once, their Townes and Cities wanted their lawfull Iudges; nor could any thing be obtained while the universality were appeased, or were no longer deceived. And this inconvenient would have brought those Cities to ill termes, had not some discreet Citizens otherwise taken order for them. Who having layd hold of a fit occasion, made a law, that all the Magistrates within or without the Citie should continue still in their offices, till new choice were made, and their successours appointed. And thus they tooke away from that counsell all opportunity of enabling them, with the Commonwealths danger, to stop the publique actions.

---

### CHAP. LI.

*A Commonwealth or Prince should make a shew to doe that of a free mind, which indeed meere necessitie compells them to doe.*

**W**ise men gaine themselves alwayes the thanks of every thing in their actions, although in truth meere necessitie constraines them in any case to doe them. This discretion was well made use of by the Romane Senate, when they resolv'd to ad a dayly stipend out of the Common treasury to those that served in the warres; it being then of custome there to serve as their own proper charges. But the Senate perceiving,

ceiving, that after that manner they could not long make warre; and hereupon neither could they besiege townes, nor lead their armies farre off; and judging it needfull they should doe the one, and the other, they determined to allow the sayd stipends, which they did in such a way, that they got themselves thanks for that, to which they were bound by necessitie. And this present was so acceptable to the people, that all Rome seem'd overjoyd with it, they thinking it to be a great benefit, which they never had hopes of, nor of themselves had ever sought after. And though the Tribuna did their best to blot out these thanks, by shewing it was a matter of grievance and not of ease to the people, seeing of necessitie they were to impose greater taxes on them, wherewith to pay these stipends, yet could they not prevayle so much; but that the people tooke every thankfully. Which also the Senate augmented by the course they tooke in ordering of the tributes. For the greatest and heaviest were those they layd upon the Nobilitie, and so were those that were first payd.

And a sly and blacke counsell to discommodious A  
 sly and blacke counsell, to discommodious A

#### CHAP. XLII.

To stay the insalence of one that growes powerfull in a Commonwealt, there is no way more secure, and lesse offensive, than to seize before hand, and so provide him of those wayes by which he attains to that power.

**W**hen by the above written discourse, how great credit the Nobility got with the people, upon the demonstrations made for their

their advantage, as well by the stipend appointed, as also by the course they took in imposing the taxes: in which way if the Nobilitie had continued, they had wholly avoyded all manner of tumult in that Citie; and they had taken from the Tribuns the credit they had with the people, and by consequence their authority. And truly it is not possible in a Commonwealth, especially in those that are corrupted, by any better way; lesse hurtfull, and more easy to oppose the ambition of any Citizen, than to prepossesse those wayes, by which a man perceives he takes his course, to attaine that dignitie hee aspires at. Which meanes if they had put in practise against *Cosmus* of *Medici*, his adversaries had gotten more by the bargain, than by chasing him from Florence: For if those Citizens that were at strife with him had taken the course to favour the people, they had without any imbryle or violence taken out of his hands those weapons which were to him of greatest advantage. *Peter Soderini* gain'd himself credit with this onely in the Citie of Florence, that he favou'd the universality, Which universality gave him the repute to be a lover of the Citie's libertie. And surely for those Citizens that envied his greatness, it was much easier, and had bin a businesse of fairer carriage, of lesse danger and damage to the Commonwealth, to lay hold before hand of those wayes by which he became great, than by offering to oppose him, lest that in ruining him, the whole remainder of the Commonwealth also should have fallen to ruine. For if they could have taken out of his hands the forces whereby hee became strong, which they might easily have done, they could in all their publique

publique counsellis and resolutions have oppos'd him without suspicion or regard. And if any man should reply, that if the Citizens that hated *Peter* committed an error in not prepossessing the wayes wherby he gain'd upon the people: *Peter* also came to commit an error in not laying hold beforehand of those wayes by which his adversaries frighted him: I answer, that *Peter* deserves excuse, as well because it was hard for him to doe it, as because the meanes were not fit for him to use. For the wayes by which he was hurt, were to favour the house of *Medici*, by which favours they overmaster'd him, and at last ruin'd him. Yet *Peter* could not fairely take his parr, because hee could not with any good repute destroy that libertie, over which hee was appointed as guardian; and seeing these favours could not passe in private, they were suddenly exceeding dangerous to *Peter*: for what way soever it had bin that he had bin discover'd to be a friend of the *Medici*, he had fallen into the jealousie, and incurr'd the hatred of the people. Whereupon his enemyes had had greater power to suppress him, then formerly they had. Therefore men ought in every resolution, consider the defects and dangers thereunto belonging, and not fasten on any one of them, when they carry with them more danger then profit, notwithstanding that they seeme well to tend to the end propounded: for being otherwise, in this case it would befall them, as it befell *Tullius*, who by going about to diminish *Marc Antonius* his power, increas'd it. For *Marc Antonius* being judged an enemy of the Senate, and he having got together a great army, a good part whereof had followed *Casars* faction,

*Tullius*



*Tullius* to take these souldiers from him, perswaded the Senate to set up the reputation of *Octavianus*, and send him accompanied with the Consuls, and an armie against *Marc Antonius*; alleading, that so soone as ere the souldiers that followed *Marc Antonius* should heare the name of *Octavianus*, *Casars* nephew, and that would be call'd *Cesar* too, they would forsake the other, and follow this. So that *Marc Antonius* being dispossess'd of his advantages would easily be suppress'd. Which fell out cleane contrary. For *Marc Antonius* got *Octavianus* to his part, who leaving *Tullius* and the Senate joyned forces with him. Which thing proof'd wholly the ruine of those great mens party. Which also it was easy to have conjectur'd: nor was that credible which *Tullius* perswaded himself; but he should rather have made account, that neither that name that with so great glory had exterminated his enemies, and gain'd himself the principality in Rome, nor yet his heirs, or adherents, would ever suffer them quietly to enjoy their libertie.

## CHAP. LIII.

*The people deceiv'd by a false shew of good oftentimes seek their owne ruine; and that great hope and large promises doe easily move them.*

WHEN the Veyentes Citie was taken, the people of Rome wer possess'd of an opinion, that it woul be profitable for them to send halfe the Romans to dwell at *Veyum*: and because that Citie had a plentifull country about it, frequent with buildings, and neare neighbouring to Rome, halfe of the Romane Chizens might thereby be enrich'd, without giving any disturbance to the civill government  
by

by reason of their neare situation. Which thing the Senate and the graver Romans thought so unprofitable or rather so hurtfull, that they freely profess'd, they would rather suffer death, then agree to any such matter; so that the businesse coming to dispute, did so incrage the people against the Senate, that they had come to blowes and to blood, had not some of the graver and reverenter Citizens oppos'd themselves against their fur'e; whose regard bridled the people so, that they proceeded not in their insolencie. Here two things are to be noted, the first, that the people many times deceived by an imaginary good, covet their owne ruine; and unlesse they be given to understand, which is the evill, and which the good, by some man they trust, the Republicques ordinarily run much hazzard. And when it so falls out, that the people hath no great confidence in any one, as sometimes it comes to passe, having bin of late deceived either by things, or men, of necessity they goe to ruine. And Dante, to this purpose, sayes, in his discourse of a Monarchie:

*A populo molte volte grida,*

*Viva la sua morte amara lavita*

*The vulgar oft times their own ruine chuse*

*And life for death ignorantly refuse.*

From this incredulitie arises, that sometimes in Commonwealths good courses are not taken, as formerly it was sayd touching the Venerians, when being set upon by so many enemyes, they could not resolve till they were quite ruin'd, to gain any of them againe, by restitution of what they had wrongfully taken. Whereupon warre was made against them, and a conspiracie of the Princes. Wherefore  
when

when we consider here, that which is easy, and that which is hard to perswade a people to, this distinction is to be made. Either, that which thou art to perswade them to, represents at the first view gain or losse; or is a course that carries somewhat in it of courage or cowardise. And when in things that are propounded to the people, there appears advantage, though covertly there be disadvantage in it; and when it seemes couragious, though underneath there be covertly hid the destruction of the Republique, it will alwayes be very easy to draw the multitude thereto. And so likewise it will be alwayes very difficult to perswade them to those courses, where there appears either cowardise or losse, though when it is better weigh'd and advis'd upon, therein is contain'd both safety and advantage. And what I have said is confirmed with very many examples of the Romans, as also with those from abroad, both moderne and ancient. For from hence grew the evill opinion, which was rais'd in Rome of *Fab. Max.* who could not perswade the people of Rome, that it was profitable for that commonwealth to proceed slowly in that war, & to susteine and beare up against *Hannibals* violence without fighting: for the people deem'd it a base course, nor had they judgement to discern the advantage there was to be gotten by it, nor had *Fab.* reasons sufficient to make it plaine by demonstrations; & ordinarily the people are so much blinded in these opinions of courage, that though they of Rome had committed that error to give power to him that was Commander of the horse under *Fab.* to fight with *Hannib.* whether *F.* would or no, & that by reason thereof the Roman army had like to have

have bin broken, if *F.* had not succourd it, yet this experience serv'd them not, but that they afterwards made *Varro C.* not for any other worth of his, but because in al meetings & publick places of Rome, he had bragg'd he would discomfit *Han.* whensoever he had power given him to do it: whence came the battell & discomfiture at *Canna*, & near upon the ruine of Rome. I will alleadge one other Ro. example. *Hanniball* had bin in Italy 8. or 10. yeares, & had fill'd the whole cuntry full of bloody slaughters of the Romans, when there came into the Senate one *M. Centenius Penula*, a very base fellow, yet he had had some place of charge in the armes; And offer'd, that if they would give him authoritie to leavy an armie of voluntaries, in what place soever it were in Italie, hee would in a short time deliver into their hands *Hanniball*, either prisoner or dead. The Senate thought his demand very rash, yet they considering that if it were denied him, and afterwards his motion were made knowne to the people, that some trouble might arise thereupon, and so the evill will and envy thereof light upon the Senate, they yie'ded to him, being content rather to suffer the hazzard of all those that went out with him, then to give any occasion of raising new discontents among the people, considering how likely this course was to be acceptable, and how hard to be dissuaded. He went then with this inordinate and rude multitude to seek out *Hanniball*, with whom he no sooner met, but he and all his troops were either slaine or routed. In Greece in the city of *Athens*, *Nicias* a very grave and discreet man, could never perswade the people that it was not for their good to go and undertake an expedition against *Sicily*, so  
that

that they having resolved thereupon, contrary to the will: mens likings, there ensued the whole ruine of *Arbens*. *Scipio* when he was made *Consull*, and that he desir'd the province of *Affricke*, promising the utter ruine of *Carthage*, whereunto the Senate not agreeing by the advice of *Fabius Maximus*, threatened to propound it to the people, as he that well knew how such like resolutions pleas'd them. We could also to this purpose lay downe some examples of our owne city, as was that of *Hercules Betruogli*, commander for the *Florentines*, together with *Antoni Giacomini*; after they had routed *Bartolomeus Alvianus* at *Saint Vincenti*, they went to incampe before *Pisa*, which enterprize was resolv'd on by the people upon the brave promises *Hercules* made them; though many discreet citizens did no way like of it, yet they could not hinder it, thrust on by the generall desire, which was grounded on the commanders large promises. I say therefore, that there is not an easier way to enlarge a Commonwealth, where the people hath the authority, then to put them into brave undertakings. For where the people is of any worth or valour, those will be alwayes well lik'd of; and if any man be of different opinion, he shall not be of force to perswade it. But if hereupon comes the destruction of the city; thence proceeds also, and most ordinarily the particular ruine of those citizens who are made the commanders of such like undertakings; for the people having presupposed the victory, when they go by the losse, never impute it to their General's evill fortune or want of sufficient forces, but blame him rather of treason or ignorance, and so either  
put

put him to death, imprison or confine him, as it befell very many Carthaginian Captains, and Athenians. Nor shall any of the former victories gloriously gotten, afterwards shelter them, for the present mishap cancels the records of all good past: as it befell Antoni Giacomini our countrey man here, who not having overcome the *Fisuns*, as the people presupposed, and he had promised, fell into such disgrace with the people, that for all his many good services past, he lived rather by the courtesy of those that having power with the people, protected him, then by any assurance else was given him.

## CHAP. LIV.

What authority the presence of great and worthy personages hath to appease and quiet the rage of a multitude.

THE second thing remarkable upon the text headed in the former Chapter is, that nothing so readily restrains the fury of a multitude thing as, as the reverence of some grave man coming among them, as *Virgil* sayes at the same purpose, and not without reason,

*Tum pietate gravem ac* If then by chance some  
*meritis si forte virum* reverent man, they  
*quem* *conspexere, silent,* *ar-* *they all grow silent*  
*rectaque auribus a-* *and their* *ears*  
*stant.*

And therefore that man of worth and merit, that either hath the command of an army,  
or

or that abides in a city where a tumult arises, ought represent himself upon the occasion, with the greatest grace, and in as honorable termes as may be, cladding himself with the ornaments belonging to his degree and quality, to gain him the more reverence. A few years agoe, Florence was divided into two factions, of the *Frateschi* and *Arrabbiati*, for so they were called: and coming to blowes, the *Frateschi* were overcome, among whom was *Paul Antonius Soderini*, a citizen of great esteem in those dayes: and the people in the time of those tumults going in armes to sack his house, *Franciscus* his brother then Bishop of *Valterra*, and now Cardinal, was by chance in his house, who presently having perceived the stir, and seen the multitude coming, clad himself with his most honorable vestments and thereupon his episcopal rochet, and to meet these armed people, where by the awfulness of his person and good words he staid them: Which thing throughout the City for many dayes was much noted and celebrated. I conclude then that there is not a more seild nor more necessary remedy to stop the fury of a multitude, then the presence of such a man, who in his aspect and worth brings an awful reverence with him. And thereupon we see (to return to the text formerly alleged) with what obstinacy the Commons of Rome accepted the party, to go to *Veium*, thinking it advantageous to them but never considering the mischief therein involved, and how being there arose divers tumults upon the occasion, there would have bin hartie stone, had not the Senate accompanied with many grave and reverent personages, restrained their fury.

## CHAP. LV.

*How easily things are ordered in a city where the people is not corrupted: and that where a parity is there is no place for a Principallity, and where that is not, a Republique cannot be.*

**A**Lthough that heretofore we have sufficiently treated, what is to be feared and what to be hoped for of Cities that are corrupted: yet methinks it is not out of purpose to consider a resolution the Senate took, touching the vow *Camillus* made, to give the tenth part of the prey they took from the *Veientes*, to *Apollo*. Which prey being fallen into the peoples hands, seeing they could no otherwise ever see any account of it, the Senate made an edict, that every one should publickly produce the tenth part of what he had gotten in the spoil of *Veium*. And though this resolution took not place, the Senate having afterwards found out another expedient, and by other means given satisfaction to *Apollo* for the people, yet we perceive by these determinations, how much the Senate trusted in the peoples goodness and how they judg'd, that there was not one of them but wou'd punctually bring forth what he was commanded by the edict. And on the other side, how the people thought not in any part to deceive the edict, by giving less then was due, but rather to free themselves therefrom, by shewing their open distaste at such



such course taken. This example with many others, above alleadged, give very good evidence of the great goodness and religion was in that people, and what might be hop'd for of them. And truly where this goodness is not, little can be hop'd for: as we can hope for nothing in those countreys, which in these daies we see corrupted, as in Italy above others, so France and Spain retain a part of the same corruption: and if in those countreys we see not so great disorders as every day arise in Italy, it proceeds not so much from the peoples goodness (which is very much said) as from that they are under one King who keeps them together in union; not onely by his vertue, but by the ordinary course of government in those Kingdomes, which is not yet quite perverted. This goodness is yet seen in Germany, and this kind of conscience is also of great force with those people, which is the occasion that many Républiques continue free, and do so strictly observe their own laws, that no forraign enemy abroad, nor ambitious man at home, dares offer to seize on them. And to prove this true, that in those countreys there remain still the marks of that ancient goodness, I will give another example, like to that above said of the Senate and of the people of Rome. Those Républiques use, when they chance to have need of any money they lay out for the common good, that the Magistrates, or the Consuls, having authority, should tax the inhabitants of the city one or two in the hundred, of that which every man is worth. And such a resolution being made according to the order of the town, every man comes before the receivers of that tax, and having first taken an oath to pay a

convenient sum, he throws into a chest, appointed to that purpose, what in his conscience he thinks he should pay. Of which payment there is no other witness, but he that payes. Whereby we may well guess at the great good and religion there is yet left among those men. And we may well think, that every one payes the due sum; for if it were not paid, the imposition would not yeeld that quantity, as those of old time were wont to do: which failing, the deceit would appear: whereupon they would seek some other means to leavy their moneys, then this. Which goodness is so much the more to be admir'd in these times, because it is very rare, or rather remains only in this countrey. Which proceeds from two things, the one, because they have not had much commerce with their neighbors; for neither have these gone into their countreys, nor they come to visit these, because they have bin contented with those goods, to feed on those victuals, and to be clad with those wools, which the countrey affords; whereby is taken away the occasion of all conversation, and the beginning of all corruption. For so they could not learn the French, Spanish, or Italian manners, which Nations together corrupt the whole world. The other reason is, because those Republicques where the common liberty is preserv'd, and uncorrupted, do not permit that any citizen of theirs should live after the manner of a gentleman, but rather maintain among them an equality; and those that live in that countrey are cruel enemies to the Lords and Gentlemen. And if by chance they fall into their hands, they put them to death, as the principal authors of corruption, and occasions

fions of scandal And to make plain this name of  
 gentlemen; what it is, I say, that those are  
 call'd gentlemen, that live in idleness; yet deli-  
 ciously, of the profits of their estates; without  
 having any care to cultivate their lands, or to  
 take any other pains necessary to the mainte-  
 nance of mans life. These kind of men are  
 very hurtfull in every Commonwealth, and  
 country; but worse are they, that, besides  
 the foresaid fortunes, hold strong Castles, and  
 have vassals that obey them. With these two  
 sorts of men the Kingdom of Naples abounds,  
 the country about Rome, Romagna, and  
 Lombardia. This is the cause, that in those  
 countreys there hath never bin any Repub-  
 lique nor any civil government: for such kinds  
 of men are enemies to all civil government.  
 And if a man had a minde to bring into such  
 countreys the forme of a Commonwealth, he  
 would find it impossible; but to bring them un-  
 der some order, if any man had the power,  
 he could take no other course, then reduce  
 them to a Royalty. The reason is this, because  
 where the matter is so extremely corrupted,  
 that the laws are not able to restrain it, it is  
 needfull to ordain together with them a great-  
 er power; which is the authority of a King,  
 who by his absolute and extraordinary power  
 may be of force to bridle the excessive ambi-  
 tion and corruption of the mighty. This rea-  
 son is verified in the example of Tuscany where  
 we see that in a small space of a countrey  
 three Republicques have long consisted, Flo-  
 rence, Siena, and Lucca; and that the other  
 cities of that countrey serve in such a kind,  
 that they have their dispositions and their or-  
 ders much like them, and that they would wil-

lingly maintain the common liberty, all this arises from hence, because there are no lords of Castles in those countreys, and never a one, or very few Gentlemen; but such equality, that an understanding man that hath appli'd himself to the knowledge of the ancient civil governments, might easily reduce them to a fixe state. But their misfortune hath bin so great, that as yet they have not lit upon any man that had either the power or knowledge to put it in execution. This conclusion then I draw from hence, that he that strives to frame a Republique where there are many gentlemen, cannot do it, unless he first dispatch them all out of the way: and he that would erect a Monarchy or a Principality where there is much equality, shall never effect it, unless he draws out of that equality many of ambitious and turbulent mindes, and makes them rather gentlemen in effect, then in title, enriching them with Castles, and possessions, allowing them the favor of wealth and men, to the end, that he being plac'd in the midst of them, by their means may maintain his power, and they by his favor preserve their ambition, and the rest be constrain'd to bear that yoke which force and nothing else can make them endure. And there being by this way a proportion from him that forces, to him that is forced, thereby men continue feeded every one in their order. And because to bring a countrey to be a Republique which is fit to be a Kingdom, and of one fit to be a Republique to make a Kingdome, is a subject worthy of a man of extraordinary judgment and authority; many there have bin that have endeavor'd it, but few have bin able to go through with it, because the

the weight and consequence thereof partly frights them, and partly so overbears them, that they fail in their first beginnings. I think the experience we have of the Republique of Venice will seem a little to contrary my opinion, that where there are gentlemen, a Republique cannot be instituted: for there none can partake of the dignities, unless they be gentlemen. The answer hereto is, that this example makes no opposition against us; for the gentlemen in that Republique are rather in name, then in effect: for they have not great revenues out of possessions, and lands, but their great wealth is founded upon merchandise, and moveable goods; and moreover none of them hold any Castles, or have any jurisdiction over men: but the name of gentleman among them is a name of honor and credit, not being grounded upon any of those things that caus'd those in other cities to be call'd gentlemen. And as other Republicques have all their divisions under several names, so Venice is divided into the Gentility, and the Commonalty; and their order is, that those are capable of all honors, these not. Which is not any cause of imbroile among them, for the reasons we have other where said. Let a Commonwealth then be there ordain'd, where all things are reduc'd to an equality; and contrariwise, let a Prince be made, where great inequality is: otherwise shall there be neither proportion nor continuance.

CHAP.

## CHAP. LVI.

Before strange accidents and changes befall a City or a country, usually there are some prodigies which fore-run them, or men that foretell them.

**F**ROM whence this proceeds I know not, but it is evident as well by ancient as modern examples, that no very heavy accident ever befell any country or City, that hath not bin foretold either by some Diviners, or by some revelations, or prodigies, or signes from heaven. And not to goe too far from home to fetch the proof herof, every one knows how long before the coming of *Charles* the eighth of France into Italy was foretold by Fryer *Jerome Savanara's*: and how besides this, it was said throughout all Tuscany, that there were heard in the aire, and seen over *Arezzo*, many men in armes skirmishing together. Moreover we all know here that before *Laurent* of *Medici* the old mans death the *Dome* or principal Church was fir'd with lightning on the top, even to the ruine thereof. Nor is any man here ignorant how a little before that *Peter Soderini*, who had bin made the *Florentines* chief Standard-bearer for life, was banish'd and depriv'd of his dignities, the Palace was in the same manner burnt with lightning. A man might alleadge other examples beside these, but I leave them rather to avoyd tediousness. I shall relate that onely which *Titus Livius* speaks of, before the Frenchmens coming to Rome, and that is, how one *Mateus Ceditius* a Plebeyan told the Senate, that he had heard at midnight, as he

he past by the new way, a voyce greater than any mans, which wain'd him to tel the Magistrates that the Frenchmen were coming to Rome. The reason hereof I think fit to be discours'd upon, and triaged of by some man well versed in the knowledge of natural and supernatural things, which I profess not. Yet it may be, as some Philosophers will have it, that the ayre being full of spirits, who by their natural knowledge foreseeing things to come take compassion upon men, and advertise them by such like signes, to the end they should prepare themselves for their defence. But however it is, we may find it true, that alwaies after such strange accidents, new and extraordinary chances befall countries.

## CHAP. LVII.

*The Common people united are strong and vigorous, but taken apart and separated, vile and contemptible.*

**M**ANY Romans (the country all about being much ruined and wasted upon the Frenchmens passage to Rome) were gone to dwell at Vejan, contrary to the appointment and order of the Senate; who, to remedy this disorder, commanded by their publique edicts, that every one within a set time, under a certain penalty, should return to inhabite at Rome. At which edicts at first, they against whom they were directed, scoffed; but afterwards, when the time drew near that they were to obey, they all yielded their obedience. And *Titus Livius* uses these words: *Officeret* that

*Ex ferocibus universis singuli  
peru suo obedientia fure.*

they were all in general, each one out of his particular fear became obedient. And truly the nature of a multitude in this particular cannot better be laid open, than here in this Text it is shew'd: for the multitude is many times very insolent in their speeches against their Princes decrees. Afterwards when they see their punishment near and certain, not trusting to one another, they hasten all to obedience; so that it plainly appears, that a man ought to have regard to the good or ill disposition of the people towards him; if it be good, to take such order that it may still continue; if ill, to provide so that it cannot hurt him. This is meant for those ill dispositions which the people have bred in them upon any other occasion, than for the loss of their liberty, or for the love of their Prince, who is yet living. For the evil humors that arise from these causes are terrible beyond measure, and have need of great remedies to restrain them. Their other indispositions will be easy, when they have not made choyce of any heads, to whom they may have their recourse: for on one side there is not a more dreadfull thing, than a dissolute multitude, and without a head: and on the other side, there is nothing weaker then it; for though they have their weapons in their hands, yet will it be easy to reduce them, provided that thou canst avoyd the first shock of their furie: for when their rage is a lit le appeas'd and every one considers that he is to return again to his home, they begin then a little to doubt of themselves, and to take a care for their safety, either by flight or agreement. Therefore a multitude up in armes, desiring to escape these dangers, is to make choyce of



a head out of themselves who may direct them, keep them united, and provide for their defence, as did the common people of Rome, when after the death of *Virginia*, they departed from Rome, and for their own preservations, they chose 3 Tribuns from among themselves: which if they do not, there allwaies befalls them that which *Tim Livius* saies in his above written discourse, that jointly together they are of strength and vigor; but when each one afterwards begins to advise of his own danger, they become weak and contemptible.

## CHAP. LVIII.

*The multitude is more wise and constant, then a Prince.*

That nothing is more vain or inconstant than the multitude, as well our Author *Tim Livius*, as all other Historians do affirm: for we find it often in the relations of men's actions, that the multitude hath condemn'd some men to death, whom afterwards they have grieved for and exceedingly wish'd for again: as we see the people of Rome did for *Manlius Capitolinus*, whom as they had condemn'd to death, they much desir'd again. And these are the words of the Author. *The people, after that by his death they perceive themselves free from danger, wished him alive again.* And in another place, when he shewes the accidents that followed in *Syracusa* after the death of *Hieronimus*, *Hieron*

nephew

*Pat natura multitudinis et sunt humiliter sevit aut superbe dominantur.* nephew, he sayes, *This is the nature of the multitude, that they are either slavish in their obedience, or insolent in their authority.* I know

not, whether herein I undertake not too hard a task, so full of difficulties, that I must either give it over with shame, or continue it with blame, having a desire to defend that, which, as I have said, is accused by all writers. But however it be, I do not judge it, nor ever will, a defect to defend some opinions with their reasons, without any intention to use either authority or force. Therefore I say, that of that defect whereof those writers accuse the multitude, all men in particular are guilty, and especially Princes: for every one that is not regulated by the lawes would commit the same errors which the loose multitude does. And this we may easily know, for there are and have bin many evil Princes; and venomous and discreet ones but a few. I speak of Princes, that have bin able to break the bridle that could check them; among whom we reckon not those that were in Egypt, when in that very ancientest antiquity that countrey was governed by the lawes, nor those of Sparta, nor those that in our daies are in France, which Kingdom is order'd more by the lawes, than any other which in these times we have knowledge of. And these Kings which grow up under such constitutions are not to be accounted in that number, from whence we are to consider the nature of every man by himself, and discern if he be like the multitude: for in parallell with them, we should set down a multitude in like manner regulated by the lawes, as they are, and therein shall be found the same goodness that

that is in them: and we shall see they neither insolently domineere, nor slavishly serve, as the people of Rome, which whilst the Republicke continued uncorrupted, never serv'd basely, nor rul'd proudly, but with their owne customes, and Magistrates held their owne degree honorably. And when it was necessary to rise up against one that were powerfull, they did it, as it appear'd in the example of *Manilius*, and in that of the *sen*, and others, who went about to oppress them. And when it was requisite they should obey the Dictators, and the Consuls, for the common safety, they did it likewise: and if the people of Rome desired again *Manilius* being dead, it is no marvel; for they desired his vertues, which had bin such, that the remembrance of them mov'd every one to compassion, and might be of force likewise to work the same effect in a Prince: for it is the opinion of all writers, that vertue is commended even in ones enemies. And if *Manilius*, in the midst of that great desire had bin reviv'd, the people of Rome would have given the same judgement upon him that they had done when they drew him out of prison, and condemn'd him to death. In like manner we see there were some Princes esteem'd wise too, that have put some men to death, whom afterwards they have much desired again; as *Alexander* did *Chion*, and others of his friends, and *Herod Mariannus*. But that which our Historian speaks touching the nature of the multitude, belongs not to that which is regulated by the lawes, as was that of the Romans, but to that which is loose, as was that of the Syracusians, which committed those errors that men intraged and

dissolute fall into, as did *Alexander the Great*, and *Heracl*, in the cases aforesaid. Therefore the nature of the multitude is not more blame-worthy, than that of Princes: for all equally do erre, when all without respect have power to erre. Whereof, besides this I have alleadged, there are examples enough, as well among the Roman Emperors, as other Kings and Princes, where we may see such unconstancy and variation of life, as never was yet seen in any multitude. I conclude then, beyond the common opinion, which sayes, that the people when they have the Principallity in their hands, are various, mutable, unthankfull, affirming that these faulcs are no otherwise in them, than they are in particular Princes. And if a man blamed both peoples and Princes together, he might say true; but exempting Princes, he is deceiv'd. For a people that rules, and is well in order, will be constant, prudent and gratefull, as well as a Prince, or better, though esteem'd worse. And on the other side, a Prince loos'd from the law will be unthankfull, various, and imprudent, more than the people: and the diversitie of their proceeding arises not from the diversitie of their dispositions (because in all of them it is much after one manner, and if there be any advantage on either side, it is on the peoples part) but rather that the one hath more regard to the lawes under which they live, than the other. And he that considers the people of Rome, shall find that for four hundred years the name of a King was hatefull to them, and yet were they zealous for the glory, and common good of their countrey: and he shall see ma-  
ny

ny examples among them that witness the one thing and the other of them And if any man alledge to mee the unthankfulnesse they used toward *Scipio* I answer that which formerly at large was sayd in this matter where it was made plaine, that people are lesse ungratefull than Princes. But as touching wisdom, and settled staydnesse, I say that a people is wiser and more stayd, and of more exact judgment than a Prince. And therefore not without cause the peoples voyce is likened to Gods voyce; for wee see that the universall opinions bring to passe rare effects in their pretages, so that it seemes by their secret vertues they foresee their owne good or evill. And touching their judgment in things, it is seldome seene, that when they heare two Oratours, pleading each of them in a contrary part, when they are both equally worth but that they follow the better opinion, and are very capable of the truth they heare. And in matters of courage, or in things that appeare profitable (as it was abovesayd) they erre, many times also does a Prince erre, drawne aside by his owne passions, which are greater in them then in the people. We see likewise in their choosing of Officers they make a sauer better choice then does a Prince. Nor will a people ever be perswaded to advance to dignity a man infamous and of a corrupt life, to which a Prince may easily and diverse wayes be brought. We see a people begin to hate some one thing, and continue many ages in the same opinion, which we see not in a Prince. And of the one and the other of these two things, the people of Rome shall serve me for witness, which in so many hundreds of yeares, in so many electio<sup>n</sup> of Consulls and Tribuns, never

never made foure choices, whereof they had  
 cause to repent them. And they hated so much  
 (as I said) the name of a King, that no citizen  
 of theirs could ever so farre oblige them, that if  
 once he affected the Royalty, they would par-  
 don his due punishment. Moreover we see, that  
 in those cities where the Principality is in the  
 people, in a short time exceeding great in-  
 creases are made, and farre greater then those  
 that have bin made under the government of a  
 Prince, as Rome did after the banishment of  
 her Kings, and Athens after she freed her selfe  
 from *Pisistratus*, which proceeds from nothing  
 else, but that the peoples governments  
 are better then Princes. Nor will we agree to  
 this, that all that our Historian sayes in the text  
 before alleadged, or any where else, opposes  
 this our opinion; for if we shall run over all the  
 disorders of peoples, & the disorders of Princes,  
 and all the glorious actions of people, as those  
 also of Princes, we shall see the people farre  
 surmount the Princes in vertue and in glory.  
 And if Princes exceede the people in ordaining  
 of Lawes, in framing a civill government, in  
 making of statutes and new institutions, yet in  
 the maintenance and preservation hereof the  
 people go so farre beyond them, that they at-  
 taine to the glory of their founders. And in  
 summe, to conclude this matter, I say, that as  
 Princes states have lasted long, so likewise have  
 those of Republicques; and the one and the other  
 have had need to be regulated by the lawes: for  
 a Prince that hath the power to doe what he  
 list, commits divers follies; and a people that  
 can do what they will, seldome give great  
 proofes of their wisdom. If then the argu-  
 ment be touching a Prince and a people tied  
 and

And chained to their lawes, a man shall see more vertue in the People, then in the Prince; but if the reasoning be of the one and the other loose from the lawes, fewer errors will appeare in the people then in the Prince; and those lesse, and which are capable of greater remedies: for a good man may easily have the meanes to perswade with a licentious and tumultuous people, and so reduce them to reason: But to a mischievous Prince no man can speake, nor is there any other remedy

but the sword.

Whereupon a man may guess at the importance of one and the others evill: for if words are of

*But this is such a remedy as hath no warrant from divine or humane lawes, especialy when that a Tyrant is the true and lawfull Prince of the country, however that by his evill government and administration, of the affaires he deservedly be termed a Tyrant. That of David none is ignorant of, 1. Sam. 24. and 5. v. Where he cut off the lapper of Sauls garment, and therefore was checked by his owne conscience. And that in the Psalm, 104. Touch not mine anointed, &c. Nor doe the heathen writers any thing true way hereto, wherefore Tacitus says, Ferenda regum ingenia, neque nisi casibus mutationes. Ann. 12. and Quomodo sterilitatem & cetera nature mala, ita luxum vel avaritiam dominantium tolerate: Vicia erunt donec homines, sed neque hac continua, & meliorum interventu pensantur. Hist. 4. I neede not alleadge others: The troubles that fell upon the Roman Empire when they began to murder their Princes, however bad, may argue their part; which was when Nero, Otho, Galba, Vitellius successively were slaine, Tacitus speaking of the story he writ*

of

of it, says it was, *Opus plenum magnis castibus, atrox proeliis, discors seditionibus, ipsa etiam pace laevum*, Hist. 1. For they are much deceived who promise themselves quiet by means of a Tyrants death: for as Julius Caesar said, Kingdomes never change them without great combustions, and states suffer worse michiefes, by not enduring insolent princes. For howbeit both particulars, and the publique also smart because of this disorder, yet the life of the Prince is the very soule and bond of the Republique: *Rege incolumi mens omnibus una est, Amisso raptare fidem*, says the Poet. This case hath bin argued by diverse at large, and the onely remedy is thus concluded on. The treacle of this venom is prayer and not vengeance: the people oppressed shall lift up their heart to God, as did the Israelites, when tyranniz'd over by Pharaoh; for the cruelties of bad Princes come not to passe by chance; and therefore is it necessary to have our recourse to God, who sometimes for chastisement sometimes for tryall permits them force to cure the peoples evil, when as that of Kings requires the sword; there is no man that will not say, but that where the medicines must be stronger, the more dangerous are the evils. When a people is risen in tumult, the follies which they commit are not so perillous, nor is there such feare to be had of the present evil, as of that which may befall, it being possible some Tyrant may grow up in the midst of that confusion. But during the time of mischievous Princes the contrary happens; for the greatest feare is of the present evil; and of the time to come there is hope, men easily perswading themselves, that his evil life may produce their liberty. So that a man may see the



the difference between the one and the other; the desperate feare of the one, is, of the present state; of the other, of the state into which it may fall. The multiplicitie of cruelties are exercis'd against those that they feare, lest they should seize upon the common good. The Princes against those that they feare, lest they should seeke to recover their owne againe. But the opinion against the people growes dayly, for every one may freely speake evill of the people without feare, even while they have the government in their hands. A man speakes not evill of Princes, but with many feares and jealousies. Not is it much out of purpose (seeing the matter drawes me to it) to argue in the Chapter following, what Confederacies a man may best trust to, either those that be made with a Republique, or that are made with a Prince.

### CHAP. LIX.

*What Confederation or league is rather to be trusted, either that which is made with a Republique, or that is made with a Prince.*

**B**Ecause every day we have it, that one Prince with another, or one Republique with another make leagues, and joyne friendship together, and in like manner also confederacies are drawne and agreements made betweene a Republique and a Prince. I thinke to examine, which is the firmest league, whereof a man should make surest account of; either of that with a Republique, or the other with a Prince. And examining the whole, I beleeve that in many cases they are alike, and in some there is some difference: and therefore, that  
 accords

accords made by force shall not be truly kept  
 thee neither by Prince nor commonwealth. And  
 I thinke that when feare comes upon them  
 touching their state, as well the one as the other,  
 rather then perish, will breake their faith with  
 thee, and requite thee with unthankfulnesse. *Demetrius*,  
 he that was ever termed the taker of  
 cities, had done exceeding much good to the  
 Athenians; it chanc'd afterwards, that being  
 routed by his enemies, and seeking refuge in  
 Athens as in a city that was his friend, and  
 much ingag'd to him, he was not admitted into  
 it. Which griev'd him much more then the  
 losse of his souldiers and army had done. *Pompey*  
 when his army was routed by *Cesar* in *Thessaly*,  
 fled into Egypt to *Ptolomy*, who formerly had  
 bin restor'd by him into his kingdome, and  
 was put to death by him. Which things we see  
 had the same occasions: yet more humanity  
 and lesse injury was us'd by the Republique,  
 then by the Prince. Therefore where there is  
 fear, a man shal finde in effect the same faith.  
 And if there be any Commonwealth or Prince  
 who to keepe their faith with thee, expect  
 while they ruine, it may proceed also from the  
 same occasion. And as for a Prince, it may well  
 chance, that he is allied to some powerfull  
 Prince, who though he then hath not the oppor-  
 tunity to defend him, yet may he well hope,  
 that in time he may restore him into his state,  
 or else that having taken side with him as  
 partisan, he thinks he cannot obaine a faith-  
 full and fair accord with his enemy. Of this  
 sort were those Princes of the Kingdome of  
 Naples, that tooke part with the French. And  
 for Republicques, of this sort was *Saguntum* in  
 Spaine, which till it was ruin'd tooke part  
 with

with the Romans; and so was Florence for siding with the French in the yeare one thousand five hundred and twelve. And I believe, having summ'd up every thing, that in these cases, where the danger is urgent, there is more assurance rather in the Republiques, then in the Princes: for though the Republiques were of the same minde and had the same intention as Princes had, yet for that they move but slowly, it will cause them to stay longer in resolving themselves, then a Prince will; and thereupon they will be longer a breaking their faith then he. Confederacies are broken for profit, Wherein Commonwealths are farre stricter in their observance of accords, then Princes. And we might bring many examples, where even for a very small gaine a Prince hath broken his faith; and where exceeding great advantages could not one whit move a Commonwealch, as was the party *Themistocles* propounded to the Athenians, to whom in an oration made them he said, that he could advise them so, that their country should gaine much advantage by it, but them he might not tell it, for feare of discovering it, for by the discovery the opportunity of doing it would be taken away. Whereupon the Athenians chose *Aristides*, to whom he should communicate his secret, and together with him consult upon it: whom *Themistocles* shew'd how the whole navall army of all Greece was in their hands under their protection, though intrusted them upon their faith, so that it was in their power by the ruine thereof to make themselves Lords of all Greece. Whereupon *Aristides* told the people that *Themistocles* advice was exceeding profitable, but very dishonest. For which cause the people wholly

wholly refus'd it, which Philip of Macedon would not have done, nor those other Princes who seeke their owne gaine rather, and have made more advantage by breaking their faith, than by any way else. Touching the breaking of agreements, upon the not observance of some particulars therein, I meane not to meddle with them, being ordinary matters; but I speak of those that breake upon extraordinary and maine points. Wherein, by what we have said, I beleeve the people are lesse faulty than the Princes, and therefore may better be trusted than they.

## CHAP. IX.

*How the Consulship and every other Magistracie in Rome was given without respect of age.*

**I**T appears by order of the Story, that the Commonwealth of Rome, after that the Consulship came among the people, bestowed it upon their Citizens, without regard of yeares or blood: and indeed they never had respect to age, but altogether aimed at vertue, whether it were in young, or old. Whic' wee perceive by the testimonie of *Valerius Corvinus*, who at 23. yeares of age was made Consul. And the same *Valerius*, speaking to his souldiers, sayd, That the Consulship was the reward of vertue,

*Erat primum virtutis, and not of blood. Which thing,*  
*non sanguinis.* whether it were advisedly sayd

or no, might require much dispute. And touching blood, this was yeilded to upon necessitie, and this necessitie that was in Rome might be in every Citie that would doe the same things Rome did, as otherwhere is sayd: for toyle,

and

and labour cannot be imposed on men without reward; nor can their hopes of obtaining reward be taken from them, without danger. And therefore it was fit timely to give them hope of the Consulship, and by this hope were they a while fed without having it; at length that hope served not, but there was a necessity to come to performance with them. But the Citie that employes not their people in any glorious action may treat them after their owne manner, as otherwise it was argued. But that which will take the same course Rome tooke, must make this distinction. And grant that it be so, for that of time there is no reply: nay rather it is necessary; for in the choosing of a young man into a degree which hath need of the discretion of an old man, it is likely (the people being to make the choyce) that some very worthy and noble action of his preferres him thereto. And when a young man becomes endowed with such vertues that hee hath made himself famous by his heroicke actions, it were a very great wrong, that that Citie might not serve her selfe of him then, but should be put off to expect, till that vigour and quicknesse of spirit were grown old and dull, whenceof in that age his country might have made good use, as Rome did of *Valerius Corvinus*, of *Scipio*, and *Pompey*, and many others, that triumphed very young.

THE  
SECOND  
BOOKE.

THE PREFACE.



EN doalwaies commend, but not alwaies with reason, the times of old, and blame the present: and they take part so much with things past, that they celebrate not onely those ages which they have known by the memory writers have left them, but those also, which now being old, they remember they have seen in their youth. And when this their opinion is false, as most commonly it is, I perswade my self the reasons that bring them into this error, are divers. And the first I take to be, that of matters of old the truth is not wholly known, & of those actions most commonly those things are conceal'd that would bring any infamy upon the times, but whatsoever advances their credit & glory is set out with magnificence. For most writers do so much follow the conquerors fortune, that to make their victories glorious, they not only augment what they have vertuously done

but

but they so illustrate their enemies actions, that those that are afterwards born in any of their countreys, either conquering or conquered, have cause to admire those men and times, and so consequently are forc'd exceedingly to praise and love them. Besides this, men hating things either for fear, or envie, two very powerfull causes of hatred, are quite spent in things that are passed, being they are not able to hurt, nor can give occasion of envie. But on the contrary part, it comes to pass that those things that are now in hand, and we see, which by reason of the through knowledge we have of them, no riddle thereof being conceal'd from us, and knowing in them together with the good, many things worthy dislike, hereupon we are compell'd to judge them much inferior to matters of old, although that in truth the present deserve far more glory and reputation: this I say, not arguing touching the arts, which are now brought to such perfection, that the times cannot take from them, nor add but little more glory to them; but speaking of things belonging to mens lives and manners, whereof the proofes are not very evident; I answer, that this custome abovementioned of praising and blaming is sometimes false and sometimes true; for sometimes they must needs light upon the truth; because all humane things are continually in motion, and either rise or fall. As we see the civil government of a city or countrey so ordain'd by some rare person, that for a time even by reason of the worth of this man, the State mends much, and is more and more amplified: he that is then borne in that State, and commends more the times of old, than those

those moderne, is much deceiv'd: and the cause of his error proceeds from those things that have bin formerly sayd. But those that are afterwards born in that City or countrie, whose dayes are onely during their decline from their excellence, then erre nor. And I devising with my selfe whence these things proceed, I think the world hath continued alwayes in one manner, and that in it hath beene alwayes as much good as evill; but that that good and evill does charge from country to country, as it appears by that which is discovered to us of those ancient kingdomes, which alrer'd from the one to the other, by change of manners. But the world continued the same. There was onely this difference, that where it first had plac'd its vertue in Affria, it afterwards remov'd it into Media, then into persia, in so much that at length it came into Italie, and so to Rome. And if after the Romane Empire there succeeded not any other that lasted, nor where the world had retired all its vertue together; yet we see it was spread abroad into severall Nations, where men behav'd themselves very bravely and valourously, as in the Kingdome of France, the Kingdome of the Turks, and that of the Soldans; so now adayes in Germanie, and so among those that were first of the Saracin sect, which did great exploits, and made themselves masters of so great a part of the world, after they had destroyed the Easterne Empire of Rome. In all these Provinces then, after the Romanes were ruined, and in all these sects hath that vertue resided; and now in some of them indeed it may be wished for, but in other some worthily commended. And he that is borne



borne in those Countries, and praises the times past more than the present, may be deceived: but he that is borne in Italy and not in Greece, and is not become either in Italy, a Tramonitan, or in Greece, a Turk, hath reason to blame the times present, and commend the former, for therein were many things made them marvail, but in these there is nothing can recover them out of extreame misery, infamy, and disgrace, where there is no observance either of Religion or Lawes, nor of warlike discipline, but they are wholly bespotted with all manner of filthiness. And so much the more detestable are these vices, by how much they are most in those that are greatest, who sitting in their Tribunals command all, and will be ador'd. But returning to our discourse, I say, that if mens understandings are corrupted in matter of judgment, touching which age is the better, the present or that of old, in those things by reason of their antiquitie they could not have such an exact knowledge, as they might have of their own times, yet should they not be corrupted in old men touching the judgement of the times of their youth, and old age, having known and seen equally the one and the other; Which thing would be true, if those men all the time of their lives continued still at the same state of judgement, and had the same desires. But they altering, though the times change not, yet cannot seem so to men to continue the same, they having other desires, other delights, and other considerations in their old age, than in their youth: for the strength of mens bodies, when they grow old, decaying, and their judgements and under-  
standings

derstandings increasing, as must needs be, that  
 those things which in their youths they thought  
 supportable and good, becomes afterwards to  
 them growing old intollerable and burthall:  
 and where these men ought herein to lay the  
 fault upon their own judgements, they blame  
 the times. Besides this, the desire of man be-  
 ing insatiable (because of nature he hath it,  
 that he can and will desire every thing, though  
 of fortune he be so limited, that he can attain  
 but a few) there arises thence, a dislike in mens  
 minds, and a loathing of the things they enjoy  
 which causes them to blame the times present  
 and commend those past, as also those that  
 are to come, although they have no motives  
 grounded upon reason to incite them thereto.  
 I know not then, whether I shall deserve to be  
 numbered among them that are deceiv'd; if  
 too much in these discourses of mine I shall  
 praise the times of the ancient Romans, and  
 blame our own. And truly if the vertue that  
 then reign'd, and the vice that now reigns,  
 were not more clear than the Sun, I should not  
 speak so freely, for fear I should incur the cen-  
 sure of that error whereof I have now blam'd  
 others: but the matter being so evident, that  
 every man sees it, I shall with boldness speak that  
 plainly which I conceive of those & these times,  
 to the end those young men who shall chance  
 to read these my writings, may avoyd the evil  
 of these times, and prepare their minds to im-  
 itate the good of these, of old, whensoever  
 their good fortune shall give them occasion:  
 for it is the duty of a good man, to teach unto  
 others that good, which by reason of the ma-  
 lignity of the times, and of fortune, thou hast  
 not been able to do thy self, to the end that ma-  
 ny

my being given to understand her self some of them, whom the heavens shall more favor, may put it in practice. And having in my former book of discourses spoken of the Romans deliberations touching their affairs within the City, in this we shall treat of those which the people of Rome did, belonging to the enlargement of the Empire.

### CHAP. IV.

Which conceits are more to the Romans in the conquest of their Empire, either their state, or their fortunes.

Many have bin of opinion, among whom is Plutarch's great Writer, that the people of Rome were more favored by fortune, than assisted by their virtues, in gaining their Empire. And among other reasons which he adduces to that purpose, he says, it appears by the confession of the same people, that they acknowledged all their victories from fortune, having consecrated more Temples to her, than to any other god. And Livie seems to side with this opinion: because it is very seldom, that he brings in any Roman speaking where he makes mention of virtue, but that he joynes fortune therewith. Wherunto I will not yield in any termes, nor think I it can be maintain'd: for if never any Republique made the same Progress that Rome made; it is because never hath any Republique bin so order'd to make its advantage, as Rome was: for the valour of their armies gain'd them their Empire, and their order of proceeding, and

their own manner: with that which their first founder likewise devised for them, made them keep what they had gotten, as hereafter in several discourses shall be declar'd. That two strong wars never at the same time met together to shake their state, they say, it was the people of Romes fortune, and not their valor: for they had no wars with the Latins, til they had not onely bearen the Samnites, but were fain to undertake a war in defence of them. Neither war'd they with the Tuscans, til they had first subdued the Latins, and wholly weakened the Samnites with many routes: whereof if two entire powers (when they were fresh) had joyned together against the Romans, without doubt a man may easily conjecture that the ruine of the Roman Republique would have followed thereupon. But however this thing came to pass, it never befell them to have two strong wars made against them at once, but rather luckily it prov'd, that when one began, the other ended, and at the end of one another began, Which we may easily see, by viewing their wars, how they followed in order: for letting alone those wars which they made before Rome was taken by the Frenchmen, we see, that whilest they fought with the *Aequi* and the *Volscei*, never (so long as these people were of any considerable power) did any other people set upon them. They then being conquer'd, the war against the Samnites began; and though before the finishing of this war the Latins Rebel'd against the Romans, nevertheless, when that rebellion followed, the Samnites were in league with Rome, and with their army help'd the Romans to bring down the Latins pride, and

and when they were subdued, the war with the Samnites again was revived. But their forces being broken by divers defeats given them, the war with the Tuscans arose; and when that was quieted, the Samnites began anew to stir, upon *Pyrrhus* his passage into Italy; when he was defeated, and beaten back into Greece, then first was kindled the fire of the Carthaginian wars: nor was that quenched til that all the French, as well beyond, as on this side the Alpes, conspired against the Romans; so that between *Pobolonia* and *Pisa*, where now is the tower at *Saint Vincent*, they were vanquish'd with a very great slaughter. After this, for the space of 20 years, they had not any war of much importance: for they had no quarrel with any but with the *Ligurians*, and the remainder of those French that were in *Lombardie*: and so they continued, til the second Carthaginian war began, which troubled Italy for 14 years space. Which being made an end of with great glory, that of *Macedon* sprung up, and was ended, when that of *Antiochus*, and afterwards that of *Asia* took their turns. After which victorie, there remained not in the whole world neither Prince nor Republique that either by themselves or altogether could oppose the Roman Forces. But before that last victory, he that considers the order of these wars, and the manner of their proceeding, shall find mingled with their fortune much valour and wisdom; so that he who examines the occasion of such fortune, shall easily discover it: for it is very certain, that when a Prince or a people have gained such a reputation, that neither prince

disgraceful manner. *Book 3. The third Book.*

our people bordering upon him dare by him-  
 self assault him, and is afraid of him, it will  
 alwaies so fall out, that none of them all will  
 set upon him, unless forced thereto, so that  
 shall be at that great Princes choise, to war  
 with which of his neighbors he shall please,  
 and the best with little pains to quiet. And  
 partly in regard of his power, partly beguiled  
 by some devices he shall make use of to dull  
 them asleep, and easily keep from stirring. And  
 for other powerfull Princes, who are more  
 remote and have no dealing with him, they  
 look upon the matter, as a thing afar off, and  
 nothing belonging to them. In which error  
 they continue so long, til the fire comes close to  
 their doors: which then being come so  
 near, they have no means to extinguish it, but  
 only to use their own arms, which suffice not,  
 the enemy being now grown exceeding mighty.  
 I will for pass, how the Samnites stood  
 still and look'd upon the Romans, while they  
 overcame the Volsci and the Abru: and that  
 may not be too tedious, I will satisfy my self  
 with the Carthaginians, who were of great  
 power and estimation, when the Romans  
 warred with the Samnites and Tuscans: for  
 even then they were masters of all Africa,  
 and had Sardinia and Sicily in their hands,  
 and had the rule of some part of Spain, who  
 being that their forces were remote from the  
 people of Rome confines, never thought of  
 assaulting them, nor of giving succours to the  
 Samnites, and Tuscans, but as if the Romans  
 increase had bin the Carthaginians advantage,  
 they made a confederacy with them, seeking  
 their friendship: nor did they perceive their  
 error committed, til the Romans having sub-

ded:

died all those peoples that lay between them  
 and the Carthaginians, began to make war with  
 them for the rule of Sicily and Spain. The  
 self same befell the French, that hinged to the  
 Carthaginians, and so to Philip of Macedon,  
 and Antiochus; and every one of them belee-  
 ved (while the Romans were busy with ano-  
 ther) that that other might chance to vanquish  
 them, and that they had time enough, either  
 by peace or war, to defend themselves from  
 them. So that, I beleeve, that the same for-  
 tune herein the Romans had, all Princes would  
 have had, provided, that they proceeded as  
 the people of Rome did, and were of equal  
 valour with them. To this purpose it would  
 not be unfit, to declare the course the peo-  
 ple of Rome held in their entrees into o-  
 ther Princes countreys, but that labour be-  
 ry of Principallities, we have discoursed there-  
 upon at large. I will only say this in brief,  
 they alwaies did put in practice to make them-  
 selves some friends in the Countreys they came  
 newly acquainted with, who served them for  
 a ladder to climb up to them, or a gate to en-  
 ter them, or a eye to hold them; as it appears,  
 by means of the Capuans they entered into Sam-  
 nium, by the Camertins into Tuscany, by the  
 Mamertins into Sicily, by the Saguntins into  
 Spain, by Masinissa into Africa, by the Tro-  
 jans into Greece, by Eumeas and other Prin-  
 ces into Asia, by the Massilians and the Medunus  
 into France. And so they never fail'd of the  
 like supports, whereby to facilitate their un-  
 dertakings, either in the enlargement of their  
 dominions, or in the maintaining them. Which,  
 those people that shall observe, shall find them-  
 selves in less want of good fortune, than they

who neglect it. And to the end, that every one may know of what avail our vertue was beyond their fortune, in the conquest of their Empire, we will treat in the Chapter following, concerning the quality of those people with whom they were to make war, and with what obstinacy they defended their liberty.

## CHAP. II.

*What people the Romans had to make war withall, and how obstinately they fought for the defence of their liberty.*

**N**Othing made it more painfull to the Romans to vanquish their neighbors near about them, as also some other Countreys further off, then the affection that in those days many people did bear to their liberty, which they so obstinately defended, that they had never bin subdu'd, but by an excessive valour: for, by many examples, we know to what dangers they expos'd themselves, as well for the maintenance as the recovery of it; and what revenges they took against those that had laid hold on it. We know likewise what damages peoples and cities receive by servitude. And whereas now adayes, there is onely one Countrey that can say, she hath free Cities in her: in ancient times people liv'd very free in all countreys. We see that in those times whereof at this present we speak, in Italy from the Alpes (which make a partition between Tuscany and Lombardy) even to the very point of Italy, there were many free peoples, as were the Tuscans, the Romans the Samnites, and many others, that dwelt in the other parts of Italy: nor does any man relate, that there was any King, besides those that



that reign'd in Rome, and Porsena King of Tuscany; whose race how it came to an end, history leaves us no memory. But we plainly see, that at the same time the Romans went to incamp before Veium, Tuscany was free, and so absolutely enjoy'd their liberty, and withall so much hated the name of a Prince, that the inhabitants of Veium for their defence having made a King among them, ask'd aid of the Tuscans against the Romans; but they resolv'd after many deliberations taken, to give them none whiles they liv'd under a King, judging it not right to defend their countrey, who of themselves had subjected it to another. And it is an easy thing to guess, whereupon it is that people take such an affection to their liberty: because we see by experience, that cities have never bin much amply'd neither in dominion nor riches, unless only during their liberty. And truly it is a strange thing to consider, unto what greatness Athens attained in the space of a hundred years, after she had freed her self from Pisistratus his tyranny: but above all it is most strange to think unto what greatness Rome attained after she was deliver'd from her Kings. The reason thereof is easy to be understood: for it is no mans particular good, but the common good, that amplifies the city. And without question this common good is not regarded but in Republicques, for there whatsoever makes for their advantage is put in practice: and though it turns to this or that private mans loss, yet are they so many, whom the said good concerns, that they are alwaies able to put it forward, in despite of those few that suffer by it. The contrary falls out, when there is a prince;

K 3

where

where, most commonly, that which maketh  
 for him endammages the City, and that  
 which maketh for the city, hurts him, so  
 that suddenly  
 otherwise Ty-  
 bany growes  
 general and most received ac-  
 sent, I cannot see; being  
 that the Prince and the people are said to make  
 each one politique body, and the welfare of the  
 part cannot be separated from the good of the  
 whole. Famous is that fable of *Aesop*, which  
*Menenius Agrippa* made use of, to reconcile  
 the Commons of Rome, upon distrust against  
 the Senate, gave a part in the body mount: On  
 a time that in man all things accorded well  
 together, each particular member advised,  
 and complained that by their care and pain  
 all things necessary were sought after, and  
 provided for the belly, and that the belly  
 merely remained idle amongst them, enjoying  
 those delicacies which their labor had pre-  
 par'd: and thereupon conspir'd together  
 that the hands should not put meat to the  
 mouth, nor the mouth receive it, nor the  
 teeth draw it: but thus while in this  
 choler they thought by famine to  
 subdue the belly, the whole body fasted.  
 Whereby it came to appear that the belly af-  
 forded its servicer, and as well gave as receiv'd  
 nourishment, distributing by the veins, through-  
 out the whole body, out of this meat which  
 it had digested, the blood well concocted,  
 whereby each part was nourish'd. Who is it  
 that feels not, when any part fails, the whole  
 is in disorder? and who sees not likewise,  
 when any part of the body grows unto it more  
 than its proportionable nouriture, that the whole  
 pines.

finer: thereupon, as from the swelling of the spleen, the health of the whole body is disturb'd, and therefore by some Politiques not unfairly compared to a Princes exchequer, which when it excessively abounds beggars the whole country. And it is a folly to think (saith a Spanish author) that the poverty of the Commonalty will not rebound to the breaking of private patrimonies, nor can great revenues continue there, where the Commonwealth is rack'd to the very bones. All these things serve to argue the mutual sympathy, as between the head and the members, so between the Prince and his subjects; and to divide the interest of the Prince from that of the people, cannot agree with good policy; for as in the natural body it breeds diseases, so in the politique it produces disorder and destruction.

upon a free state, the least ill that can thence result to those cities, is not to proceed, nor increase more in power, nor wealth: but for the most part, or rather always, it comes to pass, that they go backward: And if hap would have it, that a Tyrant should prove valorous, who by his courage and prowess should enlarge his dominions, there would thence no profit arise to the Republique, but to him alone: for he cannot advance any of these citizens that are brave and worthy, over whom he tyrannizes, unless he desires to give himself some jealousy of them. Nor can he yet subject or make tributary the cities that he conquers, to that city which he tyrannizes over: for it is not for his advantage to make it powerfully, it rather makes for him, - to hold

the state disjoyn'd, that each town and province acknowledge him, in so much that of his conquests, he onely reaps the good, and not his countrey. And he that would see the confirmation of this opinion, let him read *Xenophon* in his treaty of a Tyranny. It is no marvel then, that the peoples of old did so extreemly hate Tyrants, and lov'd the free government, & that the very name of liberty was in such request amongst them: as it happen'd, when *Hieronymus*, nephew of *Hiero* the Siracusan, was slain in Siracusa: for the news of his death being brought to his army, which lay not far from the city, they began to rise up in tumult, and take their armes in hand against them that slew him: but when they perceiv'd that in Siracusa all cried out liberty, allured with the delight of that name, they were all appeas'd, and laid aside their anger conceiv'd against them that kil'd the Tyrant, & advis'd together by what means there might be obtain'd in that city a free government. And it is no marvail, that people take extraordinary revenge of those that have laid hold of their liberty. Touching which there are many examples, whereof I intend to relate onely one, that fell out in *Cercira* a City of Greece, in the times of the *Peloponnesian* war: where the province being divided into two factions, one of which followed the Athenians, the other the Spartans; it came to pass, that of many cities which were divided among themselves, the one part follow'd the friendship of the Spartans, the other that of Athens; it happening so, that in the said city the Nobility prevail'd, and tooke from the people their liberty; but the people by means of the Athenians took heart again, and having laid hold on the Nobility, shut them

them up into a prison capable of them all, from whence they drew them out by eight and by ten at a time, pretending to banish them into severall parts, but they put them to death after a cruell manner. Whereof they that remain'd, having some notice, resolv'd as much as lay in their power, to avoid this shamefull death; so that arm'd with what they could get, and fighting with those that sought to enter, they defended the passage into the prison: whereupon, the people running together uncovered the top of the house, and with the ruines thereof overwhelm'd them. There follow'd also in the said province many such other horrible chanees, so that we find it true, that people pursue more agerly the revenge of a liberty once raken from them actually, then of that which was onely contriv'd in the intention to be pluck'd from them. Weighing then from whence it may arise, that in the times of old people esteem'd more of liberty, then now a dayes, I beleeve it proceeds from the same cause which makes men lesse valiant now adayes then formerly, which I thinke is the difference of our education from that of old, grounded upon the difference of our Religion from the ancient: for our Religion

having shew'd us the truth, *\* Here Machiav. falsely imputes the cause of mens cowardlinesse to Christian Religion. I need not alleadge any battells fought by the Christians, to proove him a lyar; histories frequently afford us examples, as well ancient as moderne, where they have bin as resolutely fought by the Christians, as ever were any by the Pagans: nay our owne memories may well supply us with some*

some if we want. If we marke from whence Machiavell takes his argument, it is from that the Pagans slew a multitude of sacrifices, the sight of which being terrible made men of the same disposition. By the same reason must it follow that our butchers and surgeons are more valiant then other men, in who customarily have their hands imbrued in blood: I may well allow them to be more cruell, and therefore our lawes exclude them from being of the Jury of life and death: but of being more valiant I never heard they had the reputation.

and the true way, causes us lesse to make account of the honour of this world, whereupon the Gentiles esteeming much of it, and placing therein their greatest good, became braver in their actions. Which may be consider'd from many of their orders, beginning from the magnificence of their sacrifices and the pooreness of ours, where indeede the pompe is more delicates then magnifick, but not any action of bravery or fiercenesse. And with the Gentiles also there was no want of pompe and magnificence in the ceremonies, but therunto was added the action of the sacrifice full of blood and cruelty, slaying a multitude of beasts. The sight of which being terrible made men of the same disposition. Besides, the ancient Religion did not beatificate but onely men fraught with worldly glory, as were the Commanders of armies, and Princes of nations. Our Religion hath rather glorified humble and contemplative men, then those of action. Moreover it hath plac'd the chief good in humility, and in the rejecting and contempt of worldly things. That other imagin'd the chief happinesse to consist in the greatness of courage, in the  
Strength

Strength of body, and in all other things fit to  
make men exceeding valiant: and if our Re-  
ligion requires valour in a man, it is rather  
that he be fit for a strong sufferance, then for  
a strong action. This manner of living then, as  
it seems, hath made the world become feeble,  
and given it in prey to wicked persons, who  
may securely rule over it, as they list, seeing  
that all men to obtaine paradise, think rather  
of suffering their wrongs, then revenging them:  
and though it may appeare, that the world is  
growne effeminate, and the heavens disarmed,  
it proceeds without doubt from the cowardise  
of men, who have given an interpretation of our  
Religion according to their owne lazy and idle  
dispositions, and not agreeable to vertue: for  
if they would consider how much it allows  
the advancement and defence of ones country,  
they should see that it wills, that we should  
love and honour it, and so prepare our selves  
that we may be able to defend it. These kindes  
of educations then, and false interpretations,  
cause that there be not so many Republicques  
now a dayes in the world as were of old. Not  
by consequence so we see among people such  
an affection to liberty as formerly: although I  
believe rather the reason thereof is, because  
the Roman Empire with its force and power  
extinguish'd all the Republicques and free  
governments. And though afterwards that  
Empire was dissolv'd, yet could not the cities  
againe be restor'd, and anew order'd in a civil  
government, unlesse it were in very few places  
of that Empire. Yet howsoever it was, the Ro-  
mans in every little corner of the world found,  
as it were, a conspiracy of Commonwealths  
very strongly united, and very obstinate to  
defend

defend their liberties; which shewes that the people of Rome without an extraordinary and rare valour had never made conquest of them. And to give an example of some member thereof, that of the Samnites shall suffice me: who (and indeed it is admirable, and so *Titus Livius* avowes it) were so powerfull and warlike, that they were of force, till the time of *Papirius Cursor* the Consul, sonne of the first *Papirius*, to resist the Romans, which was for the space of forty six yeeres, after so many routes, destruction of their townes, and so many slaughters made in their country: especially considering the country then, where so many cities were, and such a vast number of men, though now almost not inhabited. And then there was such order, and so great force, that it was insuperable, had it not bin assaulted by a Roman power. And it is an easy thing to know, whence that order and this disorder arise, for all that came from the free manner of living then, and this from the slavery now. For all countries and provinces which live free in every part, as formerly I said, make exceeding large progresses: for here we see the people more numerous, because the marriages are more free, and desir'd by men: being that every one willingly begets those children which he beleeves he can bring up, and nourish, without doubting their patrimony will be ravish'd from them; and when he knowes they are borne free and not slaves, so that by means of their vertue they may become Princes. We see riches likewise increase there in greater measure, as well those which arise from cultivation, as those which are gotten by the trades of handicraftsmen: for every one is more provident in gaining.



gaining and multiplying of those goods, which, when he hath gotten, he beleeveth he shall peaceably enjoy. From whence it comes to passe, that men even contend who shall more advance the private and publique good; so that the one and the other increase exceedingly. The contrary hereof followes in all those countries that live in servitude; and so much the more faile they of their accustomed good, by how much their servitude is harder. And of all hard servitudes, none exceeds that which is subject to a free Republique; because ordinarily it is of longest continuance, and so least hopes there are of being deliver'd from it: a second reason is, the end of a Republique is to enfeeble and weaken all other bodies in her, whereby to augment her owne. Which thing a Prince that brings thee under his rule does not, especially if it be not some Barbarian Prince, a ruiner of countries, and a destroyer of all civill societies among men, as are the easterne Princes. But if any of them have bin instructed in humane customes and the arts ordinary among men, they most commonly affect equality in the cities they have subdued, and let them still possesse all their arts and ancient customes; so that, if they cannot increase, as in liberty, they goe not to wracke, as in thraldome, speaking of that thraldome into which cities fall, when they serve a stranger; for I have formerly spoken enough of subjection to a native. Whosoever then considers well all that which is said, will not much marvaile at the power which the Samnites had being free, nor at their weakenesse into which afterwards they fell by servitude. And *TITUS LIVIUS* gives us good testimony thereof in many places, in *Hanniballs*

WATTS,

wishes, where he declared, that the Samnites being oppressed by one Legion of soldiers, that were in Nola, sent Ambassadors to Hannibal to intreat him for succours; whose speeches were to this purpose, that they had for a hundred yeares warr'd with the Romans, serving themselves onely of their owne soldiers and Captaines, and had many times withstood two Consular armies, and two Consuls, and that now they were brought so low, they had much ado to defend themselves from one small Roman legion that was in Nola.

### CHAP. III.

Rome became a great city, byrning those that were near neighbours to her, and by admitting strangers without difficulty to share in her alligiance.

Crescit  
in terra  
Roma  
Alba  
ruinis

ALL this while Rome was a great open the  
ruiner of Alba. Those that intend a city  
should farre enlarge the bounds of her dom-  
inions, ought withall indavours provide, that  
she be well fraught with inhabitants: for with-  
out a great multitude of men in her, she will  
never be able to grow great. And this is done  
two wayes, either by love or by force: by love  
holding the wayes open and secure to strag-  
ers, that might have a design to come and  
dwell in it, to the end that every one might come  
willingly to inhabit it; by force ruining and de-  
stroying the neighbour cities and sending out the  
inhabitants thereof to dwell in thine: all which  
was punctually observ'd in Rome, so that in the  
time of the sixth King in Rome there dwelt 60

thousand

thousand men able to bear arms: for the Romans meant to behave themselves like the good husbandman, who to make a plant grow big, and fructify, and ripen well its fruits, cuts off the first sprouts it thrusts forth, thus so the virtue thereof remaining yet in the root of the plant, may shortly after bring forth others more lively and fructifull. And that this course held was necessary and good for the founding and enlarging of an Empire, the Example of Sparta and Athens shewes in plaine, who being both very warlike Republicques, and furnished with excellent lawes, yet could they never attaine to the Roman Empires greatnesse, which seemed indeed a little more tumultuary and not so well ordered as they, whereof can be alledged no other reason, then that aforesaid. For Rome having enlarged by these two wayes the body of her city, was able to put in upwards hundred and 80 thousand souldiers, whereas Sparta and Athens never exceeded each of them twenty thousand men. Which proceeded not from that the situation of Rome was more flourishing then theirs, but onely from the different course they took: for L. Inachus founder of the Spartan Republicque considering that nothing could soone take away the power of his lawes, then a conjunction of new inhabitants, did what he could to hinder strangers from living with them; and that they should neither joyne matrimonies with them, nor admit them into their civill government, nor have any thing to do with them, which are the ordinary occasions of accord among men. He ordained likewise that leather money should passe current, thereby to take from every one the desire to come thither and bring any merchandise,

or art to them: so that, that citle could never grow big by multiplying her inhabitants. And because all our actions imitate nature, it is neither possible, nor naturall, that the slender body of a tree should beare a grosse bough; therefore a smal Republique cannot hold cities nor kingdomes of greater power and strenght then she her selfe is; and if perchance it comes to passe that she layes hold on them, it befalls her as it does that tree the boughs whereof are greater then the body, that sustaining it with much adoe, with every small blast it is broken, as we see it happen'd to Sparta: which having seized on the rule of all the cities of Grece, Thebes no sooner rebell'd against her, but all the other cities likewise fell from her, and so remain'd as the dead trunk of a tree without branches: which could never befall Rome, having her body and stocks so huge, that it was of force with ease to support any bough whatsoever. This manner then of proceeding, together with those others which we shall afterwards speake of, made Rome exceeding great and powerful. Which *Titus Livius* shewes in few words where he sayes; *All this while Rome* *Crescit in teris* *Roma Alba* *max'd great upon the ruines of Alba* *ruinis.*

## CHAP. IIII.

*Republiques have taken three particular courses, to amplifie and enlarge their states.*

**H**E that hath read the ancient histories with observation, findes that Commonwealthes have three manner of wayes to amplifie their states. The one hath bin that which the ancient Tuscans followed, to make a league of many Republiques together, where no one

one is preferred before the other, neither in authority nor in dignity; and to make other cities partakers with them in their gains; just as now adays the Swissses do, and formerly in Greece the Achzans and Eto- lians were wont. And because the Romans had much war with the Tuscans, the better to shew the quality of this first way, I will inlarge my self in giving notice of them particularly. Before the Romans had any great power in Italy, the Tuscans were very mighty both by sea and by land; and though there is no particular history that touches their affairs, yet is there some small remembrance thereof, and some signes left us of their greatness; and we know, how they sent a colony to the sea coast above, called by them *Adria*, which proved of such renown, that it gave the name to that sea, and the Latins call it the *Adri tick* to this day. Moreover we know, that they had conquered all from *Tiber*, to the very foot of the *Alpes*, which encompasses the whole body of Italy. Notwithstanding that two hundred years before the Romans grew to any considerable strength, the said Tuscans lost the dominion of that countrey which is now called *Lombar- dy*; which was seized on by the *Frenchs*, who either driven by necessity, or allured by the delicacy of the fruits, especially the wines, came into Italy under the conduct of *Bellovesus* their Captain, and having defeated and chased out the natives; seated themselves in that place, therein built many cities, and called the Countrey *Gallia*, from the name they then bare; and this they held til they were conquered by the Romans. The Tuscans then liv'd with that equality, and proceed.

proceeded in the amplifying their State, in that first manner, spoken of before: and there were twelve Cities, among which were Clusium, Veium, Desula, Arretim, and Volaterra, and the like; who by way of league rul'd their dominions; nor could they in large their conquests beyond the bounds of Italy, where of also there was a great part left untouched by them; for the reasons which we shall afterwards tell. The other manner is to make allies; yet not so thought, that thou still reservest not to thy self the principal place in the command & rule and title of all the exploits, which course was alwaies observ'd by the Romans. The third manner is, to make them immediately subjects, and not allies, as did the Spartans and Athenians: of which three waies, this last is altogether unprofitable, as it appears, it was in the two foresaid Republicques, which, for no other cause went to ruine; but for possessing themselves of those dominions, which they were not able to hold. For it is a thing of great difficulty and pains to hold the government of Cities by violence, especially of those that have bin accustomed to live free. And if thou beest not in armes, and well furnished with good numbers of soldiers, thou canst neither command, nor rule them. And to be able to do this, it is necessary to make friends and companions, who may assist thee in multiplying the people of thy City. And because these two Cities, did neither the one nor the other of these, their manner of proceeding was of no advantage to them. And, because Rome which gives us an example touching this third manner, did the one and the other, therefore grew it to that excessive power: and for that

the

She alone took this course of living; she alone therefore became so mighty: For she having taken to her throughout all Italy many for her companions to help her, who in many things liv'd with her upon equal termes; but on the other side, as is abovesaid, reserving to her self alwaies the seat of the Empire, and the title of commanding these thair companions (who were never aware of it) with their own pains & los of their own blood came to bring their own necks to the yoke: for when they began to transport their Armies out of Italy, and to reduce Kingdoms into Provinces, so to make those their subjects, who for that they were used to live under Kings, were never much troubled to become Subjects; and receiving Roman Governours over them, and having bin overcome by Armies, whereof the Romans had the name and title, they acknowledged no other head, but Rome. So that those allies of Rome that were in Italy, found themselves on a sudden begirt round by Romes Subjects, and oppress'd by an exceeding vast City, as then Rome was: and when they perceiv'd the deceit into which they had bin train'd; it was too late to help it, Rome had then gotten such authority with foreign Nations, and was then of such strength within it self, the people of their City being grown very numerous and warlike. And although those their companions, to be reveng'd on them for these injuries, conspir'd together against thm, yet in a short time were they losers by the war, making their own conditions worse: for of allies, they became Subjects. Which manner of proceeding (as is said) hath bin observ'd only by the Romans: nor

can a Republique that would enlarge her State take any other; for experience hath not shew'd us any course more certain or true. This way formerly spoken of concerning the leagues, wherein anciently the Tuscans, Achæans, and Aetolians liv'd, and which now adayes the Swisses use, is the better way next after that the Romans took: for, it being not possible by it to grow very great, thou gainest two advantages thereby, the one, that easily thou drawest no war upon thee; the other, that what thou gettest thou easily holdest. The reason why they cannot grow great, is, because they are divided Republicques, and placed in divers seats; which makes it more difficult to consult and resolve. And besides, because they are not very greedy of extending the limits of their dominions; for that divers Commonalties being to participate of that rule, they value not so much such conquests, as does a Republique alone, which hopes to enjoy it all herself. Moreover, they govern themselves by common advice and counsel, and therefore of force they must be slower in every deliberation, then they that live within the walls of the same City. It is plain also by experience, that this manner of proceeding pre-scribes it self certain bounds, which it passes not, nor have we any example that they were exceeded. And these were to joyn together some dozen or fourteen Commonalties, and afterwards never seek to go beyond that: for being come to those terms, that they think they are able to defend themselves against every one, they desire no greater power, as well because necessity does not bind them to have greater force; as also because they understand not any great profits that



that arise from such like purchases, for the causes formerly alledged: for then of necessity they must either go on forward to make themselves allies, and so the multitude would make a confusion; or else to make them their subjects: and because they see hereto many difficulties, and no great advantage in holding them, they make no account of them. Whereupon, when they have attained to such greatness, that they think they may live secure, they apply themselves to two things; the one to entertain others in their protection, and undertake their defences, and by these means to draw money from every part, which they can very easily divide among one another, and the other to serve in the wars under another, and to take pay of this or that Prince, who gives them wages for their service, as now adayes the Switzers do, and as we read, those we spoke of before did, wherof *Titus Livius* bears witness, where he sayes, that when *Philip* King of Macedon came to a parley with *Titus Quintius Flaminius*, to treat an accord in presence of a Pretour of the *Aetolians*, the said Pretour coming to some words with *Philip* was reproved by him for avarice and infidelity, saying, that the *Aetolians* were not ashamed to take pay and serve in the wars on both sides, so that many times their ensignes were seen in two contrary Armies. We know well all, that this manner of proceeding by Leagues hath bin alwaies alike, and hath produc'd the same effects. We see also, that that way of making people become subjects hath bin alwaies weak, and brought forth but small advantage; and when they have exceeded the due mean, they have gone to ruine. And if this course of making

L

king

king Subjects, be unprofitable in warlike Commonwealths, surely in those that are disordered, it must needs be far worse, as in our Cities have bin the Republicques of Italy. Wherefore we find that to be the true way, which the Romans held, which is the rather to be admitted, in so much as there was no other example thereof before that of Rome, nor since hath bin any that hath imitated it. And touching the leagues, there are the Switzers onely & the Swerian league that follows them. And, as in the conclusion of this matter shall be said, so many orders observ'd by the Romans, as well concerning the affairs within the City, as those without, in these our times are not onely not followed, but made no account of; some of them are deem'd untrue, some impossible, or others nothing to purpose, or unprofitable, so that whiles we stand still in this ignorance, we become a prey to any that invades our Countrey. And though it should seem difficult to imitate the Romans, yet ought it not seem so, to follow the steps of the ancient Tuscans, especially to the Tuscans now living, for though they were not able for the reasons alledged, to make themselves an Empire like that of Rome, yet could they gain them that power in Italy, that their manner of proceeding would permit them, which for a long time was with great glory of their rule, and wars, and with exceeding great commendation of their manners and religion. Which power and glory was first abated by the French, and afterwards quite put out by the Romans, and so put out, that of this power which two thousand years since was very great, at this present we have no memory left. Which

hath



others learning; and therefore destroyd all the registers of antiquity they could find: which our Author injuriously imputes to the Christians; being that they time out of minde, have caus'd those books to be taught the youth in their schools; and we find that the most esteemed Fathers in the Church were adorn'd with that learning, which they are taxed to have persecuted; which serves also very necessarily for the better understanding and illustrating of Theology, and affords good arguments many times to our Divines for the conviction of the Gentiles out of their own writers. Nor do I find there was any other restraint in these studies, than that men were advis'd to apply themselves soberly therunto, as not being studies to dwell in, but tending rather to the service of Theology.

It is true, that they attaind not thorowly to wipe out the knowledge of the prime men thereof, which was occasioned by their maintaining of the Latin tongue, to which they were forc't, being they were to write this new Law in it: for if they could have writ it in a new tongue, considering the other persecutions they made against it, there would have bin no remembrance left of things past. And whosoever reads what courses St. Gregory took, and the other heads of the Christian Religion, shall see with what obstinacy they persecuted all the ancient memorials, burning all the Poets and Historians works, defacing their images, and destroying every other thing that gave any light of that antiquity; so that if to this persecution, they had added a new language, we should have seen every thing in a short time forgotten. It is very likely therefore that what the founders of the Christian Religion

gion did against the sect of the Gentiles, they of Gentilisme had done formerly to the Sect that preceded it: and because the sects in a five or six thousand years change two or three times, the memory of things past before that time is utterly lost. And though yet there remain some remembrance thereof, we take it as some fabulous thing, whereunto no man gives credit, as it befalls the story written by *Diodorus Siculus*, in which though he gives account of a forty or fifty thousand years, nevertheless it is esteemed (and so I think it too) a false tale. As for the causes that proceed from heaven, they are such as extinguish the race of mankind, and reduce to a small number the inhabitants of part of the world: and this comes to pass, either by pestilence or famine, or by a deluge of waters: but that of most importance is this last, because it is more universal, and because those that escape, are all such as live among the mountains and are simple and ignorant people, who having no knowledge of antiquity, cannot derive it to their posterity: and if among them any knowing man chance to escape, to gain himself reputation and a name, he conceals it, and alters it at his own pleasure, so that there is left to his successors only so much as he hath bin pleas'd to commit to writing, and no more. And that the'e inundations, pestilences, and famines sometimes come, I believe there is no doubt, as well because all histories are full of them, as for that we see this effect of defacing the memory of things, as also because it accords well with reason that it is so: for nature, as in simple bodies, when there is gathered together enough superfluous matter, moves

many times of it self, and makes a purgation, which is the preservation of that bodie; so it falls out in this mixt body of mankinde, that when all countries are stuffed with Inhabitants, that they can neither live there, nor go other-where, because all places are already possessed and replenish'd, and when the subtilty and wickedness of man is grown to that fulness it can attain to, it holds with reason, that of force the world be purged by one of these three waies, that men being become few, and having suffer'd much, may live with more convenience and grow better, whereupon it is nothing strange, that, as it is above said, the Tuscan nation in old time was very potent, full of Religion and vertue, had their own manners and their native tongue, which the power of the Romans quite abolish'd, so that, as it is said, only their name remains still in the memory of posterity.

Now the Romans proceeded in making of war.

**H**AVING discours'd, how the Romans proceeded in enlarging their State, we will now treat of their proceedings in making of war, and in every one of their actions it will appear with how great judgement, they left aside the common way that others went, whereby they might more easily attain the highest pitch of greatness. The intention of that man, that makes war, either by election or by ambition, is to get, and keep what he hath gotten, and to proceed so therewith, that he may enrich and not impoverish his own country.

is necessary for him then, both in getting an holding, to take care not to diminish, but rather to augment the publique profit of his country. He that will do the things, must follow the way and course the Romans took, who first made their wars great and short; for coming into the field with huge armies, all the wars they had with the Latines, Samnites and Tuscans, they dispatcht in a very short time: and if notice were exactly taken of all those wars they made from the beginning of Rome, till the siege of Veii, we should find they were all ended, one in six dayes, another in ten, and a third in some twenty dayes space: for their endowme was this: so soon as ever they had discover'd the war, they presently went out with their armies and fought with their enemies, who being overcome'd, to save their Countrey from offensively being to their conditions, and the Romans condemn'd them in loss of some of their territories, and those they turn'd to their private Profits, or bestow'd them upon some Colony they sent thither, which being situate upon some Frontier of theirs, became Guardians of their confines, to the advantage of the inhabitants of that Colony, who had those fields in possession, and with the profit of the generality of Rome, that held this guard without expence. Nor could there be any way more assured, nor of more strength or advantage: for till the enemy went into the field, this guard was sufficient. And when they went forth strong into the field to oppress that Colony, the Romans also went out with their forces, and joyn'd battell with them, wherein having got the day, they laid more heavy burden on them, and so return'd home. Thus

came they by little and little to great credit among them, and forces in themselves. And this course held they alwaies, till they chang'd their manner of proceeding in war: which was after the siege of Veium, where to enable them to make a long war they determined to pay the soldiers, whereas formerly, being that the wars were short, there was no need to give them pay. And though the Romans gave pay, and that by vertue hereof they were able to make longer wars, and to make those more remote, they were forc'd to stay longer in the field, yet did they never alter from their first order, to dispatch them quickly, according to the time and place. Nor did they ever leave sending of Colonies: for besides their natural guife, the Consuls ambition held them to their first custome of making their wars short, for being created but for a years time, and thereof to stay at home six moneths, they desired to finish the war, that they might triumph. To send Colonies, the profit and great advantage they made thereof, still prevail'd with them. They altered indeed somewhat touching the spoiles, whereof they were not so liberal, as in former times they had bin; because they thought there was not so great need, the soldiers receiving their stipends; as also because the spoiles being greater, they intended therewith so to fill the common treasure, that they might not be constrain'd upon any enterprize in hand to leavy monies upon the City. Which order in a very short time much enrich'd their treasury. These two courses then they took, about the dividing the spoiles, and sending of Colonies, caus'd Rome to grow rich by the war, whereas other Princes and Republiques, if they find that

means



## The second Book.

3

means to relieve themselves, become impov-  
erish'd; so that it came to this at last, that a Gentle  
thought he might not triumph unless he  
brought much gold and silver and spoils of every  
kind into the treasury: Thus the Romans by  
their above written waies, sometimes by ma-  
king a quick end of the wars, otherwaies by  
drawing them out at length with discomfitures  
and invasions and treaties to their advantage,  
grew alwaies more mighty.

### CHAP. VII.

*How much land the Romans allowed to each man  
they sent out to inhabit their Colonies.*

**B**Y what parcels the Romans did divide the  
land among them, I believe it is hard to find  
out the truth, because I think they bestow'd  
on them more or less, according to the places,  
whether they sent the Colonies, and it is credi-  
ble, howsoever the case went, and whither so-  
ever they were sent, the allowance was but  
small. First to the end they might be able to  
send the more men thither, they being in-  
trulled with the guard of their colonies. Be-  
sides, because they living sparingly at home,  
it agrees not with reason, that they would allow  
their men, where withall to abound much a-  
broad. And *Titus Livius* says, that *Terentius* *Vulturnus* & *se*  
when they had taken *Veium*, they gave every *veientium* divi-  
sent a Colony thither, and to each *veientium*  
they gave three acres and a half and a twelfth  
part. For besides the things above written,  
they judge it was not the quantity of the land  
that suppli'd their wants, but the well cultiva-  
ting of it. And moreover it is very necessary  
that

through whole Colony have fields in common  
lowed every one may freely feed his cattle, and  
woodlands whence to fetch fuel for firing  
without which Colony cannot well subsist.

## CHAP. VIII.

The occasion, wherefore people leave their own  
native soyles, and invade other countreys.

Seeing that we have formerly discours'd of  
the manner of proceeding in war which the  
Romans us'd, and how the Tuscans were assail'd  
by the French, me thinks it were not much  
from the matter, to shew, that there are two  
sorts of war made. The one is through the ambi-  
tions of Princes, or Commonwealths, who in  
desire of the enlargement of their dominions; such  
was the wars of Alexander the Great, and  
the Romans, and such as now adaves every  
Prince and Potentate makes one with another.  
which wars are dangerous indeed, but yet  
they do not wholly chase the inhabitants out of  
a countrey; for the Conqueror is contented  
chiefly with the obedience of nations, and more  
commonly suffers them to live under their own  
Laws, and enjoy their own goods in  
their own houses. The other kind of  
war is, when the whole people with all their  
families, rise from a place, forc'd either by fa-  
mine or war, and goe to seek a new habitation  
and new Countrey, not out of ambition to  
discommand, as the others, but to possess it by  
themselves, and to drive thence or destroy the  
ancient inhabitants thereof. This kind of war  
is very cruel and terrible. And touching these

wars, Salust speaks in the end of the *Jugurthin*,  
 where he says, that when *Jugurtha* was over-  
 come, the French were perceived to stir, who  
 then came into Italy: and there he relates, that  
 the people of Rome fought with all other Na-  
 tions for rule and command, but with the  
 French every one fought for his life and safety:  
 For it sufficeth a Prince or Commonwealth  
 that assault a Countrey, to destroy onely those that  
 command, whereas these populations must  
 make a general destruction, being that they  
 will live upon that, which formerly sustained  
 others. The Romans had three several wars  
 of these, exceeding dangerous. The first was  
 that when Rome was taken, which was led  
 on by those Frenchmen, that (as is above said)  
 had taken Lombardy from the Tuscans, and  
 seated themselves there, whereof *Tullius Livius*  
 alleges two reasons; The first, as we said be-  
 fore, is, that they were allured by the pleasant-  
 ness of the fruits and the wines of Italy,  
 whereof they had scarcity in France: the se-  
 cond, that the people in France being excee-  
 dingly multiplied, the Countrey could not  
 feed them, whereupon the Princes of those  
 places thought it fit, that part of them should  
 goe to seek some new habitation, and that re-  
 solution being taken, they chose six Captains  
 of them that were to depart *Bellus*, and  
*Silvius*, two French Kings, whereof *Bellus*  
 came into Italy, and *Silvius* went  
 into Spain. Upon the passage of which *Bellus*  
 followed the seizure of Lombardy, and  
 thereupon the war, which first the French  
 made against Rome. Next this was that, they  
 made after the first Carthaginian war, when  
 between *Flaminio* and *Piso* they flew above their

hundred thousand French. The third was, when the Germans and Cimbrians came into Italy, who having overcome several Roman Armies, were subdu'd by *Marins*. The Romans then mastered these three very perillous wars, nor was there need of less valor than theirs to overcome them: for we see, how that after the valor of the Romans faild, and their armies lost their ancient vertue, that Empire was guind by such like people, as the Goths, Vandalls, and such others, who possessed themselves of the whole western Empire. Such people come out of their own Countreys, as is above said, compell'd thereto by necessity, which necessity proceeds either from famine, or from some war and oppression insisted on them in their own Countreys. So that they are constrained to seek new habitations. And these either are in great multitudes, and then they break with violence into others countreys, destroy the Inhabitants, possess their goods, make a new Kingdome, and change the name of the country, as *Moses* did, and those people likewise that sett'd upon the Roman Empire: for these new names, that are in Italy, and in the other Provinces, grew from nothing else, than that they were so named by their new Lords. As in Lombardy now, which was called Gallia Cisalpine; France was called Gallia Transalpina, and now is named of the French; for so were those people called, that made themselves masters of it. Sclavonia was called Illyrium; Hungary, Pannonia; England, Britanny; and many other Countreys, that have changed their names, which it would be too long to recite. *Moses* also called that part of Syria, which he made himself master of, *Jury*. And,

because

because I have formerly said, that some people are driven out of their own habitations by war, whereupon they are forc'd to seek a new, where to seat themselves, I will allege an example to that purpose, of the Maurusians, anciently a people of Syria; Who having notice of the Hebrews coming, and thinking they could not resist them, thought it better to leave their Countrey, than in striving to save that, lose themselves; And so rising thence with their families, they went into Affrique, where they sate down, driving out the Inhabitants they found in those places. And so they, who could not defend their own Countrey, could yet take that of others from them. And Procopius, who writes of the war, that Belisarius made with the Vandals, that possessed themselves of Affrique, reports that he read Letters written in certain pillars, in those parts where these Maurusians did inhabite, thus saying, Nos Maurusii, qui filii  
*We are Maurusians who fled from* simul a facie Iesu  
*the face of Iesu, the robber, who* tronsi filii Nava.  
*was Son of Nave.* Where the occasion of the departure of these people out of Syria plainly appears; wherefore these people are very excusable, when they are driven out by extremity, and unless they be encountered by puissant forces, cannot be stop'd; but when those that are constrained to abandon their Countrey are not very numerous, there is no such danger of them, as of those people we spoke, because they cannot use such violence, but ought rather by some stratagem, make themselves masters of some strong place, and therein being settled, keep it by making of friends and allies; as we see *Alexander* did with *Dido*, the *Mossians* and others, who all by agreement with  
 their

their neighbors, where they once let themselves  
 down, were able to continue. The people  
 that goe forth in the greatest multitudes,  
 and those also that have gone forth, almost  
 all came out from those parts of Scythia,  
 cold, and poore Countries, where, because  
 there are men in abundance, and the Coun-  
 try of that condition, that it cannot feed  
 them all, they are compeld to goe forth,  
 having many causes to drive them out, and  
 nothing to keep them in. And if now for  
 these five hundred years it hath not hap-  
 pend, that any of these nations have made  
 an inundation upon any Countrey, it hath  
 proceeded from several reasons. The first  
 is, the great evacuation that Countrey made  
 in the declining of the Empire, they ha-  
 ving since sent out huge swarms more than  
 thirty several times: the second is, because  
 Germany, and England, from whence  
 these people came, have their Countries well  
 mended, so that they are able to live there,  
 with better conveniency, and thereupon are  
 necessitated to change their seat. On the other  
 side, these men being very warlike, are as it  
 were a Bulwark against the Scythians, who  
 border upon them, to keep them within their  
 confines and territories: and many times there  
 chance great risings among the Tatars, who  
 are kept in by the Hungarians and Polacks:  
 who, when they are not with their arms, that were  
 made for their defence, they are the Church  
 and other, for the wages of the Tatars, Ar-  
 mies, and this shall suffice, touching these  
 fore-said people.

## CHAP. IX.

*Upon what occasions commonly warres are begun among Princes.*

**T**HE occasion, that gave beginning to the warres betweene the Romanes and Samnites; who had being long in league together, sivery ordinary, and happens often to powerfull Principallities. Which occasion, either comes by chunce, or else is offered by him, that desires to make warre. That which was betweene the Romanes and Samnites, fell out by chauce: for the Samnites intension was not, by making warre first against the Sidicini, and then against the Campani, afterwards to set upon the Romanes. But the Campani being oppressed, having their recourse to Rome, beyond the Romanes expectation and the Samnites, the Campani giving themselves into the Romans hands, they were constrained to defend them, as their subjects, and take upon them that warre, which they thought with their honour they could not avoid. For it seemed very reasonable to the Romans, not to undertake the defence of the Campani, though their friends, against the Samnites their friends; but they thought it also a shame not to defend them, when they were their subjects, or recommended to their protections. Judging that when Cistern had not taken that defence in hand, they cut off the way from all others, that ever should have a mind to shelter themselves under their power. And Rome having for her maine end the Empire and glory, and not quiet, could not refuse this enterprise. The

selfe same occasion gave beginning to the first  
 warre against the Carthaginians, for the defence  
 of the Massinenses, which the Romans under-  
 tooke in Sicily; which fell out by chance also.  
 But now the second warre, that grew between  
 them, came not by chance. For *Hannibal* the  
 Carthaginian Captaine, set upon the Saguntins  
 that were allies to the Romans in Spaine, not  
 so much for to endamage them, as to provoke  
 the Romanes to warres, and to have  
 occasion to fight with them, and so to passe  
 into Italie. This manner of handling new  
 warres hath been alwayes used among those  
 that are mighty and that have some faith  
 joynd, some other respects: for, if I desire to  
 make warre with a Prince, and between us  
 some capitulations of peace have firmly been  
 observed a long time, upon some other title  
 faire justifiable, and under some other colour,  
 I will assaile some ally of his, rather than him-  
 selfe, knowing very well, that in setting upon  
 his ally, eyther he will resent it, and so I shall  
 have my intent of moving warre against him;  
 or not resenting it, his weaknesse shall be dis-  
 covered, or his infidelitie, in not defending one  
 that is under his protection: and the one and  
 the other of these two is sufficient to discredit  
 him, and facilitate my designs. Therefore  
 what wee have formerly sayd, may be noted  
 touching the taking occasions to move warre,  
 out of this example of the yeelding of  
 the Campanians, and besides what remedie *Cicero*  
 may have, which cannot by her selfe alone  
 make her defence, and yet in any case would  
 not fall into her assaillants hands. Which is  
 freely to give her selfe into his hands, who  
 thou hast a purpose should defend thee, as the  
 Campanians



Captains to the Romanes, and the Florentines to Aschers King of Naples, who though he would not defend them as allyes, yet afterwards defended them being his subjects, against the forces of Cassinarius of Lucca, who then put them hard to it.

## CHAP. X.

*Moneye are not the sinews of war, according to the common opinion.*

**B**ECAUSE every one can begin a warre at his owne pleasure, but not end it, a Prince should before he undertake an enterprise, measure his owne forces, and order himselfe according to them; he should also have so much judgement, that he deceive not himselfe with the conceit of his owne forces; and he shall alwayes be sure to be deceiv'd when he measures them, either by the scituation, or by the good will of men towards him, his owne proper forces on the other side sayling him: for the things aforelayd may increase well thy forces, though give thee them they cannot; and by themselves alone they are of on worth, nor nothing availe without the helpe of Souldiers faithfull to thee: for great store of treasure serves to no purpose without that, nor the strength of thy Country, neither doth the faithfulnessse nor good will of men last; for these cannot be faithfull to thee, thou not having force to defend them. Every mountaine, every lake, every unaccessible place is made plaine, where the strong defendances are wanting. Nay rather moneye are so far from defending thee, that they expose thee for a prey. Nor is there any thing more false than that common opinion

that

that affirms Money to be the sinews of warre which sentence was first given by Q. *Curius*. In the warre betwene *Antipater* the Macedonian, and the King of Sparta; where he relates, that for want of money, the King of Sparta was forc'd to fight, and was broken; whereas if he had deferd the battell a few dayes, newes had come into Greece of *Alexanders* death, where he had remaind conqueror without combat. But his treasure failing, and he doubting his Armie would leave him for want thereof, was constrained to hazard the battell; whereupon Q. *Curius* says, that money is the sinews of war; which sentence is alledgd every day, and follow'd too by some Princes, not quite so wise as they should be: for making this their ground, they believe, that this is able to defend them, if they have treasure enough; and never consider, that if treasure were of force to overcome, that *Darius* would have conquer'd *Alexander*, the Greeks master'd the Romans, and in our dayes the Duke *Charles* subdu'd the Swislers, and not long time since the Pope and the Florentines together would have found no difficulty in overcoming *Francis Maria* nephew of Pope *Julius* the second in the warre of *Orbin*. But all these above nam'd, were overcome by those who esteemd not money, but good Souldiers the sinews of warre. Among other things, that *Crasus* King of Lydia shew'd to *Solon* the Athenian, was a treasure unmeasurable, and asking him what he thought of his power, *Solon* answer'd him, he thought him no whit the more powerfull for that; for warre was made with iron and not with gold, and some one might come, who had more iron than he,

and

and take his gold from him. Moreover, when after the death of *Alexander the Great*, a vast multitude of French pass'd over into Greece, and after into Asia, the French sending Ambassadors to the King of Macedon to treat some accord, that King to shew them his power, and to fright them, let them see his treasure, where was much gold and silver, whereupon these French, who had in a manner concluded a firme peace, brake; their desire grew so great then to take his gold from him: and so was that King despoild for that which he had gatherd together to defend him. The Venetians also, a few yeares since, having their treasury full of coyne, lost their whole State, being not able to defend themselves thereby. Wherefore I say, that gold as the common opinion cries it up, is not the finewe of warre, but a good Armie of stout Souldiers; for gold is not sufficient to finde good Souldiers, but good Souldiers are able well to finde out gold. As for the Romanes (if they would have waged warre by moneyes rather than with the sword) the treasure of the world, considering their vast undertakings, and the great difficulties they had therein, would not have servd their turnes. But they making their warres with the sword, never found scarcitie of gold; for they had it in abundance brought even into their Camps by those that stood in feare of them. And if that Spartan King for want of money, were to hazard the fortune of a battell, that befell him upon the matter of moneyes, which many times hath chanc'd upon other occasions; for it hath been often seene, that when an Armie wants provision of victuals, and is necessitated either to furnish or fight,

fight, usually they make choyce to fight, because it is greater honour, and where in some sort Fortune hath in her power to favour thee. Moreover, it hath often come to passe, that a Commander perceiving succours comming to his enemies Armie, must either fight with them quickly, and make tryall of the chance of battell, or expecting the ingrossing of the Armie, come at length to fight perforce upon many disadvantages. Besides, it hath been scene, as it befell *Asdruball*, when in the Marches he was assaulted by *Claudius Nero*, together with the other Romane Consull, that when a Captaine is necessitated either to fly or fight, he alwayes makes choyce to fight; thinking by this bargaine, though exceeding hazardous, he may gaine; but in that othe he must needs lose in any case. There are therefore many necessities that can force a Captaine beyond what he intended, to resolve to put it to a battell, among which sometimes may happen the scarcine of money, though not therefore should wee esteeme moneyes to be the sinews of warre rather, than other things, which bring men into the like necessities. Wee may therefore resolve the question, that money is not the sinews of warre, but good Souldiers rather. It is true, moneyes are necessary in the second place, but it is such a necessitie, which good Souldiers themselves may overcome: for it is as impossible that good Souldiers should lack money, as by moneyes alone to produce good Souldiers. What we here averre, every History shews us to be true in many places, notwithstanding that *Pericles* perswaded the Athenians to make warre with all Peloponnesus, declaring, that they

they might overcome that warre with industry and by force of money; And though in that warre the Athenians sometimes prosperd, yet at last they lost it, and the advice, and good Souldiers of *Sparta* prevayld more, than the industry and money of *Athens*. But *Titus Livius* gives us a better testimony for this opinion then any one else, where discourfing of *Alexander* the Great, whether if he had come into *Italie*, he had been able to vanquish the *Romans*, he shewes there three things necessary in the warre; a great number of Souldiers, & those good, wise Commanders, and good fortunes: where examining, whether cyther the *Romans* or *Alexander* excelld herein, at length he concludes, without making any mention of moneys. The *Capuans*, when they were requird by the *Sidicins*, to take Armes in their behalfe against the *Samnites*, should not have measurd their power by their treasure, but by their good Souldiers: for by taking that course they tooke to assist them, after two overthrowes, to save themselves, they were forc'd to become tributaries to the *Romans*.

## CHAP. XI.

*It is not a match wisely made, to joine alliance with a Prince, whose credit is greater then his strength.*

**T**ITUS LIVIUS having a purpose to shew the *Sidicins* error in relying upon the *Capuans* aid, and the *Capuans* error also in believing they were able to defend them, could not expresse it in more lively termes then these

Campani magis ho-  
men in auxilium li-  
diciorem, quam  
vires ad praedium  
atrulerunt.

these, *The Capuans contributed to the Sidicins, and, rather more reputation then forces.* Where we may observe, that those leagues that are made with Princes, who have not either the commodity to assist thee by reason of the distance of place, or forces to do it, because of some disorder of their owne at home, or for some other occasion, add rather reputation to them, than trust in them, then any strength to their party: as in our dayes it befell the Florentines, when in the yeare 1479. the Pope and the King of Naples assayl'd them: who being allies of the King of France, drew from that alliance more reputation to their side, then safe guard: as likely enough it would befall that Prince now, who under *Maximilian* the Emperours protection should undertake any enterprise: for this is one sort of those alliances, which bring more fame then advantage, as here in this text is alledg'd, that of the Capuans brought the Sidicins. Therefore in this point the Capuans committed an error, in esteeming their owne forces greater then they were. And so sometimes the small discretion men have, causes them when they neither know how, nor have the means, to defend themselves, to take upon them the protections of others, which the Tarentines also did: who, when the Roman army was going to joyne battell with that of the Samnites, sent their Ambassadors to the Roman Consul, to let him understand that they will'd there should be peace betwene those two people; and how that otherwise they should make warre against the party that should refuse it. So that the Consul scoffing at this proposition, said the

the

the triumphs to sound in presence of their ten Ambassadors, and so made his army march towards the enemy; shewing the Tarronians by his deeds and not by words what rewards they deserved, and having now discourag'd in this Chapter against some counsels, I Princess takes smile for others defence, I will in that that follows speak touching those they take for their owne defence.

## CHAP. XIII

Whether it be better for a Prince, fearing to be assail'd by his enemy, himselfe first to begin the warre with him, or to expect while he comes home to him.

I have heard it disputed sometimes by men well practis'd in military discipline, if there be two Princes neere of equal force, and the one that is the more resolute have proclaim'd warre against the other, which were the best course for that other, either to attend quietly in his owne confines whiles his enemy comes upon him, or else to goe finde him at home, and there assaile him. And I have heard them alledge arguments on both sides; and those that argue for this going to assaile him, produce the counsell that Crusus gave Cyrus when being arriv'd upon the borders of the Messagetes to make warre against them, their Queene *The Myris* sent him word, that he should take his choice, either to enter into her kingdom where she would waite him, or if he would rather that she should come, and finde him in his towne. And when the matter

came

came to dispute, Crasus advis'd against the opinion of the rest, to goe & seeke her in her owne country; urging that otherwise if he overcame her farre from her owne confines, he could not take her kingdome from her, because she would have time to repaire her losses; but if he conquer'd her within her owne territories, he might pursue her just upon her flight; & so giving her no time of recovery, take the state from her. Moreover they alledge the advice that *Hanniball* gave *Antiochus*, when that King had a purpose to make warre against the Romans, where he shewes how the Romans could not be overcome but in Italy; for there another might avails himselfe of their armes, their wealth, and their friends also. But whosoever fought with them out of Italy, leaving Italy free to them, left them that strength, that never would want life to give them fresh supplies at all occasions. And concluded, that it was easier to take Rome from them, then the Empire; and Italy, rather then their other provinces. *Agathocles* also is alleadg'd, who not being able to support the war at home, assail'd the Carthaginians, who then had made warre against him, and brought them to aske peace. The example of *Scipio* is likewise urg'd, who to take the warre out of Italy, assail'd Affricke. They that maintaine the contrary, say, that he that would bring his enemy to destruction, should withdraw him from home. The Athenians are brought for example, who while they made a convenient warre at their owne homes, remain'd victors: but when they departed out of their country, and transported their army into Sicily, they quite lost their liberty. They alledge the poetick fables withall, where it is shew'd



he w'd. how that Anteus King of Lybia affail'd  
 by Egyptian Hercules was insuperable, whiles  
 he staid for him within the confines of his  
 owne Kingdome; but when by Hercules subtil-  
 ty he was reined out of it, he lost both state  
 and life. Whereby occasion was given to the  
 fable of Anteus; that while he was upon the  
 ground, he recovered forces from his Nether;  
 which was the ground which Hercules per-  
 ceiving, scold him up in his armes, and held  
 him from the earth: Moderne advices also are  
 alleged; every one knowes that Ferdinand  
 King of Naples was in his dayes held a very  
 wise Prince; and some two years before his  
 death some flying, that Charles the eighth then  
 King of France had a determination to come  
 and affail him; after he had made much prepa-  
 ration selfe; when on his death bed, among  
 other memorials he left his friend Stephen his  
 was this also, that he should attend his enemies  
 coming within his Countrey, and upon no  
 case should draw any of his forces out of his  
 state, but should await them within his owne  
 confines with his strength entire, which was  
 not followed by him, but there was an ambis-  
 sion into Romania, which wichever any country  
 left hath it self and the state. The arguments  
 which besides the things abovesaid, are brought  
 on each side, are these; that he, that affails,  
 comes on with more courage, then he that as-  
 sauls, which gives the army more resolution.  
 Besides this, it takes away from the enemy all  
 the conveniencies of being able to make use of  
 what is his own; for he cannot help himself  
 upon those subjects, whose houses have first  
 bin sackt and their goods pillaged; and for  
 having the enemy in the house, the Prince

is constrained to take more care how he wrings money from them, and vexes them so that he comes to dry that fountain, as Hannibal sayes, which furnishes him with means to sustain the war. To this may be added, that the souldiers being in a forraign countrey, are forced to fight, and of that necessity makes a vertue, as we have often said; on the other side they say, when one awaits his enemy, he does it with much advantage; for without any discomfort to thy self thou art able to give thine enemy much trouble to come by his provisions, and other necessaries belonging to an army. Thou canst also better hinder his designs, because thou knowest the countrey better then he. Thou canst also encounter him with more forces, because there they may easily be increased, which thou canst not draw all from home. Thou canst also being routed, recover thy self with more ease, because many of thy army will save themselves, in that they have their places of refuge near, as well because the supplies are not to come from far; thou bringst to the hazzard all thy forces, and not all thy fortunes; whereas parting thence thou hazzardst all thy fortune with but a part of thy forces. And some there have bin who the better to weaken their enemy, suffer him to enter many dayes journeys into their countrey, and take divers townes, to the end that leaving garrisons in all of them, he may weaken his army; and so they may after wards fight with him at more odds. But to give my opinion hercin what I think, I beleeeve, the distinction is to be made; Either my countrey is armed, as was that of the Romans, or that of the Switzers is, or it is unarmed as the

of the Carthaginians was, or else that of the King of France, or the Italian countrey is: In this case the enemy is to be kept off from coming in, because thy advantage then consists in thy revenue, and not in thy men; so that whensoever the current thereof is cut off from thee, thou art quite spoil'd; nor doth any thing so much hinder thee, as the war within thy doors: The Carthaginians yeeld us evident examples herof, who, while they had their own home free, were able with their revenue to make war against the Romans; which, when it was assaild, could not supply them against *Agathocles*. The Florentines had not any remedy against *Castruccio* Lord of Lucca, because he warr'd with them in their owne country, so that they were faine, for their defence, to yeeld themselves to *Robert* King of Naples. But *Castruccio* being dead, the same Florentines had the courage to assail the Duke of Milan at his owne home, and wrought so far as to take his countrey from him; so much valor shew'd they in forrain wars, and such cowardise in their domestick. But when countries are aimed, as that of Rome was, and as the Switzers are, the nearer thou comest to them, the harder they are to vanquish; for the inhabitants are able to bring together more forces to resist a suddain violence, then they are to assail an enemy abroad. Neither in this case does the authority of *Hanniball* move me, because his passion, and his own interest, made him say so to *Antiochus*; for if the Romans had in that space of time received those three shutes in France, which they had in Italy by *Hanniball*, without doubt they had bin quite undone: for then they could not have helped

themselves by the remainders of their armies, nor could they have had those conveniences to repair their losses, nor made head against their enemies with such strength as they did. We never find, that to assail any country they sent out an army passing the number of sixtie. But to defend themselves at home against the French after the first Battle of Marston, they armed eighteen hundred thousand men. Nor could they afterwards defeat them in Lombardy, as they did in Tuscany, because against so great a multitude of enemies, they had never been able to draw so great forces together, nor fight with them upon the like advantage. The Cimbrians broke an army of the Romans in Germany, nor could the Romans any way help themselves. But when they came into Italy, that they once united their forces together, they presently dispatched them. The Switzers it is easy to vanquish out of their own Country, whether they cannot send above thirty or forty thousand men: but to overcome them at home, where they are able to make a body of a hundred thousand men, is exceeding difficult. I conclude therefore anew, that that Prince, who hath his people armed and addrest for war, may at his will expect a mighty and dangerous war at his own home, neither let him go to meet it. But he, whose subjects are unarmed, and his country unaccustomed to war, let him always keep it as far from home as he can. And to the one and the other, each in their degree, will better defend themselves.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XII.

That men rise from poore and small beginnings to  
great fortunes, rather by the help of guile  
than force.

Take it to be very true, that seldom or  
never it comes to pass, that men of meane  
fortunes attain to any high degrees without  
force or fraud: unless that dignity, which a  
man hath gotten, came to him by gift, or was  
cast on him by inheritance. Neither do I think,  
we ever find, that force alone suffices; but we  
often see, that guile alone avails, as he shall  
clearly perceive, that reads *Philip of Macedon*  
his, and that of *Agricola* the Sicilian, and  
many others such like, who from very vile and  
poore fortunes have gain'd either a Kingdom,  
or some other great dignities. *Xenophon* in Cy-  
rus his life, declares this necessity of deceit,  
saying that the first expedition which he makes  
Cyrus undertake against the Armenian King,  
is full of guile, and now by deceit, and not by  
force he makes him seize on his Kingdom; by  
which Action he concludes nothing else, but  
that it is necessary for a Prince, that will at-  
chieve great matters, to learn to be a cunning  
deceiver. Besides this he makes him deceive Ci-  
stares King of the Medes his Mothers uncle  
many waies, without which fraud he shews  
Cyrus could never have attain'd to that great-  
ness he afterwards  
came. And I beleeve,  
that there was never  
my plac'd in a low

\* Because this whole  
Chapter tends to shew  
how necessary for a  
Princes

Princes advantage guile is, and it is again recommended by precept in Machiavels Treaty of a Prince, I cannot but take notice that here he is blameable. Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirit, is not meant De dolo Malo: supposed by Machiavel in his Prince Chap. 19. where he persuades a Prince to use the Lyons force, and the Foxes craft. To be able in all Military stratagems and flights to circumvent the enemy, is one of the most requisite and notable parts in a Commander: provided there be no breach of Faith, nor Oath violated: for as Tully says, Est iuramentum affirmatio Religiosa: quod autem affirmare, quasi Deo teste promiseris, id tenendum est. It is much unworthy of a Prince (says a worthy late Author) to falsifie his word, either to enemy or subject that it be; and the more villanie is it to use covert fraud, than open violence, because the enemy lies more open by giving credit to his faith: And fraud distringit, non dissolvit perjurium. And with how much more solemnity Princes Oaths are ordinarily taken, mee thinks so much the more sincerity ought they to carry with them, having drawn together many eyes & ears as witnesses of their truth or falsehood. I shall conclude then with Tacitus, in the 4. of his Annals. Ceteris mortalibus in eo stant consilia quod sibi conducere putant: principum diversa sententia est, quibus precipuarum ad salutem dirigenda.

condition that ever came to any great dignity onely by plain force; and ingenuously though I grant that by guile alone one well may, as John Galeacius did who took from his uncle Barnard the state and rule of Lombardy. And that, which Princes are necessitated to do in the beginnings of their increase, Republicques are

are

are likewise forced to, till they are become mighty; then force alone suffices. And because Rome in every part is either by chance or by choyce upon all the necessary means to become great, it failed not also of this, nor in her beginning could have dealt more cunningly, than to take the course we formerly discovered to make her some companions; for under this name, she brought many to be her servants, as were the Latins, and other people neere about her: for first she served her self of their armes in subduing her neighbours round about, and in taking upon her self the reputation of the state; afterwards when she had brought them under likewise she came to such growth, that no power was able to withstand her. And the Latins never perceived their own servitude, till after that they saw the Samnites twice broken, and forced to agreement. Which victory as it gained the Romans great reputation with forraign Princes, whereby they heard of the Romans name, though they never felt their armes; so it bred great envie and suspect in those that both saw, and felt their strength, among which were the Latins: And so far prevailed this envie and fear, that not onely the Latins, but the Colonies which they had in Latium together with the Capuans by them lately defended, conspired all against the name of the Romans. And the Latins mov'd that way in that manner, as is formerly said, that for the most part wars are mov'd, not assailing the Romans, but defending the Sidicins against the Samnites, against whom the Samnites made war with the Romans leave. And that it is true, that the Latins stirred upon the knowledge of this deceit, T. Livius declares

shew'd by the mouth of *Annus Sentius* Latin Pretour, who told them in their assemblies, *Nam si videremur sub chris, for if ye me can endure umbra fideiis equali fovei servitute, under the name of an equal league, wherefore we find the Romans in their first growth wanted not that guile, which they had need to make use of, that from low beginnings might mount high, which the more covers itself, is the less discommendable, as was this of the Romans.*

**CHAPTER XXII.** *It has been said that the Romans were not so much in the habit of being humble as they were in the habit of being proud.*

*They are often affect'd, who think with humility they do overcome pride.*

**W**E often see that humility does not only not help, but hurt sometimes, especially when it is used towards insolent men, who either for envie or some other occasion, have conceiv'd hatred against thee. Whereof our Historian gives us good testimony in this occasion of war between the Romans and the Latins: for the Samnites complaining to the Romans, that the Latins had assaid them, the Romans would not yet forbid the Latins that war, being desirous not any way to incense them. Whereby they did not only not incense them, but made them become more insolent towards them, so that they sooner discover'd themselves enemies, whereof the world is told by the forenamed Latin Pretour, *Annus* in the same assembly, give good proof, saying:

Ten-  
tatis.  
patien-  
tiam,

*negando militem, qui dubitat exarsisse eos? Pertulerunt tamen hunc dolorem, exercitus non parare adversus Samnites foederatos suos audierunt, nec moverunt se ab urbe, quia nonnulli tanta modestia vix conscientia virum de nostrorum & suorum?*



They tried their patience in refusing them, so that  
 who doubts but they were angry, yet this discontent  
 have they suffered: they have not made preparation  
 against the Spaniards their allies, since for  
 this stirred they are far out of the city: and  
 whence came this modesty of their thinking, but  
 from their knowledge or lack of your forces or  
 their own? And therefore hereby we plainly see,  
 how much the Romans patience increased the  
 Latines arrogance. Wherefore a Prince should  
 never agree to defend: a while from his realm;  
 nor ever let go any thing upon security, if he  
 have a minde to leave it honorably; but only  
 then when he is able, or when he thinks also  
 he is able to maintain it: For it is better for  
 the most part (the matter being brought  
 to such termes, that thou canst not leave go  
 in the manner above said) to let it be taken  
 from thee by force, rather than by fear of  
 forces: for if thou leavest it go for fear, thou do-  
 est it to free thy self from war, which most  
 commonly it will not doe: so be to whom  
 with such open cowardise thou hast yielded  
 this, will not throw with restraint, but take on  
 their side, is from thee a friend, will be rather be  
 invited against thee, in that he values thee less;  
 when likewise on the other side, thou shalt  
 see thy friends more slack in thy defence,  
 viewing thee either weak or cowardly. But  
 if thou forthwith upon discovery of thy ene-  
 mies intent, gettst thy forces in a readiness,  
 howsoever they be inferior to his, he will be-  
 gin to make account of thee, as so will other  
 Princes thy neighbours about thee, so that  
 some there will be who will have a minde to  
 ayd thee (thou being in armes) who, if thou  
 hadst abandon'd thy self, would never have

struck stroke for thee. This is meant, when thou hast but one enemy. But in case thou hast more, thou shalt do very wisely, to render what thou hast belonging to any one of them, for to regain him to thee, notwithstanding the war be discovered, that thou mayest take him asunder from the other confederates thine enemies.

## CHAP. XV.

*Weake states are alwaies irresolute in their determinations; and slow deliberations are alwaies hurtfull.*

**I**N this very same matter, and in the same beginnings of the War between the Latins and the Romans, we may observe, that in every consultation it is good to come to the particular of that which is to be deliberated on, and not to stay long in doubt, and upon the uncertainty of a thing. Which is manifest in the consultation the Latins made, when they thought to quit themselves of the Romans: for the Romans having had some fear of this ill humour that had possessed the Latins, to be ascertained of the matter, and to try if without armes they could regain those people, gave order they should send eight Citizens to Rome, to the end they might advise with them. The Latins, understanding this, and being conscious to themselves of many things done contrary to the will of the Romans, called an assembly together, to appoint who should go to Rome, and to give them order what they should say. And Annus their Pretour being in the assembly during this dispute, uttered these words:

Ad  
summa  
rerum  
nostra.

sum pertinere arbitror, ut cogitetis magis quid agendum nobis  
nam quid loquendum sit, facile erit explicata consiliis, at-  
commodare res verba.

The

The sum of our affairs is, as I take it, that we should advise rather what we should do than what we should say, for it is an easy matter, when things are once resolved on, to put them into fit termes. Without question these words are most true, and ought to be relished by every Prince, and every Commonwealth: for during the uncertainty and doubt of that which a man will do, there is no man knowes what he should say: but when the mind is once settled and resolved of what is to be done, words to the purpose easily follow. I have the more willingly noted this passage, by reason that many times I have known that such a little hath much wrought in publick actions, even to the loss and disgrace of our Republike. And it shall ever come to pass, that, in doubtfull cases, and where there is need of judgement to deliberate, this resolution shall be when they are to be advised, and deliberated on by weak men. No less hurtfull also are slack and slow consultations, than these ambiguous, especially those that are to be taken in favour of any friend; for slowness helps nobody, and hurts ones self. These resolutions so taken, proceed either from weakness of courage, or force, or from their malignity that should resolve, not guided by their own passions, to ruin a State, and to fulfill some desire of their own, either not the consultation to goe forward, but rather hinder and cross it. For good Citizens though they perceive the whole stream of the people to run the more dangerous way, yet will they never hinder the deliberation, being that those affairs attend no time. When I remember the Levant in Syracuse was dead, there being a great war between the Carthaginians

and the Romans, the Syracusians put it to question, which alliance they should take, the Roman or Carthaginian; and such was the eagerness of the parties, that the matter remain'd in doubt, and they took to neither side, till that *Agesander*, one of the chief men in Syracusa, in a very discreet Oration of his, shew'd that they were not to be blam'd that advis'd to adhere to the Romans, nor they that would take part with the Carthaginians, but rather that irresolution and slowness in taking to any side was detestable, for he saw fully in that ambiguity the ruine of the Republick. But were it that the party were once made, on which side soe'r it were, a man might conceive some good hopes upon it. Nor could *Tullius Livius* more fully shew, than in his part he does, the harme which this hanging in suspense drawes after it. He makes it plain also in this case of the Latins; for the Latins being sought to by them for ayd against the Romans, put off the resolution of it so long, that when they were just going forth of the town to give succors to them, news came that the Latins were defeated. Whereupon their *Fretour Milvius* said, We shall pay dear to the Romans for this little way we have gone: for if at first they had resolv'd either to help, or not to help the Latins, not helping them they had not given offence to the Romans; but helping them, had their aid come in time, with the addition of their Forces, they might have gain'd them the victory; but by delay loss came every way, as it befall them. And had the Florentines observ'd this well, they had never receiv'd so many damages nor troubles by the French, as they had in *Louis* their twelfth passage into Italy.

ally against Lodowick Duke of Milan: for the King treating of such a passage, sought the Florentines for their consent; and their Agents that were with the King, agreed with him, to stand neutrals, and that the King coming into Italy, should maintain them in their State, and receive them into his protection, and gave the City a months time to ratifie this. Which ratification was delayd by some, who in their little-wildome favour'd Duke Lodowick's affairs, till that the King was even upon the point of victory, when the Florentines offering the ratification, it would not be accepted by the King, who knew the Florentines came by force, and not willingly to his friendship. Which the City of Florence was to buy out dear, and like enough to have lost the state, as afterwards another time upon the like accident it chanc'd. And so much the worse was the cure they took; for it was of no advantage to Duke Lodowick, who if he had bin victour, would have shew'd more displeasure against them, than did the King. And though touching the mischief this weakness brings upon a Republique, we have formerly spoken in another Chapter, yet upon a new occasion offer'd by a new accident, I had a mind to repeat it, thinking it very specially a matter worthy to be noted by all Republicques like unto ours.

## CHAP. XVI.

*How much the orders used by our Soldiers in these modern times, differ from those of the ancients.*

**T**HE Romans fought not a battle in any war they undertook with any Nation, of greater

greater importance than this with the Latins, in *Torquatus* and *Decius* his Consulship: for in all reason it had followed, that as the Latins by losing it became Subjects, the Romans should have undergone the same condition, had not they got the trallery: and of this opinion is *Titus Livius*: for on each part he makes the Armies equal for their order, valour, resolution, and number; he makes there this difference only, that the Commanders of the Roman Army were of more valour than those of the Latins. It appears also that in the ordering of this battell, there befell two accidents, the like whereof was never seen before, nor since I ave we had but rare examples following them: that of two Consuls, to hold their Soldiers minds firm and obedient to their commands, and resolute to fight, the one a kill'd himself, the other his Son. The equality which *Titus Livius* says in these two Armies, was, because they had both serv'd in the wars a long time together; they used the same language, order, and armes: for in the ordering of their battell, they had the same manner, and their Trumpets and the Captains of them had the same names: there was a necessity being they were of equal force and valour, that something extraordinary should happen, that could settle and fix the ones resolution, rather than the others: in which (as otherwhere we have said) consists the victory: for while that lasts in the combatants hearts, the Armies never turne their backs. And to the end it might last the longer in the Romans breasts, than in the Latins, partly fortune, and partly the Consuls valour were cause; for *Torquatus* killed his son, and *Decius* himself. *Titus Livius*, where he shews the equality

of

of their forces, sets downe the whole order the Romanes used in their Armies and in their battells, which being that he relates at large, I will not rehearse againe, but discourse onely upon that I shall thinke remarkable, and which, because it hath been neglected by all our Captaines of later times, hath been the occasion of many disorders in severall Armies and battells. I say therefore, that out of Livius his words wee gather that the Roman Army had three principal divisions, which in proper termes may be called Squadrons; the first was of the Hastati, the second of the Principi, the third of the Triarii: and each of these had their horsemen. In the ordering of a battell, they plac'd the Hastati foremost, in the second place on the right side; upon the shoulders of these the Principi were set; and in the third place yet in the same file, the Triarii came. The horse of all these ranks they plac'd on the right hand and on the left of these three battells: which Squadrons of horse from their formes and Places were call'd wings: because they looked like the two wings of that body. They rang'd the first Squadron of the Hastati, which was in front, in a manner close shut together, that it might be able either to force upon, or sustain the enemy. The second Squadron of the Principi (because it was not the first to fight, but was ordeind to succour the foremost, in case it was either bearen or driven backe) this they made not so compact together, but kept their ranks thinne, so that they might receive in to them without disordering themselves the first Squadron, whensoever being prest on by the enemy, they were forced to retire. The third Squadron of the Triarii had their

their ranks yet thinner than the second; that, if need were, they might rectifie the two former Squadrons of the Hastati and Principi. The troupes then being all plac'd in this order, began the fight: and if the Hastati were forced or overcome, they betw'd into the thinnesse of the ranks of the Principi, and they united together, and having made of two battallions one body, undertooke the fight afresh; and if these were beaten back and round, they fell back into the thinner ranks of the Triarij, and so all the battallions became one body, renew'd the fight againe, where if they vanquished, because they had not other repayre, they lost the day. And because that alwayes when this last Squadron of the Triarij came to try for it, the Army was in danger, thereupon grew this Proverb, *The*

*Res reddebat mater came so faire in the Triarij.* The  
 ell ad *Commanders of our dayes, as they have*  
 Triarios, *abandoned all the other instructions, and*

follow not in any part the ancient discipline, so have they quite neglected this part, which is of no small importance: for he that so arranges his Armie, that in the fight he can three times repel himself, so that he must have fortune three times his enemy, and be so encounter'd with valour sufficient to vanquish him. But he that stands onely on the first shock (as now our Christian Armies doe) may easily lose: for every little disorder, or mean valour, is able to take from him the victory. That which makes our Armies not able to recover themselves three times, is, because they have lost the manner of receiving one Squadron within another: which comes to passe, because now dayes battells are rang'd which one of these



two disorders; either they place their troupes at the shoulders the one of another, and make their battell large of breadth, and thinne in depth; which makes it weaker, because there is but small distance from the brest to the backe. And when to make it stronger, they reduce the troupes to the Roman manner, if the first front be broken, not having order to be receivd in the second, they fall together into a confusion, and run themselves: for if that before be beaten backe, it falls upon the second; if the second strives to advance, it is hindered by the first. Whereupon the first and the second both beating upon the third, causes such a confusion, that commonly a very little matter destroys a whole Army. The Spanish and French Armies in the battle at Ravenna, where the Lord de Pals Generall of the French forces dyed, which was (according to our times) a well fought battell, was arranged in one of these forenam'd wayes: which is, that one and the other Armie came on with all their people plac'd to shoulder the one the other, so that neither army had but one front, and were much more in breadth then in depth. And this befalls them alwayes, where they have a large plaine, as they had at Ravenna. For knowing the disorder they make in retreating, by placing themselves in one file, they avoide it when they can, which they do by making the front large, as it is said. But when the scite of the country restraines them, they remaine in the forenam'd disorder, without advising themselves of the remedy. In which they passe through their enemies countries, they goe out to forrage, or venture on any other

other exploit. And at *Saint Regulus*, in that occasion of *Pisa*, and otherwhere, where the Florentines were routed by the Pisans, during the warre which was betweene the Florentines and that city, for their rebellion, after *Charles* the King of France his passage into Italy, those defeats were caused by nothing else but by their owne horse: which being in vanguard, and by the enemies beaten backe into the Florentine foote, retired it, whereupon all the remainder turned their backs, and *Criacus de Borgo*, the ancient generall of the Florentine infantry, hath said it many times in my hearing, that they had never bin routed but by their owne horse. The Swisses who are the principall masters of our modern warres, when they serve with the French, above all things have a care to place themselves on the side, for feare their owne horse driven backe should beate upon them. And howbeit these things seeme easie to understand, and very easie to practise, yet hath not there been any of our contemporary Commanders, that would follow these ancient orders, or amend the moderne. And though they have made their Armies tripartite, terming the one the Vanguard, the other the Barrell, and the last the Rereguard: they make no other use thereof, but to command them when they are quartered in their lodgings, but in any service, very seldome it is (as is formerly said) but that they make all these bodies run one fortune. And because many to excuse their own ignorance, asledge that the violence of the Artillery permits not that many of the ancient orders be observed, I will argue it in the next Chapter, and examine whether

whether the Artillery doe hinder the practise of the ancient valour.

## CHAP. XVII.

What esteeme our moderne armies ought to haue of artillery, and if the opinion, which is generally conceived of it, be true.

**W**HEN I consider, besides the things formerly written, how many pitched battells were fought by the Romans at severall times, that general opinion which many hold, comes into my minde, that if artillery had bin used in those dayes, the Romans could never so easily have subdued the countreyes they did, nor have brought these nations they did, to become their tributaries, nor in any case could they have made such brave conquests. They say moreover, that by reason of these guns, men cannot put in practice nor shew the valour they could of old. And then they adde a third matter, that it makes it more difficult to come to a battell now, then formerly; nor can they containe themselves within the orders of those times, so that in time the warre will be all reduced to the artillery. And being desirous now not out of purpose to argue touching the truth of such opinions, and how much artillery hath augmented or diminished the force of armies, and whether they bereave or afford good Captaines occasion to behave themselves valourously, I will begin to speake concerning, their first opinion; that the ancient Roman armies would never have made those conquests they did, had artillery bin then in use. Whereupon I say in answer, that warre is made either in defence or offence. And then we are to examine, to which

which of these two parts it does more good or harm. And though reasons may be alledged on both sides, yet I thinke, that without comparison the defendant receives more damage by it, then the assaillant. The reason, which thereof I give, is, that the defendant is either within a walled towne, or in the field within trenches: If he be in a towne, either it is but little, as most commonly forrestricke are, or great and large. In the first case, the defendant is gone lost; for such is the force of artillery, that no wall be it of what thicknesse it will, but in a few dayes is ruined by it. And if those that are within the walls, have not good roome to retire themselves, with retrenchments and fortifications, they are lost; nor can they support the stroke of the enemy, when he would enter by breach in the wall, nor hath he any helpe herein of his artillery: for this is a maxime, that where men can enter in by throngs and with violence, the artillery cannot keep them off. Therefore the furious assaults of the Tramoctines it is not possible for the defendant to resist; but the assaults the Italians give, are well enough endured, who never all in a throng, but scatteringly come to the fight, which they by a manerly fit for the purpose, call skirmishes. And those that goe with this disorder and timorousnesse to enter a breach, where artillery is, go to an apparent death, and against them artillery is a good use: but those who in throngs, when the one presses forward the other, come to the breach, unless sustained by ditches and ramparts, will enter any place, and the artillery shall never bear them off; and though some few of them be

be slain; yet can they never be so many as  
can hinder them of victory. That this is true,  
we finde in many conquests which foraineers  
have here made in Italy, especially in that of  
Breiscia: for that towne having rebelled against  
the French; and the fore holding good yet  
for the French King, the Venetians were so  
supper all the violence that from thence  
could fall in upon the towne, having all that  
way guarded with artillery, and descended  
from the forresse into the city, some of the  
being planted against the front, others upon  
the flanks; and so in every other place. In  
whereof the Lord of Bois made not any ac-  
count, but descending a fure with his troopes  
passed through the midst of them, and took  
the towne, nor ever appeared in that he had  
received thereby any notable losse. So that he  
who defendeth a little towne (as it is said)  
which is walled in, but hath not space to retire  
with retrenchmentes and fortifications, and  
trusts upon the artillery, is presently lost. And  
thou defendest a great towne, and hast con-  
ueniency for retreat, yet without comparison  
is the artillery more available to the without-  
out, then within the walls. First, because  
thou wouldst with thy artillery smite those  
without, thou must of needs raise thy selfe  
it above the leuell: for while thou art on the  
leuell, every small fence is too strong, that the  
enemy makes secure him, and upon cast his  
ways, damage him so that thou being so weak  
thy selfe, and to mount thy pieces on the  
cureline of the wall, or some other ramp,  
drawest two difficulties upon thee. The first  
is, that thou canst not bring ordnance thither,  
neither of that bignes nor effect, as thou  
wilt.

without can, being that great things are not manageable in small spaces. The other is, that though we grant thou canst bring such peeces thither, yet canst thou not make those safe and strong fortifications to secure thy artillery within which they without can, being upon the plaine ground, and having those conveniences, and that roome, they can desire. So that it is impossible for him, that descha a towne to keepe his artillery mounted on those high places, when those without have store of great and good peeces. And if he brings them into lower places, they become for the most part unprofitable, as it is said. So that the defence of a city is to be made by the bodies of men, as it was the custome of old, and with the small shot: Whereby if they make any small advantage, in regard of the small shot, they suffer as much losse, which counterpoises all the good the artillery can do them: for by them the towne walls are all laid flat, and, as it were, buried in the ditches, so that when the enemy comes to enter by assault, either because the walls are beaten downe, or that the ditches are filled, he that is within, hath more disadvantages thereby, then otherwise he had. And therefore (as it was formerly said) these instruments of warre do more helpe the besieger, then the besieged. Touching the third point, which is to retire into the campe, and there to make intrenchments, no doubt is left from what till some convenience or advantage occur. I say, that herein thou hast no more helpe ordinarily to keepe thee from fighting, then had the ancients. And sometimes by reason of the artillery thou hast more disadvantage: for if the

enemy

enemy come upon thee ; and have some small  
 advantage of the field , as it may easily chance  
 that he gets the upper ground of thee ; or that  
 at his arrivall thou hast not fully cast up thy  
 trenches, nor cover'd thy selfe well with them,  
 presently he dislodges thee without remedy,  
 and thou art forced to come out of thy forti-  
 fications and fight : which befell the Spaniards  
 in the battell at Ravenna , who , being forti-  
 fied betwene the river Roncus , and a trench  
 they had cast up , the fence whereof was not  
 of that height was needfull , so that the French  
 had gotten some small advantage of the  
 ground , were forc'd by the artillery out of  
 their fortifications to come to fight. But grant  
 ( as most commonly it should be ) that the  
 place where thou hast encamped, were higher  
 then those others whereof the enemies were  
 masters , and that their fortifications were  
 good and secure in such sort as by means of  
 situation and other thy preparations the e-  
 nemy dares not assaile thee , in this case they  
 will be forc'd to use those meanes, which of old  
 they were wont , when any one lay with his  
 army , where he could not be encompass'd ,  
 which were to forrage the country and pillage  
 it , to beleaiger some of the chiefe townes , to  
 hinder thy provisions , so that by some necessity  
 thou shalt be forc'd to dislodge and be brought to  
 fight , where the artillery , as we shall here-  
 after shew , is not of so great effect. Con-  
 sidering then what sort of warres the Romans  
 made , being in all most all of them they were  
 assailable , and not defensible , it shall appeare  
 ( being that these things above writen are  
 true ) that they would have had greater ad-  
 vantages , and sooner have made their con-  
 quests ,

conquists, had the artillery bin in those times. Touching the second point, that men cannot make proofe of their valour as of old they might, by reason of the artillery, I say, that it is true, that where men are to shew themselves in scattered troops, they run more hazard, then when they are to scale a wall or make such like assaults, where they are not all in one body, but each one a part shewes himselfe. It is true also that the Captaines and Commanders of armies are exposed to more danger of death, being that then the artillery can reach them in any place, nor avails it them to be in the hindermost ranks, or invironed by their valiantest Souldiers. Yet we see, that neither of these two dangers do often endamage much; for places fortified are not easily scaled, nor do they weakly goe to assault them; but if they will take them, they must besiege them, as it was the custome of old. And where they take their townes by assault, the dangers now a dayes are not much greater then they were wont to be; for even in those times they who defended the townes, wounded not their instruments of warre where with to shote at their enemies, which (though perhaps they were not of that violence) yet for slaughter were of the same effect. Touching the death of Captaines and Commanders, in foure and twenty yeares time, that those last warres have bin in Italy we have not so many examples, as in ten yeares the ancients had; for from Consul Lelivich of Mirandola, that died at Ferrara, when the Venetians a few yeares since, allaid that fate, and the Duke of Nemours, that died at Cerignola, there hath not any one bin slaine by the canon. For the



the Lord of Foix was slain by the sword at  
Ravenna, and not by the Cannon. So that if  
men give no particular proofs of their valour,  
it is not caused by their canon, but proceeds  
from their evil orders, and the feebleness of  
their armies, which when they want valour  
in the gross, cannot then in any particular  
make shew of it. Touching the third allegation  
made by them, that they can never come to  
joyne battel, but that the sum of all will de-  
pend upon the artillery, I say that this opini-  
on is utterly false, and so shall it be held by  
those who according to the valour of old  
will imploy their armies: for whosoever will  
have a good army, must use them in trainings  
or rather in battels to come up close to the  
enemy, and there fall to handy blows with  
him, and take him by the collar: and they  
ought to ground more upon the infantry then  
the cavallery, for some reasons we shall here-  
after alledge. And when they shall rely most  
upon the foot, and upon these waies we have  
spoken of, the artillery becomes quite unpro-  
fitable; for more easily can the infantry avoyd  
the blow of the cannon by coming up close  
to the enemy, then of old they could escape the  
fury of the Elephants, the chariots armed with  
hooks, and such other unaccustomed encoun-  
ters which the Roman infantry met with, and  
found remedy against, which they would so much  
the more easily have found against these, as much  
as the time is of very short durance in which  
the artillery can harme thee, in comparison of  
of that where in the Elephants and chariots  
did mitchell: for these in the very middle and  
heat of the battle did put all into disorder;  
whereas the artillery hinders thee

N

only

only before the battel: which hinderance the infantry easily avoid, either by going cover'd under the naturall scite of the place, or by stooping towards the ground when they shoot: which also we see by experience is not necessary, especially to escape the canon, which can hardly be so right levell'd, but that if they go high they miss thee, if low they come short of thee. Afterwards when the armies are come to handy blowes, this is more clear then the light, that neither the great nor small shot can do thee much harm: for if the enemy places the artillery before him, thou mayst easily take it; if behind him, it hurts him'self before it can touch thee: or if it be on either side of thee, it cannot so gall thee, but that thou may'st come up close to it, whereupon will follow the effect we have said. Nor needs there much dispute upon this: for we have seen it by the example of the Switzers, who at Navarra in the year 1513. without arrillery or horse assail'd the French army within their fortifications being guarded with artillery, and yet routed them being no way hinder'd thereby: and the reason is, (besides the things formerly alledged) because the artillery hath need to be guarded, if we would it should make any good execution, either by some wall, or trenches or some kind of fortifications, and when it fails of these defences it becomes a prey to the enemy, & so is made unprofitable, as it comes to pass when it is defended one y by men, or as it may be in field battels, it cannot be plac'd on the flank, unless it be on that manner, that the ancients us'd their instruments of war, when they plac'd them without their squadrons, because they should play from without the ranks; and whensoever they

V  
mar  
fant  
ded  
appe  
wher  
of A  
grou  
men  
wher  
the v  
had r  
a hor  
ny o  
sent

were put at, either by the horse or others they retired behind the legions: whosever accounts otherwise of them, does not well understand the use of them, and trusts upon that, which may easily deceive him, and if the Turk by the help of his artillery, have gained any victory of the Sophy and the Soudan, it was not occasion'd by other vertue of it, then by the affright the unusual noise thereof put the horse into. Therefore I conclude, coming to the end of this discourse, that the artillery is profitable in an army, where there is a mingle of the ancient valour, without which it avails little against a courageous army.

## CHAP. XVIII.

*How by authority taken from the Romans, and from the use of the ancient military discipline, the foot is more to be esteem'd, than the horse.*

WE can plainly shew it by many reasons and examples, how much the Romans in all military actions did prefer the infantry before the cavalry, and thereupon grounded the assurance of all their executions, as it appears by many examples and among others, when they fought with the Latins near the lake of *Regillum*, where the Roman Army giving ground a little, for their succours, the horsemen were commanded to light and serve a foot wherely they made good the fight and gained the victory. Where it is manifest, the Romans had more confidence in them being a foot, than a horseback. They us'd the same termes in many other fights, and found it always a present help in their dangers. Nor let Hanni-

bals opinion counterballance this, who seeing  
 in the battell at Cannæ that the Consuls made  
 their horsemen light and serve afoot, scoffing  
*Quam mallem viactos at the course they took, said, I*  
*tuhi traderent equites. had rather indeed they should be*  
 delivered bound into my hands. Which opinion  
 however that it was uttered by a very able man,  
 yet if we are to follow authorities, we may  
 rather give credit to a Roman Commonwealth,  
 and so many excellent Captains, that flourish-  
 ed in it, than to one *Hanniball* alone, though  
 without this authority the reasons are evi-  
 dent: for a man on foot can go in many places,  
 where a horseback he cannot: he may be able  
 to instruct them, how to keep their ranks, and  
 being somewhat confus'd, how they may be  
 restored again. It is very hard to make the horse  
 keep their ranks, and when once they are in  
 disorder, it is impossible to recover them. Be-  
 sides this, as we see among men, so is it a-  
 mong horses; some there are which have but  
 small courage, others again exceeding conra-  
 gious. And many times it falls out, that a brave  
 horse is back'd by a cowardly fellow, and some-  
 times a timorous jade is mounted by a stout  
 Souldier; and there which way soever it is  
 that this disparitie follows, arises uprofitable-  
 ness and disorder. The infantry well united  
 in their ranks are easily able to rout the horse,  
 and very hardly can they be routed by them:  
 Which opinion is confirmed (besides many an-  
 cient moderne examples) by their authorities  
 who have left us the records of ancient Repub-  
 liques, where they shew us, how that at  
 first they began to make war a horseback, be-  
 cause they understood neither the order nor  
 the use of the foot, which when they once had  
 the

the knowledge of, they quickly conceiv'd how much more profitable they were than the horse. But hereupon it follows not that the horse are not necessary in armies, to discover, and to forrage and prey about in the Countrey, and to pursue the enemies in their flight, and in part also to oppose all the attempts of the the adversaries horse. But the ground-work, and the very nerves of the army, and whereof most account is to be made, is the Infantry. And among the Italian Princes faults, which have enchain'd Italy to strangers, there is none greater than that they made no account of this order, and turn'd all their regard towards the service of horsemen: Which disorder proceeded from the evil disposition of the Captains, and their ignorance that govern'd the State: by reason that for these twenty-five years last past all the military affairs in Italy were in the hands of men that had no settled estates, but were Captains adventurers, serving where they could have pay, who presently devised how they could maintain their reputation, they continuing in armes when the Princes were unarmed. And because they could not continually get pay for a good number of foot, nor had any subjects whereof to serve themselves, and a small number got them no credit, they betook themselves to horse: for a Captain having pay for 200 or 300 horse, subsisted thereby in good repute, and the payment was not such, but that those that rul'd the State could easily satisfie it. And to the end this should come on more easily, and to keep themselves the better in esteem, they took all respect and reputation from the foot, and referred all to their cavallery; And so far increas'd they this disorder,

der that in the greatest Armie they levyed; the least part of them was foot. Which custom, together with many other disorders intermixt with it, hath much weakned the Italian Soldiery, so that this Country hath easily bin trodden under foot by all strangers. This error, of esteeming the horse more than the foot, is laid open yet more plainly, by another example of the Romans. The Romans were incamp'd at Sora; and a troop of horse having made a sally out of the town to assault the Camp, a Captain of the Roman horse went to encounter them with his Cavalry, whereupon the first shock, meeting brest to brest, it chanc'd that the Commander of each troop was slain, and the residue being left without government, and the skirmish still continuing, the Romans that they might the better vanquish their enemies, lighted from their horses, and forc't their enemies (if they would defend themselves) to do the like, wherewith the Romans carried away the victory. This example could not serve better to the purpose, in shewing of how much value the infantry is, above the horse: for if in other occasions the Consuls made the horsemen to dismount, it was to succour the foot that were in distress, and had need of ayd. But in this place they light not to assist the foot, nor to fight with their enemies foot, but fighting a horseback with horsemen, they thought that though they were not able to master them on horseback, that alighting they could more easily vanquish them: I will therefore conclude, that a body of foot in good order and array cannot without much difficulty be overcome by a better body of foot. *Craſſus* and *Marcius Antoninus* both Romans, made an intrede of many daies journeys into the Parthians Kingdome, with a very few horse  
and

and a good number of foot, where they encountered with numberless troops of the Parthian horse. *Crassus* was left there dead with part of the Army; *Marcus Antonius* valourously sav'd himself. Nevertheless, in these Roman losses it appears, how much the Infantry exceeded the horse: for being in an open Country, where there are few mountains, and very few rivers, and the Sea-coast far off, and remote from all conveniency, yet for all this did *Marcus Antonius* even in the opinion of the Parthians themselves, very valourously escape, nor ever durst the whole Parthian Cavalry venture to break into the ranks of his Army. If *Crassus* perish'd there, whosoever well reads his actions, shall find, that he was rather treacherously beguiled, than forc'd, nor ever in all his disorders, durst the Parthians set upon him, but alwaies went along by him, to keep in his soldiers from straggling, and getting of provisions, and by promising fairly, but observing nothing, brought him at length unto extream distress. I should think I were to take much pains in perswading that the valour of the Infantry does much excel that of the horse, but that there are many modern examples which give us a very satisfactory testimony. And it is well known that 9000 Swisles at Navarra, formerly alleaged by us, went to encounter 10000 horse and as many more foot, & vanquish'd them: for the horse could no way harm them, and the foot being for the most part Gascoignes and ill ordered, they made small account of. We see likewise that afterwards 36000 Swisles, went to find *Francis* the French King about Milan, who had an army of 20000 horse and 40000 foot, and a 100 tire of Ordnance; and though they gaind not the battel at

at Navarra, yet they fought bravely two dayes together, and when at length they were broken the moiety of them escap'd. *Marcus Regulus Attilius* presum'd with his infantry to incounter not onely the enemies horse, but their Elephants; and though his purpose came not to effect, yet was it not so, but that the valour of his infantry was such, that he had very good reason to hope he might well overcome that difficulty. And therefore I answer, that he that would overcome a body of foot in good array, must oppose them with another body of foot in better order than they; otherwise he sustains an evident loss. In the dayes dayes of *Philip Visconti* Duke of Milan, there came down into Lombardy some 16000 Swisses, whereupon the Duke *Carmignuola* being then his General, sent him with neare upon a thousand horse and some few foot to incounter them: Who not knowing the manner of their fighting, went to meet them with his horse, not doubting but that he could presently rout them. But finding them to stand firm, and having lost many Souldiers, retir'd; yet being a very able man, and knowing in new accidents how to try new wayes, having repaired his broken troupes, he went again to meet them, where he made all his armed men a light, and serve on foot, and so by them having made a head to those of his infantry, he invested the Swisses, who found no way to help themselves: for *Carmignuolaes* horsemen being lighted, who were wel arm'd, were able with facilitie to enter into the Swisses ranks without much hurt: which when they had pierc'd, they could easily harme; so that of their whole number there was left onely that part alive, that was by *Carmignuolaes* curtesie preserv'd.



preserv'd. I beleeve well that many know the difference of valour that is between the one and the other of these orders, but so unhappy are these times, that neither the ancient nor modern examples, nor the acknowledgement of the error is of force to prevail with modern Princes to readvise themselves and consider, that to recover the reputation of the Souldiery of a Countrey or State, it is necessary to revive again these orders and entertain them near their persons, to encourage them and allow them means to live, to the end they may restore to them both life and reputation. But as we use to forsake these customs, so we leave other orders also formerly spoken of; whereupon it comes to pass, that the very conquests we make turne to our losses, and not to the advancement of a State, as hereafter we shall say.

## CHAP. XIX.

*That Conquests in Republicques not well govern'd, and which proceed not according to the Roman vertue, prove rather their ruine, than advancement.*

THESE opinions contrary to the truth, and grounded on evil precedents, which have bin introduced by these our corrupt ages, cause men not to stand much upon straying from old wonted uses. Some thirty years agoe, an Italian would never have bin perswaded, that ten thousand foot in a plain had ever bin able to assault ten thousand horse and so many more foot, and not only fight with them, but vanquish them too, as it is plain by the example of the battle at Navarra, by us sundry times allig'd.

lag'd. And however that Stories are full of  
 them, yet would they not have given us credit:  
 and if they had beleev'd us, they would have  
 said, that in these dayes men are better arm'd,  
 and that a Squadron of men at armes would  
 have bin of force to have shock'd with a rock,  
 and not only with a body of foot: and thus  
 with these false excuses they corrupted their  
 judgments. Nor would they have taken into  
 consideration, that *Lucullus* with a few foot  
 routed a 150000 horse that *Tigranes* led, and yet  
 among those horsemen there was a sort of them  
 very like our men at armes. And so this fallacy  
 was discover'd by the example of forrain Nati-  
 ons. And as thereby it proves true, touching the  
 infantry, which is relat'd in Story, so ought it  
 be beleev'd that all the rest of the ancient or-  
 ders are true and usefull. And when this we re-  
 once credited, Republicques and Princes would  
 fail less, and be of more strength to resist any  
 force should come upon them, nor hope so  
 much in the flight; and those that should have in  
 their hands the government of State, would be  
 better able to guide it, either by way of ampli-  
 fication or by way of preservation, and would  
 think that to increase the number of their Citi-  
 zens, and make them as their associates and not  
 vassals, to send forth Colonies to keep the coun-  
 tries gained, to make a general stock out of the  
 booties taken, to tame the enemy with incur-  
 sions, & by set batte's, & not long sieges, to main-  
 tain the publique State in wealth, & the private  
 in scarcity, and to be industrious in keeping the  
 armies in good discipline, are the means to in-  
 large a Commonwealth & gain an Empire. And  
 when this way of amplification should not like  
 them, then should they think that all addition to  
 their

their state are the ruine of Commonwealths, and therefore should restraine all ambition, regulating their City according to their lawes and customs, forbidding all enlargements, only ayming at defence of what they have, and keeping them under good government, as the Republicks of *Germany* do, and so have liv'd free a good while. Norwithstanding (as otherwhere I have said, when I discours'd touching the difference there was in the ordering of a State to become fit to conquer, and the ordering of one to be able to mainrain it self) it is impossible, that a Republick should have the hap to stand quiet, and enjoy her own liberty, with her small Territories: for though she molest no others yet she shall be molested her self: she may also have some mind or some necessity in some part to extend her bounds: and in case she have no enemy abroad, yet may she find some one at home, as it must needs be alwaies that such be found among a great many potent citizens, and if those Republicks of *Germany* can subsist in that manner, & have been able to continue for a time it arises from some conditions, that are in that Country, & which are nowhere else found, nor could they mainrain such a manner of government without them. This part of *Germany*, whereof I speak, was subject to the *Roman Empire*, as were *France* & *Spain*; but when the Empire began to decline, & the title of the Empire was brought into that Country, the most potent of those Cities began (according to the baseness or the necessity of those Emperors) to set themselves at liberty, buying themselves out from the Empire, and reserving thereunto only a certain annual rent. Insomuch as by little and little, all those Cities, which he d

immediately

immediatly of the Emperor, and were no way in subjection to any Prince, in such like manner set themselves free. It happened in the same times, when these Cities bought out their liberties, that certain communalities of the Duke of *Austria's* subjects, rebell'd ag'ainst him, among which were *Tilibourg*, the *Swisses* and others, who prospering in the beginning, by little and little came to such growth, that they not only shook off the *Austrian* yoke, but even became a terror to all their neighbours, and these are those they call *Swisses*. This Country therefore is divided into the *Swisses*, Republicks, which they call free Townes, Princes, and the Emperor. And the reason why among such variety of governments there arise no warres, or if any do, why they continue not, is that reverence they yeeld to the Emperor, who albeith he hath no great forces, yet is held in such esteem among them, that he alwaies reconciles them, & with his authority interposing himself as Mediator, takes away all discontents: & the greatest & longest warres that have been there, were those that follow'd betwixt the *Swisses* & the Duke of *Austria*; and though now for these many years the Emperor and the Duke of *Austria* have been one and the same thing, yet was he never so powerfull as to tame the *Swisses* insolence, where there was never any means of accord, unless it were by force; nor hath the residue of *Germany* ever given him much assistance: partly because those communalities cannot find in their hearts to hurt those that desire to live under a civil government, as they themselves do and partly because those Princes are not able, being poor, or will not, by reason that they envy too great puissance. Those communalities therefore may live contented with their

their small dominions, because they have no occasion (in regard of the Imperial Authority) to wish it greater. They may live the better in union within their owne walls, because they have the enemy near at hand, who would willingly take any opportunity to lay hold on them, whensoever they should fall into discord: but if that country were otherwise conditioned, it were fit for them to seeke the enlargment of their State, & so interrupt their owne rest: and because otherwise there are not the like termes, this manner of living cannot be followed, unless there is a necessity either to strengthen the State by way of leagues; or to amplify it as the Romans did. And whosoever undertake any other course of government, seeke not their owne life, but ruine and destruction: for many wayes, and for many reasons are conquests hurtfull: for it is very possible to gaine dominion, and not strength; and he that does increase his dominions, & yet growes not in strength, must needs go to wrack. They cannot grow strong, that grow poore in the wars, although they prove victorious, because their conquests cost them more then they get by them, as the Venetians & the Florentines did, who have bin much weaker, when the one commanded all Lombardy, and the other Tuscany, then when the one was contented with the seaonley and the other with six miles round of territories: for all this proceeded from their desire to conquer, & their ignorance to take the right course: and they deserve the more blame, in that they have very little excuse having scene the ways the Romanes went, because they might have followed their example, being that the Romanes without any pattern

terne to follow, by their own judgment, found out a fit way to go. Moreover sometimes such gain gotten do no small harm to a well govern'd Commonwealth, when either such a city or country is conquer'd that abounds with pleasures, where by conversation with them, their manners are learned, as it happen'd to Rome at first in the conquest of Capua, & afterwards to Hannibal. And had Capua been of further distance from the City, that the soldiers error had not had the remedy near hand, or that Rome had been in some part corrupted, without question that conquest had prov'd the Roman Republicks ruine. And T. Livius witnesses the same in these words: Even then was Capua little

Jam tunc minime salubris militari disciplina Capua, instrumentum omnium voluptatum, delinatos militum animos avertit a memoria patriæ.

good for the military discipline, which being the instrument of all sorts of pleasures, beset the soldiers minds so, that

they forgot their native Countries. And truly such like Cities sufficiently avenge themselves on their Conquerors without fight, or loss of blood; for by infecting them with their contagious vices, they expose them to the conquest of whoever assailes them. And Juvenal could not better have expressed this, then where in his Satyres he saies, that by their conquests of sordain nations, their minds were possessed with sordain vices, in exchange of parsimony, & other excellent vertues; Gluttony and luxury making their

Gula & Luxuria incubuit, habitatione there, revenged the victumque ulcitur orbem. worlds Conquest on them. If

therefore these gettings were likely to have been dangerous to the Romans, in the times that they proceeded with such wisdom and vertue, how will they prove to those who go on

In much different waies from them? and who besides the other errors they run in of (whereof we have formerly spoken enough) serve themselves of either mercenary or auxiliary soldiers? whereupon those mischiefs often be all them, which we shall mention in the following chap.

## CHAP. XX.

*What hazard that Prince or Commonwealth runs, which is serv'd by auxiliary and mercenary soldiers.*

**I**n another work of mine I had not treated at large of mercenary and auxiliary soldiers how unprofitable they are, and how very profitable the native soldiers of the Country are, I would much more have enlarged my self in this discourse, than now I purpose; but having elsewhere discours'd hereupon at length, I shall now on'y point at it. Nor yet did I think fit wholly to pass it over, having found in *Titus Livius* so large an example belonging to those soldiers: for auxiliary soldiers are those that a Prince or Commonwealth sends with their Caprains and pay ready furnish'd in thy aid. And coming to the text of *T. Livius*, I say, that the Romans having in severall places broken two armies of the *Samnites* with their forces, which they sent to succor the *Capuans*, and thereby freed them from that warre the *Samnites* made against them, purposing to returne to Rome, to the end the *Capuans* disposyl'd of ayd should not anew become a prey to the *Samnites*, left behind them in the country about *Capua* two legions to defend them. Which legions growing corrupt through idleness, began

began to be insnar'd with the delicacies thereof  
 So that having forgotten their owne country,  
 and the reverence they ought to the Senate,  
 they resolved to take armes, and make them-  
 selves Lords of that Country, which they by  
 their valours had defended, thinking those in-  
 habitants not worthy to enjoy those goods,  
 which they knew not how to defend. Which  
 thing, the Romanes having had some inkling of  
 it before, was stopped, and punished by them, as  
 where we speak of conspiracies, it shall be  
 show'd at large. Therefore I say again, that of all  
 kindes of souldiers the auxiliaries are the most  
 dangerous; Because among those, that Prince or  
 Republique that uses them for ayd, hath no  
 authority, but onely he that sends them: for  
 auxiliary souldiers are those that are sent there  
 by a Prince, as I have sayd, under the command  
 of his own Captaines, under his own en-  
 signes and pay also, as this army was, which the  
 Romanes sent to Capua. These kindes of sould-  
 diers, when they have vanquished, most com-  
 monly pillage as well them that have hired  
 them, as the enemy against whom they have hi-  
 red them; and this they do, either through the  
 malignant disposition of their Prince that sends  
 them, or through their owne ambition. And  
 however the Romanes had no intention to vi-  
 olate the agreement and conventions made  
 with the Capuans, yet the facility wherewith  
 those souldiers thought themselves able to take  
 their towne, was such that it might have been  
 of force to perswade them to think of taking  
 the towne and State from the Capuans: Many  
 examples to this purpose may be alledg'd;  
 but this, and that of the inhabitants of Rhegium  
 shall suffice me, from whom both liver & towne



were taken by one legion of soldiers, which the Romans had there left in garrison. Therefore a Prince or a Republick should rather take any other course, than seek to bring auxiliary soldiers into his Country, principally when he is most to rely upon them: for any accord or agreement (though very hard) to which he shall yeeld with his enemy, shall be more tolerable than this. And if things past were well call'd to mind, and those that are present well consider'd on, for one that hath had good success in such a business, a man shall find exceeding many who have been abus'd. And a Prince, or an ambitious Republick can never have a fitter opportunity to seise on a Town or Country, than when they are requir'd to send their armies for defence thereof. Wherefore he that is so ambitious, that not only for his own defence, but for offence to another, calls in such like aids, seeks to gain that he cannot hold, and which also he that gets it for him, can at his pleasure take from him. But so great is mans ambition, that if he can fulfill his desire for the present, he is never aware of that evill, which shortly after may thence redound to him. Nor do the ancient examples avail any thing with him, as well in this, as in other things we have treated of: for were men hereby mov'd, they would perceive that the more freely and fairly they dealt with their neighbours, and the farther off they were from making themselves masters of them, the more readily would they offer to cast themselves into their armes, as hereafter shall appear by example of the *Cyprians*.

## CHAP. XXI.

*The first Pretour that the Romans ever sent to any place, was to Capua, four hundred years after they began to make war.*

**H**OW much the Romans in their manner of proceeding in their Conquests did differ from those, who now a daies enlarge their dominions, we have formerly discours'd enough, and how they suffer'd those Towns which they did not utterly raze, to live with their own laws, as well those that yielded to them as subjects, as those that came under their protection as associates. And in them they left no marks of the Roman Empire, but tied them to some certain conditions, which whiles they observ'd, they still maintain'd them in their state and dignity. And we know that these courses were continued till they began to Conquer abroad out of Italy, and that they reduc'd Kingdomes and States into Provinces. Whereof the example is very clea; for the first place that ever they sent any Pretor to was Capua, whether they sent him not through their own ambition, but upon the Capuans intreaty, who (being they were at discord one with another) judg'd it necessary to have a Citizen of Rome amongst them, that might put them in order again and reunite them. The Associates also mov'd by their example, and constrain'd by the same necessity requir'd to have a Prefect sent them. And T. Livius saies upon this occasion, and upon this new way of ruling,

Quod jam non solum armis, *That now not only the Romanes jura Romana pellebant, man armes, but their lawes*

also

also were in great repute. We see therefore how much this course taken, further'd the Romans advancement: for those Cities especially that are accustomed to live free, or to be govern'd by their own Citizens, are well enough contented to live in another manner of quiet under a rule they see not ( though it may bring some burden with it too ) rather than under that which they having every day in their view, continually reproaches them with their slavery. Besides this, the Prince gains hereby another advantage, that his Officers having not in their hands these judicatures and magistracies, whereby they were to regulate those Cities, there can no imputation or aspersion be cast upon the Prince. And hereby many occasions of calumny and hatred against him are taken away. And that this is true, besides ancient examples, which we could allege, we have one of late memory in *Italy*: for as it is well known ( *Geneva* having been several times possessed by the French ) that King did alwaies (except at this present time) send them a French Governor, who under him should govern them. For this present only, but upon any intencion of the Kings; but it seem'd necessity so order'd it, he hath suffered them to be governed by their own lawes, and to have a *Genowes* for their Magistrate. And I make no question but that he that inquires which of these two waies most secures the King for his rule over them, & gives the people most satisfaction, would therather allow of this latter. Moreover men cast themselves the more freely into thy armes, the further off they think thee from being desirous to rule; & so much the less do they fear thee in regard of their liberty, by  
how

how much the more courteous and familiar thou art with them. This familiarity and free manner of behaviour made the *Capuans* hasty to aske a Prerour of the *Romans*; but had the *Romans* of themselves made but the least shew they would have sent one thither, they would presently have been in jealousy of them, and started from them. But what need we go to *Capua* and *Rome* for examples, having store enough at *Florence* and in *Tuscany*? It is well known how long since it is that *Pistoia* willingly yielded it self to the government of *Florence*. It is as well known also, what enmity hath been between the *Florentines* and the *Pisans*, the *Lukeses* and the *Seneses*; and this difference of disposition proceeds not from thence, that the *Pistoieses* value not their liberty, as well as others do, but because the *Florentines* us'd these with that respect they do their own brothers, but the others they treated as enemies. This was the occasion made the *Pistoieses* offer themselves freely to be govern'd by them; and the others struggle with all might and main, as yet they do also, not to come under them. And doubtless, had the *Florentines* either by way of alliances or succours grown familiar with their neighbours, and not have alwaies fear'd them, they had at this instant been Lords of all *Tuscany*. But hereupon I advise not, that armes and force are not to be us'd, but that they are to be reserv'd for the last place, where and when other meanes will not serve.

## CHAP. XXII.

*How erraneous many times the opinions of men are, when they give their judgements touching great affaires.*

**H**OW false oftentimes mens opinions are, they well see, who are eye-witnesses of their deliberations, which many times unless they be determin'd of by able men, are contrary to all truth. And because that excellent men in corrupted Commonwealths (especially in peaceable times) both for envy and occasions of ambition are maligned, such advice is follow'd, as by reason of a common error is well approv'd of, or such as is put forward by men that aime rather at grace and favour then the general good. This error afterward is discover'd in times of adversity, and of force recourse is had to those that in times of peace were utterly forgotten, as in its own place in this part it shall fully be spoken of. There are also certain accidents where men are very easily beguiled, if not well experienced in affaires, the present accident having in it self many likelihoods fit to make that credible, whereof in such a case men are perswaded. These words are spoken upon that which *Numicius* the Pretour (after that the Latins were defeated by the *Romans*) perswaded them; and upon that which few years since, many believed, when *Francis* the first, King of France came to the Conquest of *Milan*, which was defended by the *Swissers*. Therefore I say, that *Lewis* the Twelfth being dead, and *Francis* of *Angoulesme* succeeding in the Kingdome of France,

France, and desiring to restore the Duchy of Milan to the Kingdome whereof the *Switzers* had of late possessed themselves, by means of Pope *Julius* the second's encouragement, desired to have some aid in *Italy*, which might further his undertakings, so that besides the *Venetians*, whom King *Lewis* had gain'd, he tried the *Florentines*, and Pope *Leo* the tenth, thinking his enterprize much facilitated, by having them to side with him, because the King of *Spains* soldiers were in *Lombardy*, and some of the Emperors forces in *Verona*. Pope *Leo* yeelded not to the Kings desire, but by those that counselled him, he was perswaded (as it was said) to stand neuter, shewing him that herein consisted certain victory: for it was nothing at all for the Churches good, to have either mighty in *Italy*, the King or the *Swissers*. But if he desired to restore it to the ancient liberty, it was fit to free it from the one and the other. And because it was not possible to vanquish the one or the other, divided or united, it was not amis to let them overcome one another, and that afterwards the Church with her allies should assaile the conqueror, and it was impossible to find a better occasion then the present, both being incamped: and so the Pope having his forces in order, whereby he might be able to preserve himself upon the confines of *Lombardy*, near the two armies under colour of guarding his own state, should there abide till they had fought their battell: which in all probability (each army being very valorous) could not but prove bloody to them both and leave the Conqueror so feeble, that the Pope might easily assaile and break him, and thereby he should attain to become Lord of *Lombardy*, and only

only arbitrator of all *Italy*. And how erroneous this opinion was, appear'd by the event of the matter: for the *Swissers* being vanquish'd after a long fight, the Popes and the Spanish soldiers were so far from assailing the Conquerors, that they prepared themselves with what haste they could for flight; which also would have little avail'd them had it not been for the Kings humanity or coldness in their pursuit, who sought not after a second victory, but was contented to make agreement with the Church. This opinion hath some arguments for it, which carry a colour of truth, but indeed are far from it: for it seldome comes to pass, that the Conqueror loses many of his soldiers; for of them, there are some only slain in the battel, and not in the flight: and during the heat of the combat, whiles men stand face to face one with another, few of them fall, especially because for the most part this continues but a small while. And in case it should last long, and many of the Conquerors should fall; yet such is the reputation, and terror also, that victory draws with it, that it far exceeds the damage, that by the death of those soldiers can be suffer'd. So that an Army, which upon the opinion, that such a one were weakned, going to assaile it, would be much deceived, unless it were such an Army that at all times, before and after the victory, were able to deale with it. In this case the assailing Army may be able according to the fortune and valoric hath to win or lose: but that which had formerly fought, & vanquish'd, would have some advantage of the other: Which appears plainly by the experience the Latins gave us, and the fallacy by which

which *Numicius* the Pretour was abus'd, as also by the dammage which those people brought upon themselves by beleeving him, who (when the Romans had vanquish'd the Latins) cried out through all *Latium*, that then was it time to assaile the Romans, who were weakned with the late fight they had with the *Latines*; that the Romans had carried away only the name of the victory, but had suffered all other sorts of dammages, even as much as if they had been overcome, and that any small force, if now a fresh it should assaile them, were enough to dispatch them. Whereupon those people that gave credit to him, levied a new army, and were presently defeated, and so suffered that loss, which others shall that hold the like opinion.

## CHAP. XXIII.

*How much the Romans in giving judgement upon their subjects, whensoever occasion was offer'd, that constrain'd them therunto, avoided the mid way, and rather betook themselves to one of the extreames.*

*¶ Jam Latio is status erat rerum, ut neque pœcem, neque bellum pati possent.*

**T**He Latins were now reduc'd to such termes, that they could neither endure peace, nor maintain War. Of all unhappy conditions this is the worst, unto which a Prince or Republick can be brought, that they can neither accept of peace, nor support the War; unto which those are reduc'd, who are overmuch off'nded at the conditions of peace; and on the other side, if they have a mind



mind to make war, either they must cast themselves as a prey into the hands of those that ayd them, or become a prey to their enemy. And into these mischances men fall by evil advices and evil courses, by not having well weighed their own forces, as before it was said: for that Republique or Prince, that should well weigh them, very hardly would ever be brought to those termes the Latines came, who when they should not have made accord with the Romans, made it, and when, they should not have broke peace with them brake it. Whereby they brought it so to pass that their agreement and disagreement with the Romans did equally endamage them. The Latins then were overcome and much broken at first by *Manlius Torquatus*, and afterwards by *Camillus*; Who having forc't them to yeeld and render themselves to the Romans, and put Garrisons in all the Towns in Latium, and taken hostages of them all, when he came back to Rome, related to the Senate, that all Latium was in the people of Romes hands. And because this judgement is remarkable, and deserves note, to the end it may be follow'd, when Princes have the like occasions given them, I will produce the very words, that *Livie* put in *Camillus* his mouth, which did testifie both of the manner the Romans held in amplifying the State, and that in their judgements touching the State, they alwaies avoided the middle way, and turn'd to the extreame: for a government is nothing else, but to have such a yre upon the subjects, that they either cannor, or will not hurt thee. This is done either by making thy self fully sure of them, in taking away from them all means to hurt thee, or by

O                      doing

Dij  
 mor-  
 tales  
 ita vos  
 poten-  
 tes hu-  
 jus  
 consili-  
 fecer-  
 runt,  
 ut, sit  
 Lati-  
 um, an-  
 non  
 fit, in  
 vestra  
 manu  
 posue-  
 rint. I-  
 taque  
 pacem  
 vobis  
 (quod  
 ad La-  
 tinos  
 atti-  
 net)

parere

in perpetuum, vel sciendo vel ignoscendo potestis. Vultis  
 crudelius consulere in deditos victosque, licet delere nomen  
 Latinum. Vultis exemplo majorum augere rem Romanam,  
 victos in civitatem accipiendo, materia crescendi per summam  
 gloriam suppeditat. Certe id firmissimum imperium est, quo  
 obedientes gaudent. Illorum igitur animos, dum expecta-  
 tione stupent, seu pœna seu beneficio preoccupari oportet.

doing them so much good, that it is not pro-  
 bable they will wish to change their state: all  
 which is there comprehended; first by the pro-  
 position *Canillus* made, and afterwards by the  
 judgement the Senate gave thereupon. His  
 words were these, In this consultation,  
 the immortal Gods have given you so much power,  
 that it is wholly in your hands to chuse, whether  
*Latium* shall continue still a Nation or no. And  
 therefore now may ye for ever procure your selves  
 repose and security from thence, either by rigor  
 and punishment, or by clemency and pardon; chuse  
 ye whether. Are ye minded to proceed by way of  
 cruelty against those that have yeelded, and are  
 vanquish'd? ye may indeed blot out the very  
 name of *Latium*; But will ye, as your ancestors  
 have done before you, enlarge the Roman Empire,  
 by receiving into your City those whom ye have con-  
 quer'd? Then have ye here means to grow mighty  
 to your great glory. Certes that government is of  
 all other most sure, where the subjects take joy in  
 their obedience. And therefore it is bechoovefull,  
 whiles their mindes are in suspence between fear  
 and hope, to prevent them either with speedy  
 punishment or benefit. To this purpose  
 followed the Senates deliberation, which  
 was according to the Consuls words; for  
 calling them Town by Town, before them,  
 those that were of any moment, they ci-

ther much benefited, or quite ruined them, granting divers exemptions and privileges to those they would do good to, freely making them Citizens, and giving them security every way. They dismantled the other strong Towns, and sent Colonies thither, and brought the people from thence into Rome, and so dispersed them, that neither with their arms nor counsel they could do any more harm: Nor ever did they make use of any neutral way, in things (as I have said) of moment. Princes should imitate this judgment given; and hereunto the Florentines should have intended, when in the year 1502. *Arezzo* and the valley of *Chiana* rebelled; which had they done, they had secured their Government, and much amplified the City of Florence, and likewise might have given them those fields they wanted for their sustenance: But they made use rather of that middle way, which is the most pernicious, in giving judgment upon men, so that part of the *Aretins* they confined, part they condemned, and took from all of them their honors, and ancient degrees in the City, and yet left the City whole and untouched: And if any Citizen in their Consultations advised that *Arezzo* should be dismantled, and razed, they who seemed to be of the wiser sort, said it would be a disgrace to the Florentines to raze it; because it would be thought then that Florence wanted forces to hold them; which are some of those Reasons that seem to be, but are not true: For by the same reason a Parricide were not to be put to death, nor a

ny vile or scandalous person, it being a shame for that Prince to show that he is not able to bridle such a man alone: and these kind of men having such opinions, perceive not, how men in particular, and sometimes a whole City together too, do wrong a State: so that for others example, and his own safeguard, a Prince hath no other remedy, but utterly to raze it. And indeed the honor consists in the knowledg and power to chastise, and not in being able to hold a City under still with many dangers: for the Prince that punishes not him that offends, so that he cannot offend more, is esteem'd ignorant and unworthy. This sentence which the Romans gave, is confirm'd by the judgement they gave upon the Privernates. Where by the Text in *Livie* two things may be observed: the one, which is formerly spoken of, that subjects are either to be oblig'd by good done them, or else to be quite extinguish'd; the other is, how much avails the generous courage of the minde, and true speaking in the presence of sage and discreet men. The Senate of Rome was assembled to give their sentence upon the Privernates, who having been in Rebellion, were by force reduc'd to the Roman obedience. Many Citizens were sent from the

Quam Privernates to crave pardon of the Senate, who being come before them, were thus ask'd by one of the Senators, *What punishment* *ros* Privernates censeret. *Eas* inquam merentur, qui se liberare dignos censent. *Quid* si poenam remittimus vobis, qualem nos pacem vobis cum habituros speremus? Si bonam dederitis, & fidelem & perpetuam; sin malam, haud diuturnam. Se audivisse vocem & liberi & viri, nec credi posse ullum populum, aut hominem deniq; in ea conditione, cuius cum poeniteat diutius quam necesse sit mansurum; ibi pacem esse fidam, ubi voluntarii pacati sint, neq; eo loco, ubi servitutem esse velint, fidem sperandam esse. Eos demum, qui nihil praeterquam de libertate cogitant, dignos esse qui Romani fiant.

he should censure the Privernates worthy of. Whereunto one of the Privernates reply'd, The same that they deserve, who think themselves worthy of liberty. Whereupon the Consul answered, What if we remit you your punishment, what peace shall we hope for with you? To which he said again, If it be good you give us, you shall have it faithfully and perpetually observ'd, if ill, not long. Whereupon the wiser of those of the Senate, howbeit many were angry thereat, said, That they had heard a stout and a free man speak; neither was it credible that any Nation, or any man indeed, would continue any longer, than he must needs, in such a condition, whereof he repents himself; and there onely was it likely a peace would be inviolably kept, where it was made of their own good-wills and freely; but it was in no case to be hop'd for there, where they were brought into bondage and servitude. And upon these words they decreed, that the Privernates should be made Citizens of Rome, and honoured them with all the priviledges of their Bourgesie, saying, That they finally were worthy to be Citizens of Rome, who valu'd nothing else in comparison of their liberty. So much were these generous spirits taken with this stout and free answer: for, an answer else would have been false and cowardly. And those that think otherwise of men (especially such as are us'd to be free, or to their thinking are free) are much deceiv'd, and by this deceit are they seduc'd to take wrong courses for themselves, and of little satisfaction to others: from whence arise the often rebellions and ruines of States. But to return to our discourse, I conclude as well by this, as by that judgement given upon the

the *Latins*, when sentence is to pass upon puissant Cities, and that have been accustomed to enjoy their liberties, it is necessary either utterly to raze them, or by benefiting of them to oblige them; otherwise it is all to no purpose; for the middle way here in is absolutely to be avoided, which is dangerous, as it prov'd to the *Samnites*, having inclos'd the *Romans* at the gallows of *Gaudium*, when they would not follow that old mans counsell that advis'd them, either to let them go with all courtesie and love, or put them all to the sword. But they taking that neutral way, disarming them, and putting them all to pass under the gallows, let them go with shame and disdain, so that a while after they found by their own dammage how advantageous that old mans advice had been, and how hurtfull their own resolution was, as we shall discourse thereof more at large in its own place.

## CHAP. XXIV.

*Fortresses in general do more harm then good.*

**P**ERadventure it may seem to the wise men of our times a matter not well advis'd on, that the *Romans*, when they would make themselves sure of the people of *Larum*, and of the City of *Priverum*, never thought upon the building of some Fortress which might serve for a bridle to hold them in obedience, especially being it passes for a Proverb in *Florence*, alledg'd by our States men, that *Pisa* and other such like Cities should be kept with Citradells. And truly had the *Romans* been like them, they would have provided for the building

building of them : but because they were of another kind of courage , and judgement, and had another manner of power , therefore they never built any. And whiles Rome liv'd free, and observ'd her own ordinances, & institutions, for the propagation of vertue, she never built any one to keep under Cities or Provinces, though it may be, she preserv'd some of them she found already built. Whereupon having seen the manner of the Romans proceedings herein, and that of the Princes of our times, I think to take it into consideration, whether it be good to build Fortresses, & whether they advantage or wrong him that builds them. We must consider then, that Fortresses are built either for resistance against the enemy, or for defence against any tumult of the subjects. In the first case they are unnecessary, in the second hurtfull. And to give a reason, wherefore in the second case they are hurtfull, I say , that that Prince or Republick that is afraid of his own subjects, and their rebellion, must needs have his fear arising from the hatred his own subjects bear him ; and that hatred from his own evill carriages, which evill carriages proceed from thence, either that he beleeves he is able to keep them under by force, or from the Princes small discretion : and one of the causes that makes him think himself able to rule them by force , is the having built these Cittadels, over them : for evill treatings, which are the causes of hatred, for the most part are deriv'd from thence, that that Prince or Republick hath Cittadels upon them ; which ( when this is true ) are far more hurtful, than profitable: or first ( as it is said ) they make thee bolder and more rough among thy subjects,

being that thou hast thy security within them: for all these forces and violences which are in use to bridle a people withall, are of no value, but these two; either that thou hast alwaies a good Army ready to send into the field, as the Romans had, or that thou doest disperse, extinguish, disorder, and disunite them so, that in no case they can make such a body as can hurt thee: for be it that thou doest impoverish

Spoliatis arma  
superfunt. Pu-  
ror arma mini-  
strat.

them, *They that are despoil'd of their goods, have weapons left them.* If thou disarmst them, *Even rage will find them weapons.* If thou dost oyst their heads,

and proceedest still to injure the rest, there will grow up again new heads, as fast as those of *Hydra*. If thou buildest Cittadels, they are quite unprofitable in time of peace, because they encourage thee to wrong them; but in time of war they are of least use; for then are they assaulted by the enemy, and thy subjects too; nor is it possible they can resist them both. And if ever they were unprofitable, they are now adayes so, in regard of the Artillery, by reason of whose fury and violence, it is impossible to defend small fortresses, and where there is no place for retiring with new retrenchments, as formerly hath been shew'd. But I will dispute this matter more plainly yet. Wilt thou O Prince with these Cittadels curb thy Citizens? or wilt thou whether Prince or Commonwealth that thou art, bridle a City thou hast taken by war? I will address myself to the Prince, and tel him, that such a Fortrefse to curb his Citizens cannot be more unprofitable, for the reasons above alleadgd: because it makes thee prompter, and less careful how thou doest oppress them, which oppression



oppression makes them desperate in attempting thy ruine, and so incites them, that that Fortresse, which is the cause thereof, can no way preserve thee: so that a sage and good Prince, to keep himself still good, and that he may not give occasion to, nor imbolden his children to become bad, will never build Fortresses, to the end they relie not upon the Citadels, but rather upon the hearts of men. And if Count Francis Sforza that came to be Duke of Milan was reputed wise, and yet in Milan he built a Citadel, I say, that herein he little shewd his wisdom, as appeared by the effect, seeing that Fortresse proved rather a disadvantage and loss, then any safeguard to his heirs: for thinking that by means thereof they might pass their time in security, and yet injure their Citizens and subjects, they forbore not any kind of violence, whereupon being grown very odious, they lost the state, so soon as they were assailed by their enemy. Nor could that fortresse defend them, nor did it any way advantage them in the war, and in time of peace it had done them much harme; for if there had been no such citadel, and they for want of discretion, onely had sharply handled some of their subjects, they might sooner have discovered the danger, and withdrawn themselves from it, and so afterwards they would have bin able with more courage to have resisted the French fury, having their subjects to friend without any fortresse, then having them become thine enemies with thy fortresses, which gives thee no help at all. For either it is lost by the treachery of him that guards it, or is forced by the assailant, or else by famine. And if thou wouldest that these

should avail thee, and help thee to recover a State lost, where only the fortress holds for thee, thou must have an army, wherewith thou maist assault him that chased thee from thence. And whensoever thou hast this army, thou couldest not in any wise faile of recovering the State, howsoever there were no fortress at all; and that the more easily, by how much the Inhabitants would be more thy friends, then if thou hadst ill-treated them through presumption upon thy fortress. And it hath been proved by experience, how that this Cittadell of *Milan* hath little availed either the forces or the French party in the adversity of the one or other, but hath rather brought upon them many ruinas and mischiefes, having never advised, by means thereof, upon any fair way to keep that State. *Guido Ubaldo* Duke of *Urbino*, son to *Frederick*, who in his daies was esteemed a great Captain, being driven out of his State by *Casor Borgia* son to Pope *Alexander* the sixth, when afterwards upon a new grown occasion he returned thither again, he caused all the fortresses to be demolished that were in the Country, thinking they did more harme then good: for he having gained mens hearts to him, for their sakes would not abide them, and in regard of enemies, he saw they were not able to defend him, it being needfull to have a good army in the field to preserve them withall. so that he resolved to raze them all. Pope *Julius*, having driven the *Bentivoglio* out of *Bolonia*, built a Cittadell there, and caused a governor of his to ransacke them shrewdly, insomuch that the people rebelled, and he suddenly lost the Cittadell, so that it served him to little purpose, or rather wronged him as much, as carrying himself

himself otherwise it could have helped him. *Nicolas of Castello* father of the *Virelli*, returning into his Country from whence he had been banished, forthwith demolished two several fortresses, which *Pope Sixtus* the fourth had built there, deeming them not the fortress, but the peoples good wills were more likely to continue him in his State. But of all other examples, the freshest and of most remarkable in every point, and that which is fittest to shew the incommodity of building them, and the fruit of razing them, is that of *Genoa*, which fell out in these latter times. It is well known how that *Genoa* in the year 1507. rebelled against *Lewis* the Twelfth, King of *France*, who came in person, and with all his strength to regain it: which being done, he caused an exceeding strong Cittadel to be built there, surpassing in strength all others that are now adaies known: for in regard of the situation, and the other circumstances belonging thereto, it was impregnable, being placed upon the very point of a hill, which stretched it self out into the sea, called by the *Genueſes*, *Godeſa*. And hereby the whole port, and a great part of the Town of *Genoa* was subject to its battery: It happend afterwards in the year of our Lord God 1512. when the French were driven out of *Italy*, for all the fortress, *Genoa* rebelled and *Othavian Fregoso* recovered the State thereof, who by his industry in the terme of 16 moneths took it by famine, and as every one believed, so he was advised by many, to reserve it for his refuge in any accident. But he, as he was exceeding wise, knowing that they were not fortresses, but mens good wills that preserved Princes in

in their state, razed it to the ground, And so without laying the foundation of his dominion upon the fortress, but rather upon his own valour and judgement, he hath continually held it, and holds it yet. And whereas a thousand foot were formerly of force to charge the state of Genua, his adversaries have since assailed it with ten thousand, and have not been able to hurt him. By this therefore it appears, how the demolishing of the fortress hurt not *Octavian* at all, nor did the building of it advantage the King of France: for when he was able to come into Italy bringing an army with him, he might recover Genua, though he had no fortress there; but when he could bring no army with him into Italy, neither could he keep the Genueses in obedience, though he had a fortress there. It was therefore an expence to the King to build it, and a shame to lose it, and to *Octavian* a glory to regain it. But let us come to those Republicques that raise up fortresses, not in their native countries, but in those they have conquered. And to shew this fallacy, if that example of France and Genua suffice not, this of Florence and Pisa may, where the Florentines had built a citadel, to keep that town in subjection: And never advised themselves, that a City which had alwaies been a professed enemy to the Florentines, having lived free, which hath a recourse to liberty for a colour of Rebellion, it was necessary (being desirous to keep her) to use that manner the Romans had, either to take her as a companion into the state, or to deface and ruine her: for of what value citadels are, we saw in King *Charles* his coming into Italy, to whom they were yeilded, either through the treachery  
or

or cowardise of their governors. Whereas if they had not been, the *Florentines* would never have grounded their ability of keeping *Pisa* still upon them, nor would the King have been of power that way to have bereaved the *Florentines* of that City; and those means, whereby untill that time it had been maintained, would peradventure have been of force to preserve it. And without doubt they could not have made a worse triall, then that of the fortresses. I conclude therefore, that for the safety of ones native Country, a strong hold is but hurtfull; & to keep under Towns that are conquered, cittadels availe little. And herunto the Authority of the *Romans* shall suffice me, who dismantled the Towns they intended to hold by force, & never built up their walls; and if any one against this opinion should alledge me the example of *Tarentum* in ancient times, and in these modern that of *Brescia*, which places, by means of the cittadells, were recovered from the subjects rebellion: I answer, that at the years end *Fabius Maximus* was sent with the whole Army to recover *Tarentum*, who would have been able to recover that, though there had been no cittadell there. And though *Fabius* put those means in practise, yet had they never been, he would have us'd some other, which would have produced the same effect. And I know not what advantage a cittadell yeelds, that to regain thee the Town, requires a Consular Army, and a *Fabius Maximus* for commander, before it can be done. And that the *Romans* in any case had recover'd it plainly, appears by the example of *Capua*, where there was no cittadell, but they got it by the soldiers valor. But so  
that

that of *Brescia*, I say, that seldome chances which be'ell in that rebellion, that the fortress which is possessed still by thy forces (the Town being fallen into rebellion) should have a great army to friend and near hand, as was that of the French: for the Lord *De Foix* the Kings General being with his army at *Bellona*, when he understood the loss of *Brescia*, by means of the Fortress indeed recover'd the Towne. Therefore that Fortress yet stood in need (to do any good) of such a one as was the Lord of *Foix*, and a French army, that in three daies might relieve them; so that this example against those on the contrary side is of small weight: for many fortresses have been taken in the wars in our daies, and recover'd by the same fortune that the field hath been taken, and recovered again, not only in *Lombardy*, but in *Romania*, in the Kingdom of *Naples*, and in all parts of *Italy*. But touching the building of fortresses for defence against forrain enemies, I say, they are not usefull to those people, nor Kingdoms, who have good armies on foot; they are rather unprofitable, because that good armies without fortresses are of force to keep them: but fortresses without good armies cannot defend thee. And this we see by experience of those who have been held excellent in matters of state and government and other things, as we know the *Romans* and *Spartans* were: for if the *Romans* built no fortresses, the *Spartans* did not only forbear from them, but suffered none of their Cities to be wall'd in neither, because they would have no other guard but a mans own valor, to defend him. Whereupon when a *Spartan* was asked by an *Athepian*, whether the walls a-

bout

bour *Ariens* were not very faire, he answered him, yes, if all the inhabitants of the Town were women. To that Prince then that hath good armies, when upon the maritime frontiers of his state he hath a fortress, that for some few daies he is able to sustain the enemy, till things are somewhat order'd, it would sometimes be of small avail, but of no necessity. But when a Prince hath no strong army, fortresses either in the heart of his State, or at his frontiers, are hurtfull, or unprofitable: hurtfull, because he easily loses them, and being lost they make war upon him; or put case they are so strong, that the enemy cannot take them, they are left behind by the enemies army, and so they become of no service. For good armies, if they meet not with very sharp encounters, enter far into their enemies Countries, without regard either of Town or fortress they leave behind them: As it was evil lent in the ancient Stories, and as we see *Francis Maria* did, who in these latter times without any regard of them, left ten of the enemies Cities behind him, to assayl that of *Vrbis*. That Prince then that can raise a good army, can do well enough, without having any strong holds: but he that cannot have an army ready, should never build any: well may he fortifie the City of his abode, and keep it in good strength, and the Citizens thereof well disposed, wherby he may be able to support the enemies violence, till either some accord, or some forrain aid come to his relief. All other designs are expensive in time of peace, and unfruitfull in time of war. And whosoever shall well weigh all this that I have said, shall perceive that the *Romans*

as they were in all other their affairs very judicious, so were they very well advised in this judgement they gave upon the Latins, and the Privernates, where taking no care at all for citadels, they assur'd themselves of them by wiser and better waies.

## CHAP. XXV.

*It is a wrong course to assaile a City fallen into discord, thinking by means thereof, to master it.*

**I**N the Roman Repnblick the people and the Nobility were so far fallen asunder, that the *Veyntes* together with the *Eburans* by means of their disagreement, thought they might be able quite to root out the *Romans*: and having levied an Army, and forrag'd all the Country of *Rome*, the Senate armed out *Cneus Manilius* and *M. Fabius* against them, who having brought their Army near to that of the *Veyntes*, they forbear not with all insolences and reproaches to revile them, and disgrace the *Roman* name, and such was their fool-hardiness and presumptions that the *Romans* though then they were at odds one with another, came to agreement, and so coming to the comba, broke and vanquish'd them. We see therefore how much men deceive themselves (as formerly we have treated) in the courses they take, and that many times where they think to get, they lose. The *Veyntes* beleev'd, that by getting upon the *Romans* that were at variance one with another, they should overcome them; but it prov'd the occasion of reconciliation

to



to the Romans, but of ruine to themselves: for the causes of discord in Republicks, is most commonly idleness and peace; and the cause of union and concord is fear and war. Wherefore had the *Veyentes* been wise, the more at variance they had perceived Rome to have been, so much the more should they have forborn from war against them, and with devices of Peace cast about how to master them. The way is, to endeavour to be reputed a confident friend of that City, which is in discord: and whiles they come not to armes, to carry himself as an Umpire between both parties. And when they do come to armes, to afford some slow favours to the weaker party, as well to keep them still at war, and consume them, as to hinder them from doubting that with thy great forces, thou meanest to suppress them, and become their Prince. And when this part is well plaid, it cannot fail ordinarily, but that it will directly have the success thou lookest for. The City of *Pistoya* (as in another discourse and to another purpose I said) came to the *Florentines* Republick, by no other trick than this: for it being divided in factions, the *Florentines* now favouring the one, and then the other without any imputation of blame from either, brought them to such terms, that being tir'd with their tumultuous living, they came willingly to cast themselves into the *Florentines* armes. The City of *Siena* never changed her State upon the *Florentines* favour, but when their courtesies came but thin and small: for when they were frequent and strong, they united them rather for the defence of the State in which they liv'd. I will add to these aforesaid one

one other example. *Philp Visconti Duke of Milan*, several times made war against the *Florentines*, grounding much upon their disagreements, and alwaies came off a loser. Whereupon he was wont to say, when he complained of the evill success of his undertakings, that the *Florentines* follies had made him spend two millions of gold to no purpose. Therefore (as it was said before) the *Veyentes* and the *Etruscans* deceived themselves by this conceit of theirs, and were at last in a set battell vanquish'd by the *Romans*. And thus will others find themselves deceiv'd, whoever shall seek by the like cour'e, and upon the same occasion to subdu any nation or people.

## CHAP. XXVI.

*Contempt and contumely begets a hatred against those that use it, without any returne of advantage to them.*

I Beleeve it is one of the greatest parts of wisdom in men, to abstain from threatening or injuring of any one in words; for neither the one nor other bereave the enemy of any part of his strength; but the one makes him more wary of thee, and the other bear more deadly hatred against thee, and devise by all manner of waies he can to hurt thee. This is plain by the example of the *Veyentes*, whereof we spake in the former Chapter: who to the wrong of making war against the *Romans*, added the reproach of words, from which every prudent Commander ought to restrain his soldiers: so that they are things that incense and provoke the enemy to revenge, and are no defence (as it is said) against

gainst the hurt he does, insomuch that they are all weapons thrown from thee, which returne againe upon thee, Whereof there followed a notable example a good while since in *Asie*, where *Gabades* a Commander of the *Persians*, having a long while lien incamped before *Amida*, and determined upon the tediousness of the siege to depart, and therefore to that purpose rising with his campe, those of the Town being come all upon the walls, and grown insolent upon their victory, forbore no kind of outrage, disgracing, blaming and reproaching the enemy with his baseness and cowardise: whereupon *Gabades* being incensed, alter'd his purpose, and return'd to the siege, where such was their indignation at the contumely, that in a few daies they took and sack'd the Town. In the same manner it befell the *Veyentes*, who were not content (as is said) to make war against the *Romans*, but they rayl'd on them in vile termes, going even to their very trenches to reproach them, so that they incensed them more with their words then blowes: and those soldiers which were hardly drawn to fight, constrein'd the Consul to begin to fight, so that the *Veyentes* suffer'd, as the others we spoke of before, for their insolence. Wherefore every good Commander of armies, and good Governor of Commonwealths is to practice all possible remedies, that these injuries or reproaches be not us'd either in the city or the army, neither one among another, nor against the enemy: for being practised against the enemy, there arise from thence the aforesaid inconvenients: and among themselves they would do worse, w<sup>h</sup>en there

there is no reparation made, which wise and judicious men have alwaies awarded. When the Roman legions left at Capua conspired against the Capuans, as in its place shall be related, and a sedition was there occasioned by this conspiracy, ( which was afterwards quieted by *Valerius Corvinus* ) among other constitutions which were made in the agreement, they ordained very grievous punishments for those that should ever reproach any of those soldiers with that sedition. *Tiberius Gracchus*, who during the warre with *Hannibal* was made a Captain over some certain number of slaves, whom the Romans for want of men had put into armes, ordained specially a capital punishment for any that should object to any of them their servitude: so hurtful a matter ( as it is said ) was it thought by the Romans to set men at nought, and reproach them with any disgrace: for there is nothing so much incenses men to rage or breeds more hatred in them, whether it be spoken in earnest or in jeast. *Bitter taunts*

*Facetie asperæ quæ nimium ex vero traxerunt, acrem sui memoriam reliquant.* when they have root- great a mingle of truths with them, leave behind

them a very distastfull remembrance.

CHAR.

## CHAP. XXVII.

*Prudent Princes and Commonwealths ought to be contented with the victory: for oftentimes when that suffices them not, they lose it.*

THE using of disgracefull words against the enemy, proceeds most commonly from an insolencie, which either the victory or a false hope of victory incites thee to: which false hope causes men to erre not only in their sayings, but in their doings also: for this hope when it enters into mens breasts, makes them go beyond the point, and many times lose the opportunity of having a certain good, hoping to attain unto a better uncertain good: and because this is a matter worthy consideration, men often deceiving themselves, to the dammage of their State, I am of advice to shew it particularly by ancient examples and modern, being it cannot so distinctly be prov'd by reasons. *Hannibal* after he had defeated the *Romans* at *Canna*, sent his Agents to *Carthage*, to give them notice of the victory, and to demand new supplies. It was argued in the Senate, what was fit to be done. *Hanno* an old man and a discreet Citizen of *Carthage* advised, to use this victory wisely, and make peace with the *Romans*, being that now they might have it upon reasonable termes, having gained a battell; and that they should not go about to seek for it after a battell lost: for it should be the *Carthaginians* design to shew the *Romans*, that they were able to deal with them, and having gotten a victory, they should

Should take a care not to lose it for hope of a greater. This course was not taken, but afterwards the Senate of *Carthage* understood that this was very good counsell, when the occasion was lost. When *Alexander* the Great had conquer'd all the Levant, the Commonwealth of *Tyre*, famous in those daies, and puissant, by reason that their City was seated in the water, as *Venice* is, seeing *Alexanders* greatness, sent Ambassadors to him to tell him, that they would become his faithfull servants, and yeeld him what obedience he should desire, but that they would not admit either him or his soldiers into their Town. Whereat *Alexander* disdainig, that any one City should shut her gates against him, seeing he had forc'd all others open throughout the whole world, would not accept their conditions, but rejected them, and forthwith sent his army thither. That Town stood in the water, and was well provided with victuals, and other munition fit for defence, so that *Alexander* after four moneths spent, considering that one City took away all that time from his glory, which many other great conquests never did, and therefore determined to try an agreement, and to grant what they of themselves had asked. But they of *Tyre* being grown insolent hereupon, not only refused the conditions, but slew those that came to treat with them. Whereupon *Alexander* all enraged at this affront, so strongly assaulted the Town, that he took it, destroy'd it, and slew or made slaves all the men therein. A Spanish Army came upon the *Florentines* Territories, to restore the *Medici* into *Florence*, and to lay some taxes upon the Town,

Town, being hired herunto by some Citizens inhabiting therein, who put them in hopes that as soon as they should set foot in their Country, they would take armes in favour of them; they comming into the plain, and none of these discovering themselves to be for them, because they had want of victuals, tryed to make an agreement, whereupon the *Florentines* grown proud, would not accept of any, upon which occasion followed the loss of *Prato*, and the ruine of that State. Therefore Princes cannot commit a greater error when they are assail'd (in case the assailants are far more puissant then they) then to refuse all termes of agreement, especially when they are proffer'd them: for never will such poor ones be offerd, wherein is not in a good measure comprised his good that accepts them, and some part of his victory. Wherefore the *Tyrians* should have satisfied themselves, that *Alexander* accepted those conditions he had formerly refused: and their victory had been great enough, when with their armes in hand, they had made so mighty a Prince as he to yeeld to their demands. It should have sufficed the *Florentines* also, and they had gotten a good victory too, if the Spanish army gave way to any of their desires, though they had not fulfilled all of them; for that armies design was to change the State of *Florence*, to take away her devotion to *France*, and to draw some monies from her. When of these three the people had yeelded to two, which were the last, and had gotten themselves but one, which was the preservation of their state, they within had each of them gained some honour and satisfaction,

nor

nor should the people have troubled themselves for the other two things, one remaining to them; nor should they have offered, thinking they had been sure of a certain victory to hazard it at fortunes discretion, trying even the extremity thereof, which never any wise man will endanger himself in, unless it be upon necessity. *Hanniball* being departed out of *Italy*, where he had been very glorious for sixteen years, recalled by his own country men the *Carthaginians*, to receive his native Country, found *Asdruball* and *Siphax* defeated, the Kingdome of *Numidia* lost, and *Carthage* restrain'd within the compass of her own walls, which had no other refuge but him and his army: and knowing that was his Countries last hopes, he would not hazard it, till he had first made trial of all other remedies: nor was he asham'd to ask peace, judging, that if there was any way to save his Country, it was by that, and not by war, which being refused him, though he had been sure to lose, he would not fail to fight, thinking that it might fall out so, that possible it was for him to overcome, and if lose, it he must lose it gloriously. And if *Hanniball*, who was so valorous a captain, and had his army intire, did require peace, before he would hazard the battell, when he perceived that in losing it, his country would be subdued, what should another of less valor and experience then he do? But men run into this error, by not knowing how to limit their hopes, so that grounded on their own vast conceits, without weighing their strengths, they are utterly ruin'd.



## CHAP. XXVIII.

*How dangerous a thing it is for a Republick or Prince not to revenge an injury done against a publick State, or against a private person.*

What Indignation may cause men to do, is easily known, by that which befell the *Romans*, when they sent the three *Fabij* for Ambassadors to the French, who came to invade *Tuscany*, and in particular *Clusium*: for the people of *Clusium*, having sent to require aide at *Rome*, the *Romans* sent their Ambassadors to the French, to let them know they were to forbear from making warr against the *Tuscans*, which Ambassadors being upon the place, and fitter to play the Soldiers part, then the Ambassadors, the French and the *Tuscans* comming to fight, they rank'd themselves amongst the foremost to combat the French, whence it came, that being known by them, they converted all the hatred they bore the *Tuscans* against the *Romans*, which hatred became greater: for the French by their Ambassadors having complained to the Senate of this injury, and required in satisfaction of the dammage, that the also mentioned *Fabij* should be given into their hands, they were not only not given them, or in any other manner punished, but when the time of their Assemblies came, they were made Tribuns with Consular power: insomuch that the French perceiving those to be honored, that should have been punished,

punished, took all this as done in despight and disgrace to them: and thus incensed with rage and disdain they came to assaile Rome, which they took, the Capitoll excepted. Which destruction fell upon the Romans, only for their inobservance of justice: for their Ambassadors having offended against the law of nations, when they should have been punished, were honored. Therefore it is worthy consideration, how much every Republick or Prince should beware of doing the like wrong, not only against a nation, but also against any particular man: for if a man be exceedingly offended either by the publick, or by any private man, and hath had no reparation made him to his content: if he lives in a Commonwealth, he will seek even with the utter ruine thereof to avenge himself: if he lives under a Prince, and be a man of any courage, he will never rest, till in some kind or other he be revenged on him, however that he knows he draws thereby his own destruction on his head. And to verify this, there is not a fitter nor truer example, then that of Philip of Macedon Alexanders Father. In his Court there was a very handsome young noble man named Pausanias, and of him one Attalus, one of the cheifest men, that was neer about Philip, was inamoured; who having several times tryed if he would yeeld to him, and finding him far off from consenting to any such thing, determined to gain that by a trick and by force, which no way else he saw he could attaine to. And having made a solemn invitation, whereat Pausanias and many other noble men met, after that every one had liberally eate and drinke, caus'd Pausanias to be taken and brought to some by-chamber,

ber, were not only by force he satisfied his beastly lust upon him, but the more to disgrace him, he made him be so used by many others in the like manner. Of which injury *Pausanias* several times made his complaint to *Philip*, who having held him a long time in hope of revenging him, instead thereof made *Attalus* governour of a Province in *Greece*; whereupon *Pausanias* seeing his enemy honored, and not punished, converted his indignation not against him that had injured him, but against *Philip* that had not aveng'd him. And on a morning when *Philip's* daughter was solemnly married to *Alexander* of *Epirus*, as *Philip* went to the Temple to celebrate the espousals, he slew him between the two *Alexanders*, the son, and the son in law. Which example is much like that of the *Romans*, and is remarkable for all those that rule, who should never value any man at so low a rate, as to think (that by heaping injury upon injury) he that is thus wrong'd will not devise some way to be reveng'd, though it be with his own utter loss and destruction.

---

### CHAP. XXIX.

*Fortune blinds mens minds, when she will not suffer them to prevent her designs.*

IF we consider well the course of humane affaires, wee shall many times see things come to pass, and chances happen which the heavens altogether would not, that order should be taken to prevent. And in as much as this, which I speak of, befell *Rome*,

where there was so much valor, so much Religion and good order, it is no marvail if the same thing often fall out in a City or Country that wants the said things: and because this place is very remarkable to shew the power heaven hath over human things, *I. Livius* at large and with words of very great efficacy represses it, saying, that the heavens would for some end, that the *Romans* should know their power; and therefore caus'd those *Fabij* to erre, that were sent Ambassadors to the French, and by their means provokt them to make war against *Rome*. And afterwards ordaind, that for the suppressing of that war, there was nothing done in *Rome* worthy of the *Romans*, having first ordain'd, that *Camillus*, who only was able to remedy so great a mischief should then be banished to *Ardea*. And then the French comming towards *Rome*, they who to resist the fury of the *Volsci* and many their neighbouring enemies, had several times created a Dictatour; now upon the approach of the French never created any. Moreover, for their choyce of Soldiers, it was very weake, and without any extraordinary diligence: & they were so slow in taking of arms, that they were hardly time enough to incounter the French at the river *Allia*, ten miles from *Rome*. Here the Tribuns pitcht their campe without any ordinary diligence: not viewing the ground first, neither incompassing it with trench or paliado, making use neither of human nor divine helps. And in ranging of their battell, they left their ranks so thin and weak, that as well the Soldiers as the Captains did nothing worthy of the *Roman* discipline. They fought afterwards without any effusion of blood,

for

for they fled before they were assayl'd: the greater part went thence to *Veium*, the other retir'd to *Rome*, who never going into their own houses, went unto the Capitoll: so that the Senate taking no care to defend *Rome*, did not so much as shut the gates, and part of them fled from thence, and part got into the Capitoll: yet in defence thereof, they had not such disorder; for they did not cloy it with unusual people, they furnished it with all the Corne they could possibly get, that it might endure out the siege: and the greater part of the unprofitable multitude of o'l men, women, and children, fled unto the neighbouring Towns about, the rest staid at *Rome* for a prey to the French. So that whoever should have read of the brave atchievements of that people many years before, and afterwards of these times following them, would have much a do to believe it were the same people. And *T. Livius* having reckon'd up the aforesaid disorders, concludes thus, *Somuch does fortune* Adeo obcecatur animos  
*blind mens eyes, when shee would* fortuna, cum vim suam  
*not have her force withstood.* refringi non vult. Nor  
 can this conclusion be more true. Whereupon men that are alwaies under hard crosses deserve the less blame, as they that enjoy continuall prosperity also merit less prayse; for we shall many times see those led to their destruction, and these advanc'd to an extraordinary greatness by some occasion the heavens have presented in their furtherances hereto, giving means to the one to behave himself vertuously, & quite bereaving the other of them. And we may well say fortune does this, for she makes choyce of a man (when she purposes to bring great matters to pass) of such judgement and spirit, that

knows how to make use of those occasions she presents him. So in like manner, when shee would bring horrible destructions upon any Place, shee there preferres men to that purpose, that they may help to draw on that ruine. And in case there be any that may prevent these mischiefes, shee either brings him to his end, or else deprives him of all abilities to do any good. This we very well know by our Authors discourse, how that fortune for to amplify Rome, and to bring it to that greatness it attain'd to, deem'd it necessary to scourge it, as we shall discourse at large in the beginning of the next book following, but yet would not wholly ruin it. And this appears, in as much as shee banished *Camillus*, but put him not to death: shee made Rome be taken, but not the Capitoll: shee ordein'd that the *Romans* should not think out any thing of ayaile to save Rome, yet for defence of the Capitoll, they wanted of no good advice. To the end Rome should be taken, shee caus'd the greater part of those Soldiers, that were routed at *Allia*, to go to *Veium*. And as for defence of the City of Rome, shee cut off all the waies to order it, so shee prepar'd every thing ready to recover it again, having conducted an invire Roman Army to *Veium*, and *Camillus* to *Ardea*, whereby they might be able to make a strong head under the command of a Caprain never blemished with any disgrace of loss yet, & thoroughly whole in his reputation, for the recovery of his Country. Wee might here produce some modern example to confirm what wee have said: but because I think it unnecessary, being this may well suffice, I shall omit it. I avow therefore this to be very true, as by many histories wee may see it, that men

men may well follow fortune, but not oppose it; they may well weave her webs, but not break them. Wherefore let men never abandon themselves, being they know not what shall become of them in the end, the passages of their fortunes being through crooked and unknown waies; they should ever hope, and so hoping put on still, and never give over in despaire, whatsoever chance or trouble they be safn into.

## CHAP. XXX.

*Republicks and Princes, that really are mighty, seek not by monies to make alliance with others, but by their valour, and repute of their Forces.*

**T**HE Romans were straightly besiegd in the Capitoll, and however they lookt for ayd from Veium, and from Camillus, being forc't by famine. they came to termes of agreement with the French, to redeem themselves for a certain sum of money, upon which agreement, as they were weighing the gold, Camillus, arriv'd with his Army, which fortune brought to pass (saies our Historian) to the end that the Romans should not live Ut Romani auro redempti by gold. Which thing is dempti non viverent not only remarkable in this part, but in the proceſe of this Commonwealths actions, where it is evident, that they never vanquished Towns with moneys, nor ever bought peace by mony, but by prowesse in the warres. Which I think never befell any other Republick; and among other signes by which a man dis-

cerns the power of a State, he is to marke in what manner it lives with the neighbouring States. And when it is so orderd, that they become tributaries thereunto, to keep friendship with it, there is an assured sign, that that State is powerfull. But when the said neighbours, though inferious to it, draw money from thence, there is then a great evidence of the weakness thereof. Read all the *Roman* Stories, and ye shall see how the *Massilians*, the *Ednans*, the *Rhodians*, *Hiero* the *Siracusas*, *Enmenes*, and *Massinissa* Kings joyning upon the confines of the *Roman* Empire, to have friendship with it, concur'd in expences and tribute at all times that need was, seeking after no other requitall thereof, but to be protected by it. Wee shall see the contrary in poor and feeble States; and so beginning at ours of *Florence* in the times past, even when the reputation thereof was at the greatest, there was never a great Lord in *Romania*, that had not some allowance from thence, and besides she gave to those of *Perugia*, and *Castella*, & to all the rest of her neighbours. For had this City been warlick and strong, the contrary would have follow'd; for all those to have been under the protection of it, would have given money, and have sought to buy its friendship, and not to sell their own. Neither have the *Florentines* alone liv'd in this baseness, but the *Venetians*, and the King of *France*, who, though a Prince of great Dominions, lives tributary to the *Swisses*, and the King of *Engl.* The cause whereof is, in that he disarms his subjects, and because that King and those other afore-named had rather enjoy a present profit to rack their people and squeeze them, and avoid rather an imaginary than a real



real danger, than do such expedients as would secure and for ever make their States happy. Which disorder, though some while it may produce quiet, yet in time it proves the cause of want, losses, and unrecoverable ruine. And it would be too long to relate, how many times the *Florentines*, the *Venetians*, and this Kingdome, have redeemed themselves even in the wars, and how many times they have subjected themselves to disgrace, which the *Romans* were only once like to have done. It would be tedious to tell, how many Towns the *Florentines* and *Venetians* have bought, whereof afterwards the inconvenience hath been found, and how that those things that are bought with gold, men know not how to defend with the sword. The *Romans* observed this brave way and manner of living, while they were free; but after they came under their Emperors governments, and that those Emperors grew naught, and lov'd the shade, and could not endure any toyle in the Sun, they began also to redeem themselves, sometimes from the *Parthians*, sometimes from the *Germanes*, and now and then also from some others of their neighbours, which was the beginning of that great Empires ruine. Whereupon arose the like inconvenients from their having disarm'd their people, from whence also proceeds another greater, that the nearer thy enemy comes to thee, the weaker he finds thee, for whosoever lives after that manner we have spoken of above, treats evill those subjects he hath within his dominions, because his men are not so well disciplin'd in the wars, as to keep the enemy from entring into the heart of their Country. Whence it proceeds, that to keep

the enemy off: he allows ſome proviſion of moneys to thoſe Princes or people that border upon his Country. And thereupon, thoſe States make ſome reſiſtance upon the confines only, which when the enemy hath paſſed, they have no kind of remedy left: and they perceive not, that this their manner of proceeding, is quite contrary to all good order: for the heart and the vital parts of a body are to be arm'd, and not the extremities thereof; for it can live without thoſe, but if theſe be hurt it dyes; but theſe States keep the heart diſarm'd, and arme their hands and feet. What this diſorder hath done at *Florence*, hath been and is daily ſeen: for when any Army paſſes the frontiers, and enters near to the heart of the Country, there is no further remedy. We ſaw not long ſince the ſame proof of the *Venetians*; and had not their City been begirt by the waters, we ſhould have ſeen an end of it. We have not ſo often ſeen this tryal in *France*, becauſe it is ſo great a Kingdom, that it hath few enemies mightier than it: nevertheless when the *English* invaded that Country in the year 1513. the whole Country quak'd, and the King himſelf, and every one thought, that one defeat alone would have been ſufficient to loſe him the State. The contrary beſell the *Romans*; for the nearer the enemy approached to *Rome*, the more able he found the City to make reſiſtance. And it was evident, when *Hannibal* came into *Italy*, that after three defeats, and the ſlaughters of ſo many Captains and ſoldiers, they were not only able to ſuſtain the enemy, but to vanquiſh him. All this proceeded from that they had well arm'd the heart, and made ſmall account of the extremities;

tremities; for the foundation of their State was the people of Rome; and the Latins, and the other Townes their allies in Italy, and their Colonies, from whence they drew so many Soldiers, that with them they were able to fight with and keep in awe the whole world. And that this is true, it appears by the question *Hanno* the *Carthaginian* put to *Hannibals* agents, after that great overthrow at *Canna*, who having exceedingly magnified *Hannibals* great acts, were asked by *Hanno*, whether any of the *Romans* were yet come to demand peace, or if any Town of the Latins, or any of their Colonies had yet rebelld against the *Roman*; and they denying the one and the other, *Hanno* reply'd, Then is the warr yet as intire as it was at first. We see therefore by this discourse, and what wee have elsewhere said, what difference there is between the proceedings of Republicks now adayes, and those of the ancients. Wee see also hereupon every day exceeding great losses, and wonderfull great conquests: for where men are but of small valour and resolution, fortune shews much power: and because shee is alwaies various, therefore do Common-wealths and States change often, and will alwaies change, till at length some one stand up, who is so much a lover of antiquitie, as to regulate her, that she take not occasion to shew at every turne of the Sun, how great her power is.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XXXI.

*How dangerous a thing it is, to give credit to men that are banished out of their Country.*

**M**Ethinks it is not out of purpose, to treat among these other discourses, how dangerous a thing it is to trust those that are banished out of their Country; these being matters that every day are practis'd by those that are Rulers of States; especially seeing it may be prov'd by a memorable example out of *T. Livius* in his history, though this thing be out of his purpose quite. When *Alexander* the Great passed into *Asia* with his Army, *Alexander* of *Epirus* his kinsman & unc'e, came with certain troopes into *Italy*, being cald upon by some onrlawd *Lucans*, who put him in hope, that by their means he might become master of that whole Country. Whereupon it came to pass, that he being come into *Italy* upon their word and assurance, was slain by them; their Citizens having promis'd them their return into their Country, if they slew him. Therefore should it be consider'd, how vain their words and promises are, who are banished their Countries; for, in regard of their word, it is to be thought, that whensoever by other means than thine, they can be restord to their Country, they will forsake thee, and cleave to others, notwithstanding all the promises they have made thee. And this is the reason why there is no hold to their word, because so extream is their desire to return to to their native homes, that naturally they beleeve many things that  
are

are false, and some things out of their own cunning they adde; so that between what they think, and what they say they think, they put thee in such hopes, that grounding thereupon, thou art brought to a vain expence, or to undertake somewhat that proves thy destruction. I will satisfie my self with the aforesaid example of *Alexander*, and only this other of *Themistocles* the *Athenian*, who being outlawd, fled to *Darius* in *Asia*, where he promised him so much, when he should invade *Greece*, that *Darius* undertook the enterprize. But *Themistocles* not being able to make good his promises, either for shame or fear of punishment, poisoned himself. And if *Themistocles* a rare man committed this error, what should we think but that they do much more erre, who because of their less vertue will suffer themselves to be more violently drawn by their own passions and desires. And therefore a Prince ought to proceed very slowly in undertakings upon the re'ation of exil'd men; for otherwise he suffers either great shame, or damage by them. And because it seldom comes to pass, that Towns and Countries are taken by strength, or by intelligence that any one hath in them, methinks it is not much out of purpose to treat thereof in the Chapter following, adding thereto by how many waies the *Romans* got them.

C.B.A.P.

## CHAP. XXXII.

*How many waies the Romans used to make themselves masters of townes.*

**T**HE Romans applying themselves all to the war, did evermore make it with all advantage possible, as well for the expence, as for every thing else belonging thereto. From hence it proceeded, that they were alwaies aware of taking of townes by long sieges, thinking it a matter of great charges, and incommodity, that surpasses far the profit their conquest thereof can bring. And for this cause they thought it more for their own advantage, to take a town any way else then by siege. Whereupon in such great and so many wars, we have very few examples of sieges made by them. The waies then whereby they got their townes, were either by conquest or yielding. And this conquest was either by force or open violence, or by force mingled with fraud. Open violence was either by assault, without

*Agred urbem coronâ* bearing the walls, which was to beleagure a town round with an army: for they enviroind it, and combatted it on all parts, and many times it prov'd so luckily to them, that in one assault they took a town, though a very vast one, as when Scipio took new Carthage in Spain. Or when this assault served not, they betook them to break down the walls with their rams, and other their warlike

warlike engines, or else by some mine or vault they made, whereby they enter'd the City, by which way the took the City of Veium; or to make themselves equal in height with those that defended the walls, they made towres of wood, or cast up mountains of earth, which leaped upon the wall on the outside, whereby they might get to the height of it. Against these assaults, they that defended the towns, in the first case in regard of their being besieg'd round, ranne a more sudden hazard, and had more doubtfull remedies: for having need in every place of many defendants, perchance either those that they had, were not so many as could supply every place, or change often to refresh them: or if they could, they were not all of equal courage to make resistance: and in case the skirmish had inclin'd in any part, all had bin lost. Therefore it came to pass (as I said) that this way lit many times on good success. But when it succeeded not at first, they did not much more try that way, because it was dangerous for the army: for the City being able for so long a space to defend it self, the army could not but grow weak, and hardly be able to withstand any sally of the enemies from within, and besides the soldiers disorder'd and wearied themselves hereby, yet notwithstanding for once, and that on the sudden, they assayd that way.) As for the breaking down of the walls, they made resistance as they do now adayes with new reparations, and against their mines, they made countermines, and thereby they oppos'd their enemies either with their armes in hand, or with other engines, & among others this was one, they fill'd divers vessels with feathers, and set fire on them, which being

ing thus kindled they put into the Mine, so that by the smoke and stink thereof, the enemy was hindred of entering therein: And if they assail'd them with towers of wood, they sought to fire them. And for the mounts of earth, they commonly broke open the wall undernea h, whereupon the mount did lean, drawing thence the earth into the town, whereby they without did raise their mount, so that how- ever they brought the earth without, being that they within carried it away, the mount came to no great matter. These waies of assailing cannot be continued long: for they must either rise from the siege, and seek by other means to make an end of the war, as *Scipio* did when being entred into Affricke he assailed *Vtica*, but could not take it, he rose thence with his whole camp, and sought how to over hrow the Carthaginian armies; or else they must turne again to the siege, as they did at *Veium*, *Capua*, *Carthage*, and *Ierusalem*, and other like townes, which they took by siege. As for conquest by force and fraud, as it befel *Pa'epolis*, it chanced that the Romans, by treating with the inhabitants took some towne. But by his assailing the Romans and others, tried many, but prevail'd in few: the reason is, because every small impediment breakes the designe, and impediments easily happen: for either the conspiracie is discover'd before it takes effect; and without much difficulty it is discovered. as well through their infidelity, to whom it is communicated, as by the difficulty to put it in practise, being they are to agree with enemies with whom they cannot parly, but under some other colour. But in case the conspiracy be not disclosed in the



the ordering of it, there arise multitudes of difficulties in putting it in execution: for if either thou comest before the time appointed, or after, all is spoiled, if any false alarme be given, as was that of the geese in the Capitol; if any usual order be broken, every little error, or affright taken, spoiles the designe. Hereunto may be added the darkness of the night which often puts in fear the rather those that undertake such perillous things. And the greater part of those men that are brought upon such enterprises, being unexperienced in the situation, the countrey, and the places, whether they are led, become astonished, disheartened, and confosed upon every small accident shall happen; And every shadow is of force to make them run away. Nor ever was there any more happy in these fraudulent night plots, then *Agathocles*, who was as base and cowardly in any action by day, as he was of worth and spirit in these by night. Which we may well think was rather through some hidden vertue wherewith he was endowed, then because there was naturally required in them the more good luck. Many of these waies are put in practice, few of them come to trial, and very few take effect. Touching the gaining of rownes by yeelding, they yeeld either of good will or by force: this willingness arises either upon some forrain necessity, which compels them to fly unto thy protection, as *Capua* did unto the Romans, or through a desire to be wel governed, being allur'd by the good government that Prince holds among them that have given themselves into his hands: as the *Rodians*, the *Massilians*, and other like cities did, that gave themselves unto the Romans. Touching

surrendring

surrendring up upon force, proceeds either from a long siege, as is formerly said; or from a continual oppression of incursions, pillagings, and other hard usages, which when a city desires to be freed from, she yeelds her self. Of all those said ways the Romans practised this last more then foure hundred and fifty years to weary out their neighbors with routes and incursions, and by gaining credit with them, by gaining credit with them, by means of agreements made, as we have said otherwhere; and upon that way they alwaies grounded, though they tryd all, but in the other they found things either dangerous or unprofitable. For in a siege, there is length of time and expences: in forcible assault, doubt and danger: and in conspiracies, uncertainty. And they saw, that by the defeat of an enemies army, sometimes they got a Kingdom in one day, and to take by siege a town that was obstinate, it cost them many years.

---

### CHAP. XXXIII.

*How the Romans gave the Commanders of their armies free and large Commissions.*

I Think it fit for him (that by reading of *Livies* story wou d make advantage thereof) wel to consider all the waies of the people and Senate of Romes proceedings: and among other things that merite consideration, this is one, to see with what authority they sent forth their Consuls, Dictators, & Commanders of armies, which we see was very great, and the Senate reserved nothing

thing else to themselves, but a power to make new wars, and to confirme peace, but they referred every thing else to the arbitrement and power of the Consul: for when the people and the Senate had once resolved on the war, (as for example sake against the Latines) they left all the rest to the Consuls discretion, who had free power either to fight a battel, or to leave it, and to besiege either this, or any other town else as he pleas'd, Which things by many examples are verified, and especially by that which fell out in an expedition against the Tuscans: for *Fabius* the Consul having overcome them near unto Satrium, and intending with his army to pass the wood Cimina, and go into Tuscany, he did not onely nor advise with the Senate, but gave them no notice at all of it, though he was to make the war in a new countrey full of doubts and dangers: which is witnessed by a resolution of the Senate taken directly against this very course; who having understood of the victory *Fabius* had gotten, and doubting he would venture to pass the said woods into Tuscany, thinking it would be well not to try that war, nor runn that hazzard, sent two Deputies unto *Fabius*, to give him notice, they would not have him pass into Tuscany: who came thither, when he had already past, and gotten the victory, and in lieu of hindring the war, they returned Ambassadors of his conquest and victory gotten. And whosoever considers these termes, will find them discreetly used: for if the Senate would have had the Consull to proceed on forwards in the war, onely as they gave him order, they had made him less circumspect, and

and slower in his actions: for he would have thought, that the glory of the victory had not bin wholly his, but that the Senate had participated with him, by whose counse he had bin governed. Besides this, the Senate then obliged themselves to advise in things they could not have the means to understand. For, notwithstanding that among them there were men exceedingly well experienced in the wars, yet being they were not upon the place, and therefore ignorant of very many particulars, which are needfull for him to know that will advise well, by interposing their Councell, they would have committed many errors. And for this cause they suffered the Consul to do all of himself, and that the glory thereof should be entirely his, the love of which they thought would provoke and encourage him to do well. I have the more willingly marked this place, because I see that the Republiques now adayes, as the Venerian and the Florentine, understand it not so: and if their Commanders, Proveditours, and Commissioners are to plant any battery, they will know it first, and advise thereupon. Which course deserves the same praise the others do, which altogether have brought them into those miseries they now suffer.

THE

# THE THIRD BOOKE.

---

## CHAP. I.

*For the maintenance of a Religion or a Commonwealth long in being, it is necessary oftentimes to reduce them to their first grounds.*



**I**T is most true, that all things in the world have an end of their life; but those things enjoy that course that is generally ordaind them by heaven, which disorder not their body, but govern it in such a regular course, that either it changes not, or if it does, it is for the better, and not for the worse. And because I speak of mixt bodies, such as are Republicques and sects, I say, that those changes are for the health thereof, which bring them back to their first beginnings: and therefore are they the best order'd, and subsist the longest which (by the help of their own orders) may often be renewed, or that by accident without the same orders attain to the said renovation. And it is more clear than the light, that these bodies not being renewed, last not; and the way to renew them is (as is said) to reduce them

them to their first beginnings; for all beginnings of Sects, Commonwealths and Kingdoms, must needs contain some goodness in them, by means whereof they recover their first reputation and increase: for in process of time that goodness growes corrupt, and unless something happen, that reduces it to the just mark, that body must needs be destroyed. And our Doctors of Physick say (speaking of the bodies of men) *die aggregatur ali-* *That a man daily gathers some*  
*quod quandoque evil, which sometimes hath need*  
*t curatione.* *of cure.* This reducing to the

beginning (speaking of Commonwealths) is done either by some outward accident, or by some prudence within. Touching the first, we see it was necessary, that Rome should be taken by the French, if we would have her spring again; and thus springing again, should recover a new life, and a new vertue, and take her self anew to the observance of religion, and justice, which began in her to be much blemish'd, which we may easily gather by the Story of *Livie*, where he shews that in drawing out the army against the French, and in creating the Tribunes with Consular power, they observed not any religious ceremonie: so in like manner, they did not onely not punish the three *Fabii* who against the law of nations had fought against the French, but created them tribunes. And we may well think, that of other good laws also ordained by *Romulus*, and their other sage Princes, they began now to hold less esteem than was reasonable, or necessary to maintain a free government. This forrain blow therefore lit on them, to the end they should anew betake themselves to all the old orders of their City, and to shew that people, that it

was

was not necessary not only to maintain religion and justice, but to esteem well of their good Citizens, & to make more account of their vertue, than of those profits, which they thought they lost or got by their means: Which we see, came directly to pass; for presently after Rome was recovered from the French, they renewed all the rites of their ancient Religion, they punished those *Fabij* who fought against the Law of Nations, and afterwards made such account of *Camillus* his vertue and goodness, that the Senate & all others who laying envy aside, gave the whole government of the Commonwealth into his hands. It is necessary therefore (as I have said) that men, who live together in any order, should often revise themselves, either upon occasion given by outward, or else by inward accidents. And for these last, they must either proceed from a law, which may take a review as it were of the men that are in that body, or else from some good man that may arise among them, who by his example & vertuous actions may work the same effect, which that law or order can. This good then arises in Commonwealths, by the vertue of some man, or the force of some order. And touching this last, those orders that reduc'd the Roman Republick to its own beginning, were the *Tribuns* of the people, the *Censors*, & all those other laws, which were made against the ambition or insolence of men, which orders have need to be quicken'd by the vertue of some one Citizen, that courageously joyntes with them for their execution, mangre the power of those that break them. The executions whereof, before the sacking of Rome by the French, were notable, the death of *Brutus* his sons, the death of those of the *Decemvirate*,  
that

that of *Melius* touching the laying down the price of their corne : after the taking of Rome, was the death of *Manlius Capitolinus*, the death of the son of *Manlius Torquatus*, the execution which *Papirius Cursor* did upon the Commander of his Cavallerie, the accusation of the *Scipios*: which things being they were extraordinary & remarkable, whensoever any of them did chance, caused men more strictly to conforme themselves to the exact rule ; and when these began to fall out seldom, then began they to give men more leisure to grow naughty, and become more dangerous and tumultuous; for from one to another of such like executions, there should not pass more than ten years time; for after such a time men begin again to change their manners and trespass against the lawes: and unless something chance, which anew calls the punishment to memory, and puts them in fear thereof, there meet together so many delinquents, that without danger they cannot be punished. To this purpose, they who govern'd the State of Florence from 1434. to 1494. said it was necessary every fifty year to reforme the State, otherwise it was hard to maintain it; and they call'd reforming of the State, to put that terror and fear in men, which they caus'd in them at the first founding of the lawes, having then severely punish'd those that had offended against their manner of living. But when the memory of that punishment is once extinguished, men again take the boldness to attempt some innovations, and speak ill of the present State : and therefore it is necessary to take order for it by reducing it to the first grounds. Also this bringing back of Republicques to their beginnings, arises sometimes from



from the plain vertue of some one man, without dependance on any law, inciting thee to any execution: yet are they of so great reputation, and of such remarke, that the good men desire to follow them, and the bad are asham'd to live contrarily to them. Those that in Rome particularly worked these good effects, were *Horatius Cocles*, *Scevola*, *Fabritius*, the two *Decii*, *Regulus*, *Attilius*, and some others, who by their rare and worthy examples, in Rome wrought the same effect that good lawes and good orders could. And if the forenamed executions of lawes together with these particulars examples had succeeded every ten years in this Ciry, it had been of necessary consequence that it could never be corrupted: but as the one and the other of these two things began to fall out seldome, the corruptions multiplied: for after *Marcus Regulus* the like example was never more seen. And though in Rome there arose the two *Catoes*, yet such was the distance between him and them, and between them, from th'one to th'other, and they remained so alone, that with their good examples they could effectuate no good thing, and especially the last *Cato*, who finding a great part of the Ciry corrupted, could not prevaile so by his example, as to better his Citizens. And this may suffice for Republicks. But touching Religions, wee see also these reformatiōs are necessary, by example of our Religion: which had it not been reduc'd again to its principles by *Saint Francis*, and *Saint Dominique*, it would have been quite defac'd: for these by their poverty, and their imitation of Christs life, made a new impressiō thereof in mens minds, which was quite blotter'd out thence: and their new rules

R

were

were so powerfull, and now are the cause that the dishonesty of the Prelates, and the heads of the Religion, do nor ruine it, partly by their living in poverty, and partly by the great credit they have in confessing the people, and preaching to them, whereby they give them to understand that it is evill, to speak evil against him that is evill; and that it is good, rather to live in obedience to them; and if they are faulty, to leave them to the chastisement of God. And so they offend the most they can; for they feare not the punishment they see not, and believe not. This reformation then hath and does maintain this Religion. Kingdomes also have need of reforming and restoring their laws to their first beginnings. And wee see how much good this does in the Kingdom of France, Which Kingdom is governed more by its lawes and customes than any other kingdom else. Of which lawes and customes, the Parliaments are the principal maintainers, and especially that of Paris, which restores them again to life, whensoever it makes any execution against a Prince of the Realm, and that they condemn the King in their sentences: and till this present it hath maintained it self, by being an obstinate executioner against that Nobility: but whensoever it should suffer any of their faults to escape unpunished, and they chauce to multiply, without doubt it would come to pass that either they were to be corrected with great disorder, or that Kingdom come to a dissolution. Therefore we conclude that there is nothing more necessary in a politicke government, Sect, Kingdom, or Commonwealth that it be, than to restore it to that reputation which in its first beginning it had, and take a care that  
either

either the customes be good, or the men good, that they may rather work this effect, that it be not left to some forraign force to do it : For (however that sometimes it be an excellent remedy, as it prov'd to Rome ) yet is it so dangerous, that it is in no case to be desir'd: And to make it appear to any man, how much the actions of particular men served to advance Romes greatness, and wrought many good effects in that City, I will come to the narration and discourse of them, within the bounde whereof we will conclude this third Book, and last part of this first decade. And howbeit the Kings actions were great and remarkable, being the History sets them down at large, we shall omit them, nor speak of them otherwise, unless it be touching some thing they did belonging to their private advantage ; and here we will begin with *Brutus*, Father of the Roman liberty.

## CHAP. II.

*It is a very great part of wisdom, sometime to seem a fool.*

**N**O man was ever reputed so sage or wise for any thing that ever he did, as *Junius Brutus* deserves to be accounted for taking upon him the person of a fool ; and though *Titus Livius* expresses no other but one reason to induce him thereto, which was to live in security, and preserve his patrimony ; yet if we consider his manner of proceeding, we may believe, that he thus dissembled, to the end he might be less observed, & have the more

conveniency to suppress the Kings, and free his Country, upon any occasion offered. And that he thought upon this, it appears first in the interpretation he made of *Apollons* Oracle, when he fained to fall down, that he might kiss the ground, deeming thereby that the Gods favour'd his designs; and afterwards when at the occasion where *Lucretia* was slain, among the Father, husband, and other of her kindred, he was the first that drew the knife out of the wound, and made those that were present swear they would never more endure in time to come a King in Rome. From his example are those to learn, that are discontented with any Prince: and first they should measure and weigh their own forces: and if they are so powerfull, that they are able to discover themselves as enemies, and openly make war against him, then ought they plainly go that way, as least dangerous and the more honorable. But if they be of such condition, that they are not able to enter into termes of open hostilitie against him, then ought they to use all industry in seeking to gain his favour; and to this effect enter into him by all those waies that are fit, following him in his sports, and taking pleasure in all those things they see he delights in. This familiarity first causes thee to live secure, and without running any hazard, gives thee means to enjoy that Princes good fortune with him, and layes the way open to thee to satisfie thy own mind. It is true that some say, they would not stand so near the Princes, as to be oppressed with their ruines, nor so far off, but that when their ruine comes, they may be able time enough to rise upon some part of their ruines. Which middle way would be the truest, were

it rightly kept. But because I think it is impossible, it is meet to reduce it to the two waies above mentioned, which is either to be at large from them, or cleave close to them. Hee that does otherwise, if he be a man of eminent qualities, lives in continuall danger. Nor sufficeth it to say, I care not for any thing. I desire neither honors, nor wealth, I will live quietly, and without entring into any factions; for these excuses are heard, but pass not as current. Neither can men of quality chuse this standing quier, however that heartily they make choyce of it and without any ambition, because they are not beleaved in it, in so much as though they themselves would, yet others will not let them live so. They must then play the fool as Brutus did; and he plaies the fool a great deal, that prayes, and prates to them, is present at, and bears a part in those things that are against his own mind; to comply with his Princes delights. And seeing we have spoken of this mans wisdom in recovering of the State, we will now speak of his severity in maintaining it.

---

CHAP. III.

*That it was necessary, for preservation of the new gotten liberty, to put Brutus his sons to death.*

**B**rutus his severity was no less necessary than usefull to maintain Rome in the liberty she had gotten, which was of rare example in all memorials of things happen'd, to see the Father sit on his Tribunal, and not

only condemn his sons to death, but be present and assistant at it. And this is alwaies well known to those that read ancient stories, how that after the change of a State, either from a Republick into a Tyranny, or from a Tyranny into a Republick, some memorable execution upon the enemies of the present condition is needfull. And hee that sets up a Tyranny, and slayes not *Brutus*, and hee that brings in liberty, and slayes not *Brutus* his sons, can hardly subsist. And because formerly wee have discoursed hereof at large, I refer my self to what was then spoken hereof. I shall alledge here only one example which was in our times, and in our Country: that of *Peter Soderini*, who thought with his patience and goodness to overcome that passionate desire which was in the sons of *Brutus*, to return under another government, but deceived himself therein. And albeit hee by his wisdom perceived well this necessity, and that the way and ambition of those that shoud against him, gave him occasion to extinguish them, yet hee never bent his mind to it: for besides his opinion that he was able by patience and goodness to worke out all ill humors, and by liberality towards them, to weare out any enmity was borne against him, hee was of advice (as many times by discourse hee shewed some of his friends) that if hee would strongly incounter the oppositions were made against him, and master his adversaries, he had need take upon him extraordinary authority, whereby he shoud break the civil equality among them. Which thing (however that hee shoud never afterwards act tyrannically) would so much affright the multitude, that they would never

never agree after his death to create a new standard-bearer for life, which dignity he held he to put forward and maintain. This respect was wise and good: yet must we never suffer any evil to continue in regard of a good, being that good may easily be suppress by that evil. And he should helieve, being his actions and his intentions were to bee judged by their end (in case that good fortune and life should have accompanied him.) that he could have assured every one, how that what he had done, was for the safety of his Country, not for his own ambition, whereby he might have been able to regulate things in such a manner, that no successor of his could do that for evil, which hee had done for good. But the first opinion deceived him, not knowing that malice is not abated by time, nor appeased by any good turne. So that because he was ignorant how to imitate Brutus, he lost together with his Country the State, and his own reputation. And as it is a hard thing to save a free State, so is it not easie to preserve a Monarchy, as in the Chapter following it shall be shewed.

## C H A P. IV.

*No Prince lives secure in his Principality, while those are living who were despoild of it.*

**T**he death of *Tarquinius Priscus* caused by the sons of *Ancus*, and the death of *Servius Tullus* caused by *Tarquinius* the proud, shew how hard and dangerous it is, to despoyle any one of his Kingdome, and suffer him to live, though he indeavour by many favours to gaine him. And we see how *Tarquinius*

Q 4

*Priscus.*

*Priscus* was deceived in thinking legally to possess that Kingdom, in that it was given him by the people, and confirm'd by the Senate. Neither did he believe that disdain could so much prevaile with *Anchus* his sons, that they would not be satisfied, with what all *Rome* was contented. And *Servius Tullus* deluded himself, in thinking he could with new obligations gain the good will of *Tarquins* sons. So that touching the first, every Prince may well be advis'd that he cannot live sure of his Principality, while they live who were bereav'd of it. Touching the second, every one that is of power may well remember, that never were old injuries cancell'd with new favours, especially when the new favours are less of value than the wrongs done. And without all doubt *Servius Tullus* was nothing wise to think that *Tarquins* sons would patiently endure to be his sons in law, whose King they thought by right they ought to be. And this desire of reigning is so great, that it not only enters their breasts, that look to succeed in the kingdom, but they also who no waies expect it. As in *Tarquinius* his wife, *Servius* his young daughter, who would wish this rage against that piety shee ought her father, set her husband against him, to take his life from him, and his Kingdom thereby; so much more accounted she to be a Queen, than the daughter of a King. If then *Tarquinius Priscus* and *Servius Tullus* lost the Kingdom for not assuring themselves of those upon whose right they had usurp'd, *Tarquinius* the proud lost it for not observing the ancient Kings Customes, as shall be shew'd in the Chapter following.

CHAP.



## CHAP. V.

*What it is that makes a King lose his Kingdome, which he enjoys by right of Inheritance.*

**T**Arquinius the proud having slain Servius Tullus, and of him no heirs remaining behind, came to possess the Kingdom securely, having no cause to feare those things that had hurt his predecessours. And however his way of getting the Kingdom had been so extraordinary, and odious, yet had he observ'd the ancient customes of the other Kings; he would have been borne with: nor would't the Senate nor the Commonalty have risen against him to wrest the State out of his hands. Hee was not then banished because his son Sextus ravish'd *Lucretia*, but for that he had broken the laws of the kingdome, and ruld tyrannously, having tak'n all authority from the Senate and reserved it wholly to himself, and those affaires, which had been dispatch'd in publick by the Senate of Rome with generall satisfaction, he reduc'd to be treated in his own Palace, which gain'd him both blame and envie: so that in a very short time he despoyl'd Rome of all that liberty which she had alwaies maintained under others. Nor was this enough to make the Senate his enemy, but he provok'd the people also against him, tiring them out in base mechanic services, and such as were far different from that; wherein his ancestors had imploy'd them: so that having replenish'd Rome with examples of his cruelty and pride, he had now dispos'd all the Romans min's to rebellion, whensoever occasion should be offer'd And had not that accident of *Lucretia* fallen

Q. S. out,

out, so soon as any other should have chanc'd, it would have produc'd the same effect: for if *Tarquinius* had liv'd, as the other Kings did; and *Sextus* his son had committed that offence, *Brutus* & *Collatinus* would have had recourse to *Tarquinius*, for revenge against *Sextus*, and not to the people of *Rome*. Therefore let Princes know, that at the same houre they begin to lose the State, when they begin to violate the Laws, & and those manners & customs that are ancient, under which men have liv'd a long time. And in case they come to lose their State, and should ever become so wise as to understand with what facility they maintain their Principallities, who follow good counsell, they themselves would much more lament their loss & blame themselves more than others would: for it is much easier to be belov'd by the good, than by the bad; & to obey the Laws, than command over them. And if they would understand what course they were to take, whereby to put this in practice, and that they are not to undergo greater labour than to view the lives of good Princes, & take them for looking-glasses, such as were *Timoleon* the *Corinthian*, & *Aratus Sicionius*, & such like, in whose lives they shall find security, & satisfaction, as well of him that rules, as of him that is ruled, they would have a desire to become like them, being able for the reasons alledged to do so; for men, when they are well govern'd, seek after no other liberty, as it befell the people that were govern'd by the two were named before, who were constrain'd to be Princes whilst they liv'd, however they tryed many times to retire themselves to a private life. And because in this & the two precedent Chapters, we have discoursed of humors stirr'd up against Princes, and of the conspiracy made

made by Brutus his sons against their Country, & of those against Tarquinus Priscus & Servius Tullius: methinks it is not out of our purpose to speak at large thereof in the following Chapter, being a matter wherof Princes and private men may worthily take notice.

# CHAP. VI.

## Of Conspiracies.

I would not omit to discourse somewhat touching Conspiracies, being they are dangerous for Princes and private men also: for wee see that more Princes have lost their lives thereby, and States too, than by open war: because few are able to make open war against Princes, but every one may conspire against them. On the other side, private men enter not into a more dangerous nor rash enterprise than this: for it is full of difficulties, and exceeding perillous every way; From whence proceeds, that many of them are praesid, but few succeed. To the end therof that Princes may learn to beware of these dangers, and private men be more fearful to thrust themselves into them, or rather learn to content themselves to live under that rule which their fortune hath allotted them, I shall speak thereof more at large, nor omitting any thing remarkable, that may serve for instruction of the one or the other. And truly that of Tacitus is well termed a golden sentence, where he saies, that men are to reverence things past, and submit to what is present, and should wish for good Princes, but whatsoever they are, endure them: and verily he who does otherwise, ruines both himself and his Country. Wee must then (entering into the matter) consider against whom Conspiracies are made;

and

and wee shall find they are plotted against a mans Country, or against his Prince, of which two I intend this present discourse: for touching those that are practis'd to deliver a Town into the enemies hands that besiege it, or that have likelihood with this for any cause, wee have already sufficiently spoken. And wee will treat in this first part, touching that against a Prince: and first we will examine the reasons thereof, which are many, though one there is of more importance than all the rest. And this is general hatred: for that Prince, that hath provok'd general hate, must needs have needd some particulars, somewhat more than others, insomuch that they long to be revengd on him: and they are the more incited hereto, by the general hatred they find conceivd against him. A Prince then ought to avoyd these publick blames, and how he should behave himself to avoid them (having treated otherwise) I will not now meddle: for if he beware well of them, offences against particulars shall be of small force to hurt him: one reason is, because Princes seldom light upon men that are so sensible of an injury as to run such extrem hazard to revenge them; the other is, that though they were of such resolution and force, as might serve to do it, yet would that general good will of men to that Prince withhold them from it. The injuries must be either touching the fortunes, lives, or honors. Of those that are touching mens lives, the threats are more dangerous than the execution, or rather the threats are very dangerous; but in the execution there is no danger at all; for he that is dead cannot think upon revenge; and those that remain alive, most commonly leave to think of him.

him that is dead : but he that is threatned, and sees himself put to a point, either to do or suffer, becomes a very dangerous man to the Prince, as we shall say particularly in due place. The fortunes and honours of a man are those two things which excepting this necessity, touch men more nearly then any other essence, whereof a Prince should be well aware : for he can never strip a man so bare, but that he may find a knife to revenge himself, nor so much dishonour any one, but that he may still hold an obstinate resolution of vengeance. And touching honours, the dishonoring of women is of most importance, and after this the shame and disgrace of their persons. This armed *Pausanias* against *Philip* of Macedonia, and this hath put weapons in many others hands against divers Princes. And in our dayes *Julius Belanti* had no other motive to conspire against *Pandulphus* the tyrant of *Siena*, but onely for that he had given him one of his daughters to wife and afterwards taken her away from him, as in its place we shall relate. The greatest cause the *Pazzi* had to conspire against the *Medici*, was, the inheritance of *John Bonrosnei*, whereof they were dispossess'd by their order. And another cause, and a very great one too, why men plot treachery against a Prince, is a desire which they have to free their countrey, which hath bin seisd on by him. This mov'd *Brutus* and *Cassius* against *Caesar*. This incited many others against *Falaris*, *Dionysius*, and such other usurpers of their Countries. Nor can any Tyrant free himself from the danger of his humor by other means then by laying down his Tyranny. And because we find none will doe this, there are but few of them.

them that come not to ill ends; Which gave Iu-  
venal occasion to say;

Ad generum Cereris sine  
crude & sanguine patet  
Descendunt Reges & sic  
ca morre Tyranni.

Few Tyrants unto Platoes

Court do goe,

But that are thither sent by  
bloody blow.

The dangers that (as I said before) accom-  
pany conspiracies, are great, and continual:  
for in such cases there is danger in plotting  
them, in executing them, and after they are  
executed too. Those that conspire, are either  
one or more; that of one cannot be termed a  
conspiracy, but a settled resolution bred in a man  
to slay a Prince. This alone of all the three  
dangers, which conspiracies hazard, is free  
from the first. For before the putting it in ex-  
ecution, it carries no hazard with it, being  
none is made privy to his secret, nor is there  
any danger, that his purpose come to the  
Princes eare. A resolution after this sort may  
happen to be found in any man of any condi-  
tion, little or great, Noble or ignoble, famili-  
ar or not familiar with the Prince: for at some  
times it is permitted to any man to speak with  
him and; he that comes to speak with him may  
vent this passion of his minde. *Pausanias*, of  
whom we have otherwise spoken, slew *Philip* of  
*Macedon*, as he was going to the Tem-  
ple environ'd with a thousand armed men, and  
between his own son and son in law; but he  
was one of the Nobles, and well known to the  
Prince. A poore and abject Spaniard  
strook *Ferdinand* King of Spain with a knife  
in the neck; however the wound was not mor-  
tal, yet hereby it appeared, that he had both  
courage and opportunity to do it. A Turkish  
Priest nam'd *Dervie*, drew a semitrarre against

*Bajazet*:

*Basajet*, father of this present Turk, but hit him not, yet wanted he neither courage nor commodity for his purpose. Of this sort of resolutions thus bent, I think there are many, that would do it: for in willing this, there is neither punishment, nor danger at all, but few venture to act it; and of those that do, exceeding few or none there are, that are not slain in the act. Therefore no man willingly will thrust himself upon a certaine death. But let us leave these single resolutions, and come to consider the conspiracies have bin made by great men, or those that are very familiar with the Prince: for others (unless they be stark mad) will never offer to conspire: for mean men, and not familiar with the Prince, want all those conveniencies, which are required in the executing of a conspiracy. First, mean men cannot find those that will be true to them: for no one man can apply himself to their wills, for any of those hopes which cause men to adventure upon desperate dangers, so that when they have enlarged themselves to two or three persons, some one of them becomes an accuser, and ruines all. But in case they should be so happy, that none should discover their plots, yet in the execution are they be't with such difficulties (having not free access unto the Prince) that it is impossible, but that therein they must perish: for if great men, who ordinarily come near him, are oppress'd with such difficulties, which we shall presently mention, it must needs be that with those these difficulties must perpetually increase. Therefore men (because where there is losse both of life

and

and fortunes they are not stark mad) when they find themselves weak, are well aware of what they do : and when they are very weary of a Prince, they are contented onely to curse him, and expect, while those that are of higher quality then themselves, do avenge them. And yet in case that any of such like as these should have assailed any thing, the design they had might well be laudable, but not their wisdom. We see therefore, that those that have conspired, were all great men, or familiar with the Prince : Whereof many have conspired, as well being moved by too many favors, as by too many injuries. As *Perennius* was against *Commodus*, *Plantianus* against *Severus*, *Sejanus* against *Tiberius*. All these were by their Emperors so enriched with wealth, and dignified with titles and honours, that it seemed there wanted not any thing to perfect their power but the Empire it self, which they meaning not to fail of, betook themselves to conspire against their Prince, and their treasons all had that end, which their ingratitude well deserved. However that among those of this sort in these latter times that of *Jacob Apianus* against *Petrus Gambacorti* Prince of *Vila* succeeded fortunately, which *Jacobus* having had his education and breeding and credit too from him, afterwards took the state from him. Of this sort was that of *Coppola* in our dayes against *Ferdinand* King of *Aragon*, which *Coppola* having attained to that greatness, that he thought he wanted nothing but the Kingdom, meaning not to go without, lost his life. And indeed if any conspiracie against Princes made by great men be ever like to take effect, this was very probable, being made by one that might



might have been termed a King for his power and conveniencies he had to work his will. But that greedy ambition which blinds them in their desire to rule, blinds them as well in the manning of this enterprise: for if they know how to act this villany with discretion, it were impossible but it should succeed. A Prince then that would be well wary of conspiracies, should be more jealous of those to whom he hath afforded most favours, then of those to whom he hath done most wrongs: for these want the means, and those have them at pleasure, and the will is a like; for the desire of rule is as great or greater then that of revenge. Wherefore they are to confer but so much authority upon their favourites, that still between it and the Principality they keep a distance, and leave (as it were) some obstacle in their way, otherwise seldome falls it out but that it chanceth to them, as to the fore-mentioned Princes. But let us return to our order. I say, that being they are to be great men that plot these treasons, and have easie access unto the Prince, we are to discourse upon the successes of these their undertakings, what they have been, and point at the reason that hath caus'd them to prove happy or unhappy. And (as I formerly said) at three severall times, herein are dangers found. In the plotting, in the acting, and after. Therefore are there very few that prove lucky: for it is almost impossible to pass all these happily. And beginning to treat touching the dangers of the first, that are of most importance, I say, there had need be much circumspection and advisement, which likewise had need be seconded by good fortune, that in the contriving

riving and ordering of a conspiracy, it be  
 not disclosed; for that is done either by rela-  
 tion, or by conjecture. This relation proceeds  
 from the small faith; or small discretion of  
 those men with whom thou communicatest  
 thy secret. And it is a thing ordinary to find  
 but small faith; for thou canst not communi-  
 cate it but to thy confidants, who for love of  
 thee may adventure death, or to men that are  
 discontented with the Prince. Of confidants,  
 possible it is that one or two may be found;  
 but when thou openest thy self to more, it is  
 impossible thou shouldst find them. Besides  
 the good will they beare thee, had need be ve-  
 ry great, to the end they be not affrighted at  
 the punishment and perill they incur. More-  
 over men are often deceived touching the love,  
 which thou believest another beares thee, nor  
 canst thou ever assure thy self of it, unless thou  
 hast had experience thereof; and to make  
 proof of it herein is exceeding dangerous; and  
 though thou hast had proof thereof in some  
 other dangerous exploit, where they have  
 stuck close upon thee, yet canst thou not from  
 thence measure them for this, being this dan-  
 ger surpasses all others. If thou measurest their  
 faith by their discontent against their Prince,  
 therein thou mayest easily deceive thy self. For  
 so soon as thou hast revealed thy mind to that  
 malecontent, thou givest him a subject where-  
 upon to work again his own content; and ei-  
 ther his hatred had need be great, or thy power  
 with him of much force to keep him faithful.  
 Hereupon it arises, that very many of them are  
 discover'd & crush'd even in the egge; and when  
 one of them among many men hath bin kept se-  
 cret any time, it hath bin thought of as a miracle

as was that of *Piso* against *Nero*, & in our daies that of *Laurence* and *Julian* of *Medici*, whereunto above fifty persons were made privy, who met together all to discover themselves in the execution thereof. As for the discovery for want of discretion, that falls out when a conspirator is not wary in his talk, so that a servant or another third person comes take notice thereof, as it befell *Bythin* his sonnes, who in contriving the business with *Tarquins* Ambassadors, were understood by a slave who accused them: or else through a certain lightness of thine own, thou communicatest it to a woman, or a child which thou lovest, or some such slight person, as *Dimus* did, one of those that conspir'd with *Philotas* against *Alexander* the Great, who told the treason to *Nicomachus*, a child which he lov'd, who presently told it to *Cibalinus* his brother, and *Cibalinus* to the King. Touching discovery by conjecture, we have an example for it, where *Piso* conspired against *Nero*, at which time *Seevinus* one of the conspirators, the day before that he was to slay *Nero*, made his will, and gave order that *Milichinus* his freedman should cause his old and rusty dagger to be scoured; he made all his slaves free, and gave them money; he appointed many clouts to bind up wounds to be prepared; by which conjectures *Milichinus* being assured of the business, accused him before *Nero*. *Seevinus* was taken, and with him *Natasis* one of the Conspirators, who had bin seen the day before to talk a good while and privately in his company, who not agreeing concerning the discourse they held, were forc'd to confess the truth. So that the treason was bewraied, and the conspirators utterly ruin'd.

From

From these occasions of discovery it is impossible to beware, but that through malice, indiscretion, or fondness all comes to light, whensoever the complotters thereof pass the number of three or four; and in case that more then one of them chance to be taken, it is impossible but that it must be so; for two cannot be so well agreed of all their discourses together, but that in some things they shall jarre. When one alone that is resolute, is laid hold on, he may through the strength of his courage, be able to conceal the rest of his complices: but then must his consors shew no less resolution than he, in standing firm and not discovering themselves by flight: for on which side soever courage failes, either on his that is taken, or his that is at liberty, the conspiracy is disclosed. And the example alleadgd by T. Livius, is very rare in the treason that was plotted against *Ierolamus* King of *Siracusa*, where *Theodorus* one of the conspirators being taken, with a stout courage conceald all his companions, and accused the Kings friends; and on the other part, all the confederates were confident of *Theodorus* his resolution, that not one of them forsook *Siracusa*, or made any shew of fear. Wherefore all these dangers are to be passed in the ordering of a conspiracy, before the acting of it. Against which these are the remedies. The first and truest whereof, or better to term it, the only one is, not to give leisure to our complices to accuse us, nor communicate the matter unto them, till just when thou meanest to put it in execution, and not before. They who have thus done, assuredly escape the dangers belonging to the practise thereof; and oftentimes the others also, or rather have they all had good

success.

success: and I think every one that is wise should endeavor to carry the matter thus. I will content my self to produce only two examples. *Nelemtus* not being able to indure the tyranny of *Aristotimus*, Tyrant of *Epirus*, assembled together in his house many of his friends and kinsfolke, and having encourag'd them to set their Country at liberty, some of them requir'd time to be advised and prepared: whereupon *Nelemtus* cauld his servants to shut the doors, and told those he had cald together, That they should either swear presently to do this, or if not, he would deliver them all prisoners to *Aristotimus*: whereby all of them, being mov'd, swore, and so without more delay, went and put in execution what *Nelemtus* had orderd. One of the *Magi* having by treachery seisd upon the kingdom of *Persia*, *Orsbanus* a great man had notice thereof, and found out the deceit, and thereupon conferr'd with six other Princes of that State, saying, he was now underraking to vindicate the Kingdom from the Tyranny of that Magician; and when some of them demanded time, *Darius* rose up (one of the six that was cald by *Orsbanus*) and said, Either wee will all now go and execute this, or else I will go and accuse you all: so rising all by consent, and not giving any one time to repent himself, they happily effected what they desir'd. Like unto these two examples also, is the course the *Aetolians* took to put *Nabis* the Spartan Tyrant to death, who sent *Alessamenes* a Citizen of theirs with 300 horse and 1000 foot to *Nabis*, under colour of giving him ayd: the secret they communicated to *Alessamenes* only; the others that were with him they charged to obey him in whatsoever matter it were

were, under pain of banishment. This man went into Sparta, never communicating his Commission to any, till just he was to put it in execution; whereupon it fell out that he slew him. They then by these means escap'd the dangers that accompany the plotting and ordering of Conspiracies; and whoever shall do as they did, shall alwaies be sure to escape them: And that every one also is able so to do, I will shew by the example of *Piso* alleged before. *Piso* was a very great man, and of much esteem, and very familiar with *Nero*, on whom we much rely'd: And *Nero* went oftentimes to banquet with him in his gardens: *Piso* therefore might have procur'd himself friends of spirit and courage, and willing too to put such a thing in execution, being a matter easie for any great man to compass; and when he had had *Nero* in his gardens, then communicated the business to them, and with fit words perswaded them to it, so that they could not have had time to refuse, and impossible had it bin, but that it must have taken effect. And if we shall examine all the others we have mentioned, we shall find very few could have bin otherwise carried. But men that ordinarily do not well weigh the actions of the world, often commit very great errors, and the greater in those actions, that have something of extraordinary in them, as this. The matter then is never to be communicated, but upon necessity, or even at the very acting of it, and yet if thou wilt communicate it, let that be but unto one of whom thou hast had long experience, or that therein is interested upon the same reasons thou art. It is easier to find one man of that condition than many, and thereby also is less danger.

Moreover,

Moreover, when he should deceive thee, there were some means left yet to defend thee, which could not be where the conspirators are many: for it is the saying of a wise man, that with one alone a man may speak any thing for one man's sake, is as good as another mans No, provided that nothing be given by thee under thine own hand-writing. And of writing any thing a man should be as wary as of a perilous rock; for nothing convicts thee sooner than thine own hand. *Plautianus* having a mind to kill *Severus* the Emperor, *Antonius* his son, committed the execution of it to *Saurinus* a Tribune: who purposing to accuse and not obey him, yet doubting when he should come to the tryal, *Plautianus* would be beleey'd before him, asked him a note under his hand, that might give him assurance of his Commission; which *Plautianus*, blinded with ambition, gave him, whereupon it follow'd, that he was accus'd and convicted by the Tribune, without which, and certain other tokens, *Plautianus* had carried it clear against him, so boldly he deny'd it. Therefore when one only accuses, there may be some remedy, especially in case thou beest not convicted by any writing of thine, or countermark, whereof a man should be well aware. In *Piso's* conspiracie there was a woman called *Epicaris*, which formerly had bin one of *Nero's* Mistresses, who thinking it would serve well to purpose to joyn with the conspirators, one that was a Captain of some galleys, which *Nero* kept for his safeguard, opened to him the conspiracie, but not who were the conspirators, whereupon that Captain contrary to his word given, accus'd her before *Nero*; but such was her boldness in denying it, that *Nero* was astonish'd thereat, & demanded

demned her not. There are then in communicating the matter to one alone two dangers; the one that the party go not voluntarily to accuse thee, alledging some proof against thee; the other that he detect thee not constrained and forc't thereunto by torture, having been apprehended upon some conjecture or suspicion had of him: but in either of these two dangers there is some remedy, being that in the one it may be deny'd, by saying the party did it out of hatred he bore thee; and in the other, by alledging that the extremity of torture compell'd him to utter any thing, though false. It is wisdom then to make no man privy to such a secret, but rather to order it conformably to the above alledged examples; or in case thou revealst it, not to exceed one, where though there be somewhat more danger, yet is there much less than when it is discoverd to divers. Near unto this course is, when a necessity constrains thee to do that to the Prince, which thou seest he would do unto thee, which necessity is so excessive, that it gives thee leisure only to provide for thy security. This necessity brings the business ordinarily to a good end; and to prove it, two examples shall suffice mee. *Commodus* the Emperor did use *Letus* and *Eletus*, Captains of his guard, among his familiar and principal friends, and *Martia* among his chief Concubines, and Mistresses: but because sometime he had been reprehended by them for some things done, whereby he had disgrac'd his person and the Empire, he resolv'd to put them to death, and writ in a list the names of *Martia*, *Letus*, and *Eletus*, and some others, who the night following he meant should die, and so put that list under his pillow; and when he



he went to rise, a little boy which he lov'd, playing about his chamber and his bed, found that list, and going out with it in his hand met with *Martin*, who took it from him, and read it, and having seen the contents thereof, sent for *Lettus* and *Eletsus*, whereupon they three knowing the danger they were in, resolv'd to prevent it, and so without longer delay the night following slew *Commodus*. *Antoninus* a *racalla* the Emperor was in *Mesopotamia* with his Armies, whereof *Macrinus* was chief Commander, a man more politick than warlike; and as it comes to pass, Princes that are not good, are alwaies fearful, least others work against them, what they are guilty to themselves they well deserve; *Antoninus* writ to *Maternianus* his friend at *Rome*, that he should inquire of the Astrologers if any one aspired to the Empire, and should advise him of it. Whereupon *Maternianus* writ back unto him, *Macrinus* was he that aspired therto; but the Letter coming first to *Macrinus* his hand, before the Emperors, and he thereby perceiving the necessity impos'd upon him, agreed with *Martialis* a Centurion, one of his confidants (whose brother a few daies before *Antoninus* had slain) that he should kill him, which was luckily done by him. It is evident then, that this necessity which gives no leisure, works even the same effect which that course did, I formerly said, *Nelematus* of *Epirus* took. We see also that provid which I spoke of in the beginning of this discourse, that Princes threats more mischiefes on them, and occasion more desperate conspiracies, than the wrongs they do; whereof a Prince ought to take good heed: for men are either to be well treated

red by them, or at least to be put out of doubt of them, that they be not reduced to such terms, as to think they must of force either kill or be kild: Touching the dangers that are incurred upon the execution, they arise either from changing the order given, or from want of courage in the actor, or from some error the actor commits for want of judgement, or from the fayle of fully perfecting the matter in hand by leaving some of those surviving who were appointed for death. I think therefore that nothing so much disturbs or hinders mens actions, as at an instant without respite of time, to be compeld to alter an order once given, or divert the course of it a different way from that it was first intended. And if this variation causes disorder in any thing, it is in the actions of warr, and such like matters, whereof we now speak: for in such occasions, there is nothing so necessary for men to do, as to resolve with themselves to execute fully all that is look'd for at their hands. And if men have a good while beat their minds to one course or order, and that chance suddenly to bealterd, it must needs breed some disturbance to them all, and ruine the whole design, so that it is much better for them to execute any thing according to the order first given (however that some inconvenience ensue thereupon) then, by desiring to cancell that, to enter into a thousand inconveniences. This happens when they have not time to put themselves in order again: for when a man hath leisure, he may go his own way he likes best. The Conspiracy of the *Pazzi* against *Laurence* and *Julian* of the house of *Medici*, is well known: the order given amongst them was this, that they should invite the  
Car-

Cardinal of Saint George to dinner, and there-  
 at kill them they intended; where they had  
 their appointments who were to slay these, as  
 those also that were to seize on the Palace, and  
 they that were to run about the streets, and  
 call the people together to lay hold of their  
 liberty. It so fell out, that the *Pazzi* and the  
*Medici* together with the Cardinal being in the  
 Cathedral Church of *Florence* at Masse, no-  
 tice was given that *Julian* would not dine there  
 that day, which caused the Conspirators to  
 consult together, and what they were to have  
 done in the house to those of *Medici*, they re-  
 solv'd to do in the Church, which gave distur-  
 bance to the whole order: for *John Baptista de*  
*Monte sacro*, would not be guilty of murder  
 committed in the Church, insomuch as they  
 were forc't to change the actors in every part,  
 who having not time to settle & confirm their  
 resolutions, committed such errors, that in the  
 very execution thereof they were all ruin'd.  
 Courage sayles him that is to execute any  
 thing, either through reverence of the person  
 he is to do the mischief upon, or through the  
 executioners own innate cowardice. Such is the  
 Majesty and reverence which the presence of a  
 Prince carries along with it, that it is an ordi-  
 nary thing for it, either to mitigate or to affright  
 an executioner. A Slave was sent to *Marius*,  
 when he was taken prisoner by the Minturveses,  
 to kill him, who amaz'd at the presence of  
 the man, and at the remembrance of his name  
 prov'd so cowardly, that he lost all power to slay  
 him. And if there be such power in the person  
 of a man that is bound, and in prison, and in a  
 manner cheak'd up with ill fortune, how  
 much more may we think there is in a Prince

that is at liberty attir'd in the Majesty of his ornaments of state, and environ'd with his trayne, insomuch that the pompe thereof is of force to affright, or else with the least courtesie he shall receive thee, to humble thee again before him. There were some conspir'd against *Siralees* King of *Thrace*, and they appointed amongst them a day for the execution, and met at the place agreed on where the Prince was, but none of them once mov'd to hurt him, so that they parted all thence without attempting any thing; and without knowing what it was that hinder'd them, but blaming one another for the fayle: into such errors they often fall afterwards, in so much as the treason was discover'd, and they suffer'd punishment for that evill, which they could, but durst not act. Against *Alfonsus* Duke of *Ferrara*, two of his own brothers conspir'd together, and us'd the helpe of one *Giannes* a Priest & Musician belonging to that Duke who many times at their intreat brought the Duke amongst them, so that it was in their power to kill him; yet never was any of them so hardy as to do it, whereupon at length being discover'd they suffered for their wickedness, and want of wit. This negligence could not proceed from elsewhere then from that of necessity the Princes presence did affright them, or that some courtesie he shew'd them humbled them. In such executions an inconvenient or error many times arises, either for lack of discretion or courage: for when the one or other of these two once amazes thee, thou art borne forward in such confusion of thy understanding, that it makes thee both say and do what thou oughtst not. And that men are thus astonished and confounded, *Livie* does

very

very well shew it, where he sets forth *Alexander* the *Etolian*, as he went about to kill *Nabis* the *Spartan*, whereof we spake formerly, that when hee came to the execution, and discovered to those that were with him, what he was to do, *T. Livius* saies these words: He gathers together his wits to him, which *Colligit & ipse* the consideration of so weighty a matter *animum con-* had somewhat disorderd. For it is im- *sum tanta cogita-* possible, that any man (though of a *tionem rel.* resolute courage, & accustomed to the slaughters of men, and use of his weapons) should not be quite astonish'd. Therefore choice is to be made of men experienced in such matters, nor should one commit them to any other, however he be esteem'd very couragious: for let no man that hath not formerly made tryall of himself, presume too much upon his courage in the performance of any great exploit. This amazement then may either cause thee to let thy weapons fall out of thy hands, or such words from thy mouth, as may work the same effect. *Lucius Commodus* his sister had so order'd it, that *Quintianus* should kill him. And he awaited *Commodus* in the passage into the Theater, where with a naked poinard coming up to him, he cryed out, This the Senate sends thee, which words caus'd him to be first laid hold on, before hee could bring down his arme to strike him. *M. Antonius* of *Volterra* appointed (as wee said before) to kill *Laurence of Medici*, as hee came near him, said, Ah Traitor! which saying of his occasioned the safety of *Laurence*, and the wrack of that Conspiracy. Such a matter may be fully perfected, when it is practised only against one head, for the reasons alledged: but

very hardly can it well be accomplished against two principals, or rather impossibly: for it is impossible that one and the like action should succeed at the same instant in several places: for it cannot be, but whither a man will or no, the one shall ruine the other, being done at several times. So that if it be a thing very hazardous and full of danger and small advisedness to practise against the person of one Prince alone; certainly to conspire against two, is wholly vain and to no purpose. And were it not for the reverence I bear to the Historian, I would never beleve, that were possible, which *Herodian* says of *Plantianus*, that he gave the charge to *Saturninus* the Centurion to kill *Severus* and *Antoninus* abiding in severall place; for it differs so much from reason, that nothing else but this authority would make me credit it. Certain young men of *Athens* conspir'd together against *Diocles* and *Hippias* Tyrants of that City and slew *Diocles*, but *Hippias* that remaind, revenged it. *Chionis* and *Leonides*, *Heracians*, that were *Platoes* Disciples, conspir'd against *Clearchus* and *Satirus* that were Tyrants; they slew *Clearchus*, and *Satirus* that was left alive punished the fact. And the *Pazzi*, several times alledged by us, had not the fortune to kill but *Julian* alone. Insomuch as every one should be so wise as forbear to conspire against several principals: for he neither advantageth himself, nor his Country, nor any body else; but rather they that are left behind, become more intolerable and fiercer, as *Florence*, *Athens*, and *Heraclea*, which I spoke of before, know well. It is true, that the conspiracy which *Pelopidas* practised to free *Thebes* his native Country, had all manner

manner of difficulties, yet it succeeded luckily: for *Pelopidas* conspired not only against two Tyrants, but against ten: and not only was he not a confidant of any of theirs, and so had no easie access unto any of those Tyrants, but he was a rebell: yet for all this came he into *Thebes*, slew the Tyrants and set the Country at liberty. Nevertheless he affected all this with the assistance of one *Carion* a Counsellor belonging to those Tyrants, by whose means he had easie access to execute his purpose. Yet let none take example from him: for it was an enterprise almost impossible, and a miracle: it was that it succeeded; and so it was, and is now esteemed by those writers that celebrate the memory thereof, as a matter of great rarity, and without patterne. Such an execution may be hindered by a false imagination, or upon some sudden accident, that arises just upon the fact. On the morning that *Brutus* and the other Conspirators purposed to kill *Caesar*, it fell out so that he talked a good while with *Cn. Popilius Lenax*, one of the Conspirators, whereupon the others seeing this long discourse, they were in fear least the said *Popilius* had revealed the Conspiracy to *Caesar*, and they were about to attempt to slay *Caesar* there, & not expect till he came into the Senate, had it not been that when the discourse ended, they saw that *Caesar* made not any extraordinary motion thereat, and so they settled themselves anew. These false conceits are to be consider'd, and weigh'd with discretion, & the rather, because they are easy to be taken; for he that hath a guilty conscience, easily beleeves that others talk of him a word may be heard spoken to another purpose,

pose, that may much trouble thy mind, and make thee believe it touches the matter thou hast in hand, and cause thee by thy flight to discover thine own Conspiracy, or put the action into disorder by hastening it faster than its time. And this comes to pass the more easily, where Many are made privy to the Conspiracy. Touching the accidents (because they fall out unexpected) they cannot be shewed but by examples; and make men wary, according to their rule. *Julius Belanti* of *Siena* (of whom I have former'y made mention) for the hatred which he bore to *Pandulphus* that had taken his daughter from him, whom he had first given him to wife, resolv'd to kill him, and chose this time. *Pandulphus* went almost every day to visit a kinsman of his that was sick, and in going thither passed by *Julius* his house. Who perceiving this, provided so, that his Conspirators were altogether ready in his house to kill *Pandulphus*, as hee should pass and having plac'd them all arm'd in the entry, he had one stood in a window, that as *Pandulphus* should pass, when he came near to the entry, should make a sign. It chanc'd that *Pandulphus* coming, & the other having given the sign, he met a friend that stopt him, and some of those that were with him passed forward before him, and hearing the noise of armes, they discoverd the ambush laid, so that *Pandulphus* escap'd, and *Julius* with his confederates were constrain'd to fly from *Siena*. The chance of that meeting hindred the success of that action, & ruin'd quite *Julius* his enterprize. For which accidents (because they are very rare) we cannot find any remedy, it is very necessary to examin well those that may chance, and help them



Thomas we can. It remaines now only that  
 we discourse of the dangers which they run  
 after the execution done, which are all but  
 one, and this it is, when any one is left alive to  
 revenge the dead Prince. There may then his  
 brothers or his sons be left, or other of his al-  
 lies to whom the Principality may belong, &  
 may be left alive by thy negligence, or upon  
 some occasions (formerly spoken of) that may  
 execute this revange, as it befell *John Andreat*  
 of *Lampognabo*, who together with his Com-  
 plotters having slain the Duke of *Milan*, and  
 there being left alive one son of his and two  
 brothers, they were ready at hand time enough  
 to revenge his death. And truly in this case  
 these conspirators are excusable: because they  
 have here no remedy: but when any of them  
 survives, for lack of good advisement, or  
 through their negligence, then indeed there is  
 no excuse to be made for them. Some conspira-  
 tors at *Forly* slew Count *Ierosimus* their Lord;  
 took prisoners his wife and sons, which were  
 but little ones; and thinking they could have  
 no security, unless they became masters of the  
 fortress, which the governour was not willing  
 to give into their hands; whereupon the Lady  
*Katherine* (for so the Countess was called) *of*  
 promised the Traitors, that if they would let  
 her enter therein, she would cause it to be de-  
 livered up to them, and that they should keep  
 her sons for pledges. They upon her word  
 thus given, suffered her to enter in, who so  
 soon as shee was within the walls, reproached  
 them with the murder of her husband, and  
 threatened them with all manner of revange; &  
 so let them know shee had no regard of her  
 children, she shewed them her privy parts, say-

ing she had the means left her to bring forth others, so that they not knowing what to do, and too late perceiving their own error, suffered perpetual exile in punishment of their lack of wit. But of all dangers that can befall after the execution, there is none more certain, nor more terrible, then when the people is a friend to that Prince thou hast slain: for against this the conspirators can have no remedy: for they can never secure themselves. We have *Cesar* for example hereof, who because he had the people of Rome to friend, was by their means revenged: for when they had chased the conspirators from Rome they caused all of them in several places to be slain. Treasons that are practised against ones own Countrey, are less dangerous for those that work them, then those that are practised against Princes: for in the ordering of them the dangers are less then in the others, and in executing of them they are the same, and after the execution there is none at all. In the plotting and working them the dangers are not many: for a Citizen may frame himself so, as to be capable of power, without manifesting his mind therein or intention to any one; and unless those his purposes receive some interruption, he may happily proceed in his design: but if any law made, chance to cross them, he must stay his time, and seek some other course. This is to be understood of a Republique wherein corruption is entred in some part; for in one not corrupted (no evil beginning taking any place there) these thoughts cannot enter into the heart of any citizen. The Citizens then may by several means and many waies aspire unto the Principality, where they run no hazard of being

being oppress'd, as well because Republicques are more slow then a Prince, and stand less in doubt, & therefore are less wary, as also because they carry more respect towards their principal citizens, and therefore are they the more audacious and more insolent to practise against them. Few there are but have read *Catalines* conspiracy written by *Salust*, & know how that afterwards when it was discovered, *Cataline* did not only abide in *Rome*, but came into the Senate-house, & spoke in villanous termes against the Senate and the Consuls; so great was the respect that the City bore to her Citizens, so that when he was departed from *Rome*, and had his Armies already on foot, *Leutius* nor those others had never been layd hold on, had not there been letters of his own hand brought against him, which manifestly accused him. *Hanno* the most potent Citizen in *Carthage*, aspiring to a Tyranny, had provided at the marriage of one of his own daughters to poison all the Senate, and afterwards make himself Prince. When this matter was known, the Senate took no other order then to make a law which limited the excess of expences at banquets and weddings; such was the respect they bore to men of their qualities. It is very true that in the executing of a treason against ones native Country, there is more difficulty, and greater dangers; for very seldome is it, that thy own forces suffice, being to conspire against so many; for every one hath not an Army at his command, as *Cesar*, *Agathocles*, or *Clomenes*, and such like, who at one pluck have been able to seise on the Country: for unto such the way is easie and safe enough. But others that have  
not

not such advantages of forces, must do it either with some slight or artifice, or by the aide of forraine forces. As for slights and tricks, *Pisistratus* the *Athenian* having overcome the *Megarenses*, and thereby got credit with the people, one morning came out among them wounded, saying, The nobility through envy had thus wrong'd him, and ask'd leave of them for his defence to have a guard of arm'd men about him. By this power he easily attain'd to such greatness, that he brought *Athens* under his Tyranny. *Pandulfus Petrucci* return'd himself with others that were out-law'd into *Siena*, & there he had the charge given him over the common guard of Justice, as a Mecanick office, and which others refus'd, yet in time those arm'd men gave him such reputation, that shortly after he became Lord of the Town. Many others have used other endeavors, and other waies, and in a short space, and without danger have attained to the same. Those that by their own force, or by help of forrain forces have conspir'd to make themselves Lords over their native Countries, Have had several successes, as fortune hath befriended them or otherwise. *Cataline* we spoke of before, was ruined thereby. *Hanno* ( of whom we formerly made mention ) when the poison took not effect, armed many thousands of his partisans, who with himself were all slain. Some of the prime Citizens of *Thebes*, to the end they might become Lords of the Town, called to their aid a *Spartan* army, and so took upon them the rule of that City. So that when we shall have examined all the conspiracies made against a Country, we shall not find any, at least very few, that in the plotting there-  
of.

of have been suppressed, but all of them either have taken effect, or bin ruined in the execution rather. When they are once acted, they carry not with them any further dangers, then the nature of a Principality hath in it self: for when a man hath once gotten to be a Tyrant, he hath his own proper and ordinary dangers belonging to him, against which there are no other remedies then those we have formerly touch'd. This is that which I had to write touching conspiracies; and if I have discours'd of those onely that are executed with the sword, and not done by poison, it is because they have all the same rule. It is true, that those done with poison, are the more dangerous, because they are more uncertain, for that a man cannot administer by every one, and he must needs reveal it to him that he makes his instrument; and from this necessity of revealing it, arises thy danger: moreover upon many accidents a draught of poison cannot prove deadly, as it befell those that slew *Commodus*, for he having vomited up the poison which they gave him, they were forced to strangle him, before they could make him dye. Whereupon I judge that Princes have not a greater enemy then treason; because when a treason is once practised against them, it either brings them to their end, or procures them much infamy; for if it succeeds, they die; if it be discovered, and they slay the traitors, men always suppose it hath been some device of that Prince, to vent his avaice and cruelty against the bloods and estates of those he hath put to death. I would not fail therefore to warn those Princes or Republicques against which treasons have been devised, that they be wary, when a

cons.

conspiracy is once disclosed to them, before they go about to revenge it, but first to pry narrowly into it, and to seek to understand well the qualities thereof, and weigh well the conditions of the conspirators, and their own; and when they finde them great and mighty, never to discover them, till they be furnished with sufficient forces to crush them; for in doing otherwise, they should discover it to their own ruine. Wherefore they ought to dissemble it with all possible care; because the conspirators, when they finde themselves discovered, of force are driven to act what they can without respect. We have an example hereof from the Romanes, who having 1. or two legions of souldiers to guard the Capuans against the Samnites, as otherwhere we have said, the heads of those Legions conspired together to oppress the Capuans: Whereof notice being given at Rome, the matter was committed to *Rutilius* the new Consul, that he should take order for it, who to lull asleep the conspirators, gave it out, that the Senate had again confirmed the Capuan Legions abroad there: Which those soldiers giving credit to, and thinking they had time enough to execute their purpose, they never went about to hasten the matter: And so they stood still, till they began to see that the Consul separated them one from another, which thing having begotten suspicion in them, made them discover themselves, and execute their design. Nor can there be a fuller example on the one or the other part: for hereby it appears how slow men are in matters, where they think they have time enough; and how quick, when a necessity drives them to it. Nor can a Prince or Re-  
publique

publique (that would defer the discovery of a treason for his own advantage) take a better course, then by some device or trick offer the conspirators shortly some handsome opportunity, to the end that they attending that, or thinking they have time enough, may give leisure to that Prince or Commonwealth to punish them. They who have done otherwise, have hastened their own destruction, as the Duke of Athens did, and *William* of the family of the *Pazzi*. The Duke being become the tyrant of Florence, and understanding that there was a conspiracy plotted against him, caused without further examining the matter, one of the conspirators to be laid hold on, which gave an alarme to the rest, whereupon arming themselves, they took the state from him. *William* being a Commissary in the valley of Chiana in the year 1502. having had notice, that in Arezzo there was a conspiracy in favour of the Vitelli, to take that Town from the Florentines, presently went to the town, and notwithstanding his own forces, nor the conspirators, nor taking order to furnish himself with any, by the Bishops advice, who was his son, caused one of the conspirators to be laid hands on, whereupon the first presently took arms, got away the town from the Florentines, and *William* of a Commissary was made a prisoner. But when those conspiracies are feeble, they may and ought without any regard be suppressed. Yet in any case we must not follow two courses which have been used in a manner contrary one to the other: The one by the forenamed Duke of Athens, who so far as he believed that he had the citizens of Florence good wills, put one to death that detected a conspiracy against him:

The

The other by *Dion* a *Siracusan*, who to sound the minde of one whom he had in suspicion, agreed that *Callippus*, of whom he was very confidant, should make him believe that he were working a plot against him; but these matters fell out ill for them both. For the one took all courage away from the accusers, and encouraged traitors; the other made the way easie to his own ruine, or rather he himself was principal of the conspiracy against himself, and so it fell out, for *Callippus* (being that he could without any respect practise such a thing against *Dion*) did it so in earnest, that he took both his life and his State from him.

---

### CHAP. VII.

*From whence proceeds it, that of the changes from liberty to slavery, and from slavery to liberty, some are without blood, others exceeding bloody?*

Some will marvel perchance from whence it comes to pass, that of many changes which are made from a free State to a Tyrannical, and contrarily, some are with much effusion of blood, others quite without any: for, as we learn by Histories, in such like alterations sometimes very many men have been slain, and sometimes again not one hath suffered any injury; as it befell in the change that Rome made from her Kings to Consuls, wherein none but the *Tarquins* were banished, without wrong done to any body else. Which depends hereupon; for that State that is changed, begins first either by violence, or without it: and when it begins with violence, it must needs begin



begin with doing wrong to many; and it is necessary afterwards that in its destruction, they who have been wronged, revenge themselves, and so from their desire of revenge proceeds the effusion of blood and death of many. But when that State is begun by the common consent of an universality, and thereby hath been amplify'd, it hath no cause afterwards when that universality is ruined, to wrong others then the head onely; and of this kind was the State of Rome, and the *Tarquins* banishment, as also was in Florence the State which the *Medici* held, when afterwards in their destructions in the year 1444. none else were hurt but they. And so such like changes never prove very dangerous; but those rather are very full of danger, which are wrought by those that endeavor to revenge themselves withall, which have been such, that they have caused horror even in him that reads them. And because of examples to this purpose histories are full fraught, I will let this pass.

---

### C H A P. VIII.

*He that will make alteration in a Republique, must consider the subject he is to work upon.*

**I**T hath been formerly treated how that a malicious Citizen cannot work mischief in a Republique that is not grown corrupted; which conclusion is confirmed (besides the reasons that then were alledged) with the example of *Sp. Cassius*, and of *Manlius Capitolinus*. Which *Spurius* being an ambitious man, and desirous to take upon him extraordinary authority in Rome,

Rome, and gain the people to him by doing them many good turns, as was that, to sell them those fields, which the Romans had taken from the Hermici, this his ambition was deserv'd by the Fathers, and so much suspected, that when he spake to the people and offered to give them those moneys, which the Corn was sold for, that the Publique had caused to be brought from Sicily, they wholly refused them, thinking that *Spiritus* meant to give them the price of their liberty. But had that people been already corrupted, they would not have refused the said price, but rather have opened him that way to the tyranny, which now they shut against him. A fuller example hereof *Manlius Capitolinus* represents unto us; for in him we see, what excellencies of mind and body, how many brave exploits acted in defence of a mans native Country, a brutish desire of rule quite rases out: which (as it appeared) grew in him, through the envy he bore *Camillus* for the honors were done him, whereby his understanding was so blinded, as not considering the manner of Government used in the City, nor examining, whereupon he was to work, unapt as yet to receive so evil a form, betook himself to raise tumults in Rome against the Senate, and contrary to the Laws of his Country. Wherein the perfection of that City is very evident, and the goodness of the matter thereof; for in his case none of the Nobility, however that they were very eager defenders the one of another, never stirred in his favour, nor any of his kindred undertook any thing in his defence: whereas ordinarily when others were accused, they used to accompany them in a rueful manner, clad in black, and all sorrowful; whereby

whereby they might gain compassion in favor of the defendant, and with *Manlius* none of these were seen. The Tribunes of the people, who were wont to favour those things, which seemed to be mov'd for the peoples advantage, and the more they were against the Nobility, so much the forwarder used to thrust them, in this case held with the Nobility to suppress a common mischief. The people of Rome exceedingly desirous of their own advantage, and a great favourer of any thing that thwarted the Nobility, however they afforded *Manlius* many favors, nevertheless, when the Tribunes cited him, and referred his cause to be judged by the people, that people being become judge of a defendant, without regard condemned him to death. Wherefore I believe there is not any example in this History more proper to shew the goodness of that Commonwealths orders, then this, seeing that not one of this whole City moved in behalf of a very valourous Citizen, who as well publicly as privately had done many worthy acts: because in all of them the love of their country was of more force than any other regard, and they considered more the present dangers that depended on him, than his fore-past deserts, so that by his death they set themselves at liberty. And

*T. Livius* says, *This end had that*

*man, who had he not been born in a free State, was worthy of admiration.* Where two things are to be

considered; the one, that by other means a man ought to seek after glory in a City corrupted, than in one that lives strictly according to the civil government; the other is (which is almost the

*Hunc exitum habuit vir, nisi in libera civitate natus esset, memorabilis.*

same

(some with the first) that men in their proceedings, and the rather in actions of consequence should consider the times, and conforme themselves thereunto: and those that by their evill choice, or natural inclination disagree with the times, most commonly live unhappily, and their actions have but ill success. The contrary befalls those that can accord with the times: and without question, by the Historians words which we formerly mentioned, we may make this conclusion, that if *Manlius* had been borne in the times that *Marius* and *Silla* were, where the matter was already corrupted, that his ambition could have made some impression therein, he might have workd the same effect, and had the same success that *Silla* and *Marius* had, and others afterwards, who after them aspired to the Tyranny. So in like manner, if *Silla* and *Marius* had liv'd in *Manlius* his daies, they had been crushd in the very egge: for one man may indeed begin with his evill courses and mischievous waies to debauch the people of a City: but it is impossible that one mans life can suffice to corrupt it so, that he himself can make any advantage thereof. And in case it were possible, that in tract of time, he could do it, yet would it be impossible, in regard of the manner of mens proceedings, who are impatient, and cannot defer any passion of theirs long. Moreover, they erre in their affairs, and in those especially which they much desire, in so much as either through their small patience, or through their error, they would venture upon the executing of their purposes, in counter time, and so come to an evill end. Therefore is it necessary, if a man would gain authority in a Republick, and induce some ill forme

forme therein, to find the matter already disorder'd by time, and that by little and little, and from age to age is brought into disorder, which of force comes therunto, when it is not (as formerly hath been said) refresh'd by veruious examples, or by new laws reduc'd to the first principles: *Marius* then had been a rare man, and famous, had he been borne in a corrupted City. And therefore should those Citizens that in Republicks undertake any thing either in fauour of liberty, or in fauour of Tyranny, consider the subject they are to work on, and from thence conjecture the difficulty of the worke: for it is as hard and dangerous to see free a people that would live in thralldom, as to inthrall a people that would live free. And because we have before touch'd, that in all manner of actions men should consider the quality of the times, and proceed conformably to those, we will speak of them at length in the Chapter following.

# CHAP. IX.

*How a man must of necessity change with the times, if he will alwaies have good success in his undertakings.*

**T** Have many times consider'd, how the occasion of mens good or euill fortunes depends upon the manner of the encounter of their proceedings with the times: for it is euident, that some men proceed in their affaires with violence, others with regard and wariness. And because that in the one and other

other of these two ways, the convenient terms are transgressed, being that they cannot hit upon the true way; both in the one and the other they fail. But he fails least, and of next lights upon good success, that meets (as I have said) time in its own way, and always proceeds according as his own nature puts him forward. Every one knows how *Fabius Maximus* proceeded with his Army carefully and warily, far from all that kind of meele and confidence which otherwhiles the Romans used; and his good fortune would have it, that this his way agreed well with the times: for *Hannibal* being come a young man into Italy, and with a fresh gale of fortune, and having twice broken the Roman Armies, and that Republike almost lost all her good soldiers, and therefore being affrighted, could not light upon better fortune than to have such a Captain, who by his slowness and wariness should keep the enemy in play with vain delays: Nor could *Fabius* have met with times fitter for his ways: whereupon came it to pass that he grew glorious. And that *Fabius* did this upon the instigation of his own nature, and not upon a meer choice, we see that when *Scipio* desired to pass over into Africa with those Armies, whereby to make an end of the war, *Fabius* much contradicted it, as he that could not go out of his own pace, nor leave his own custome, so that for all him, *Hannibal* might have continued still in Italy; for he perceived not, that the times were changed, and it was needful to alter the manner of making war. And had *Fabius* been King of Rome, he might easily have spoiled that war, because he would not have known how to alter his proceedings with the alteration of times.

times. But being he was born in a Republike, where there was divers Citizens, and divers humors, as she had *Fabius*, who was excellent in those times, when the war was onely to be supported; so had she *Scipio* in the times when their enemies were to be overcome. Whence arises it, that a Republike hath a longer life, and longer enjoys good fortune than a principality: because she can better fit her self for several accidents, by reason of the variety of her Subjects that are in her, then can a Prince: for a man that is accustomed to proceed in one manner, never alters, as it is said, and must of necessity, when the times disagree with his way, go to wrack. *Peter Soderini*, formerly spoken of; proceeded in all his affairs with mildness and patience: and he and his Country prospered, while the times agreed with his manner of proceedings: but when the times fell out so, that it was needful to break off all patience and mildness, he knew not how to do it: so that together with his Country he fell to ruine. Pope *Julius* the second carried himself all the time of his Pontificate with great violence and rage, and because the times sorted well therewith, all his undertakings succeeded well. But if other times had come, that would have required other advice, of force he must have gone to destruction: because he would never have altered his manner nor order in his proceedings. And that we cannot change our selves, there are two reasons; the one because we cannot resist that which our nature is inclined to; the other is, because when one man in such a kind of proceeding hath gone on luckily, it is impossible to perswade him, that things will prove well, where  
he

hee proceeds otherwise. Whereupon it comes to pass, that in one man fortune varies, because shee changes the times, and he changes not his courses. Thence arises also the ruine of a City, because the orders of Commonwealthe change not with the times, as we have treated heretofore at large, but they are slower: for it is a greater trouble to them to change; and to effect it, they have need of times which should in a manner take a Republick quite off the things whereby a thorough alteration should be made in her: for which one man alone suffices, not by changing the manner of her proceedings. And because wee have made mention of *Fabius Maximus*, who held off *Hannibal* with delays, I purpose to treat in the following Chapter, whether a Captain, being desirous to fight a battell with the enemy in any case, can be so hindred that he do it not.

### CHAP. X.

*That a Captain cannot avoid battell, when his enemy will fight in any case.*

*Cneus Sulpitius Dictator adversus Gallos bellum trahebat, nolens se fortunæ committere adversus hostem, quem tempus deteriorē in dies, & locus alienus faceret.*

*C*neus Sulpitius the dictator held off from fighting with the French, being not willing to stand at fortunes discretion in a tryall against his enemy, whom time and a strange Country would continually weaken and consume. When such an error enues, where all men or the greater part of them erre, I think it not much amiss many times



times to reprove it. Wherefore though I have formerly several times shewed, how the actions about great matters now adays differ from those of ancient times; yet I think it not superfluous at this present to repeat it: for if in any part it differs from the ancient orders, it is especially in military orders, where now is not any of those things observed, which the ancients made much account of. And this inconvenient grew first hereupon, because Commonwealths and Princes, have committed this care to others, and to avoid dangers, have much laid aside that exercise; and if perchance sometime a King in our days venture to go in person, we believe not therefore that he seeks out any new orders, that are more commendable: for when they chance to give themselves to that imployment, they do it rather in shew of their pompe, then upon any other laudable occasion. Yet do these commit lesser errors, personally visiting their Armies, and keeping in their own hands the Majesty of their Government, then Republiques do, especially those of Italy, which trust to others, not understanding any thing in the wars, or attending to any thing belonging to them: and on the other side, when they are desirous (whereby they may seem to be Princes) to take any thing into deliberation, they commit therein exceeding many errors. And however that otherwhere I have treated of some of them, yet at this present I will not forbear to tell one of very great importance. When these lazy Princes, or effeminate Commonwealths send forth any Commander of theirs, the wisest commission that they think they can give him, is to charge him, that in any case he fight not a battel, but avoid it, and con-

S

ceiring

ceiting with themselves, that herein they imitate *Fabius Maximus* his discretion, who by forbearing to fight, saved the Romane State; they understand not that most commonly, this commission is either to no purpose, or else hurtful. For we must take this for a conclusion, that a General, that will abide in the field, cannot avoid a battel, when the enemy will in any case fight. So that this commission is but thus, as if he should say, fight with thine enemy at his pleasure, and not at thine own. For if a man will abide in the field and not fight, the surest way is to keep himself fifty miles off from his enemy at least, and then keep good espions, so that if he chance to bend towards thee, thou maist avoid him at leisure. Another course is to immure himself up in a City; but the one and the other of these two courses is very pernicious. In the first he leaves his Country in prey to the enemy; and a valiant Prince will rather hazard the battel than prolong the war with so much dammage to his Subjects. And in the second the loss is evident; for it must needs be, that retiring thy self within the walls of a Town with thy Army, thou be besieged, and at length suffer famine, and so be forced to yeeld: insomuch as to avoid battel by either of these two means, must needs prove very hurtful. The course that *Fabius Maximus* held, to abide in strong places is very good, when thou hast an Army so valorous, that the enemy dares not come to find thee in thy advantages. Nor can it be said that *Fabius* avoided fighting, but rather that he would fight at his advantage. For if *Hannibal* had gone to find him, *Fabius* would have staid for him, and fought with him; but *Hannibal* durst not deal with him after his manner.

So

So the battel was as well avoided by *Hannibal* as by *Fabius*; but if one of them had been desirous to have hazarded in any case, the other had but one of these three remedies, to wit those two we have before mentioned, or to flee. There are many examples and maxims in the war, which the Romanes made with *Philip* of Macedon, Father of *Perfes*, to make good what I say; for *Philip* being assailed by the Romanes, resolved not to come to battel; and therefore first he thought to do as *Fabius Maximus* had done in Italy, and placed himself with his Army upon the top of a mountain, where he fortified himself all he could, deeming that the Romanes had not the heart to come and find him there; but when they went thither, and sought with him, and drove him from the mountain, being not able to withstand them, he fled with the greater part of his people: and that which saved him was the roughness of the Country, so that the Romanes could not follow the pursuit. *Philip* then being unwilling to fight, and having pitched his campe near the Romanes, had no other mean but to fly; and having found by this experience, that when they meant not to fight, it was not enough for them to get upon the top of the mountains; and having no mind to inclose himself in any Town, resolved to take the other course, to remove many miles distant from the Romanes Campe. Whereupon, if the Romanes were in one Province, they went into another, and so always they went thither from whence the Romanes were parted: and considering in the end, how that in prolonging the war this way, his own estate declined, and how that his Subjects were sometimes by himself, otherwhile by

his enemies daily oppressed, resolved to put it to the tryal of a day, and so came to a set battel with the Romanes. It is profitable then not to fight, when the Armies have these conditions which *Fabius* his Army had, or that then had that of *Cneus Sulpitius*, which are, to have an Army so good, that the enemy dares not come and find thee within thy fortifications, and that the enemy though he be in thy Country, yet hath he not much footing therein, where he may suffer want of provisions, and in this case the course is advantageous for the seasons *Titus*

Nolens se fortuna  
committere adversus  
hostem, quem tem-  
pus deteriozem in-  
dies, & locus alienus  
faceret.

*Livius* alledges: Unwilling to stand at fortunes discretion on a tryal against his enemy, whom time and a strange Country would daily weaken and consume. But in any other case the battel cannot be avoided,

but with thy shame and danger; for to flie (as *Philip* did) is the same, that it is to be routed, and that with the more disgrace, by how much the less thou hast made proof of thy valor. And however he had the luck to escape, another could not have had the like, unless he had help by the situation of the Country, as well as he. That *Hannibal* was a master in the art of war, I think every one will acknowledge, and being to oppose *Scipio* in Affrica, if he had seen any advantage in prolonging the war, without doubt he would have done it, and peradventure could too (being a good Commander and having a good Army) as well as *Fabius* did in Italy. But being he did it not, we may well believe, that some important reason perswaded him for, for a Prince that hath an Army levied, and sees that for want of moneys or friends he cannot keep them long together, is a very fool if he

ventures not his fortune, before h's Army falls  
 asunder; for by delaying he certainly loses,  
 whereas hazzarding he might overcome. Ano-  
 ther thing there is yet much to be accounted  
 of, which is, that a man ought (even in his  
 losing) seek to gain glory; and it is more glo-  
 ry, to be overcome by force, than by any  
 other inconvenient, that may have made  
 thee lose. Therefore it must needs be that  
*Hannibal* was forc'd by these necessities; and  
 on the other side *Scipio*, if *Hannibal*  
 would have protracted the war, and he  
 durst not have adventured to go seek him in  
 his Trenches, had not suffered therein, in that  
 he had already overcome *Siphax*, and taken so  
 many Towns in *Affrick*, so that he could have  
 continued there with security and convenien-  
 cy, as well as in *Italy*. Which was not so  
 with *Hannibal*, when he had to deal with *Fa-  
 bim*, nor with those French-men, when they  
 were opposed by *Snipitius*. So much the less  
 also can he avoid the fight, that with an Army  
 invades another mans Country, he must (when-  
 soever the enemy faces him) fight with him;  
 and if he incampes before any Town, so much  
 the rather is he obliged to fight, as in our days  
 it befell Duke *Charles* of Burgundy, who being  
 set down before *Morat*, a Town belonging to  
 the *Swissers*, was assaulted by them and bro-  
 ken: and so it chanc'd to the French Army,  
 that incamping at *Novarra*, was in like man-  
 ner routed by the *Swissers*.

## C H A P. XI.

*He that hath to deal with many, however that he be the weaker, provided that he can but support their first violence, overcomes.*

**T**HE Tribunes of the peoples power in Rome was great, and necessary, as many times we have said: for otherwise it would never have been possible to bridle the Nobilities ambition, which would much sooner, then it did, have corrupted that Commonwealth: yet because in every thing (as is often said) some evil proper to every thing lies lurking in it, which causes new accidents to arise, it is needful with new orders to remedy them. Wherefore the Tribunitial power being grown insolent, and terrible to the Nobility, and to all Rome, some very hurtful inconvenient to the Romane liberty would have risen, if the way had not been shewed by *Appian Claudius*, whereby they might defend themselves against the Tribunes ambition: which was that they always found some one among them, that either was fearful or might be corrupted, or that was a lover of the common good: so that they disposed him to oppose other mens wills, that desired to draw forward any deliberation against the Senates will. Which remedy was a great allay to such an authority, and a long time much helped Rome. Which thing hath made me consider, that whensoever many powerful ones are united together against one that is powerful, though all they together are much more puissant then he, yet may there much more be hoped.

hoped for in him alone, though less powerful, then in those many, though very strong: for (leaving a part all those things, wherein one alone is able to do more then many, which things are innumerable) this will always come to pass, that one alone, taking but a little care, shall be able to disunite those many, and so weaken that body which was strong. I will not herein alledge ancient examples, which are very frequent; the modern shall suffice me, which have fallen in our days. In the year 1484, all Italy conspired against the Venetians, who when they were in a manner wholly lost, and could not any more abide in the field with the Army, ~~that then ruled in Milan~~ <sup>that then ruled in Milan</sup>, and by means of that corruption made an accord, wherein they not only had again the towns they had lost, but usurped a part of the state of Ferrara. And thus they that had been losers in the war, remained gainers by the peace. A few years past, the whole world conspired against France; yet before they came to see the end of the war, Spain broke off from her confederates, and made agreement with her, in so much as the rest of the confederates also were forced to make their accords too. So that without doubt, we ought always judge, when we see a war made by many against one, that that one is like to be a gainer at the end, provided that he be of such valour, that he is able to sustain the first brunts, and so govern himself with the time as to attend time: which if he were not able to do, he would run the hazard of many dangers, as it happened to the Venetians in the eighth year, who if they could have temporised with the French Army, and so have had time to gain themselves some

of those that were confederated against them, they might have escaped that destruction, but not having so good an Army, as thereby to play with the enemy awhile; and hereupon not having had leisure to take any of them asunder, they were ruined: for we saw, that the Pope when he had what was his, became their friend, and so Spaine, and very willingly the one and the other of these two Princes would have saved them the state of Lombardy against France, for fear of making it too great in Italy, if it had been in their power. The Venetians then might have given a part, to save the rest, which if they had done in time, that it had appeared it was not out of necessity, and before the beginning of the war, would have been wisely done of them; but when the wars were begun, it was disgraceful, and peradventure of small benefit. But before such imbroiles, few of the Citizens of Venice could foresee the danger, very few the way to help, and none to adjuv it. But to return again to the beginning of this discourse, I conclude, that even so as the Senate of Rome had a remedy to save their country from the Tribunes ambition, because they were many, so shall any Prince that is assailed by many, finde a remedy, whensoever he knows with discretion how to use the convenient means to dismantle them.

CHAP.



## CHAP. XII.

*That a wise Commander upon his own souldiers should lay all manner of necessity to fight, and take it, as much as he can, from his enemies.*

**A**T other times we have treated, of what advantage necessity is to humane actions, and to what glory they have thereby been promoted; and that by some moral Philosophers it hath been written, that mens hands and tongues two of their worthiest instruments to ennoble them, would never have worked so perfectly, nor have brought mens labors to that excellency, whereunto we see them now come, had they not been thrust forward by necessity. The vertue then of such necessity being known by the ancient Commanders of Armies, and how thereby the souldiers minds were made the more obstinate to fight, they used all their industry, to force them by it. And on the other side, they as well endeavored, to free their enemies from it; and hereupon many times they opened that way to the enemy, which they could have shut against them, and shut it against their own soldiers, which they could have left open for them. He then that desires, either that a City defend it self obstinately, or that an Army in the field fight it out resolutely, must try his wits to make an impression in the breasts of them that are to fight, that such a necessity lies upon them. Whereupon a discreet Commander that is going to besiege a Town, may conjecture of the facility or difficulty in taking it, by the knowledge and consideration

of the necessity that binds the inhabitants to defend themselves; and as he finds the necessity urging them to be great, so let him judge it difficult to overcome them, or otherwise easie. Whence it proceeds, that those Towns which have rebelled, are harder to be regained then they were at their first conquest; for in the beginning not having any cause to fear punishment, as not having offended, they yeeld easily; but thinking (after they have rebelled) that they have offended, and hereupon fearing the chastisement, they prove harder to be recovered. Moreover such obstinacy arises from the innate hatreds which neighboring Princes and Republiques, bear one to another, which proceeds from their ambition to rule, and the jealousy of their own state, especially if they be Republiques as it chanceth in Tuscany. Which strife and contention hath caused, and ever will, a great difficulty in the mastery of the one or other. Whereof he that considers well the City of Florences neighbors, and those of Venice, will not marvel (as many do) that Florence hath spent more in her wars, and gained less then Venice, for this is, because the Venetians never found their neighboring Towns so obstinate in their defence, as Florence hath; for that all the Towns confining upon Venice have been accustomed to live in subjection under a Prince, and not free; and those that have been used to serve, make small account of changing their Lord, or rather many times they much desire it. So that Venice (howsoever she hath had more powerful neighbors then Florence) yet because she hath found her Townes less obstinate against her, hath been able sooner to subdue them then the other could, being

being environed round by free Towns. A Commander therefore should (to return to our first discourse) when he lies down before any Town, provide with all diligence to take from the defendants all scruples of such necessity, and consequently such obstinacy, promising pardon, if they are afraid of punishment: and if they doubt their liberty is aimed at, shew them there is nothing intended against the common good, but against some few ambitious men in the City, which thing hath many times facilitated such enterprises and takings of Towns. And though such colours are easily seen through, and especially by understanding men, yet are the people oft deceived thereby, who being desirous of the present peace, shut their eyes against any other snare that under large promises can be laid for them. And this way exceeding many Cities have been reduced to servitude, as it befell Florence in these latter days, and Crassus also with his whole Army, who though he knew the Parthians promises were not to be credited, which were made onely to take from his soldiers the necessity of defending themselves, yet could he not keep them obstinate, being blinded by the offers of peace made them by their enemies, as in particular may be seen in his life, by him that shall read it. When the Samnites, contrary to the articles of agreement, upon the ambition of some few had foraged and spoiled the Romans their confederates fields, and afterwards sent Ambassadors to Rome to require peace, offering to make restitution of all that was taken, and deliver them prisoners, the authors of those broyles and robberies, they were refus'd by the Romans, and sent back to Samnium without hope.

hope of agreement : *Claudius Pontius* the commander of the *Sannites* Army, with a notable oration of his shewed, the Romans would have war in any case; and though for their own parts they wished for peace, yet necessity made them take the war in hand, saying these words, *They justly take arms that*

*Justum est bellum, quibus necessarium; & pia arma, quibus nisi in armis spes non est.*

*are forced to do so; and piously too who have no other hope but in them.* Upon which necessity he with his souldiers grounded his

hopes of victory. And to the end I need not return again to this matter, I think it fit to alledge those examples of the Romans, which are most worthy of remarke; *Caius Manilius* went forth with an army to incounter the *Veientes*, and part of their Army having forced his trenches, *Manilius* came speedily with new Troops to succour his own, and that the *Veientes* should not escape, guarded all the passages into the campe. Whereupon the *Veientes* seeing themselves shut in los all sides, began to fight with such fury, that they slew *Manilius*, and would have otherthrown all the rest of the Romans, if, by the wisdom of one Tribune, a way for them to escape by, had not been opened. Where we see that whiles necessity constrained the *Veientes* to fight, they stood to it stoutly; but as soon as a way was opened for them, they thought more upon flying then fighting. The *Volser* and *Equi* having entered with their armies upon the Roman territories, the Consuls were sent against them, and whiles they were in fight, the *Volscies* army, the chief whereof was *Vellius Melius*, chanced to be inclosed between their own trenches, which

which the Romans were now become masters of, and the other Roman Army, who seeing they must all either die or make way by the sword, he spake thus to his soldiers, Come along with mee; there is neither rampire nor ditch to oppose you, but men only against men: you are equall to them in valour, and, which is the last and hardest weapon, your necessity gives you advantage of them. Insomuch as this necessity is term'd by Titus Livius the extreamest and greatest weapon. Camillus the wisest of all the Roman commanders being got within the walls of the Veientes City with his Army, whereby to take it more easily, and to free the enemies from that last necessity of defending themselves gave command so that the Veientes heard it, that none should hurt those that were disarm'd: so that having cast all their armes upon the ground, that City was taken with little or no effusion of blood; Which course was afterwards followed by many Commanders.

Ita mecum; non murus nec vallum; armati armatis obstant; virtute pares; quod ultimum & maximum telum est; necessitate superiores eritis.

### CHAP. XIII.

Whether more trust is to be reposed in a good Commander that hath a weak Army, or in a good Army that hath a weak Commander.

**C**oriolanus being banished from Rome, went from thence to the Volsci; where having gotten together an Army to be reveng'd of his own Citizens, came from thence to Rome; from whence he was mov'd to depart, rather for

for pity to his mother, than by the *Romans* forces. Upon which place *T. Livius* saies, that hereby it is known that the *Commonwealth* of *Rome* grew more by the Captains valours, than the soldiers, considering that the *Volscei* formerly had been alwaies loiers, and only then had overcome when *Co. Iulius* was their General: And how ever that *Livie* holds such an opinion, yet we see in many places of his History, that Soldiers without any Captain have given extraordinary proofs of their valors, and have been better ordered and fiercer after the death of their Consuls, than before they were slain, as it happend in the Army which the *Romans* had in *Spain* under the *Scipioes*, which when the two Captains were slain, was able by its own valor not only to save it self, but overcome the enemy, and keep that Province for the Republiek. So relating all, wee shall find many examples where the Soldiers valor alone hath got the day, and many others where the Generals valor only hath done the same effect. In so much as wee may well judge, that either of them hath need of the other: And here it is not amiss to consider first, whether is most to be feared, either a good Army led by an unskilfull Commander, or a good Commander followed by a bad Army. And taking after *Cesars* opinion, small account is to be made of the one or the other: for when he went into *Spain* against *Africanus* and *Petrejus*, who had with them a good Army, he said he little doubted them, Because he went against an Army that lacked a Commander, shewing the Commanders weakness. On the contrary when he went into *The. Italy* against *Pompey*, he said,

That  
ad ex-  
erci-  
tum si  
ne du-  
ec.

I go against a Commander without an Army. Vado  
ad du-  
cem li-  
ne ex-  
ercitu.  
 Another thing may be considered, which is  
 more easie, either for a good Commander to  
 make a good Army, or for a good Army to  
 make a good Commander. Whereupon I an-  
 swer, that the question seems already decided:  
 for more easily many shall find one, or shall  
 instruct one so that he become good, than one  
 alone shall many. *Lucullus* when he was sent  
 against *Mitridates*, was altogether unexperi-  
 in the wars: yet that good Army, wherein  
 were so many good Chieftaines, quickly made  
 him a skilful Commander. For want of Sol-  
 diers the *Romans* put many slaves in Armes,  
 and gave order to *Sempronius Gracchus* to train  
 them, who in a small time made a very good  
 Army of them. *Pelopidas* and *Epaminondas* (as  
 we have said otherwise), after they had deli-  
 vered *Thebes* their native Country out of the  
*Spartans* bondage, made the *Thebans* exceed-  
 ing good Soldiers in a short time, that they  
 were able not only to sustain, but overcome  
 the Soldiers of *Sparta*; so that the case is e-  
 qual on both sides: for the one being good, may  
 soon find the other so: yet a good Army wi-  
 out a good head, ordinarily becomes insolent  
 and dangerous; as was the *Macedonian* Army  
 after *Alexander* his death, and likewise the  
 Veterane soldiers in the civil warres. So that  
 I think, that much more account is to be made  
 of a Commander that hath time and conve-  
 nience to train up and arme his Soldiers, than  
 of an insolent Army, having a Captain from  
 among them tumultuarily made their Chief.  
 Wherefore, double glory and renown may  
 well be ascrib'd to those Commanders,  
 who have not only taken upon them to o-  
 vercome

vercome the enemy, but before their comming to fight with them, have to make them fit for the occasion, disciplind and instructed their Armies well: for therein appears their vertue double and admirable; whereas if the charge hereof were communicated to many, far less account or esteem would be made of them.

#### CHAP. XIV.

*New sleights and inventions, that are usd in the midst of a fight, and new cries that are heard, what effects they produce.*

**O**F what moment in combates and fights a new accident is, that arises upon any new matter seen or heard, appears in many places, and especially in that occasion, where the Romans fought with the Volsci, where *Quintus* seeing one of the horns of his Army beginning to fayle, began to cry out aloud, that they should stand firm: because the other horne of the Army was already victorious: by which words, having encourag'd his own, and affrighted his enemies, hee overcame them. And if such vociferations in an Army well orderd be of great effect, in one then that is but tumultuary and ill disciplind, they must needs be of much greater: because the whole frame thereof moves by the like wind. To this purpose I will alledge a notable example befalln in our dayes. The City of *Perugia*, a few years since, was divided into two factions, of the *Oddi*, and the *Bagliori*; these raignd there, the others were banishd men, who having by help of their allies gotten an Army together, and brought



brought it into some Town confining upon *Perugia*, by favour of their faction one night entered the City, & without being descryd, came to take the *Piazza*; & because that City hath chains on all the corners of the waies, which kept them hard, the Soldiers belonging to the *Oddi* had a man went before them, who with a bar of Iron was to break the locks of those chains, to the end the horse might pass, & there being but one only left them to break, which immediately opened into the *Piazza*, and now a generall alarme being given, and he that broke them, being oppressed by the multitude that followd him, and not able therefore well to lift up his armes with his bar, whereby to imploy it, he beg'd to say Stand back; which word going by degrees, saying back, began to cause the furthest off to flie, and so by little and little the rest with such force, that they all routed one another. And thus the design of the *Oddi*, by occasion of so poor an accident, became frustrate. Where we may consider, that discipline and order is not usefull in an Army so much for orderly fighting, as that every small accident put thee not quite into disorder: for, were it for nothing else, the ordinary multitude is unfit for the warrs, because every rumor, every voice, every noise changes them, and puts them to flight. And therefore a good Commander, among his other orders, ought appoint those that are to take the word from him, & to pass it to others, and accustome his Soldiers, so that they give no credit save only to their own officers, to the end that they tell them only, what is given them in charge from him: for when this part is not well observ'd, many disorders often fall out. Touching the sight of these new things,

things every Commander ought well bend his wits, to make some shew whiles the battail is in tryal, whereby to encourage his own, and dishearten the enemy, because among those accidents which may give thee the victory, this is the most effectuall. Whereof wee alledge for testimony the example of *Cneus Sulpitius* the Roman Dictatour, who comming to fight a battell with the French, arm'd all the poor drudges and rascality of the Camp: and having mounted th'm upon Mules and poore Asses with armes and ensignes, to make them seem as if they were cavallry, he plac'd them behind a hill, and commanded that at a signall given, whiles he was in the hottest of the battell they should shew themselves to the enemy: which thing so ordered and done, put the French men in such a fright that they lost they day. And therefore a good Commander ought to do two things; the one is, to try some of these inventions to startle the enemy: the other, to stand so prepar'd that the enemy offering any such to him, he may be able to discover and quite frustrate them, as did the Indian King to *Semiramis*; who seeing, that King had a great number of Elephants, to affright him, and make him think shee had more her self than he, made a great many of them of Bulls and Bufaloes hides, and having put them upon Camells, sent them before: but that King finding out her deceiver, turn'd it upon her not only vain but hurtfull. *Mammercus* was sent Dictator against the *Fidenates*, who to affright the Roman Army, appointed that in the heat of the skirmish a good number of soldiers should sally forth of *Fidenas* with lights upon the top of their Lances, to the

the end that the Romans taken a while with the novelty of the matter, should fall into some disorder. Whereupon it is to be noted, that when such devices carry more truth than appearance with them, they may well be represented to the view of men, because that having in them a great deal of that which is lively and likely, their weakness cannot so quickly be discovered: but when they have more of fiction in them than of truth, it is better either not to use them, or using them to keep them off at such a distance that a full discovery of them cannot suddenly be made, as was that trick of the Muleters *Cn. Sulpitius* practis'd: for when there is nothing but weakness within them, as they are approached, they are quickly seen through, and do thee wrong rather than give thee advantage, as those Elephants did to *Semiramis*, and the fires to the *Fidenates*; which however that at first they a little troubled the Army, yet when the Dictator came up to them, and began to cry out, That they might be ashamed to fly from the smook like Bees, but that they should rather turn back their flames upon them, saying, *Bayne out these people of Fidenas with fire, whose rancorous spirits you could never assuage with all your courtisie.* Thus that device of the *Fidenates* serv'd them to no purpose, and so they lost the fight.

Suis flammis delete  
Fidenas, quas vestris  
beneficiis placare non  
potuistis.

## CHAP.

## C H A P. XV.

*That the command of an Army ought to be given in charge only to one ; and where there are more, they alwaies erre.*

**T**HE *Fidenates* having rebelld, and slain that Colony, which the *Romans* had sent to *Fidenas*, the *Romans* created four Tribuns with Consular power to exact satisfaction for this wrong done: whereof one being left for the safeguard of *Rome*, the rest were sent against the *Fidenates*, and the *Vejentes*, who because they were at variance one with another, brought back disgrace from the service, though no loss: of the disgrace they were the cause, but that they received no loss, the Soldiers valour was the cause. Whereupon the *Romans* seeing this disorder, had their recourse to the creation of a Dictator, to the end one alone should rectifie again, what three had disorderd. Whence we see the unprofitableness of many Commanders in one Army or Town, that is to defend itself: and *T. Livius* cannot more plainly express it, than in these words here

*Tres Tribuni potestate Consulari documento fuere, quam plurium imperium bello in utile esset: tendendo ad sua quisque consilia, cum alij aliud videretur, apperuerunt ad occasionem locum hostili*

written; *Three Tribuns with Consular power taught us how unprofitable a thing it was, to have many Commanders in the war; for every one of them making severall parties, and each one thinking his own best, gave opportunity to the enemy. And however that this is example sufficient to prove the disorder which a plurality of Com-*

Commanders causes in the war, yet will I alledge some other as well modern as ancient, for the better declaration of it. In the year 1300. after the reprisal of *Milan* by *Lewes* the twelfth of *France*, he sent his Army to *Pisa*, to restore it to the *Florentines*, whether *John Baptista Ridolphi* and *Luke Antony* of the *Albizzi* were sent Commissaries. And because *John Baptista* was a man of credit and years, *Luke* left the whole government in every thing unto him. And if he did not discover his ambition in opposing him, yet he manifested it by his silence, and neglecting and scorning every thing that was ordred, so that he nothing furtherd the actions of the Campe neither in word nor in deed, as if he had been a man of no worth. But afterwards it appeared quite contrary, when upon an occasion following, *John Baptista* was faine to returne to *Florence*; *Luke* being left alone shewd his abilities, both by his courage, industry and counsell. All which things were in a manner quite lost in him, while he had a companion. I will anew produce in confirmation hereof *T. Livius* his words, who relating, how that *Quintius* and *Agrippa* his Collegue, being sent by the *Romans* against the *Æqui*, the whole disposing of the war was in *Quintius* his hands, and saies: *In the managing of weighty affaires, it is the safest way to commit the main charge to one.* Which is clean contrary, to what is now adaies practised by our Republicks and Princes: who use to send into those places, that they may the better order them, more Commissaries, and more Commanders than one, which causes much con-

Saluberrimum in administratione magnarum rerum est, summam Imperij apud unum esse.

confusion : and if the occasion were inquired after, why the Italian and French Armies are now adays ruined, we should find this had been the principall. And it may truly be concluded, that it is to more purpose to imploy one man alone of but ordinary judgement in such an expedition, then two very able men together with equall commission.

---

### CHAP. XVI.

*In times of difficulty and perill true worth and vertue is sought after, and in calme and quiet times, not mens vertues, but their wealth, friends, and parentage preferre them.*

**I**T was alwaies and ever will be, that great personages and the worthiest men, in peaceable times, are of small esteem : for because of envy, following the reputation which their vertue hath gained them, in such times there are many Citizens, that are ambitious, not only to bee their equals, but superiors ; and to this purpose there is a place in *Thucydides* the Greeke Historian, which serves very fitly, where he shewes that when the *Athenian* Republick came off victour in the *Peloponnesian* war, and had taken down the *Spartanes* pride, and in a manner subjected all Greece, the *Athenians* conceited so highly of themselves, as that they designed the conquest of *Sicile* also. This enterprise came to be disputed in *Athens* : *Alcibiades* and some other Citizens perswaded

swaded it, as they that little caring for the publick good, thought only upon the advancing their own particular reputations, each one of them having hopes to bee sent Commander in the imployment. But *Nicias* that was the principal among the best reputed of *Athens*, dissuaded it: and the greatest reason he alledged in perswading the people to give credit to his words, was this, because while hee advised them thus that the warr should nor proceed, he perswaded them to that which was not for his advantage; for while *Athens* was in peace, he knew, there were many Citizens would go before him; but in time of war hee was sure none could go before, no nor come near him. Wee see therefore, that in Republicks there is this disorder, in times of peace to make small account of able men, which thing enrages them two severall waies, the one to see their own degrees sayl them; the other to see unworthy men, and of smaller abilities then themselves, made their companions or rather their superiors: which disorder in Republicks hath caused much destruction; for those Citizens who see themselves undeservedly despised, and know that quiet times are the occasion thereof, devise all the wayes they can to disturbe them, suggesting inducements to new wars in prejudice of the Commonwealth. And devising what might be the remedies hereof, we find two; the one to keep the Citizens alwaies poor, to the end that riches without vertue should not be able to corrupt neither those nor others: the other to be alwaies so ready for the war, as that they may be able continually to make war, & may have need alwaies of well reputed Citizens, as *Rome* did in her first beginnings; for that

that City having alwaies some Armyes abroad, there was ever place left to mens vertues, nor could they bereave such a one of his dignity, that deserved it; or confer it upon another not deserving it; for in case that such a thing were done, some times upon mistake or for tryall, there quickly ensued such a disorder thereupon and a danger, that all returned presently into the right way. But those other Commonwealths, that are not so ordered as shee, and that then only make war when necessity constrains them, cannot free themselves of such an inconvenient, or rather they will alwaies incur it, and there will ever some disorder be ready to arise, when that vertuous Citizen thus neglected is of a revengefull disposition, and hath in the City some good repute and correspondence; and from this the City of Rome kept her self free a good while. Yet she (after she had subdu'd *Carthage* and *Antiochus*, as we said otherwhere, being no more in doubt of the issue of her warrs) thought she might give the Command of her Armies to whom she pleas'd, not so much regarding their vertues as their other qualities, ingratiating them with the people: for we see *Paulus Emilius* had several repulses in demanding the Consulate, before he was made Consul, till the *Macedonian* war chanc'd: which because it was thought dangerous, by general consent of the City was committed to him. In our City of *Florence* after the year 1494. many warrs following, one upon the neck of the other, and all the Citizens of *Florence* having made unlucky tryal of themselves, the City by chance lit upon one man who shewed them the manner how their Armies were to be commanded, which

was



was *Antoni Giacomini*: and whiles the wars in hand were perillous, the other Citizens ambitions ceas'd; and in the election of Commissary or Commander of their Armies, he had no competitor stood with him. But when as any war was to be made where no hazard was, but a great deal of honor and dignity, he found alwaies so many competitors, that they being to make election of these Commissioners to beleager *Piza*, he was left out of the number. And however it was not perceiv'd evidently, that evill would befall the State, because *Antony* was not sent thither, yet may we easily conjecture, because the *Pisans* having no means for further defence or sustenance, had *Antony* been sent thither, they would before that have been so straightly beset, that they should have surrendred themselves to the *Florentines* directions. But they being besieged by Commanders that understood not how to begin, nor force them, were so long held in hand, that the City of *Florence* bought them, whereas they might have had them by force. It was likely that such a distaste with *Antony* might have done much, and he had need truly of much patience, and so good a disposition as not to desire revenge hereupon, either with the destruction of the City (if he were able) or with the wrong of any particular Citizen. Whereof a Republtck ought to beware, as in the Chapter following we shall treat.

T

CHAP.

## C H A P. XVII.

That he who hath receiv'd any notable disgrace or injury done him from a Prince or Commonwealth, should never after be intrusted by them with any employment or service of importance.

**A** Commonwealth should be well advis'd, never to commit any weighty service to any one, to whom any notable injury hath been done. *Claudius Nero* ( who left his Army which he had lying in front against *Hannibal*, and with part thereof went into the Marches to find the other Consul, to combat *Asdrubal*, before he should joyn with *Hannibal* ) had formerly in Spain been incamp'd against *Asdrubal*, and having shut him up in a place with his Army, so that *Asdrubal*, was either to fight at disadvantage, or perish by famine, was cunningly by *Asdrubal* so long held in hand with certain treaties of agreement, that hee scap'd him, and took from him the opportunity he had to suppress him. Which thing being known at *Rome*, got him great discredit as well with the Senate as the people, and he was spoken of very disgracefully throughout the City, to his great disreputation and despite thereat too: but being afterwards made Consul, and sent against *Hannibal*, took the course we have said, which was a very dangerous one, so that *Rome* was amazed and in tumults, till news arived of *Asdrubals* defeat, and *Claudius* being afterwards asked

on

on what ground he undertook so dangerous a course, where without an extream necessity he had hazarded the liberty of Rome, answer'd that he had done it, because if it prov'd lucky, he should recover the glory he had formerly lost in Spain : and if it sayl'd him, and this course fell out cross, he knew he should be reveng'd of that City and those Citizens, who had unthankfully and undiscreefly wrong'd him. And when these passions, arising from such offences, are of such force in a Citizen of Rome, and in those dayes before corruption was crept into Rome, we may well ghesse how powerfull they are in a Citizen of such a City that is not so regulated nor order'd as she then was : and because to such like disorders which grow up in Commonwealths, no certain remedy can be assign'd, there followes an impossibility to frame a perpetual Commonwealth, for by many unexpected waies destruction breaks in upon it.

## CHAP. XVIII.

*There is nothing more worthy of a Commander, than to be able to discover beforehand, and espye out the enemies practises.*

**E**Paminondas the Theban said, that nothing was more advantageous or useful to a Commander, than to know the enemies designs and purposes, and because it is hard to attaine to that knowledge, he deserves the greater commendation, who takes such a course that he ghessees it out. And it is

not so hard to discover the enemies purposes as some times to understand his actions, and not so much his actions, which by him are done a far off, as those present and near hand: for it hath many times chanc'd, that a fight having continued til night, he hath vanquished that thinks he hath lo't, and he lost that thought he had overcome; which error hath caus'd some to take resolutions clean contrary to their own good, as it befell *Brutus* and *Cassius*, who upon this mistake lost their war; for *Brutus* having overcome on his wing, *Cassius* believ'd he had lost, that the whole Army was broken, and upon this error despairing of his own safety, slew himself. In our daies in the battell at *Saint Cecily* in *Lombardy* that *Francis* the King of *France* fought with the *Swissers*, the night overtaking them, that part of the *Swissers*, which remained entire, thought they had got the victory, knowing nothing of those that had been broken and slain. Which error was the occasion that they themselves escap'd nor, staying to fight again on the morning much at their disadvantage: such like error also caused to mistake and well near ruined thereby the *Popes* & the *Spanish Army*, which upon this false advice of victory passed the *Po*, and had it gone never so little on forwarde, had been prisoner to the *French*, who were the Conquerors. The like error to this happened in the *Romans Campe*, and in that also of the *Equi*, where *Sempronius* the Consul was with the Army to encounter the enemy, and the battell being joyned, the combat lasted while night with variable fortune on the one and the other side; and night being come, each Army being halfe broken, neither of them

them returned to their quarters, but both of them chose rather to withdraw themselves unto the adjoyning hills, where they thought they might be more secure, and the Roman Army divided itself into two parts, whereof the one went with the Consul, the other with one *Tampanius* a Centurion, whose valor that day kept the Roman Army from being wholly routed; the morning being come, the Roman Consul, without hearing further of the enemy, retired towards *Rome*; and the like did the *Equi* Armie, because each of these thought the enemy had been victour, and therefore they each withdrew themselves, without any regard that they left their Campes in prey to the Enemy. It fell out that *Tampanius* who was there with the remainder of the Roman Army, retiring too, learned by certain wounded soldiers of the *Equi*, that their Captaines were gone and had abandoned their quarters, upon which news he went into the Roman quarters and saved them, but sacked those of the *Equi*, and so returned victorious to *Rome*: which victory (as wee see) consists only in, who hath notice of the enemies disorder. Where we should consider, that it may often come to pass, that the two Armies which are in front one against another, may be both in the like disorder, and suffer the same wants, and that after remains vanquisher that first comes to knowledge of the others necessities. And hereof I will give a domestick and moderne example. In the year one thousand four hundred ninety eight, when the *Florentines* had a great Army about *Pisa*, and beleaguered the Town very strongly, where-

of the *Venetians* having undertaken the protection, and not seeing any other way to save it, resolved to divert the war, by assailing the territories of *Florence* on the other side; wherefore with a strong Army they entered by the vally of *Lamona*, and seized upon the Village of *Marradi*, and besieged the Fortres of *Castiglione* which is upon the hill above; Which the *Florentines* perceiving, resolved to succour *Marradi*, and yet not lessen their forces which they had about *Pisa*; so that having levied new foot, and appointed new horse, they sent them that way, whose Commanders were *Jacobus Quartus* of *Appian*, Lord of *Piombin*, and Count *Rinuccio* of *Marcian*. These then being come to the hills above *Marradi*, the enemies left beleaguering *Marradi*, and betook themselves to the Village; where these two Armies being in front one against the other for some daies, both suffered much for the scarcity of provisions, and other necessities; and neither daring to set upon the other, nor either knowing the others wants, both at once resolved over night to raise their Campes the morning following, and retire, the *Venetian* toward *Berzighella* and *Faenza*, the other toward *Casaglia* and *Mugello*. the morning then com-, and each Campe having begun to send away their carriages, by chance a woman parted from the Bourg of *Marradi*, and came towards the *Florentine* Campe, being secure enough from wrong, because of her old age, and poverty, desirous belike to see some of her friends in that Campe; by whom the *Florentine* Captains understanding of the *Venetian* Camps departure, upon this news grew a little more couragious, and having changed

ged their purpose, as if they had dislodged their enemies, went out, and took their quarters, and writ to *Florence*, they had repulsed and vanquished them. Which victory proceeded from nothing else, than from having first had notice of their enemies departure: which notice had it been given on the other side, would have wrought the same effect against ours.

## CHAP. XIX.

*Whether in the government of a multitude, mildness or severity be of greater avail.*

THE Commonwealth of *Rome* was in a combustion, because of the differences between the Nobles and the Commons: nevertheless as occasion of wars was offered them, they sent forth with their Armies *Quintius* and *Appius Claudius*: *Appius* because he was cruell and rough in commanding, was ill obeyed by those that followed him, so that almost quite broken he fled from his charge. *Quintius* by using a mild and gentle behaviour towards his soldiers, found them very obedient, and returned with victory. Whereupon it seems, that to governe a multitude, it is better to be courteous than insolent, compassionate rather than cruel. Notwithstanding *Cornelius Tacitus* with whom many other writers agree, in a saying of his, concludes the contrary, where he saies, *To rule a multitude, severity is of more force then mildness.* And devising with my self how each of these opinions may be made good, I

In multitudine regenda, plus parum quam obsequium valet.

say either thou art to governe men that ordinarily are thy companions, or that are alwaies in subjection to thee. When they are thy companions, severity or rigour cannot fully be us'd against them according as *Cornelius* argues: and because the common people of *Rome* had equal power in the *Roman* government with the Nobility, he that became Prince among them for a time, could not rule them with roughness and rigor. And many time it was evident, that the *Roman* Commanders did more good that got the good wills of their soldiers, and held but a gentle hand over them, then those that by rough handling kept them in a slavish aw of them, unless they were accompani'd with extraordinary endowments, as was *Manlius Tarquatus*. But he that commands over subjects (whereof *Cornelius* discourses) to the end they grow not insolent, and by reason of thy two great mildness tread thee not under foot, ought rather betake himself to rigor then gentleness. But this a so is not to exceed moderation, for fear of incurring hatred: for it never turns to any Princes advantage to gain the peoples hate. The way to avoid it is, to lay no hands on the subjects estates: for of blood (when rapine is not the covert cause there) no Prince is thirsty, unless forc'd thereto, which seldome he is: but where rapine is mixt, this necessity comes alwaies upon them, nor ever want they occasion, nor desire to shed blood, as in another treaty to this purpose is discours'd at large. *Quintius* was more praise worthy then *Appius*; and yet the saying of *Cornelius* limited as it ought to be, but not in the case observ'd by *Appius*, deserves approbation. And because we have spoken of severity



severity and mildness, methinks it is not more then needs to shew, how one action of humanity was of more force with the Falisci, then many violent acts of hostility.

## CHAP. XX.

*One example of humanity prevail'd more with the Falisci, then all the force of Rome could.*

**C**amillus with the Army being set down before the Faliscies Town, and besieging it, a Pedagogue that taught the children of the chiefest men of the City, thinking to gratify Camillus and the people of Rome, under colour of exercise going forth with them out of the Town, brought them all into the Campe before Camillus: where having presented them he said, that by means of them the Town would forthwith be deliver'd into his hands. Which present was not only not accepted by Camillus, but having caus'd the Pedagogue to be strip'd, and his hands bound behind him, and given to each one of those children a rod in his hand, caus'd him to be whip'd back again by them with many stripes into the Town: Which when they of the Town understood, Camillus his humanity and integrity so much pleas'd them, that not desiring longer to defend themselves, they resolv'd to render up the Town to him. Where it is to be considered by this true example, how much more a courteous and charitable act works in mens minds then any one full of cruelty and violence; and how that many times those countries and cities that

no weapons, nor warlike instruments, nor any other force of man hath been able to open, one action of humanity, piety, chastity, or liberality hath laid wide open. Whereof in stories (besides this) we have in ny other examples. And we all see that the *Romans* by war were not of power to drive *Pyrrhus* out of *Italy*; and yet *Fabritius* his Frankenesse sent him out, when he discover'd to him the offer which a familiar friend of his had made the *Romans* to poison him. We see also, that the conquest of new *Carthage* got not *Scipio Affricanus* so much credit in *Spaine*, as the example he gave of his chastity, when he restored a young woman he took, which was exceeding beautifull, untouch'd by him to her husband. The same of which action got him friendship throughout all *Spaine*. We see moreover how much these vertues are by the people wished for in great men, and how much commended by writers, both by those that set forth Princes lives, and those also that give instructions how they ought to live. Among whom *Zenophon* takes much paines in shewing what honours, how great conquests, and how exceeding good reputation *Cyrus* gained by his humanity and affability, and by abstaining from all actions of pride, cruelty, luxury, and other vices, which blemish men lives. Yet notwithstanding, seeing *Hannibal* by courses contrary to these, gained great fame, and great victories, I purpose to discourse thereupon in the Chapter following, from whence this proceeded.

## CHAP. XXI.

from whence it came, that Hannibal by a manner of proceeding different from that of Scipioes, wrought the same effects in Italy, which the other did in Spaine.

I Think, that some men could well marvaile, seeing certain Commanders (notwithstanding that they have led a contrary course of life) bring to effect the like things, which they have done that lived in the manner above written: so that it appears, that the cause of these victories depends not upon the aforesaid reasons; and it seems that those waies gain thee neither more force nor better fortune, being that glory and reputation may be gotten by contrary courses. And not to part from the man I have above written of, and the better to clear what I propounded, I say, as we see Scipio enter into Spain, and by his humanity and mildness gain the friendship of that whole country, and for them be adored and admired of those nations: on the contrary side wee see Hannibal enter into Italy, using all contrary waies, which is, by violence, cruelty and rapine, and all manner of infidelity, worke the same effect that Scipio did in Spaine: for to Hannibal all the Towns in Italy rebelled, and all the people ran after him. And considering whence this may arise, we see therein many reasons: the first is, that men are desirous of new matters, insomuch as very often times as well they that live at ease, as they who

do not, desire novelty : for ( as we said  
otherwhere, and it is true ) men are as  
well glutted with good, as afflicted and  
vexed with evill. This desire therefore  
opens the gates wide to every one, that  
in any Country makes himself the cheif of  
any innovation. And be he a stranger,  
they run after him ; if of the Country,  
they come all about him, they strengthen  
and favour him, so that in what sort so-  
ever it be he proceeds, he comes to ad-  
vance exceedingly in those places. Besides  
this, men are thrust forward by two prin-  
cipal things, either by love or feare, so  
that he as well commands them that  
makes himself beloved, as he that causes  
himself to be feared ; and most commonly  
he is more followed and obeyed that makes  
himself be feared, then he that makes him-  
self beloved. Therefore it little imports a  
Commander by which of these wayes he  
goes, provided that he be a worthy man,  
and that worth causes him to be of great  
repute among men : for when that worth  
is great as it was in *Hannibal* and *Scipio*,  
it cancells all the errors they commit, ei-  
ther by the great love they beare them, or  
the great feare they stand in of them. For  
from the one and the other of these two  
waies great inconveniences may arise, of  
force to ruine a Prince : for he that de-  
sires to be too much belov'd, any little that  
he swerves from the true way, becomes  
contempnible. And that other who would  
be too much feared, when he a little  
exceeds the mean, growes odious ; and to  
keep

keep the middle way it is not possible : for our nature will not comport it. But it is necessary to allay these things, that exceed, with an extraordinary worth, as *Hannibal* and *Scipio* both did : yet it appeared that the one and the other of them were endamag'd by their manner of life, for which they were esteem'd and valu'd. The valuation of both of them we have already spoke of: the damage as for *Scipio*, was that his own Soldiers in Spain together with some of his friends mutined against him, which proceeded from nothing else than because they fear'd him not : for men are so unfeild that upon the least overture made to their ambition, they forthwith forget all the good will they owe their Prince for his mildness and courtesie, as did the aforesaid Soldiers and friends, in so much as *Scipio*, to remedie this inconvenient, was constrain'd to practise that cruelty in some part, which he had abhor'd. As for *Hannibal*, we have no particular example, where the cruelty he us'd, or his small faulth did him any harm. But we may well conceive, that Naples and many other Townes that continued in obedience to the Romans, did it for fear thereof. This we see plainly, that his wicked manner of living, made him more odious to the people of Rome, than any other enemy that Commonwealth ever had : so that, whereas to *Pyrrhus* (while he was with his Armie in Italy) they discover'd the party that intended to poyson him, they never forgave it *Hannibal* (though disarm'd and banish'd) till they had made an end of him. These inconveniencies then accru'd to *Hannibal* for being held impious, a breaker of his faith, and cruel : but on the other side, he thereby

got

got one very great advantage, which is much admired by all Writers, that in his army (though composed of several Nations) there never arose any mutiny, neither among themselves, nor against him. Which we cannot derive from any other cause than from the terror that grew from his person, which was so great, mixt with the reputation he gave of his valor, that it kept his Soldiers in quietness and concord. I conclude then, that it imports not much, in which of these two waies a Commander proceeds, provided he hath so great worth in him, as may well season the one and the other manner of living: for (as it is said) both in the one and the other there is defect and danger, when it is not corrected by some extraordinary endowments. And if *Hannibal* and *Scipio*, the one by commendable means, and the other by detestable courses, wrought the same effect, me thinks I should not forbear to discourse also of two Roman Citizens, who by several wayes, but both honorable, attained one and the same glory.

## CHAP, XXII.

*How Manlius Torquatus his rigor, and Valerius Corvinus his mildness, gained each of them the same glory.*

**A**T the same time there were in Rome two famous Captaines, *Manlius Torquatus* and *Valerius Corvinus*: who both of equal vertue, had a like triumph'd, and liv'd in equal credit & reputation in Rome; & each of them (touching the enemy) had with equal valor gained it; but as for the Armies, and treating of their Soldiers

Soldiers, they proceeded exceeding differently: for *Manlius* with all kind of severity commanded them, without intermitting his Soldiers pains or punishments. *Valerius* on the other part in all kinds and termes of courtesie treated them with a familiar way of affability; for it appears, that the one to keep his Soldiers in obedience put his own son to death, and the other never hurt any. Yet in such a differency of proceeding, each produc'd the same fruit, as well to the enemies loss, as the Commonwealths profit, and his own particular; for never any Soldier refus'd the fight or mutini'd against them, or in any part disagreed from their wills, however that *Manlius* his commands were so rigorous, that all other kinds of commands, which exceeded measure in severity, were termed *Manlian commands*. Where we are first to consider, whence it was that *Manlius* was constrained to proceed so rigidly: the next is, what was the cause that these two different waies brought forth the same effect: and in the last place, which is the better of the two, and more profitable to imitate. If any man consider well *Manlius* his disposition, from the time that *T. Livius* begins to make mention of him, he shall find him, a very valiant man, religiously loving his Father and his Countrey, and exceedingly reverencing his Superiors. These things we gather from the slaughter of the Frenchmen, from the defence of his Father against the Tribune, and in that before he went to fight with the Frenchmen, he went to the Consul, with these words, *Without thy allowance, I will never fight*

*Injussa tuo adversus hostem  
nunquam pugnabo, non si cer-  
tam victoriam videam.*

*with*

with the enemy, no though I were assured of victory. When a man then so dispos'd attains to such dignity as to command, he desires to find all other men like himself, and his strong courage moves him to command strong and stout things: and the same (when once they are commanded) will likewise that they be observed; and the rule is most certain, that when rigid and hard things are commanded, it is fit with rigor to see them observ'd; otherwise wouldst thou find thy self much deceiv'd. Where it is to be noted that if a man will be obeyed, it is necessary he know how to command; and they know how to command, that make a comparison between their own quality, and theirs that are to obey; and when they see a proportion, then let them command; but when a disproportion, let them forbear. And therefore a wise man said, that to hold a Commonwealth by violence and force, it was needfull there were a proportion between the person forcing, and the party forced; and whenever that proportion was, there it was credible that that violence would last: but when the party forced was of more force than the person forcing, it might be doubted that violence would every day fail. But returning to our discourse, I say, that to command stout and strong things it is necessary to be stout too: and he that is of this stoutness, and commands such things, can never by mildness cause them to be observ'd: but he that hath not the strength of courage, ought beware of these extraordinary commands, and in those ordinary he may well use his own humanity: for ordinary punishments are not imputed to the Prince, but to the lawes and customes. We ought then to believe,



believe, that *Manlius* was forced to proceed so roughly, by his own extraordinary commands, whereunto his own nature was inclinable, which are very useful in a Commonwealth, because they reduce the orders thereof to their originals and ancient vigor. And if a Republike were so fortunate, that she often had (as we have formerly said) some one by his example to renew and revive the Laws, and not retain them onely from running to ruine, but draw them quite back to their beginnings, she might be perpetual. So that *Manlius* was one of those, who by the rigor of his commands maintained the military discipline in Rome, drawn thereunto first by his own nature, afterwards from a desire which he had that that should be observed, which his natural inclination had made him ordain. On the other side *Valerius* might as he pleased proceed with cunctise, as he, whom it sufficed, that the accustomed orders were observed in the Roman Armies: which custome (because it was good) was enough to honor him, and yet not painful to observe; nor did it force *Valerius* to punish the offenders, as well because it may be there were none, as for that if there had been any, they imputed (as it is said) their punishments to the wonted orders and customes, and not to the Princes cruelty. So that *Valerius* had power to cause all humanity and mildness to flie from himself, whereby he might easily gain his souldiers good wills. Whereupon it came to pass that the one or the other having the same obedience, were able, though proceeding diversly, to work the same effect. They that would follow these, may chance to fall into those vices of contempt and hatred, as I said in  
my

my discourse before of *Hanaibal* and *Scipio*, which is avoided by an excessive worth in thee, and not otherwise. It remains now that we consider which of these ways of proceeding is the more commendable: which I take to be a matter disputable, because as well the one as other is much prais'd by writers. Yet they that write how a Prince should rule his subjects, come nearer to *Valerius* then *Manlius*. And *Xenophon*, alledged formerly by me, giving many examples of *Cyrus* his humanity, accords much with that which *T. Livius* says of *Va. le. rius*: for being made Consul against the *Samnites*, & the day come he was to fight, he spake to his souldiers with that affability and familiarity, with which he used to behave himself towards them and after such speaking, *T. Livius*

says these words; *There was never any Captain more familiar w th his souldiers, among the meanest of them, freely undergoing all s rvices: besides in military exercises, where as the soldiers use to contend with their equals either in swiftness or strength, he himself without change of countenance or graciously and easily lost as won; nor scorned he any one that offered himself to match him; liberal he was, and affable, no less mindful of other mens liberties, then of his own dignity; and which is the greatest point of popularity, the same course he took to attain to his magistracy, the same he followed in executing it. In like*

*Non alius militi familiarior dux fuit, inter infimos militum omnia haud gravatè munia obundo in ludo præterea militari cum velocitatis, virumque inter se æquales certamina ineunt; comiter facillis vincere, ac vinctu eodem, nec quenquam aspernari parem qui se offerret; factis benignus; pro redactis, haud minus libertatis alienæ, quam suæ dignitatis memor; & quo nihil popularius est, quibus artibus petierat magistratus, iisdem gerebat.*

man.

manner *T. Livius* speaks honorably of *Manlius*, shewing that his severity in putting his son to death, made the Army so obedient to the Consul, that it was a cause the Romans gain'd the victory of the Latines: and he proceeds so far in commending him, that after this victory, having set down all the order of the battel, and shewed all the dangers which the people of Rome ran, and the difficulties there were to overcome, he concludes thus, that onely *Manlius* his valour gave the Romans that victory. And comparing the forces of the two Armies together, affirms, that that side would have overcome, which soever had had *Manlius* for their Consul. So that considering all that writers speak hereof, it would be hard to give a good judgement hereupon. Nevertheless, not to leave this part undecided, I say, that in a Citizen living under the laws of a Republike, it is more laudable and less dangerous to proceed as *Manlius* did; for that way is wholly in favour of the publike, and no whit regards private ambition; for by such a course a man cannot gain any partisans, shewing himself rigid to every one, favoring onely the common good: for no man behaving himself thus, can get any particular friends, which we term (as it was said before) Partisan. In so much that a like manner of proceeding cannot be more profitable nor more approved in a Republike: the publike advantage nothing failing in it, and being impossible to give thereby any jealousy of private ambition. But in the course *Valerius* took it is contrary; for, however that in regard of the publike, the same effects are produc'd, yet there arise many doubts, by reason of

of the particular good will, which this man gains of his soldiers, which in a long continuance of government might much wrong the common liberty. And if in publike there grew no mischief hereupon, the reason was, because the Romans minds as yet were not corrupted, nor he long continued in his command. But if we are to consider a Prince as *Xenophon* does, we must wholly take to *Valerius*, and leave *Manlius*: for a Prince ought in his soldiers and subjects aim at love and obedience: that he maintains the old orders, and is esteemed virtuous, will yeeld him obedience: and love his affability, humanity, his pity and those other endowments *Valerius* had, which *Xenophon* also writes were in *Cyrus*: for to be a Prince well-willed in particular, and to have his whole Army as particularly affected to him, agrees well with all other parts of his state. But in a Citizen, having an Army so to take part with him, this part agrees not with the rest, which are to oblige him to live under the Laws, and obey the Magistrates. We read among the ancient stories of the Venetian Republike, how that the Gallies of Venice being returned home, and a difference arising between them of the Gallies and the people, whereby an uproar and tumult was raised, nor could the matter be quieted by force of officers, reverence of Citizens, nor fear of the principal Magistrates, of a sudden when *Peter Loredanus* shewed himself to those Mariners, who the year before had been their Commander, for love of him they departed and left the fight. Which obedience begot such a suspicion in the Senate, that a little while after the Venetians either by imprisonment or death assured themselves of him

him. I conclude therefore that *Valerius* his manner of proceeding is profitable in a Prince, and hurtful in a Citizen, not onely to his country, but to himself: to his country, because those courses prepare a way to tyranny: to himself, for when his country is suspicious of his proceedings, it is constrained to make sure of him with his damage. So on the contrary, I affirm that *Manlius* his proceeding in a Prince is hurtful, and in a citizen profitable, and especially to the country, and also seldom offends, if now this hatred which thy severity draws after it, be not increased by suspicion which by means of thy great reputation thy other virtues charge thee with, as by and by shall be discoursed touching *Camillus*.

## C H A P. XXIII.

For what cause *Camillus* was banished from Rome.

WE have formerly concluded that by proceeding as *Valerius* did, a man hurts both his country and himself. And by proceeding as *Manlius* did, a man advantages his country, and sometimes hurts himself. Which is sufficiently proved by the example of *Camillus*, who in his manner of proceeding came nearer to *Manlius* then *Valerius*. Whereupon *Titus Livius* speaking of him, says, His virtue the soldiers loved, and yet admired. That which caused the admiration of him, was his carefulness, his wisdom, the magnanimity of his spirit, and the good order in employing

Eius virtutem milites oderant, & mirantur.

ing and commanding his Armies. That which got him hatred, was, that he was more severe in chastising then liberal in rewarding them. And *Titus Livius* alledges these occasions of this hatred. The first was, that the monies which were made of the sale of the Veientes goods, he brought all into the treasury, and divided not together with the spoile among the soldiers. The second, that in his triumph he made his triumphal Chariot be drawn with four white horses, where they said that in his pride he strove to equal the Sun. The third, that he made a vow to give *Apollo* the tenth part of the prey taken from the Veientes, which (he desiring to pay his vow) was to be taken out of the soldiers hands, who already had got possession of it. Where those things are very easily marked, that make a Prince odious with his people. Of which the principal is, to bereave them of any profit, which is a matter of much importance: for the things that carry any profit with them, when a man is deprived thereof, he never forgers; and every little necessity puts thee in mind of them; and because necessities haunt us every day, thou remembrest these things every day: the other thing is to appear losly and puffed up with pride, then which nothing is more odious to the people, especially those that enjoy their liberty. And however that from that pride and stateliness of theirs the people receive no hurt, yet do they always hate them that use it: whereof a Prince ought to beware, as of a rock; for to procure hatred without advantage, is but a rash and foolish course.

## CHAP. XXIV.

*The continuation of governments brought Rome into slavery.*

**I**F we consider well the proceedings of the Roman Republike, we shall see that two things were the cause of that Republikes dissolution: the one was contentions which grew upon the Agrarian law; the other was the continuation of governments. Which things had they been well seen into in the beginning, and due remedies applied thereto, their free state would have lasted longer, and probably have been less turbulent. And however, that as for the prolonging of any charge we see not that in Rome any tumult was raised, yet in effect we see how much that authority hurt the City, which the Citizens took upon them by such decrees. And if the other Citizens, whose magistracies were prorogued, had been wise and virtuous, as *L. Quinctius*, this inconvenient would never have fallen out, whose goodness in one example is remarkable: for there being an agreement made between the Commons and the Senate, and the Commons having prolonged the Tribunes charges for one year, judging them able to resist the Nobilities ambition, the Senate would for strife sake, with the Commons, and not to seem of less power then they, prorogue *T. Quintius* his Consulship: who absolutely denied this determination of theirs, saying, that they should endeavor to blot out and cancell evil examples, rather then increase their number with another evil one; and so would needs have them  
make

make new Consuls. Which goodness and wisdom had it been in all the Cities of Rome, it would never have suffered the introducing of that custome, to prolong magistracies: and from thence they would not have proceeded to the continuation of Commands over Armies, which thing at length ruined that Republike. The first who had his command continued to him, was *P. Philo*, who being incamped before the City of Palepolis, and his Consulship coming to an end, the Senate thinking he had neer upon gotten the victory, sent him no successor, but made him Proconsul, so that he was the first Proconsul. Which thing (though propounded by the Senate for the publike good) was that which in time brought Rome into bondage: for the further abroad the Romans went with their Armies, the more thought they such prorogation necessary; and the more they used it; which thing produced two inconveniences; the one that a smaller number of men were employed and practised in commands: and by this the reputation hereof came to be restrained to a few: the other was, that one Citizen continuing long time commander of an Army, got it to himself, and made it of his own faction. For that Army in time forgot the Senate, and took him only for their head. Hereby it came that *Sylla* and *Marinus* could finde soldiers that would take their parts against the Publike. By these means could *Cesar* make himself Lord of his native country. Yet if the Romans had not prolonged these magistracies and commands, they had never so quickly attained so great power: and had their conquests been more slow, they would not so soon have fallen into servitude.



## CHAP. XXV.

Of Cincinnatus and many other Roman Citizens poverties.

WE have elsewhere discoursed, that the most profitable ordinance that can be made in a free State, is, that the Citizens be kept bare and poor. And however in Rome it appears not what order that was which wrought this effect (especially considering the Agrarian law had such opposition) nevertheless it was seen by experience, that four hundred years after Rome was built, there was very great poverty: nor is it credible, that other greater order produc'd this effect, than to see, that poverty was no bar to any preferment whatsoever, or any honor, and that they went to find out virtue in what cottage soever she dwelt. Which manner of living made people less covet wealth. This appears plain, because when Minucius the Consul besieged with his Army by the Equi, Rome was exceedingly afraid, lest that Army should be lost, so that they created a Dictator, being the last recourse they had in their difficulties, and this was L. Quinctus Cincinnatus, who at that time was in his little Country farm; which he then shut up with his own hands. *Opera pretium est audire quid sententia humana de divitiis communis, neque honoris, magno locum, neque virtuti putant esse, nisi emula acuant opes.*

unto honours or vertue, but where riches flow abundantly. *Cincinnatus* was then at plough in his Country Village, which exceeded not the quantity of four acres of ground, when from Rome Deputies were sent him by the Senate to let him know the election of his Dictatourship, and to shew him in what danger the Commonwealth then was. He then having taken to him his gown, came to Rome, and devied an Army, and went thence and delivered *Mintius*; and having broken and despoyled the enemies, and set him free, would not permit that the besieged Army should partake of the prey, saying these words, I will not allow thou shouldst partake of this prey, whose prey thou wert to have been. And deprived *Mintius* of the Consulship, and made him Lieutenant, telling him, Thou shalt stay at this degree, till thou knowest how to be Consul. He had made *L. Tarquinus* General of his horse, who out of meer poverty served afoot. It is observable (as is said) what honour they did unto poverty, and how that to a good and worthy man four acres of land were sufficient to mainrain him. Which poverty we see that it was also in the dayes of *Marcus Regulus*: for being with the Armies in *Affrica*, he asked the Senate leave, he might turne to his Country farme, which was spoyled by his husbandmen. Where wee see two very notable things, the one the poverty, and how they were contented therewith, and how it sufficed these Citizens to gain honour from the wars; & the profit of it of they left to the publick: for if they had purposed to grow rich by the wars, it would little have troubled them, that their fields were spoyled. The other is to consider the generous

rage of those Citizens, who when they were made Commanders of an Army, exceeded any Prince in magnanimity of spirit, they valued neither Kings nor Commonwealths, nothing affrighted or terrified them; and afterwards when they were returned to live private men, became parsimonious, humble, and men that themselves husbanded and took pains in managing their own small possessions, obedient to the Magistrates, reverencing their superiors, so that it seems impossible that the same mind could endure such change. This poverty continued yet til the days of *Paulus Emilius*, which were in a manner the last happy daies of that Republick, where a Citizen who by his triumph enrich'd *Rome*, notwithstanding kept himself very poor. And moreover, so much was poverty in esteem, that *Paulus* for a reward of behaving himself bravely in the war, gave a silver cup to a son-in-law of his; which was the first peece of Plate he ever had in his house. It were easy with a long discourse to shew, how much better fruits poverty produces than riches; and that the one hath honored Cities, Countries, and Religions; and the other hath been the destruction thereof, had not this subject been handled several times by other writers.

## CHAP. XXVI.

*How that upon the occasion of women, States have been ruined.*

**T**Here fell out in the City of *Ardea* between the Nobles and the Commons a debate by reason of an alliance: where a young woman that was an heire being as yet to marry, one of the Commons and one of the Nobles wooed her at the same time, and she having no Father alive, her Tutors desired to bestow her on the *Plebeyan*, and her Mother on the Nobleman: whereupon such a tumult was rais'd, that they came to blowes, where the Nobility was in armes in favour of the Nobleman, and the Commons in favour of the *Plebeyan*, so that the Commons having the worle, went out of *Ardea*, and sent for ayd to the *Volsai*, and the Nobles sent to *Rome*. The *Volsai* were there first, and as soon as they arrived they sat down before *Ardea*. The *Romans* came afterwards upon them, and inclosed the *Volsai* between the Town and them, so that they forc'd them (brought to it by famine) to yeeld to their discretion. And the *Romans* entring into *Ardea*, and putting to death the principals of the sedition, accorded all the matters of that City. In this text are many things to be observed. First we see, that women have been the occasions of many destructions, and have brought great mischiefs upon the Governors of Cities, and have caused many dissentions in them. And (as it hath been already seen in this our Story) that excess committed against *Lucretia* lost the

*Tarquin*

Tarquins their State. That other act against Virginia deprived the ten of their power. And Aristotle among the principal occasions hee shewes of Tyrants destructions, reckons the injuries they did some others for their women in deflowring and ravishing them, or defiling their marriage bed; as touching this part, in the Chapter where we treated of Conspiracies, we spoke at large. I say then, that absolute Princes, and Governors of Commonwealths are to take no smaller care hereof, but ought well consider the disorders, which may grow upon such an accident, and remedy it in time, so that the remedy be neither with the hurt, nor disgrace of their state, or Commonwealth, as it befell the Ardeates, who for having suffered that difference to increa'se among Citizens, came to take part with their several factions: and when they would have reunited themselves, were forc'd to send for forraign ayds, which is the beginning of a servitude at hand. But let us come to the other remarkable thing of the manner of reuniting Cities, whereof in the Chapter following we mean to treat.

# CHAP. XXVII.

*How a City at discord in it self is to be united; and how that opinion is not true, that to maintain Cities in chedience, it is necessary to keep them in discord, and divided into factions.*

BY the example of the Roman Consuls, who made a reconciliation among the Ardeates, the way is shewed how matters

are to be composed in a City at variance: which is no other, nor can otherwaies be helpe then by putting to death the chief ringleaders of seditions: for of necessity one of these three waies is to be gone either to put them to death, as they did, or remove them out of the City, or cause them to make peace one with another, with assurance given not to wrong either the other. Of these three waies this last is the most pernicious, less certain, and most unprofitable: for it is impossible, where much blood hath been shed, and other like outrages, that a peace made by force should continue, looking one another in the face every day: and it is very hard for them to forbear injuring one another, being there may every day be given amongst them by reason of their daily conversation new occasions of quarrels. Whereupon a better example cannot be alledged then the City of *Pistoia*. That City was divided (as still it is) fifteen years agoe, into the *Panciatichi*, and the *Cancellieri*: but then were they in armes, now they have laid them aside. And after many brabbles amongst them, they came at length to the shedding of blood, to demolishing of houses, and pillaging of goods, and to all other termes of hostilitie. And the *Florentines* that were to reconcile them, alwaies took that third course: and thereupon alwaies arose greater tumults and greater scandals: So that weary hereof, they came to take that second course, to remove the heads of the factions, some of which they put in prison, others they confined in several places: in so much as the agreement was able to continue, and so hath done till this present day; but without doubt the safest way had

had been the best. But because such like executions have some thing in them of greatness of spirit and magnanimity, a feeble Republick knows not how to put them in practise, but is so far there from, that hardly arrives she to use the second remedy. And these are some of those errors, of which I spake in the beginning, that the Princes of our times commit, being to give their judgements in matters of weight: for they should have a mind to see how they have carried themselves, who of old have delivered their opinions in like cases. But the weakness of men now a daies, caused by their weak education, and their little knowledge of things makes them esteem those opinions of the ancients partly inhuman, partly impossible. Whereas they have certain of their moderne opinions, quite contrary to the truth, as is that, where the wise man of our City a while agoe said, it was needfull to hold *Fistais* by factions; and *Pise* with Cittadells: nor perceive they how unprofitable the one and the other of these things is. I will pass over the Cittadells, because formerly wee spake of them at large, & now discourse of the incommodity that arises from holding the Towns thou hast under thy government, divided into factions. And touching the former, it is impossible thou canst maintain both those ancient factions, Prince or Republick thou art that goverest them: for by nature men are inclined to take part in any thing that is divided, and to be pleased more with this than with that; so that the having a faction in that Town discontented with thee, is a cause that the first war that comes, thou loest it: for it is impossible to guard a City, that hath enemies without doors, & within doors. If it be a Republick that go-

vernes this City, there is no readier way to make thy Subjects become nought, and to set thy City at variance, than by having in thy dominions a Town thus at odds; for each faction seeks favour, and each part strives to gain friends by all manner of corruption, so that two very great inconveniences arise thereupon: the one is, that thou canst never make them thy friends, because thou canst not well govern them, the rule oftentimes varying, sometimes with the one humor, sometimes with the other: the other is, that that favouring of sides must needs divide thy Republick. And *Blondus* speaking of the *Florentines*, and the *Pisoyeses*, tells us plainly, that while the *Florentines* thought to reconcile those of *Pisoya*, they divided themselves. Whereupon wee may easily perceive the evill which grows upon this division. In the year 1301. when *Arezzo* was lost, and the whole vale of *Tiber*, and that of *Chiana* was taken by the *Vitelli* and the Duke *Valentine*, there came a Gentleman called *de Lant*, sent by the King of *France*, to cause a restitution of all those Towns lost to the *Florentines* again: and this *de Lant* finding in every one of those Fortresses men, who when they came to visit him, told him they were of the faction of *Margocco*, he much blamed their division, saying that if in *France* one of the Kings Subjects should say hee were of the Kings party, he would be punished: because such a speech could signifie no less, than that there in the Country were people enemies to the King, whereas that King will that all those Towns be his friends, united in themselves, and without factions. But all these wiles, & opinions differing from the truth, arise from the weakness of those



those that are Princes, who seeing they are not able to hold their States by force and valour, beake themselves to such like devices, which sometimes when things are in quietness helpe somewhat; but if they come to any distress, and that they have warn, they quickly shew them what little trust there is to be had in them.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

*That the Citizens Actions ought to be well weighed for many times under vertuous and charitable deeds are laid the foundations of a Tyranny.*

THE City of Rome being much oppressed by famine, and the publick provisions insufficient to ease it, one *Spurius Melius* had a mind, being very rich in those times, out of his private estate to make provision of Corn, and feed the common people to their content. Whereupon the people flocked so thick about him in favour of him, that the Senate perceiving the inconvenience that grew upon this his liberality, to suppress it before it took better hold, created a Dictatour, and set him on his back, who put him to death. Here is to be noted, that many times those works which seem to be done upon charity and piety, and no way with reason to be condemn'd, prove very pernicious and dangerous, when they are not looked to in good time. And to argue this matter more particularly, I say that a Republick cannot subsist, nor in any case be well govern'd without Citizens of good credit and reputation. On the other side the Citizens reputation, is the occasion of Tyranny in a Commonwealth. And if we will regulate this matter, it must so be order'd, that the Citizens stand upon such manner of reputation.

ration, as may advantage and not endamage the City, nor the liberty thereof. And therefore the means are to be examin'd, whereby they gain reputation, which in effect are two, either publick or private. The publick means are, when one by advising well, and doing better for the publick benefit, gains reputation. To this honour the way should be set open to the Citizens, and rewards given, as well for good advices, as good actions, so that they are therefore both to be honoured and satisfied: for when these reputations are gotten by these plain and honest courses, they will never prove dangerous. But when they are gain'd by particular waies (which is the other means by us alleadged before) they are very dangerous and hurtfull. The private waies are the benefiting this and that other particular, lending monies, marrying with their daughters, protecting them against the magistrates, and doing them such other like favours, which make men become factious, and encourage him that is thus favour'd by them, to think he may be able to corrupt the publick, & violate the laws. Therefore ought a Republick that is well ordered, give easy access to those that seek favour by publick means, but bar out those that work by their own private by waies, as Rome did, we see. For in reward of him that did the publick good service, she ordain'd their triumphs and all those other honors, which she bestow'd on her Citizens: and to punish those, who under diverse colours aspired to greatness by private waies, she appointed the publick accusations: and when these would not serve, because the people was blinded with the shew of a false good, she created a Dictator, who by a Kinglike power

Power should reduce those into their ranks again, that were broken out, as she did to punish *Spurius Melius*. And when one of these things is left unpunished, it is of force to ruine a Republick; for hardly upon such an example may she afterwards be brought into the right way again.

## CHAP. XXIX.

*That the peoples faults grow first from their Princes.*

Princes have no reason to complain of any fault, which the people that is under their governments do commit: for their faults must needs proceed either from their negligence, or because they are blemished with the like errors. And whoever shall run over the nations that in our dayes have been accounted full of robberies, and such like offences, shall perceive they all wholly proceeded from those that govern'd them who were of the like condition. In *Romania* those Princes in it before they were extinguish'd by Pope *Alexander* the sixth, gave patterns to every one of a most ungodly and unconscionable life: for here a man might see horrible executions upon every slight occasion, and exceeding great rapines: Which first grew from the wickedness of those Princes, not from the mischievous disposition of the people, as they said: for those Princes being but poor, and yet having a mind to live as stately as those that were rich, were necessitated to apply themselves to many rapins, and to practise them di-

verſe waies, and among other diſhoneſt waies they took, this was one: they made lawes and forbid ſome kind of action to be done: afterwards they were the firſt that gave the occaſion to break it, nor ever puniſh'd they the breakers of it, till afterwards when they ſaw many others had committed the ſame fault, and then they began to puniſh the breach, not for any zeal towards the law made, but for covetouſneſſe to recover the penalty: whereupon grew many inconveniencies: and above all this, that the people were impoveriſh'd, and no way amended, and thoſe that were impoveriſh'd uſed all their wits to work upon thoſe that were their inferior. Whereupon aroſe all theſe evils (we have now ſpoken of) whereof the Prince was the only cauſe. And that this is true, *T. Livius* ſhews us, where he relates, that the Roman Ambaſſadors, carrying a gift of the ſpoile taken from the Venetians to *Apollonia*, were taken by the Corſaiges of *Lipari* in *Sicily*, and there brought to land. But *Timasitheus* their Prince, having underſtood, what gift it was, whether it went, and who ſent it, though he were borne in *Lipari*, yet behaved he himſelf like a worthy Roman, and told the people, that it was impiety to lay hands on ſuch a gift, in ſo much as by general conſent they ſet the Ambaſſadors at liberty with all that was theirs: and the Hiſtorians

*Timasitheus* magnitudinem religionis implevit, quia ſemper regentem ſibi ſibi.

words are theſe, *Timasitheus* made all the multitude religious, who is done a waies like a true governor, And *Laurence* of Medicines confirmation ſo this opinion ſhews.

THE

*The Princes actions or examples move,*

*And those in their best patterns men approve.*

*Et quel che fail Signor famopoſi molti,*

*Che nel Signor ſon culti li oſtri volti.*

### CHAP. XXX.

*A Citizen, that will of his own authority do any good work in his own City, of neceſſity muſt firſt extinguish all envy, and what order is to be given for the defence of a City upon the enemies approach.*

**T**HE Rōmane Senate having notice, that all Tuscany had made a new levy of souldiery with purpose to endamage Rome, and that the Latini and Hernici, who formerly had been their friends, were now joyned to the Volsci, the perpetual enemies of Rome, considered that this war might prove perillous. And Camillus at that time being Tribune with Consular power, thought all might be well done without creating a Dictator, if the other Tribunes his colleagues would yeeld up unto him the ſum and whole command of the Empire, which the said Tribunes willingly did. *Nor thought they (says T. Livius) in any thing derogated from their Majesty, what they had yeelded to him.* Whereupon Camillus having taken this obedience upon their words, commanded they should inroll three Armies. Of the first he would be general to go against the Tuscans, Of the second he made

*Nec quicquam de  
majestate sua detra-  
ctum credebant quod  
majestati eius con-  
cessissent.*

made *Quintus Servilius* Commander, whom he would have to abide near about Rome, to withstand the *Latini* and the *Hernici*, if they should stir. He gave *Lucius Quintius* the command of the third Army, which he levied for the guard of the City, the defence of the gates and the court of justice, in case any chance should happen; besides this he ordained, that *Horatius* one of his Collegues, should make provision of arms and corn and other things requisite in time of war. He made *Cornelius* also his Collegue chief of the Senate, and over the publike Councel, to consult upon those things which in general were to be executed: Thus were the Tribunes in those times disposed for the good of their Country to command, and to obey. It is noted by the text here, what a virtuous and prudent man may do, and what great good he may be cause of, and how much he may be able to advantage his country, when by means of his goodness and vertue, he hath quite extinguished all envy, which many times is the cause that men cannot effectuate a good work, the said envy not allowing them that authority which it is necessary they should have in matters of importance. And this envy is quite put out two ways; either by some strong and difficult accident, where every one seeing themselves ready to perish, laying ambition aside, willingly run to obey him, whom they believe by his vertue able to deliver them, as it befell *Camillus*: who having given so many proofs of his being an admirable man, and having been thrice Dictator, and performed that place alwayes with the advantage of the publike, and no way to his own profit, had now caused men

not

not to be afraid of his greatness. And because he was so magnanimous, and of such great credit, they thought it no shame to them to be inferiours to him: And therefore saies *Titus Erius* very wisely these words, *Nor thought they it any things, &c.* Another way is envy blotted out, when either by violence or by course of nature they dye that have been thy competitors in attaining to any reputation, or greatness; who seeing the more esteemed then they, it is impossible they ever should be at rest, or have any patience. And when they are accustomed to live in a corrupted City, where their education hath not bred any goodness in them, it is impossible, let what accident will fall out, that they should ever go back from any thing; and without doubt to have their wills, and satisfy the waywardness of their minds; they would be contented even to see the ruine of their native Country. To overcome this envy, there is no other remedy but the death of those that bear it: and when fortune is so favorable to that vertuous man, as that those men dye a natural death, he becomes glorious without giving any scandal, when without any obstacle or offence he may display his vertues. But when he hath not this good luck, he must devise by any means to take them out of his way. And before he can do any thing he must practise those wayes whereby to overcome this difficulty. And he that reads the Bible with understanding, shall see that *Moses* was forced (if he would have his lawes and ordinances proceed) to put a great number of men to death, who provoked by nothing else but envy, withstood his purpose.

purpose. This necessity I doubt that the un-  
 Friar Jerom Savonarola knew very well, and advises others of, he  
 Peter Soderini chief Stat- wants himself: not  
 knowing the meaning of, or not believing the holy  
 writs whereby he puts men past suspicion of his  
 Atheisme. For what he alledges of Moses, he  
 must needs take originally from Moses his books,  
 being we have not any author of that antiquity, as  
 could write any thing of his own knowledge touch-  
 ing those times. But those Mach. seems not to  
 believe further then served his own humor, reading  
 the Scriptures onely to a politicke end, not so much  
 for the strengthening of his belief, as the better-  
 ing of his discourse. Yet however Machiavel did  
 not, I hope others will believe that Moses deliver-  
 ed to the Israelites the true Oracles of GOD, and  
 that it was not Moses that punished the delin-  
 quents among them, but GOD sending his im-  
 mediate judgements. As in the rebellion of Co-  
 rah and his complices, Numbers the 16. Moses did but  
 cite them as to appearance: but GOD immedi-  
 ately sent his vengeance: For the earth under them  
 opened, vers. 31. And when that wretched fel-  
 low gathered sticks on the Sabbath, Numb 15.  
 Moses waited till GOD passed the sentence  
 upon him for his death, and the manner there-  
 of, vers. 35. Therefore Machiavell may justly be  
 taxed for traducing Moses here of more then he  
 hath warrant for, making no other esteem of Mo-  
 ses his bringing the Israelites out of Egypt, and his  
 leading them through the wilderness, then of Ro-  
 mulus his gathering together a scattered multi-  
 tude, and laying the foundation of that Common-  
 wealth, which affords his courage and ambition of  
 rule and glory thrust him upon, not seeming to take  
 notice, that Moses was immediately called by  
 GOD,



GOD, and sent to shew his wonders and judgments against the Egyptians, and to condukt the Israelites into Canaan (according to GOD'S promises formerly made to their forefathers) wherein he behaved not himself either ambitiously or insolently, nor was any thing done by his own prowess or policy, but meely by the ordinance of GOD.

hard-bearer of Florence knew it also. The one could not overcome it, because he had not power to do it, which was the Fryar, and because he was not well understood by those that followed him who might have had power to have done it. But it was not his fault, and his sermons are full of the blames he lays upon the wise men of the world, and of invectives against them; for so he terms those envious men, and all that opposed his ordinances. That others believed that in time, by his goodness, and good fortune, and doing good turns to some of them, quite to extinguish this envy; seeing himself young enough too, and then wearing so many new favors, which the manner of his proceeding afforded him, so that he thought he was able to overcome those many that enviously opposed him, without any scandal, violence, or tumult. And did not know that time cannot stay; goodness is not sufficient, fortune changes; and there is no gift can appease malice. So that the one and the other of these two went to ruine, and their ruine proceeded either from their ignorance, or their disability to overcome this envy. The other thing remarkable is the order which *Camillus* took both within and abroad for the preservation of Rome. And indeed not without reason the good Historians (as ours here is) set down particularly and distinctly

distinctly certain cases, to the end posterity should learn how in the like accidents they are to defend themselves. And it ought well be observ'd in this text, that there is not a more dangerous nor unprofitable defence, then that which is confusedly made, and without order, and this appears by this third army which *Camillus* caused to be inrolled, and to be left at *Rome* to guard the Town: for many would have judg'd that part superfluous, where the people is most commonly arm'd, and warlike; and for this cause a man would not think it needfull to have them inroll'd otherwise, but only that it sufficed to cause them to be in armes as occasion should require. But *Camillus* and who else were wise as he was, think otherwise, who never allow a multitude to take armes, unless by certain order and appointment: Wherefore upon this example, he that is appointed over the guard of a City, should avoid, as a rock, the arming of men in confusion, but ought first have those chosen and registered which he would have in armes, and whom he would have them obey, where their rendezvous, and whether to go, and command those that are not inrolled to abide every man at his own house, for the safeguard thereof. They that shall take this order in a City assailed, will easily be able to defend themselves: whoever does otherwise, shall neither imitate *Camillus*, nor defend himself.

## CHAP. XXXI.

*Powerfull Commonwealths, and great and worthy personages in all manner of fortune retain the same courage, and the same dignity.*

**A**Mong other matters of magnificence, that our Historian brings in *Camillus* speaking or doing, to shew how an excellent man ought to behave himself, he puts these words in his mouth: *Neither did my Dictatorship elevate my courage, nor hath my banishment abated it: By which words we see that great personages are alwaies the same in all fortunes. And though she varies, now exalting them, and then bringing them low, they never differ from themselves, but alwaies hold a constant resolution, so readily fastened to their ordinary course of living, that by every one of them it appears that chance hath no power over them. Weake men behave themselves in another manner: for they beseele and besot themselves in good fortune, attributing all the good they have to those vertues which they never knew; whence it proceeds that they grow insupportable and odious to those that are about them; whereupon depends the sudden alteration of fortune, which so soon as they look once in the face, they fall presently into the other defect, and become vile and abject. From hence it comes that such manner of Princes thinke rather in adversitie how to make an escape, than to stand upon their*

*Nec mihi Dictatura  
animos fecit, nec ex-  
ilium ademit.*

their defence, as those that for having made evil use of good fortune, are not prepared for any kind of safeguard. This vertue, and this vice, which I say, is found in one man alone, we find also in a Republike, of which the Romanes and the Venetians serve us for example. Those former never any bad fortune could make abject, nor any good fortune insolent, as it manifestly appeared after the defeat they had at Canna, and after the victory they got against *Antiochus*: for upon that defeat, however a very great one, because it had been the third together, they never grew base upon it, but continued to send forth Armies; they would not redeem prisoners against the orders they had made, nor send to *Hannibal* or Carthage to ask peace, but casting aside all those unworthy courses, they thought still upon providing for the war, arming for want of souldiers their old men and slaves. Which thing being known to *Hanno* the Carthaginian (as was said before) he shewed that Senate what small account they were to make of that defeat at Canna. And so it appeared, as those hard times did not affright, nor abase them, on the other part neither did their more fortunate times puffe them up: for, when *Antiochus* sent Ambassadors to *Scipio* to require an agreement, before they came to joyn batel, or that he had lost it, *Scipio* gave him certain conditions of peace, which were, that he should retire into Syria, and leave the rest to the Romans disposing, which *Antiochus* refusing, and coming to batel and losing it, sent again his Ambassadors to *Scipio*, with order that he would submit to all those conditions which the Conqueror should impose on him, to whom he propounded no other

con.

conditions than what he had formerly offered before the victory, adding these words: *That the Romanes if they be overcome, lose not their courages, nor when they overcome grow they insolent.* Clean contrary hereunto we have seen the Venetians do: who in their prosperity (thinking they had gotten it by their own valor which they never were guilty of) grew to such an excess of insolence, that they termed the King of France Saint Marks son, they contemned the Church; and their ambition all Italy would not hold, but imagined they were to frame a Monarchy like that of the Romanes. Afterwards their good fortune abandoning them, and that they were a little routed by the King of France at Vayla, they not onely lost all their State by rebellion, but a good part of it they gave up to the Pope and the King of Spaine, even through meer baseness and cowardise. And they became so vile and abject, that they sent Ambassadors to the Emperor, to offer themselves to be his tributaries, and writ letters to the Pope full of baseness and submission, whereby to move him to compassion. Into which unhappiness they fell in four days space, and after a half defeat: for their Army come to battel and to fight, in their retreat lost near one half of their men, yet so that one of their Proveditors that escaped, came to Verona with above five and twenty thousand souldiers between foot and horse: in case that if either the Venetians, or any of their orders had been of value, they might easily have recovered themselves, and looked fortune again in the face, and have been ready either to overcome, or lose more gloriously, or get more honorable terms of agreement: but the baseness of their spirits

spirits caused by the quality of their orders, nothing good in matters touching the war, made them at once lose both their State and courage. And so will it alwaies befall any that shall behave themselves as they did : for this growing insolent in good fortune, and abject in evill, arises from the manner of thy proceeding, and from the education wherein thou hast been trained up: Which when it is weak & vain, makes thee like to it self, when otherwise it casts thee in another manner of mould, and makes thee know the world better, rejoicing less at the good befalls thee, as also grieving less at the evill comes upon thee : and that which is said of one man alone, is said also of many that live in the same Commonwealth, who attain to that perfection, which the order and manner of government thereof will afford. And though elsewhere we have said, that the foundation of all States is good military discipline; and where this is nor, there can neither be good lawes, nor any other thing good, methinks it is not more than needs to repeat it again; for to many purposes, in the reading of this Story, wee see this necessity appears, and wee see that neither can the soldiers be good, unless they be reaind and practis'd, nor can they be train'd, unless compos'd of thy own subjects: for the wars do not alwaies last, & impossible it is they should: therefore is it necessary to be able to practise this military exercise in time of peace; neither can this exercise be us'd in regard of the expence, with others then with thy own subjects. *Camillus* was gone (as we said before) with the Army against the *Iuscaris*, and his souldiers having seen the greatness of the enemies Army were much

much amazed at it, thinking themselves too weak to sustain the violence of their enemies: the rumor of this fearfulness comming to *Camilus* his eares, he came forth abroad amongst them, and going about through the Camp, speaking now to one soldier, and then to another, worke this opinion out of their heads, and in conclusion, without any otherwise ordering of his Army, said, *Let every man doe what he hath learned and used to doe.* And whosoever shall well consider these termes and the words he said to them, for their encouragement to encounter with their enemies, shall perceive that none of th<sup>e</sup> se things could be said or done to an Army that had not first beene ordered and exercised as well in peace as in war: for upon those soldiers that have not learned to do any thing, a Commander cannot rely, nor beleeve they can do any thing to the purpose: and were a new *Hannibal* to command them, he could not subside: for a General (during the battell) not being able to be in every part, unless he have first taken order to have men of his manner of courage, knowing well his orders, and the wayes of his proceeding, must of force staine there: If then a City shall be armed and ordered as Rome, and that every day the Citizens are put to it to make tryal in particular and in general of their own valour, and the power of fortune, it shall alwayes come to pass, that at any time whatsoever, they shall continue fixed in the same resolution, and keep themselves in the same dignity. But when they shall be disarmed, and rest only upon the helpes of fortune, and not upon their own valours, they

they shall change as her wheel turns; and give that example of themselves, which the Venetians gave.

## C H A P. XXXII.

*What means some have practised to disturb a treaty of peace.*

**C**ircei and Velitre two Roman Colonies being rebelled, in hope that the Latines would defend them, afterwards the Latines being overcome, and so those hopes failing them, divers of the Citizens advised, they should send Ambassadors to Rome, to recommend them to the Senate: which course was hindered by those that had been Authors of the rebellion, who were afraid lest the whole punishment should fall upon their heads; and therefore to cut off all treaty of peace, they incited the multitude to take arms, and make an incursion upon the Rome territories. And truly when any one desires that a people or Prince should wholly take their minds off from agreement, there is no truer nor certainer way than to make them do some foul act against him, with whom thou wouldst not have the accord made. For the fear of that punishment which he shall think he hath deserved for his fault, shall always keep him off. After the first wars which the Carthaginians had with the Romanes, those soldiers who had served the Carthaginians in that war in Sicily and Sardinia, when the peace was concluded, went back into Africa, where not being satisfied for their pay, they made wars against the



the Carthaginians, and having chosen two out of themselves for their heads, *Mathus* and *Spendius*, they took divers Towns of the Carthaginians, and sacked divers. The Carthaginians willing to try any other way then battell, sent *Asdrubal* a Citizen of theirs Ambassadour to them, who they thought had some credit with them, having formerly been their General. And he being come, and *Spendius* and *Mathus* desiring to oblige all these Souldiers, never to hope they could have peace again with the Carthaginians, and to engage them in the war, perswaded them it was better to kill him, with all the Citizens of Carthage, which then they had prisoners. Whereupon they not only slew them, but put them to death with torments, to this villany adding an edict, that all Carthaginians, who in time to come were taken, should in the same sort be slain. Which deliberation and execution made that Army exceeding cruell and obstinate against the Carthaginians.

### CHAP. XXXIII.

*It much furthers and advantages an Army in the winning of a battell, to be confident of their own forces, and their Generals valour.*

*It much helps an Army towards the winning of a battell, to make them confident, that in any case, they cannot chuse but vanquish. The things, that give them this confidence, are, that they be well armed and well ordered, and be acquainted one with another. Nor can this confidence or this order be but a-*

mong those Soldiers that have been borne and liv'd together. The Commander also must be of repute, so that the Soldiers may be confident of his wisdom: and they shall alwaies beso, when they perceive him to be a man orderly carefull, and couragious, and that maintains well, and with esteem the Majesty of his digniry: and he shall alwaies be able to do so, while he punisheth their faulrs, while he tires not out the soldiers to no purpose, keeps his word with them, shewes them an easie way to vanquish the enemy; those things that may endanger them, conceals from them; or if they be evident, by his speeche lessens their opinion of them: which things well observed, are a great occasion of confidence in the Army; and that confidence of victory the Romans us'd to make their Armies thus confident by way of Religion: from hence proceeded, that by their soothsayings and auspices they created their Consuls, they levied their souldiers, march'd with their armies, and fought their batels; and without having done some of these things, never would a good or discreet Commander, have put any thing to hazard, deeming that he might easily lose, unless his souldiers had first understood that the gods were on their side. And when any Consul or Caprain of theirs should have fought contrary to the auspices, they would have punishd him, as they did *Claudius Pulcher*. And however we find this true in all the *Roman Histories*, yet it is proved more certain by the words which *Livie* brings in *Appian Claudius* speaking, who complaining to the people of their Tribunes insolency, and shewing that by means of them the auspices and other matters pertaining to Religion were

were corrupted, sayes thus: Let them now sciffe at Religion; for, what matter is it, whether the chickens feed, or whether they come slower out of their cage, whether a bird hath sung or no? these, tis true, are all small things: but by not contemning of these little things, our Ancestours have exceedingly amplified this Commonwealt. For

Eludant nunc licet Religionem; quid enim est, si pulli non pascuntur, si ex caven tardius exierint, si occiderit avis? parva sunt hæc: sed parva ista non contemnendo, Majores nostri maximam hanc Rempublicam fecerunt.

in these small matters there is force to hold the souldiers united and confident, which thing is a principall occasion of any victory. Yet must these things be accompanied with valour, otherwise they will avail little. The Prenestini having their Army abroad against the Romans, went to incampe upon the river of Allia, a place where the Romans had been overcome by the French, which they did to make their own souldiers confident, and to affright the Romans with the ferture of the place. And though the course they took, was probable for those reasons we have already said, yet the conclusion of the matter shewed, that true valour feares not every small accident: Which the Historian sayes very well, in those words which he makes the Dictatour speak, who saies thus to the Master of his Cavallerie: Seest thou how they taking benefit of their fortune, have incamped themselves upon the river Allia? But thou making use of thy Armes and courage assaile the very heart of their Armie. For a true valour, a good discipline, and an assurance taken from so many victories, cannot be extinguished by matters of small mo-

Vides tu fortunam illos fretos ad Alliam confedisse. At tu fretus armis animisque invade medium aciem.

ment, nor does any vain matter affright them, nor one disorder hurt them, as we saw it: for two *Manlij* being Consuls against the *Volsces*, by reason that they had rashly sent part of their Army to forrage, it followed, that both they that were gone and those that staid behind, were besieged: from which danger, not the wisdom of the Consuls, but the Soldiers own valour freed them, where *T. Livius* says

*Militem etiam sine  
reductore stabili vir-  
tus putata est.*

these words, *The Soldiers valour even without a Commander was though firme and constant.* I will not let pass one terme us'd by *Fabius*, being newly entered with his Army into *Tuscan*, to make them confident, deeming such a confidence to be the more necessary, now that he had brought them into a new Country, and to fight with new enemies, who speaking to his souldiers before the fight, and having told them many reasons, whereupon they might hope for the victory, said, that he could also tell them certain good things, and where they might plainly see the victory, but that it was dangerous to disclose them. Which course as it was discreetly us'd, so deserves it to be followed.

#### CHAP. XXXIV.

*What fame, report, or opinion causes the people to begin to cast their favours upon a Citizen: and whether a Prince or a people do bestow their Magistracies with better judgement.*

Otherwhere we said, that *T. Manlius*, who afterwards was termed *Torquatus*, sav'd *L. Manlius* his Father from an accusation, which

which M. Pomponius Tribune of the people had made against him. And however the manner of saving him, was somewhat violent and extraordinary, yet that filial piety towards his Father, was so acceptable to the generall, that it was not onely not blame, but when Tribunes were to be appointed over the Legions, T. Manlius was chosen in the second place. Upon which success, I beleeve it fit to consider, what way the people take to give their iudgements upon men in distributing of their charge. that thereby we may see, whether that be true which we formerly concluded, that the people is a better distributor than a Prince. I say then, that the people in their distribution follows the report that goes of one by publick voyce and fame: when they know him, not otherwise by his ordinary behaviour, or by presumption or opinion conceived of him. Which two things have been caused either by the Fathers of such, who for that they have been great personages, and of ability in the Cities, it is thought their sons should be like them, untill by their actions the contrary be found: Or else it is caused by the courses such a one takes, of whom we speak: the best courses and waies that can be held, are to keep company with grave men, well dispos'd, and such as by every one are reputed wise. And because there cannot be a greater marke or discovery of a man than by the company he frequents, without question he that uses good company, gaines a good name: for it is impossible but that he shall much resemble them. Or indeed this publick reputation is gotten by some extraordinary and notable exploit, however private, that hath proved in thy hands very honourable. And of

all these three things, which in the beginning gain any one a good reputation, nothing gives if more amply then this last: for that first of parents, and fathers is so deceitfull, that men advance therein very leisurely, and that is presently quite spent, when it is not accompanied by the the proper vertue of him that is to be censured. The second way, which makes thee be known by the company thou usest, is better then the first; but is much inferior to the third; for untill thou hast given evidence of thy self by some worthy exploit, thy repoute is wholly groundd upon opinion, which is very easily cancelled. But that third being begun and groundd upon thy workes, gives thee at first such renown, that needs must it be, that afterwards thou commit many acts contrary thereunto, if thou wouldst disannul it. Therefore ought those men that spring up in a Commonwealth, take this course, and indeavour by some extraordinary act to begin their rise. Which many at Rome did in their youths, either by publishing of a law, furthering the common good, or by accusing some potent Citizen as a breaker of the laws, by doing such like notable things, and unwonted, whereof men should have occasion to speak afterwards. Neither are such like things needfull only to begin ones reputation, but they are as necessary for the maintenance and advancement of it. And to do this, a man had need to renew them again, as *Manlius* did during his whole life: for when he had defended his father so vertuously and beyond the ordinary strain, and by this action taken his first degree of reputation, after some years he fought with that Frenchman, and took from him that chain of gold, which gave him the

the name of *Torgatus*: nor stay'd he upon this, but afterwards in riper years he put his son to death for having fought without his allowance, however he had vanquished his enemy. Which three actions gave him a greater name, and throughout all ages make him more famous, then ever any triumph or victory did, wherewith he was adorn'd as much as any other *Roman*. And the reason is, because in those victories *Manlius* had very many like him, but in these particulars he had either very few or none. *Scipio* the elder got not greater glory by all his triumphs, then that action of defending his father upon the *Tesin* gained him in his youth, and that other when after the defeat at *Canna*, courageously with his sword drawn he made many young *Romans* swear they would never abandon *Italy*, as already then among them it was resolv'd which two actions were the beginnings of his reputation, which made him a way to his triumphs of *Spain* and *Africa*, which opinion of him was also increased, when he sent back the daughter to her Father, and the wife to her husband in *Spain*. This manner of proceeding is not alone needful for those Citizens, that would gain reputation, whereby to attain the dignities in their Commonwealth, but is also necessary for Princes to maintain their credits in their Principalities: for nothing gives them so great esteem as to yeeld some rare examples of themselves, by some deed or pithy saying, agreeable with the common good, which may evidently prove the Prince either magnanimous, or liberall, or just; and that he is such a one, that his life may serve for a patterne, and his wise sayings may be used by his subjects as proverbs. But to re-

turne, whereat we began this discourse, I say that the people, when they begin to confer any dignity upon one of their Citizens, grounding upon any of those reasons before alledged, take no ill ground; but when afterwards the frequent examples of one mans good carriage makes him better known, then is a better ground taken; for in such case there can never fall any deceit. I speak only of those honours which are given to men in the beginning, before they be well known by a certain experience, or that they transgress from one action to another unlike it; Where both touching the false opinion and the corruption, they alwaies commit less errors, then Princes. And because it may fall out, that the people might be deceived in the report, in the opinion, and actions of a man, conceiving them greater then in truth they are, which would not be so with a Prince, because it is like it should be told him, or that he should be advertised thereof by some of his Counsellours; to the end therefore that the people want not these advertisements, the good founders of Republicks have ordained, that when the cheifest dignities of Cities are to be bestowed, whereunto it might prove dangerous to prefer insufficient men, and seeing the peoples wills sometimes bent to advance some one unfit, that it may be lawfull for any Citizen, and accounted as an honour to him, to publish in their assemblies that mans defects, that the people (this notice not failing them) may the better give their judgments thereupon. And that this was customary at Rome, the oration which *P. Maximus* made, witnessed, which he uttered before the people in the second Punicke warr, when at the creation of the



the Consuls they took a liking to *T. Otacilius*; and *Pabius* deeming him insufficient to manage the Consulate in those times, spake against him, declaring his insufficiency, in so much as he hindered him of that dignity, and converted the peoples favour to one that deserved it better than he. The people then in the choice of their Magistrates, judge according to the truest marks they can have of men. And when they can be advised, as Princes are, they run into fewer errors than Princes; and that Citizen that will begin to seek the peoples favour, must with some notable exploit gain it, as *Tiberius Manlius* did.

## CHAP. XXXV

What dangers they incurre that put themselves forwards as principals to advise any design, which are so much the greater, by how much this carries with it the more difficulty and perill.

**H**ow dangerous a thing it is for any man to become the ringleader of any new matter, which belongs to many, and how hard a thing it is to meddle in it, and bring it on forwards, and make it good being thus brought forwards, would be too long and too deep a matter to discourse on. Therefore reserving it for a fitter place, I will only reate of those dangers, which Citizens incur, or those that advise a Prince, making themselves chief in perswading him to any weighty and important resolution, so that the Councell thereof is wholly imputed to them: for, men judging things by

their events, of all the evil that arises thereupon, the blame is wholly laid on him as author; and if good come of it, he is commended for it; but the reward comes much short of the loss is hindered. This present Sultan *Selimus* termed the Great Turk, having made preparation (as some report, who now come from his Country) for the Conquest of *Syria* and *Egypt*, was encouraged by one of his *Bashawes*, who was then upon the confines of *Persia*, to undertake rather an expedition against the *Sophy*; by whose Counsell being perswaded, he went to that enterprise with an exceeding great army, and coming into a very vast Country, where a great part of it is desert, and rivers very few, and finding there those difficulties, which long since had ruin'd many *Roman* armies, was so distressed thereby, that he lost there by famine and plague (however that in the war he were the vanquisher) a great part of his army. Whereupon being enrag'd against the author of that Counsell, he put him to death. We reade of many Citizens, that were the advisers to such and such enterprises, who because these had evil success, have straightway been banished. Certain Citizens of *Rome* there were, who as authors of the advice, stood to have a Consul from among the Commons in *Rome*; it happened, that the first of them, that went abroad with their armies, was defeated. Whereupon it had prov'd but unluckily to the authors of that Counsell, had not their party been strong, by whose favour such resolution was taken. It is then most certain, that they who advise a Republick and they that Counsell a Prince, are equally brought into these streights; and if they do not advise those

these things, which they take to be profitable either for the City or the Prince without respect, they faile of their duties; and in case they do counsell them, they run the hazard of their lives, and of their estates; all men here in being so blind as to judge advices good or evil by the success they take. And devising with my self by what means they might escape this infamy or danger, I see no other way, then that they put things forward moderately, and not take any thing upon them as their own enterprise, and give their opinion without passion, and defend it also modestly without passion, so that if either the City or the Prince follow that advice, it may seem they willingly took that course, and were not drawn thereto by thy importunity. When thou dost so, it is not reasonable that a Prince or a people should seek revenge on thee for thy counsell, it being not followed against other mens wills: for here the danger is, that many having contradicted thee, in the unhappy success of thy advice they will concur in working thy ruine. And if in this case, one should say, that when he failes of that glory which another gets by being one alone against many in advising any course, when it proves luckily, we meere here with two advantages to countervail it: the first is to be quite exempt out of all danger: the second is, if thou advisest any thing modestly, and by reason of the opposition made against it, thy Counsell be not taken, and some disaster follow upon the advice another hath given, thou gainest much glory thereby. And however the glory, which is gotten by mischiefs, befallen thy City or thy Prince, cannot well be said to be enjoyed, yet is there some account to be

be made of them. I beleeeve there is no other advice can be given to men in this part; for the perswading them to hold their peace, and not give their opinion, would be a thing very unprofitable to the Commonwealth and their Princes, & they would hardly be able to escape danger; for in a small time would they be suspected; it might also befall them, as it did those friends of *Perse* the King of *Macedon*, who having been defeated by *Paulus Emilius*, & flying with a few of his confidants, it chanc'd, that in relating things past, one of them began to tell *Perse* of many errors committed by him, which were the occasion of his ruine, to whom *Perse* turning said, Traitor, and hast thou delay'd to tell me it, untill now that I have no remedy? and upon these words slew him with his own hand. And thus he suffer'd punishment for his silence when he should have spoken, and for having spoken when he should have held his peace: neither avoided he the danger, by not giving his advice. Wherefore I beleeeve the rules above given, are to be kept and observ'd.

---

#### CHAP. XXXVI.

*The reason wherefore the French have been and are thought in combats at the beginning more then men, and afterwards less then women.*

**T**HE fierceness of that Frenchman who challeng'd any Roman whatsoever, near the river *Anien*, to fight with him, and afterwards the combat between him and *T. Manlius*, put me in minde of that which *T. Livius* sayes many times, that the Frenchmen in the beginning

ginning of the combat are more then men, and in the end thereof prove less then women. And weighing well from whence this may proceed, many beleeve that naturally they are so dispos'd, which I think is true : but hence it followes not that this their naturall humer, which makes them so fierce in the beginning, might not be so order'd by art, as to continue them fierce till the very conclusion : And for proof hereof, I say, that there are armes of three sorts : the one where there is both fury and order, for from the order arises fury and valour, as was that of the *Romans*; for it appears in all their histories, that there was a very good order in that army, which military discipline in tract of time had brought in amongst them. For in a well train'd army, no man is to do any thing but by rule and order. And we find hereby, that in the *Roman Army* (from which, insomuch as it conquer'd the whole world, all others may take example) they neither ate, nor slept, nor bought, neither did they any military action nor domestick without the Consuls order : for those armies which do otherwise, are not right armies; and if they come to make any trial of themselves in any action, they do it by force of rage and violence, and not by valour : but where valour is accompanied with due ordinances, it makes good use of the fury in such manner and in such times that no difficulty abates it, nor ever quales the courage, because those good ordinances reinforce the spirit, and the fury, both being still maintained by the hope of overcoming, which never failes while the orders hold firme. The contrary falls out in those armies wherein is fury and not order, as were those

of

of the French, who ever failed by little and little. For it proved not, that their first assault prevailed, and that their fury; whereon they much relied, was not maintained by an ordinate valour, not having any thing else, besides that, whereto to trust, as that grew coole, so they failed. On the other side the Romans doubting less of dangers by reason of their good orders, not distrusting the victory, fought resolutely and obstinately with the same courage and valour as well in the end as in the beginning, or rather enraged by fighting, they grew still more fierce. The third kind of armies is, where there is no naturall fury, nor accidentall order, as the Italian armies are in our daies, which are quite unprofitable: and unless they incounter with an army which upon some accident chances to run away, they shall never overcome: and without alledging other examples, we every day see that they give good proofes they have no valour at all. And because by *T. Livius* his testimony, every one may understand, how the good soldiery ought to be ordered and how the bad is, I will set down *Papirius Cursor* his words, having a mind to punish *Fabius* the commander of the horse,

Nemo hominum, nec  
Deorum verecun-  
diam habeat, non e-  
dicta Imperatorum;  
non auspicia obser-  
ventur; sine com-  
atu vagi milites in  
pacato & in hostico  
errent, immemores

sacramenti, licentia sola exauctorentur; infrequentia deferantur signa, neque conveniatur ad edictum, nec discernatur interdictum, nocte, a quo an iniquo loco, injussu Imperatoris pugnent; non signa, non ordines servant. Latrocinij modo caeca & fortuita pro solenni & sacra militia sit.

where he said. Let neither GOD  
nor man be had in any reverence, nor  
the Generals commands, nor his aus-  
pices be regarded; let the souldiers  
fillaging up and down for want of  
provision as well in their friends  
country as in their foes, let them

casbeare themselves, at their pleasures, for getting their oaths, let them quit their Ensignes, nor come together at command: let them fight without the Generals leave by night or by day in place of advantage or disadvantage, caring neither for ranke nor order: and let the sacred and and solemn rites of warfare become like the blind and obscure tricks and chances of robberies. By the text here we may easily see whether the warfare in our daies, be blind and casuall, or sacred and so'lemn, and how much it comes short of resembling that which properly is termed a warfare, & how it differs from a furious and ordinate warfare as was that of the Romans, or from a furious only as was that of the French.

## CHAP. XXXVII.

Whether slight skirmishes or combats are necessary before a great battell, and what is to be done to know a new enemy, when one should avoid those skirmishes.

**I**T seemes that in humane actions ( as otherwise we have discoursed ) besides other difficulties found in bringing any thing to its perfection, there is alwaies some evill very nearly neighbouring to the good: Which so easily grows up with that good, that it seems impossible, if a man would enjoy the one, to be quit of the other. And this wee see in all the works of man: and therefore is that good attain'd with difficulty, unless by thy good fortune thou be so assisted, that she by her power overcome this ordinary and natural inconvenient. The Combate between *Maslim Tiquagus* and the Frenchman hath put me in mind hereof,

Tanti ea dimicatio ad  
universi belli eventum  
fuit, ut Gallorum  
exercitus, relicto tre-  
pide Castris, in Tibur-  
tinum agrum, mox in  
Campaniam transie-  
rint.

hereof, where T. Livius saies  
That combate so much imported  
the event of the war, that the  
French Army leaving their Campe  
in a fright, went into the Tiburtine  
Country, and thence into Campania.  
For I consider on the one side,  
that a good Commander ought  
wholly avoid to do any thing which being but  
of small moment, may produce but evill effects  
in his Army: for to begin a skirmish or a com-  
bate wherein the whole forces are not im-  
ployed, and yet the whole fortune is there laid  
to stake, is a thing favouring too much of rash-  
ness, as I said before, when I condemn'd the  
guarding of the passages. On the other side I  
consider, that wise and experienced Comman-  
ders, when they meet with a new enemy, and  
that is of reputation, are forc'd before they  
come to joyne battell, to cause their souldiers  
to make tryall of them by light skirmishes, to  
the end that beginning to know them, and to  
have to deale with them, they may be rid of that  
terror which the report and reputation of these  
men have put them in. And this part is a Gene-  
rall's of exceeding great importance; for there  
is a kind of necessity in it, which forceth thee  
thereunto; for thou wilt think that thou goest  
to thy manifest destruction, unless thou have  
first by these small experiences made thy soldi-  
ers cast out that terror, which by means of  
the enemies reputation had possessed their  
minds. *Valerius Corvinus* was sent by the Ro-  
mans with an Army against the *Samnites*, who  
were new enemies, and these formerly had  
never proved the one the others forces, where  
T. Livius saies, that *Valerius* caused the Romans



to make some small skirmishes with the Samnites, That a new war, and a new enemy might not affright them. Notwithstanding

Ne eos novum bellum, ne novus hostis terre sit.

it is a very great hazzard, that thy Souldiers in those skirmishes remaning losers, their fear and cowardise grow not more upon them, and that effects contrary to thy purpose follow not thereupon, that is, that thou fright them not, whereas thy design was to assure them. So that this is one of those things, which hath the evill so near neighbouring unto the good, or rather they are so neare joyn'd together, that it is very easy to mistake the one for the other: Whereupon I say, that a good Commander should be very careful, that nothing arise, which upon any accident may take away the courage and heart of his soldiers. That which may be of force to take away their courage, is to begin to lose: and therefore a man should be well aware of these small skirmishes, and no way suffer any of them, unless with exceeding great advantage, and certain hope of victory. Nor ought he undertake to guard any passages, where he cannot bring his whole Army together. Nor should he keep any Towns unless it be those that by losing of them, his utter ruine followes thereupon; and those that he guards, he should take such care both with their defenses and also with his Army, that whenever the enemy hath any design to assaile them, he may make use of all his forces in rescue of them: the others he should leave undefended: for whensoever any thing is lost, that was before abandon'd, the Army being yet afoor, there is neither the reputation of the war lost, nor the hope of conquest.

conquest. But when any thing is lost, which thou hadst purposed to defend, and every one beleeve thou mightest defend, there is the dammage and loss, and there thou hast in a manner, as those Frenchmen did, by a matter of small moment lost the whole war. *Philip* of *Macedon* the Father of *Perse*, a warlike man, and of great esteem in his time, being assaill'd by the *Romans*, forsook and laid waste much of his Country, as he, who because he was wise, thought it more pernicious to lose reputation by not being able to defend that which he undertook to defend, then by leaving it in prey to the enemy, to lose it as a thing neglected. The *Romans* when after the defeat at *Canna*, their estate was in great perplexity, refus'd many that were under their protection, and so also divers of their own Subjects, charging them to defend themselves the best they cou'd, which are better courses far, than to undertake defences, and afterwards not be able to go through with them; for hereby those friends are lost, and forces only in those friends. But returning to the small skirmishes, I say, that yet if a Commander be forc'd by reason of the newness of the enemy to make any skirmish, he ought take so much advantage in it, that he run no hazard to lose it, nor do, as *Marius* did, which is the better way. Who going against the *Cimbrians*, which were an exceeding fierce people, and came to make a prey of *Italy*, and whithersoever they came, casting a great terror, because of their fierceness and multitude, and by reason they had formerly vanquish'd a *Roman* Army, *Marius* thought it necessary before he came to joyn battell, to worke somewhat, which might make his Soldiers

souldiers lay aside that terror, which the feare of the enemy had put them in; and as a very well advis'd Commander, brought his Army several times, where the *Cimbrians* with their troupes were to pa's: And thus within the fortifications of his Campe he would that his Souldiers should see them, and accustome their eyes to the view of that enemy, to the end that by seeing a disordinate multitude loaded with baggage and unprofitable armes, and in part too disarm'd, they might reasssure themselves, and grow desirous of battell, which course as it was discreetly practis'd by *Marium*, so likewise ought it be diligently imitated by others, whereby they might not be forc'd to incur those dangers which I mentioned before, nor to do as the Frenchmen did:

*Who for a matter of small moment fled in a fright into the Triburtine Country, and streight after into Compania.* And because wee

have alledg'd *Valerius Corvinus* in this Treaty, in the Chapter following I intend, by the helpe of his words, to shew what manner of man a Commander should be.

*Qui ob rem parvi ponderis, trepidi in Tiburtem agrum, & in Campaniam transierunt.*

#### CHAP. XXXVIII.

*What manner of man that General ought to be, on whose abilities an Army may confidently rely.*

**V**ALERIUS CORVINUS was (as we said formerly) abroad with an Army against the *Sannites*, new enemies of the people of Rome, whereupon partly to assure his own Souldiers, and

and partly to make them know the enemy. He caused some of his to enter into certain light skirmishes with them, nor contented herewith, before the day of battell would needs speak to his own souldiers, and shew with all efficacy, how little esteem they were to make of such enemies, putting them in minde of their own and his valour also: where it may be noted by the words that *Livius* brings him in speaking, what manner of man a Commander ought to be, in wh. man Army is to have confidence: which words are these; And also to consider,

Tum etiam inueneri  
cujus ductu, auspici-  
que incunda, sit pug-  
na; utrum audien-  
dus duntaxat magni-  
ficus ad hor. tator sit  
verbis tantum ferox,  
operum militarium  
expers, an qui & ip. a  
tela trahere, proce-  
dere ante signa, ver-  
sari media in mole  
pugnæ sciat: facta  
mea, non dicta vos  
milites sequi volo:  
nec disciplinam mo-  
do, sed exemplum e-  
tiam a me petere, qui  
hac dextra mihi tres  
consularus, summam-  
que laudem peperit.

under whose conduct and auspices  
you fight; whether he you are to  
hearken unto, be only a magnificent  
exhorter, fierce in words, but not  
of promise to shew you any milita-  
ry examples, or else such a one  
that knows how to make use of  
your armes to march before your  
ensignes, and behave himself  
bravely in the thickest of your  
troops. I would have you my souldi-  
ers to follow my deeds rather than  
my words, and not to seek your dis-  
cipline only from me, but your ex-  
ample, who by this right hand  
have gained three Consulships and  
the height of honour. Which  
words well consider'd teach e-

very man how he ought to proceed if he would  
hold the dignity of a Commander; and who-  
soever shall otherwise carry it, shall find in time  
that dignity (when either by chance or ambi-  
tion he is raised thereunto) will rather take  
from him, then any way gain him reputation:  
for titles honour not men, but men their  
titles.

ties. And from the beginning of this discourse we may consider, that if great Commanders have us'd extraordinary means to confirme the resolutions of an Army of old soldiers, when they were to encounter with unaccustomed enemies, how much rather is there pains to be taken with an army of fresh-water soldiers, who never yet look'd the enemy in the face for if an unaccustomed enemy terrifies an army of old soldiers, much more probable is it that any enemy should affright an army of new soldiers. Yet we have many times seen all these difficulties overcome by the exceeding great wisdom of good Commanders, as *Gracchus* the Roman did and *Epaminondas* the Theban, of whom we have spoken elsewhere, who with their armies of new soldiers vanquished armies of *Veteranes*, who had been of long experience. The courses they took, were for many months to exercise them in counterfeit skirmishes, and train them up in obedience and order, and from thence they came to imploy them with a great deal of assurance in very fierce battells. Therefore ought no warlike man doubt, but that he may be able to make good soldiers when he wants not men: for that Prince who hath many men, and wants soldiers, should complain rather of his own sloth and small wisdom, then of the peoples cowardise.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XXXIX.

*That a Commander ought exactly know scituations.*

**A**Mong other things befitting the General of an Army, is the knowledge of scituations and countries; for without this knowledge in general and in particular, the Commander of an Army cannot well effectuate any thing. And because all sciences, if a man would be exact in them, require practice, this is one that askes exceeding much practice. (And this practice or (as I may terme it) particular knowledge is gain'd rather by means of hunting, then by any other exercise. Wherefore the ancient writers say, that those Heroes, that rul'd the world in their days, were brought up in the woods and in frequent huntings: for the chase teacheth thee many things besides this knowledge, which very much concerns the war. And *Xenophon* in *Cyrus* his life shewes, that *Cyrus* going to assaile the King of *Armenia*, as he gave order for the service, he put his souldiers in mind that this was nothing else then one of those chaces which they had many times made in his company. And he told those he sent to lie in ambush upon the mountains, that they were like unto those that went to pitch their toiles upon the hills, and those that scowred the plain; that they were like those that went to put up the beast out of his covert, to the end that being chased, he fall into the toiles. This is said to shew that the chase according as *Xenophon* allowes of it, hath

hath a kinde of resemblance of war. And therefore is such exercise very honorable and well becoming great personages. Nor can this knowledge of countries by any fitter means be learned then by way of hunting: for the chase makes him that frequents it know how in particular the country lies where he uses to hunt; and when a man hath made himself well acquainted with the scire, of one country, he afterwards with facility comprehends that of all other strange Countries: for every Country and every member of them have some kind of conformity one with another, so that he who knows the one well, may easily attain to the knowledge of the other. But he that hath never practised the one, very hardly or never, unless it be by long experience, can know the other; whereas he that is well versed therein, at the first cast of his eye knows how that plane lies, or that hill rises, how far that vally reaches, and all such other like things, whereof for the time to come he hath gained a settled knowledge. And that this is true, *T. Livius* shewes us by the example of *Publius Decius*, who being Tribune of the souldiers in the Army which *Cornelius* the Consull led against the *Samnites*, when the Consull was forced to betake himself to a vally, where the *Romans* army might easily have been inclosed by the *Samnites*, this *Decius* perceiving the danger they were in, said to the Consull, *Seest thou*

*Aulus Cornelius* that hill which is above the enemy? that is the strength of our hope and safety, if we, because the *Samnites* being

Vides tu Aule Cornelii cacumen illud super hostem? Atque illa est spei salutisque nostrae, si eam (quoniam

caci reliquere *Samnites*.) impigre capimus. *Publius Decius* tribunus militum unum editum in saltu collem imminentem hostium castris ostendit, aditu arduum impedito agminibus, expeditis

blind e

blinde have neglected it, quickly seise on it. And before these words uttered by Decius, T. Livius says, Publius Decius the souldiers Tribune shewed a pretty high hill which lay a little higher then the enemies campe, of hard ascent to men incombred with compleat armes, but of easy access to men lightly harnessed. Whereupon being sent thither himself by the Consull with 3000 souldiers, and having sav'd the Roman army, and purposing when night came, himself to depart, and so to save himself and his own souldiers, he is brought in thus speaking, Follow me, that

*Te mecum, ut dum lucis aliquid superest, quibus locis hostes praesidia ponant, quae pateat hinc exitus exploremus. Hac orania sagulo militari armatus ne ducem circumire hostes notarent per lussavit,*

yet while it is day light we may discover what places the enemy guards and which way we may get out. All these things he went to view clad in a souldiers cassocke, so that the enemy should take no notice the Captaine rounded them. He therefore that well considers this whole text, shall see how profi-

table and necessary for a Commander it is to understand the natural situations of countries; for if Decius had not well known them, he had never been able to judge what advantage it was to the Roman army to seize upon that hill, nor could he have been able to discern at such distance, whether that hill were accessible or no. And when he had once gotten there upon it, having a mind to depart and return again to the Consell, being environed round with enemies, he would never have been able so far off to spy out the passages to escape thence, and discern which places were guarded by the enemy, so that it must be of necessity, that Decius had a very exact knowledge, whereby he brought it to pass that by the taking of that hill



hill, the Roman Army was delivered, and afterwards he himself (being besieged) knew how to find a way of escape both for himself and those that were with him.

## CHAP. XL.

*How deceit is commendable, used against the enemy in time of war.*

**H**OWEVER that the use of fraud in any action be detestable, yet in the managing of a war it is a thing laudable and glorious, and he is as much praise, that vanquishes the enemy by deceit, as he that overcomes him by force. And this we see, by the judgment of those that write the lives of great personages, who commend Hannibal and others, who have been very notable in such like ways of proceeding. Whereof because there are many examples every where obvious, I will not add any. I will say this only, that I mean not, that that fraud is glorious, which causes thee to breake thy faith given, and agreements made: for that, though it may sometimes gain thee a state or Kingdom, as formerly hath been said, yet will it never get thee any glory. But I speak of such a deceit, which is put in practise against such an enemy that trusts not in thee, and that consists properly in matter of war as was that of Hannibal, when at the lake of Trasimene he feigned a flight, whereby he might have inclosed the Consul and the Roman Army; and when to escape out of Fabius Maximus's hand, he tied flaming fire brands to the horns of his whole herd of oxen. The like un-

so which was that, which *Pontius* the Samnites General practised to shut in the Roman Army at the gallows of *Caudium*, where having placed his army behind the mountains, he sent many of his soldiers clad like shepherds with much carrel through the plain, and they being taken by the Romans, and required of where the Samnites army was, agreed all, according to the order received from *Pontius*, to say that it was gone to the siege of *Nocera*. Which thing the Consuls believing, gave them opportunity to shut them up in those precipices of *Caudium*, wherein as soon as they entred, they were presently besieged by the Samnites; and this victory gained by fraud, would have proved very glorious to *Pontius*, if he had followed his fathers counsel, who advised either to set the Romans freely at liberty, or put them all to the sword, and in no case take the middle way.

*Quæ neque amicos  
parat, neque inimi-  
cos tollit.*

*Which neither gaires friends, nor takes  
foes out of the way. Which middle  
way was always pernicious in mat-*

*ters of state, as otherwhere it hath formerly  
been said.*

## CHAP. XLI.

*That the defence of ones country ought to be under-  
taken, either with ignominy, or with glory, or  
whatsoever way it be done, it is well defended.*

**T**HE Consul and the Roman Army, as is a-  
bove said, were besieged by the Samnites,  
who having propounded to the Romans ex-  
ceeding dishonorable terms, as was that to  
make them go under the gallows, and send  
them

them without Arms to Rome; and hereupon the Consuls standing amazed, and the whole army in despair, *Lucius Lentulus* the Roman Lieutenant said, that, as he thought, no conditions were to be refused to save their country: for the safety of Rome consisting in the life of that Army, he thought it good to save it in any case: and that the Country is well defended, by what means soever it be, either with disgrace, or with glory: for that Army being saved, Rome might in very good time cancel all that ignominy; but in case it were not saved, however it should dye gloriously. Rome and her liberty was utterly lost, and so his advise was followed. Which thing deserves well to be noted by any Citizen that chanceth to be called to counsel his country: for where the deliberation is wholly touching the safety of the country, there ought no consideration to be had of just or unjust, pitiful or cruel, honorable or dishonorable, but rather all other respect being laid aside, that course is to be taken which may preserve the life and maintain the liberty thereof, which thing is followed by the sayings and deeds of the French, in defence of the Majesty of their King, and the power of their Kingdoms; for they heat nothing with more impatience, then that it should be said Such a course was dishonorable to their King; for say they, their King cannot suffer dishonor in any resolution taken by him, either in prosperous or adverse fortune: for whether he wins or loses, they commend the action, and say it was done like a King.

## CHAP. XLII.

*Promises extorted by force, ought not to be kept.*

**W**Hen the Consuls were return'd to Rome with their disarm'd army, and the disgrace which was put upon it, the first that spake in the Senate, that the peace made at *Candium* should not be observ'd, was the Consul *S. Posthumius*, saying that the people of *Rome* was not tied thereunto, but that he himself indeed was bound, and the rest that had promis'd the peace; and therefore the people if they would free themselves from all eyes, were to yeeld up him and the rest that had promis'd it with him into the *Samnites* hands: and this conclusion he held with such obstinacy, that at length the Senate was content therewith, and so sending him and the others to *Samnium*, protested to the *Samnites* that the peace was of no force. And in this case so favourable was fortune to *Posthumius*, that the *Samnites* held him not; and when he was returned to *Rome* among the *Romans*, he was more glorious by his loss, then *Pentius* was among the *Samnites* by his conquest. Where two things are to be noted. The one is, that in what action soever glory may be gotten; for in victory it is ordinarily gain'd, but in loss it is obtained either by shewing that loss came not by thy default, or by the achievement of some valorous action which may cancell it. The other is: that it is no dishonour to violate those promises which by force thou wert constrain'd to make; and always promises extorted regard-  
ing

ing the publick, when there is want of strength, shall be broken, and that without the disgrace of him that breaks them. Wherefore in all histories we read several examples, and every day in these moderne times we see many of them; and, not only among Princes, promises forc'd when they want strength, are not kept, but also all other promises are not observed, when the occasions faile that mov'd them to promise. Which if it be a thing commendable or no, or whether suchlike ways are to be followed by a Prince or no, it is at large disputed by us in our treaty concerning a Peince, so that for this present we shall not touch it.

## CHAP. XLIII.

*Those men that are bred in the same country, do throughout all ages keep very near the same nature and disposition.*

**W**He men are wont to say (and not by chance nor without reason) that he who will see what shall be, let him consider what hath been: for all things in the world at all times have their very incounter with the times of old. Which comes to pass, because those things are wrought by men, who were always & are subject to the same passions; & therefore follows it of necessity, that they take the same effect. It is true, that their actions sometimes in this province are more vertuous, then those in that, & so sometimes in that more then in this, according to the forme of their education, wherein those people have taken their manner of living. It gives a facility also in the knowledge of future things by those that are  
Y 3 past,

past, to see one Nation a long time hold the same customes and conditions, being either alwayes covetous, or always treacherous, or having some other such vice or vertue. And whosoever shall read the things past belonging to our City of Florence, and consider also what hath happened in the latter times, shall finde the Germans and French very covetous, proud, cruel, and unfaithful: for in all these four, several times have they much wronged our City. And touching their small faith, every one knows monies were given to King Charles the 8. of France, and he promised to render the Cittadels of Pi'a, and yet he never did it. Wherein that King manifested his small faith, and much avarice. But let us pass over these matters of late memory. Everyone may well have heard of that which followed in the war that the Florentines had with the Vicounts of Milan: when Florence being deprived of all other expedients, thought to bring the Emperour into Italy, by his reputation and forces to assail Lombardy. The Emperour promised to bring a good Army with him, and undertake that war against the Vicounts, and defend Florence against their whole power, in case that at his rising up in arms the Florentines would pay him an hundred thousand ducates, and at his arrival in Italy another hundred thousand; to which agreements the Florentines consented, and having made the first paiement, and afterwards the second, he came onely to Verona, and thence returned back again, having not done any thing in their behalf, blaming them, as if it were their fault, for not having observed the conditions between them. So that if Florence had not been either constrained by necessity, or overcome by passion,

sion, and had read and known the ancient customs of the Barbarians, she would never have been neither this time, nor many other times deceived by them, they having behaved themselves always after one manner, and in every part, and with every one used the same terms, as it appears they formerly did to the Tuscans, who being oppressed by the Romans, by reason they had been several times put in flight by them and routed, and seeing that by their own forces alone they were not able to make resistance, they agreed with the French, who dwelt on this side the Alps in Italy, to give them a sum of money, to oblige them to joyn their Armies with them, whereby to make head against the Romans. Whereupon it followed, that they having taken the monies, would not afterwards take arms for them, saying these they had received, not to make war upon their enemies, but that they should forbear to forrage the country of Tuscany. And thus the Tuscans through the covetousness and small truth of the French, were bereft of their monies and left without the succors they expected from them. Inasmuch as we see by this example of the ancient Tuscans, and that of the Florentines, that the French have continually used the same terms: and hereby may it easily be conjectured, what trust Princes can repose in them.

## CHAP. XLIV.

By sudden surprisall and boldness many times more  
is obtained, then by ordinary means can be  
gotten.

**T**He Samnites being invaded by the Romans,  
and their army unable to stand in the field  
against them, determin'd having left their  
Towns well guarded in Samnium, to pass with  
their whole Army into Tuscany, which then had  
made truce with the Romans, to try with that  
passage, if by the presence of their Army they  
could induce the Tuscans to take armes again:  
which they had denied to their Ambassadors;  
and in the parly the Samnites had with the Tus-  
cans (shewing what principally moved them  
to take armes) they used a notable terme, where

Rebellasse quod per  
servientibus gravior  
quam liberis bellum  
esset.

they said, *They had rebelled, be-  
cause hence was more grievous to  
these in subjection, then was war  
to them that enjoy their liberty.*

And so partly by perswasions, partly by the  
presence of their army, they wrought them to  
take armes. Where it is to be noted, that when  
any Prince desires to obtain any thing of ano-  
ther, he ought (if the occasion will bear it)  
never give him time to advise himself, but car-  
ry the matter so, that he may see the necessity  
of his sudden resolution, which is, when  
he that is required, perceives that by his deni-  
all, or delay, there may arise a sudden and dan-  
gerous distaste. These termes were seen to  
have been well used by Pope Julius with the  
French



French, and by *De Foix* the French Kings General with the Marquess of *Mantua* for Pope *Julius* having a mind to expell the *Seni-volij* out of *Bolonia*; and to this purpose thinking he had need of the French forces, and that the *Venetians* should stand Newtralls; and having solicited the one and the other to this intent, but receiv'd from them a doubtful and various answer, resolv'd by not giving them leisure to bring them both to his bent. Whereupon parting from *Rome* with those forces he could put together, he went thence towards *Bolonia*, and to the *Venetians* he sent that they should continue Newtrers, and to the King that he should send him forces; so that they all being restrain'd by the small time they had, and considering that the Pope might with reason rake an open distast at either their delay or refusal, gave way to his will, and the King sent him aid, and the *Venetians* remain'd newtrers. *De Foix* also being with his Army in *Bolonia*, and having had notice of the rebellion of *Brescia*, and being desirous to go to recover it, had two ways, the one through the Kings own dominions long and tedious, the other short through the dominion of *Mantua*; and not only was he necessitated to pass through the dominions of that Marquess, but of force was to pass by certain sluces between marshy grounds and lakes, whereof that country is full, which with fortresses & other means were shut up, and guarded by him: whereupon *De Foix* having resolv'd to take the shorter passage, to overcome all difficulties, & give no time to the Marquess to deliberate, at the same instant brought his souldiers on that way, and signified to the Mar-

queſts that he ſhould ſend him the keys of the paſſage. So that the Marqueſs ſurpriſed by this ſudden reſolution, ſent him the keys, which he would never have done, if *De Fois* had carried himſelf more coolly in the matter, that Marqueſs being in league with the Pope and the Venetians, and having a ſon of his in the Popes hands, which things gave him many fair colours to deny him. But being aſſailed by the ſudden courſe taken (upon the reaſons already alledged) yeelded. So did the Tufcans with the Samnites, having upon the preſence of that Army of Samnium taken arms, which they had otherwiſe denied them.

---

#### C H A P. XLV.

*Which courſe is the better in a battel, either at the firſt to ſuſtain onely the enemies ſhock, and reſerve ſome forces till the latter end to give them a blow withall, or elſe as upon the main to venture all upon the fury of the firſt onſet.*

**D***Ecius* and *Fabius* the Roman Conſuls were in the field with two armies againſt the Samnites and Tufcans, and coming to the ſkirmiſh and to joyn battel together, it is worth the noting in that ſervice, which of thoſe ways of proceeding, practiſed by thoſe two Conſuls, were the better: for *D-* with all his force and violence aſſailed the enemy, *Fabius* only held them up, judging the ſlow aſſault to be of more advantage, reſerving his blow till the laſt, when the enemy ſhould have loſt his firſt heat of fight, or rage (as  
some

some terms it) where we see by the success that follow'd, that *Fabius* his design took effect better, then that of *Decius*, who tir'd himself so in the first onset, that seeing his souldiers ready to turne their faces, to attain to that glory by death which by victory he could not, in imitation of his father, he sacrific'd himself for the Roman Legions. Which thing when *Fabius* understood, that he might gain no less glory by living, then his Colleague had gotten by dying, put forward all these forces, which he had reserv'd for the last pinch, whereby he carried away a very happy victory. From hence is it evident, that *Fabius* his manner of proceeding is the more secure and warrantable.

## CHAP. XLVI.

*Whence proceedes it, that one family in a City holds a long time the same manners and disposition.*

IT seems that not only one City hath certain ways and orders different from those of another City, and breeds men either more hardy or more effeminate, but in the same City we see the same difference among families: which we find to be true in every City: and in Rome we reade of many examples to this purpose: for we see the *Manlij* were hard and obstinate men, the *Publicoli* courteous and lovers of the people, the *Appij* ambitious and enemies of the commonalty, and so many other families have had their qualities differing one much from the other. Which thing cannot proceede from the

Elcodd

blood only, for that must needs alter by reason of the variety of marriages; but it must come from the education, which one family hath diverse from another. For it avails much, that a youth from his tender years begins to relish well or ill any one thing: for of necessity it must make an impression, and thereupon give a rule to his manner of proceeding all the dayes of his life: and were not this so, it would be impossible that all the *Appij* should have had the same will, and been led by the same passions, as *T. Livius* remarques in many of them: and for the last, one of them being made Censor, and his Colleague at the end of eighteen moneths having (as the law order'd it) depos'd his magistracy, *Appius* would not depose his, saying that he might hold his yet five years, according to the first law ordain'd by the Censors. And however hereupon many speeches were made, and many tumults were caus'd; yet was there no helpe to make him lay it down, maugre the people and the greater part of the Senate. And whosoever reads the oration he made against *P. Sempronius* Tribune of the people, shall note upon that occasion all the *Appian* insolences, and the goodness and humanity used by many other Citizens in obedience of the laws and in their love to their Country.

---

## CHAP. XLVII.

*That a good Citizen for the love of his country  
ought to forget all private wrongs.*

**M** *Anlius* the Consul was imployed with an Army against the *Samnites*, and he having been wounded in a battell, and the Army therefore running some hazard, the Senate judg'd it necessary to send *Papirius Cursor* thither for Dictator, to supply the want of the Consul; and there being a necessity that the Dictator should be nam'd by *Fabius* who was then in *Tuscany* with an Army, and doubting that, because he was his enemy, he would not name him, the Senators sent him two Ambassadors to intreate him, that laying aside all private differences for the publick goods sake he would name him. Which *Fabius* did, moved by the love he bore his Country; howbeit by his silence, and many other signes, he shewed that nomination pressed him much. Whereof all those, that would be thought good Citizens, ought take example.

## CHAP. XLVIII.

*When we see the enemy commit a great error,  
we ought to believe there is some treachery  
in the business.*

**F** *Ulvius* remaining Lieutenant in the Army which the Romans had in *Tuscany*, for that the Consul was gone to Rome by reason

reason of some ceremonies there, the *Tuscans* to see if they could draw this man forth, laid an ambuscado near the *Romans* campe, and sent some soldiers clad like shepherds with good store of cattel, and caused them to come in sight of the *Roman* army, who so disguised came near their very trenches, whereupon the Lieutenant marvelling at this their presumption, not thinking it a thing reasonable, found such an expedient as discovered the deceit, and so the *Tuscans* plot was spoiled. Here it may fitly be noted, that the commander of an army ought not to give much credit to an error, which he plainly sees the enemy run into: for there will alwaies be some treachery lurking, it being not a thing reasonable that men should be so unwary. But oftentimes the desire of victory so blinds mens eyes, that they can see nothing else, but what they think makes all for their advantage. The Frenchmen having overcome the *Romans* at *Alia*, and coming to *Rome*, and finding the gates open, and without guard, stayed all that day, and the next night, without entring in, fearing some treachery, and not possibly beleeving, there could be such cowardise and so small understanding in the *Romans*, as utterly to abandon their Country. When in the year 1508 the *Florentines* besieged *Pisa*, *Alphonso del Mutola*, a Citizen of *Pisa*, was then the *Florentines* prisoner, and promised if he were set free that he would open a gate of *Pisa* to the *Florentine* army, whereupon he had his liberty; afterwards as if it had been to put the matter in execution, he came many times to treat with the commissaries Deputies, but came not privately nor by stealth, but openly and accompanied by  
some

Some *Pisans*, who stood aside, while he talked with the *Florentines*: so that a man might well have guest at his double heart: for there was no probability, that if the end of this practice had been faithfully intended, as it was promis'd, it should ever have been so openly treated. But the desire the *Florentines* had to be masters of *Pisa*, did so blind them, that by his order coming to the gate of *Lucca*, they left there divers of their Captains and many others, to their great dishonour, by meanes of the said *Alphonsoes* double dealing, with them.

## CHAP. XLIX.

*A Republick, if one would preserve it free, hath every day need of provision of new orders, and in regard of his good deserts that way Fabius was term'd Maximus.*

There is a necessity (as it hath been said somewhere) that every day in a vast City such accidents happen as have need of the Physician: and according as they are of more consequence, so have they need of the wiser Physician. And if in any City the like accidents ever happen'd, it was in *Rome*, where there fell out both strange and unexpected, as was that, when it seemed, that all the *Roman* dames had conspir'd to kill their husbands: so many were there that had poisoned their husbands, and so many that had prepared the poyson to give their husbands. Such like also was that conspiracy of the *Baccanalls*, which was discovered in the time of the *Macedonian* wars, wherein were intrangled many thousands of men and women: and had it not been revealed, it would

would have proved very dangerous for that City, or else if the *Romans* had not been accustomed to chastise a whole multitude of offenders: for were there not other exceeding many evident tokens to shew forth the greatness and magnificence of that Republick, and power of her executions, yet would it sufficiently appear by the quality of the punishment she imposed on the offenders. She never stood upon it, to put to death by way of justice a whole legion at once, and a whole City, and to confine eight or ten thousand men, with extraordinary hard conditions, had it been to one man alone, much more to so many. As it befell those soldiers, who had fought unfortunately at *Carna*, whom she confined to *Sicily*, and layd this on them, that they should never lodge in any Townes, and should always care standing. But of all the other execution, the most terrible was that decimation of armies, where by lot throughout a whole army one of ten was put to death. Nor could there, to chastise a whole multitude, a more horrible punishment be found: for when a multitude offends, where the author is not certain, all cannot suffer, because they are too many: and to punish one part, and let the other go scotfree, were to wrong those they should punish, and those that escaped free would be encouraged to offend another time. But to put to death the tenth part by lot, when all deserve it, he that suffers, blames his evill fortune: and he that escapes, is afraid leass that another time the lot may fall on him, and so is wary not to offend. Those empoisoners then & Bacchanalls were punished as their offences deserved. And however these diseases in a republick produce evill effects,



sects, yet are they not deadly: for that almost alwayes there is time given to correct them; but there is hardly any leasure in those that regard the state, which unless they fall under the hand of some wise man, ruine the City. There was in Rome, by reason of the liberality the Romans used in bestowing the Burgeouship & freedom of their City upon strangers, so many new people borne, that they began to have such a part in the suffrages, that the government began to vary, and parted with those things and from those men, by whom it was accustomed to walke. Which *Q. Fabius*, who was then Censor, perceiving, he placed all these new people upon whom this disorder depended, under four Tribes, to the end that being reduced into so small spaces they might not corrupt the whole City of Rome. This thing was well understood by *Fabius*, and by him was there a convenient remedy applied, without much change: which was so well accepted by the City, that they always after gave him the title of *Maximus*.

---

*Nicolas Machiavel to Zanbino Buonellmontana  
and Cosmus Rucellayus Gent.*

I Send you a present, which if it answers not my obligations to you, yet certainly is the greatest that *Nicolas Machiavel* could commend unto you: for herein I have expressed what I know, and what I have learned by a long experience, and continual reading of the affairs of the world. And being that neither you nor any body else can look for more of me, you have no reason to complain,

plain, I have given you no more. Well may you be sorry at the feebleness of my understanding, being that these relations of mine here are but weake, and at the error of my judgment, being that I my self several times in my discourses am deceived. Which being so, I know not which of us is the less beholding the one to the other, either I to you, who have forced me to write that which of my own self I should never have undertaken: or you to me, who have given you but smal satisfaction in my writings. Receive this then so, as things should be taken by friends, where more regard is had to the good will of him that sends, then to the worth of what is sent. And believe that herein I have one alone satisfaction, when I think that, however perchance I may have erred in many circumstances herein, in this alone I know I have not fail'd in making choise of you to whom before all others I may dedicate these my discourses, partly because in thus doing I have shewed some thankfulness for the good turnes you have done me, and partly for that me thinks I have quit the common custome of those that write, who use alwayes to dedicate all their works to Princes; and blinded by ambition, and covetousness, attribute to him the commendations of all vertuous qualities, whereas they ought to blame him for what is faulty in him. Whereupon, that I may not run into this error, I have made choice, not of those that are Princes, but of those that for their many good parts might deserve well to be so; nor of those that are able to bestow preferments, honours, nor wealth upon me, but of those who though they are not powerful, yet are they willing to do well for me:

for

for men, if they would carry a right judgment, should esteem of those that in themselves are, and not of those that have the means to be liberrall; and so of those that understand how to governe, and not of those that without understanding have the government of a kingdom. And writers commend rather *Hieron of Siracusa* when he was a private man, then *Perse of Macedon*, when he was a King: For *Hieron* wanted nothing else of being a Prince, then a Principality: that other had no part of a King but a Kingdome. Enjoy therefore that good or that evill which you your selves have desired; and if you shall continue still in this error, that these my opinions be accepttable to you, I shall not faile to proceed in the rest of the story, as in the beginning I made my promise.

---

FINIS.

---